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C H U N H U N G L I N * 
Developing Countries and the Practicality of Multilateral 
Investment Agreements on Telecommunications 
Abstract. During the past few decades, foreign investment has rapidly increased worldwide 
and has enhanced economic growth in developing countries. Although foreign investment 
brings huge economic benefits, many developing countries fear that by opening up markets to 
competition and foreign investment without restriction, they will lose control of their strategic 
industries. Among those industries, telecommunications is a sector with substantial impact and 
influence on national security, social stability and economic development. Therefore, the 
balance between economic gains from foreign investment and national telecommunications 
sovereignty presents a challenging task. A proposed international investment agreement has 
been negotiated in international community to possibly solve many of the disputes between 
foreign investment and national sovereignty. However, is foreign investment a necessary 
mechanism for developing countries to promote their economic growth? With different 
developmental models and a myriad of different economic difficulties, is a uniform global 
investment instrument suitable to meet the different demands for developing countries? This 
article will examine current international investment regime and their relation with tele-
communications as an influence in developing countires. Assessing these crtitical issues, this 
article hopes to find a new poisition for telecommunications in a formingly integrated global 
market. 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 
Developing Countries, Telecommunications, Technology Transfer, Markets Competition, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
I. Introduction 
Telecommunications sector plays a dual role in economic activities, not only 
itself a distinct circle in economic system but also a supplying mean for other 
sectors. Having this kind of special characters, telecommunications cover 
and relate to many other industrial and economic sectors such as manufacture, 
entertainment, and communication sectors. Foreign investment has been one 
Scientiae Juridicae Doctor, Counsel of law; LL.M., SJD, Golden Gate University, 
San Francisco, USA; LL.B. National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. This article is 
specially dedicated to the memory of my dear mother, Mrs. Hsu, Hsiu-Chin. 
E-mail: jasonlin626@yahoo.com.tw 
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of the most important driving force in the exploration of natural resources 
and improvement of economic conditions in underdeveloped and developing 
countries for centuries. Recently, foreign investment has not only increased 
rapidly but also covered a wide spectrum of industries around the world. The 
role of foreign investment has played a more and more important role in the 
world's economy. Generally speaking, foreign investment money will spur 
economic growth and create a better living standard in the newly invested countries. 
From an economic standpoint, international investment mutually benefits both 
sides of the investing and invested countries; however, there is still not an 
international investment regime or thorough international agreement that 
fairly addresses both sides. Although foreign investment brings abundant funds 
and advanced technology, many developing countries fear that by opening up 
their markets to competition without any restriction, they will be forfeiting 
economic guiding power and lose control of strategic industries. 
Among FDI, telecommunications is one of the most strategic industries of 
national economic control. Even though foreign investments on telecommuni-
cations will bring advanced technological skills, large amount of funds, as well 
as market competition and will benefit national telecommunications develop-
ment, many countries guide policy and legal requirements to control foreign 
investment to correspond to their economic and developmental demands. Tele-
communications have a substantial and important influence on national security, 
social stability and economic development, as well as many industrial sectors. 
Due to its particular character, telecommunication industries are often state-
operated and monopolized in many countries. Therefore, the balance between 
economic gains from foreign investment and national telecommunications 
sovereignty presents a challenging task. 
This article will be divided into four parts to discuss business aspect of 
telecommunications on investment. This article will examine international 
investment regimes including the meaning of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), and their relation 
with telecommunications as an influence in the global economic market. From 
the standpoint of foreign investment, this article hopes to find a new poisition 
for telecommunications in a formingly integrated global market. 
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II. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Telecommunications 
1. Meaning and Economic Benefits of FDI 
Over the past two decades, FDI has been one of the most important driving 
forces for the world's economic growth. According to the US Department of 
Commerce, FDI is a direct investment which "implies that a person in one country 
has a lasting interest in, and a degree of influence over the management of, a 
business enterprise in another country."1 The US Commerce Department defines 
FDI as "ownership or control by a foreign person of 10 percent or more of an 
enterprise's voting securities or the equivalent", which is deemed enough to 
influence management decisions.2 At a Global Investment Forum hosted by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development3 (UNCTAD), it was 
reported that "there was a strong feeling among ministers from some developing 
countries that more research and analysis was needed about the critical issues 
at stake in a multilateral framework on investment... and many speakers stressed 
the complexity of the issues related to the effects of economic policy liberalization 
on the quantity, quality and distribution of FDI, and its impact on development."4 
Requiring sufficient economic information and abundant funds, foreign invest-
ment is always accompanied by higher risks. With such risks, foreign investment 
also comes with the possibility of much greater returns. Traditionally, foreign 
investment has been very closely related either with trade or with an international 
development agency. Most current foreign investment thus has either been the 
result of someone taking a huge risk or the result of an international organization 
such as the World Bank underwriting that risk. Meanwhile, international 
developmental agencies often pursue the more enlightened goal of helping 
countries develop properly rather than seeking the greatest return.5 
1
 US Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: 1992 Benchmark Survey, M-3. 
:
 Ibid, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: 1992 Benchmark Survey, M-3. 
1
 Established in 1964, the UNCTAD aims at the development-friendly integration of 
developing countries into the world economy. UNCTAD is the focal point within the United 
Nations for the integrated treatment of trade and development and the interrelated issues in 
the areas of finance, technology, investment and sustainable development. Source available 
on http://www.unctad.org 
4
 Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development—Lessons from Six Emerging 
Economies; This report was presented at an OECD-DNME Workshop on Foreign Direct 
Investment held in Mexico City 1997. The information has been updated up 1998. 
5
 S tan Ng: "Background Information on the Multilateral Agreement on Trade"', see 
http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~sustain/issueguides/MAI/MAI-Background.htm 
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The benefits of foreign investment include promoting economic growth, 
technology transfer and job-creation in the local economies. It is assumed that 
exports would increase since a large part of exports is comprised of shipments 
from domestic companies to their foreign affiliates. Technology transferred 
from foreign investment projects will improve the efficiency of local firms as 
well. These effects become the major attractions for developing and under-
developed countries seeking foreign investment.fi In addition, FDI can serve 
to integrate domestic markets into the global economic system far more 
effectively than could have been achieved only by traditional trade flows. The 
benefits from FDI will be enhanced in an open investment environment with a 
democratic trade and investment regime, active competition policies, macro-
economic stability and privatization and deregulation.7 Under such conditions, 
FDI can play a key role in improving the capacity of a country to correspond to 
global economic integration and future national developmental strategies. In 
practice, the greater the openness and freedom toward FDI, the more economic 
reforms and potential benefits that receiving countries will reap.8 
2. Policy Requirements of FDI and Multinational Enterprises 
Although FDI implicitly brings large economic benefits and potentially attracts 
numerous business opportunities, many countries are only partially open to 
foreign investment or even refuse business with foreign enterprises. Those 
countries believe they will be losing the control power over the local economy 
by inviting foreign investment. They often use performance requirements such 
as exporting requirements or technology transfer agreements to control the 
categories and sizes of FDI. For many countries, performance requirements on 
foreign investment were considered necessary and desirable to ensure that the 
activities of foreign capitals are consonant with local countries' developmental 
strategies.9 The same decline in effectiveness can be seen in terms of policies 
designed to maximize the potential benefits from inward investment. However, 
since it has been acknowledged that FDI can stimulate economic growth and 
national development, there remains a tremendous diversity in countries' 
6
 Sforza, M.—Nova, S.—Weisbrot, M.: Writing the Constitution of a Single Global 
Economy: A Concise Guide to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment—Supporters' and 
Opponents' Views, also see http://www.preamble.org/MAI/maioverv.html 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 See http://www.preamble.org/MAI/maiweb.html 
Thompson, H. В.: Investing in the Global Information Infrastructure. Telecom '99 
Keynote Panel: Investing in Communications Companies: Geneva, 1999. 
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approaches on their policies towards FDI. Countries can also screen incoming 
investment and retain control on foreign participation in particular sectors.10 
Those measures are designed to certify local government can still retain the 
final decision on economic policies and ensure foreign investment will not 
cause negative effects on national development. 
Due to the increase of international trade and the advent of internationali-
zation, more and more industrial firms from different countries are expanding 
their business scale through foreign direct investment, and these cross-nation 
companies have gradually formed as multinational enterprises (MNEs). Different 
from traditional small-scale foreign investment, direct investment by MNEs 
has the potential to restructure local industries rapidly and to transform local 
economies into prodigious exporters of manufactured goods or services to the 
global market." Targeted at huge benefits of the international market, almost 
all economies now compete to attract huge investments from those MNEs. 
Integration with the global economy does not merely come through direct 
exports from foreign-owned companies, but it also derives from the presence 
of foreign MNEs in sectors providing goods and services to exporters. As 
foreign affiliates of MNEs become more oriented toward the global market and 
less dependent on the domestic market, and as the number of countries eager 
to attract FDI grows, the tolerance of foreign investors for barriers and 
restrictions on their operations is likely to be much less than in the past.12 
When more and more economies tend to compete for FDI and MNEs, foreign 
investors now consider not only economic conditions of invested countries such 
as the location of natural resources or labor force, but also local economic 
policies. Other relatively new factors include whether distort investment exist, 
where corporations are chartered, and how real estate and other fixed assets are 
regulated. Under this trend, the policy requirements of FDI gradually deregulated 
in many countries and a more open attitude toward FDI has been adopted. 
3. Arguments about FDI in the Global Economy 
The economic problems of underdeveloped and developing countries are funda-
mentally different from those of developed countries and require different 
measures and policies. Since the 1950s, it was recognized that "late industria-
lization countries" required even greater protection and state intervention 
than even the most developed countries had relied upon during their early 
10
 Ibid. 
1
 See http://www.0ecd.0rg/daf/cmis/fdi/fdisix.htm#execsum 
12
 Ibid., also see supra note Thompson, 1999. 
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development.13 For underdeveloped or developing countries, FDI would 
undermine many of their development strategies and developmental processes. 
For example, in Mexico, most people seemed to be economically better off 
under a more authoritarian regime.14 Prior to international trade and investment 
liberalization, Mexican economic growth was fairly rapid, at a real per capita 
rate of 3.9% in the 1960s and 3.2% in the 1970s. Since the 1980s, after 
liberalization began, per capita income has stagnated and real wages have 
actually fallen.15 Economists have pointed out that the instability of inter-
national financial markets was a major cause of the previous 1994 financial 
crisis in Mexico.'6 The effect of such disinvestments with Mexico, therefore, 
should be questioned whether or not the deregulation of international capital 
flows is in the best interest of "emerging market" economies.17 
Likewise, in South Korea, many economic regulations that were prohibited 
by the national treatment provisions were essential to economic growth and 
development. The Korean government used measures like subsidized credits, 
tax and tariff exemptions and export subsidies to intervene against foreign invest-
ment. They targeted industries such as cement, fertilizer, steel, chemicals, and 
consumer goods, etc. FDI was restricted and played a minimal role in South 
18 
Korea's industrialization and economic development. After Asia's financial 
crisis in 1997, the IMF required the Korean government to take measures for 
internationalization and deregulation, including the removal of a number of 
restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic stocks and bonds, residents' 
ownership of foreign assets, and overseas borrowing by domestic financial and 
non-financial institutions.14 The sharp reduction in government planning and 
industrial policy has caused problems such as overcapacity in the petrochemical 
20 
industry, over-investment, and corporate failures in industries." Meanwhile, the 
13 
Gerschenkron, A.: Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of 
Essays. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. 14
 See Maddison, A.: Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, 1995, 78-79. 
y id. 
Calvo, G.—Mendoza, E.: Reflections on Mexico's Balance of Payments Crisis: A 
Chronicle of a Death Foretold. Journal of International Economics, 1995, 235. 
17
 See supra note Weisbrot, 1998. 
18
 See Westphal, L.: Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from 
South Korea's Experience. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 3, Summer 1990, 
41-59. 
14
 Chang, Ha—Joon, Hong—Jae Park—Chul Gyue Yoo: 1998. Interpreting the Korean 
Crisis-—Financial Liberalization, Industrial Policy, and Corporate Governance. Draft of 
forthcoming article in Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No. 6, 9-14. 
20
 See supra note Chang, Ha—Joon, Hong—Jae Park—Chul Gyue Yoo, 1998. 
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1997 Asia Financial Crisis, one of the world's worst economic crises since the 
Great Depression. The crisis engulfed much of Asia including South Korea, 
Thailand, and Indonesia caused by the set-off of hot money prior to August 1997, 
and then a true panic when the Thai baht began to fall. The liberalization of 
international investment was struck by the Asian financial crisis and economists 
pointed out that the liberalization of international borrowing and investing in 
those countries over the last decades created the instability from which the 
crisis was born. One economist has noted, "The Asian crisis cannot be 
separated from the excessive borrowings of foreign short-term capital as Asian 
economies loosened up their capital account controls and enabled their banks 
and firms to borrow abroad. It has become apparent that crises attendant on 
capital mobility cannot be ignored."21 The reversal of capital flows amounting 
to eleven percent of the regional GDP was a result of foreign and domestic 
investors stampeding for the exits for fear of being caught with greatly 
depreciated local currency and assets.22 Economists who supported increasing 
deregulation of international investment have recently begun to concede that a 
large number of workers have indeed been hurt by such a process. On the other 
hand, foreign investors take into account all relevant information affecting 
asset returns when deciding their market positions and would be hard pressed 
23 
to explain future disinvestments from these countries. The OECD has just 
issued a report intended to make the case for international investment liberali-
zation where they contend that such negative impacts are "at most, modest".24 
4. Meaning of FDI on Telecommunications 
Foreign direct investment on telecommunications comprises the ability to 
establish a commercial presence in a foreign territory, or the purchase of 
telephone companies by foreign investors or joint ventures between local and 
foreign partners to establish new telecommunication service companies. 
Historically, the opportunities for foreign investment in the telecommunication 
services sector have been limited by the fact that most countries had state-
: l
 See Jagdish Bhagwati: The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets 
and Dollars, Foreign Affairs, 1998, 8. Jagdish Bhagwhati, one of the world's leading 
international economists and the Economic Policy Adviser to the Director-General of the 
GATT (1991-93). 
22
 Weisbrot, M., 1998: Globalization for Whom? Cornell International Law Journal, 
Symposium Issue, Vol. 31, No. 3. 
23
 See supra note Weisbrot, 1998. 
Open Markets Matter: The Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalization, OECD, 
1998, 11. 
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owned monopoly telecommunication carriers. Since 1984, however, forty-four 
Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) have been privatized raising 
159 billion US dollars with about one-third of this investment coming from 
25 
outside the home countries." Obviously, fueling the operation of old PTOs, 
foreign investment has gradually played a more important role in either domestic 
or international telecommunication market. For increasing the proportion of 
foreign investment on telecommunication sectors, foreign capital now has 
raised either through a share offering or the sale of a minority share of a PTO 
to foreign partners. Under the process of privatization of telecommunication 
industries, there are increasing numbers of opportunities for foreign investors 
to establish foreign subsidiaries or to combine with others in joint ventures.26 
On the other hand, because telecommunications covers many other industrial 
sectors including the sectors of manufacture, entertainment, and communication, 
it has a dual role as both a traded product and service, and as a facilitator of 
trade in other products and services. Liberal foreign investment on telecommu-
nications will promote more economic gains including new and improved 
telecommunication products and services with lower prices and additional 
investment on other industrial sectors. Opening foreign investment on the tele-
communication services sector should result in more competition, lowering 
prices for most businesses and for many consumers and providing both with a 
choice of different service providers.27 FDI brings not only new technology 
and developmental funds to telecommunications industries; it also brings 
innovation and competition for telecommunications providers. These positive 
effects promote the capacity of telecommunication in underdeveloped and 
developing countries and benefit the formation of "world village." 
5. FDI and Global Telecommunication Development 
Telecommunication development represents not merely expanding the number 
of telephone lines per hundred inhabitants, but it enhances the heightening 
of culture exchange, business opportunities, education promotion and new 
technology invention. However, many countries still have fewer than 10 
telephones per 100 inhabitants while about half of the population are waiting 
23
 Public Telecommunication Operators for Sale; Value of privatizations of PTO's, by 
region, 1984-1996 and over time, 1990-1996; ITU Telecommunication Privatizations 
Database. 
~
6
 1996/97 World Telecommunication Development Report, Trade in telecommuni-
cations, Executive Summary; also see http://www.itu.int/plweb-cgi/ 
27 
See supra note 1996/97World Telecommunication Development Report. 
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for a telephone, and the other half waiting for a dial tone. They live in rural and 
often isolated areas where most of the natural resources are located. Access to 
information and telecommunications is essential for development of such areas 
but is still inadequate or non-existing. It was reported that there are still 43 
million people on registered waiting lists for telephone connections in emerging 
28 
markets with the average waiting time longer than a year. By introducing 
foreign investment into those areas, waiting lists can be sharply reduced. At this 
point, the role of foreign investment on telecommunications is not a market 
competitor but a basic service provider. 
For most developing and developed countries, foreign investment on tele-
communications is not merely a provider for improvement of local telecommu-
nication equipments but also a driving force for telecommunication market 
competition and transformation. Seeing the huge benefits from foreign invest-
ment in telecommunications, a large portion of the world hopes to attract foreign 
investment to pursue a schedule of projects to improve the basic telecommuni-
cations infrastructure. First, to attract more foreign investment and making 
market competition, developing countries privatized their public telecommuni-
29 
cation operators at the start of the 1990s. By deregulating domestic tele-
communication regimes, it is expected that local telecommunication markets 
will be more efficient and attractive for foreign firms especially those MNEs. 
Second, to attract more foreign investment and to operate toward an integrated 
global economy, countries have to make more available high-speed data net-
works, cellular radio, mobile satellite services, Internet access and facsimile 
for foreign firms. By deregulating domestic telecommunication regimes and 
upgrading the level of telecommunication methods, these countries expect that 
FDI or MNEs would have more willingness to choose them as a base for future 
global telecommunications competition. In developed countries, they have con-
centrated more on recognizing telecommunications trends and have tried to 
satisfy the complex requirements of multinational enterprises. Both developed 
and developing countries face the same pressure to upgrade and diversify 
the telecommunications sector, but developing countries typically have less 
financial, technical and operational resources to do so, particularly in light of 
Integrated Rural Development and Universal Access; Brief description of ITU's 
Buenos Aires Action Plan Programme Nos. 9 & 12 (Valetta Action Plan Programme 3) 
1998; also see http://www.itu.int/ITU-D-UniversalAccess/reports/ PPstatus981016.htm 
24
 See supra note 1996/97 World Telecommunication Development Report. 
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an incomplete basic infrastructure.30 The best way to resolve this dilemma 
and to attract foreign investment for business and basic telecommunication 
infrastructure will be through upgrading the technology skill of the labor force 
and the privatization of public telecommunication regimes. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, telecommunications market reform has continued 
apace with developing countries such as the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand, 
and has opened up their markets to foreign investment. In Latin America, 
several countries that first privatized their domestic operators at the beginning of 
the decade are now preparing for a second round of market-openings. Even 
Africa, which has long been the last bastion of telecommunication monopolies, 
is leading the way by attracting foreign partners investing in their telecommuni-
31 
cation sectors." Foreign private investment has entered the developing markets 
through joint ventures with local telecommunication operators, the award of 
licenses to foreign companies, or the sale of equity stakes in state-owned tele-
communication entities to private foreign investors. Private investment was 
initially permitted mostly in value-added services, but increasingly, it is entering 
the basic services as well.32 
In Latin America and Africa, privatizations have been conducted through 
the sale of an equity interest in the company to foreign strategic investors such 
as France Telecom, Telekom Malaysia and SBC of USA.33 Privatization and 
increased foreign investment in telecommunication markets has resulted in 
substantial progress in meeting developing countries' basic telephony upgrading 
goals. It is also expected that market competition as a the provision of inter-
national and domestic telecommunication services will bring a significant 
reduction in prices and more parity between domestic and international tele-
phone services. Where markets have been liberalized, the level of investment, 
particularly foreign investment, has generally increased and telephony and net-
work development has proceeded more rapidly. This combination of competitive 
markets, private ownership and foreign investment has created an appropriate 
environment for next generation global telecommunications development. 
30 
Sir Maitland, D.: 'The Missing Link': Still Missing 8 Years Later? Proceedings of 
Seminar on Telecommunications and Its Role in Socio-Economic Development, ISBN 87-
984401-0-1, 5. (Copenhagen, 1992). 
" Dr. Tarjanne, P.: Telecommunications and World Development: Forecasts, Tech-
nologies and Services, ITU Forum ITA, Moscow, 1997. 
32
 Dr. Chasia, H.: Forum De Crans Montana, Deputy Secretary-General ITU; Session 
of Saturday 27th June Crans Montana, Switzerland, 1998. 
33
 See supra note Dr. Chasia, H.: Forum De Crans Montana. 
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6. FDI on Telecommunications and International Organizations 
The telecommunications sector is currently undergoing a transition from a 
global market system for telecommunication services that has been based on 
multilateral arrangements. This should foster a suitable international environ-
ment where investment and entrepreneurship can prosper, including the 
development of new forms of electronic commerce. For FDI in the Telecommuni-
cations sector, the WTO and ITU are two of the most important international 
organizations. The WTO agreement hopes to promote foreign and domestic 
investment in the telecommunication sector and, as a consequence, the develop-
ment of each country's telecommunication infrastructure and services.34 Under 
the WTO, GATS on Telecommunication which was concluded on February 
1997 and which entered into force on February 1998, commits 72 countries to a 
program of progressive opening of their basic telecommunication service markets 
to competition and increased foreign investment.35 Those agreeing countries 
made commitments to liberalize their telecommunication market and to open 
up to foreign investment in basic telecommunication services. That is, the 
provision of voice telephone, telex, telegraph, data transmission and privately 
leased circuits.36 
On the other hand, the ITU provides great benefits in terms of tele-
communication infrastructure construction and the development of information 
processing industries. The ITU allocates a global spectrum to particular services 
and manages scarce communications resources among countries that benefit 
trade liberalization and the prevention of discrimination between domestic and 
foreign suppliers. The ITU also promotes global telecommunication develop-
ment and plays the role of providing the information to let developing 
countries understand the benefits that liberalization and trade in telecommuni-
cations can bring, as well as the measures necessary to protect national 
interests.37 Both WTO and ITU encourage the development of global tele-
communication infrastructure and the formation of an integrated global tele-
communication market. Global telecommunication development tends to 
strengthen the leadership role of the private sector in the development of a 
44
 Second Draft of the Secretary-General's Report to the Second World Telecommuni-
cation Policy Forum on Trade in Telecommunications; ITU Geneva, 1997. 
35
 Third Draft Of The Secretary-General's Report To The Second World Tele-
communication Policy Forum on Trade in Telecommunications; ITU Geneva, 1998. 
36
 First Draft of the Secretary-General's Report to the Second World Telecommuni-
cation Policy Forum on Trade in Telecommunications; ITU Geneva, 1998. 
37
 See supra note Dr Tarjanne: Telecommunications and Trade. 
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diverse, affordable, and accessible information infrastructure around the world. 
Under this trend, it also hopes to promote the involvement of developing 
countries in the building and utilization of a truly global and open information 
infrastructure and facilitate activities and identify policy options that foster the 
effective global application of telecommunications, broadcasting, and infor-
mation technologies and services. 
7. FDI on Telecommunications and Economic Growth 
Investment in telecommunications is a prerequisite for broad based economic 
development. The dual role of telecommunications as both a traded service and 
a vehicle for trade in other service sectors means that price reductions, improve-
ments in the level of investment and the development of infrastructure and 
services brought about by liberalization should also have an impact on other 
sectors of the economy.34 In addition, efficient, low-cost telecommunication 
networks will provide the necessary platform for the growth of electronic 
commerce. The implementation of liberalized telecommunication investment 
should produce significant benefits not only within the country's telecommuni-
cation sector but also for the national economy as a whole. The opening of 
telecommunication markets has facilitated the entry of domestic and foreign 
private capital and technological skills that have in turn accelerated network 
build-out, the provision of new services and improvements in the quality of 
service. Market liberalization also has a profound effect in promoting develop-
ment in other sectors such as information technology and computing, which 
depend heavily on good, reliable and low-cost telecommunications. 
Economic development in these sectors indeed has been constrained in many 
countries because of the lack of an adequate telecommunication infrastructure to 
service them.40 Inadequate telecommunications also reduces efficiency throughout 
the economy, diminishes the effectiveness of investments and development 
programs, causes a comparative disadvantage in attracting investment, and lowers 
the quality of living standard as well as personal access to communication. 
The evidence leaves no doubt that there was indeed a correlation between 
economic development and investment on telecommunications.41 Throughout 
38
 See supra note Thompson, 1999. 
34
 See supra note Third Draft of the Secretary-General's Report to the Second World 
Telecommunication Policy Forum. 
y bid. 
Frieden, R. M.: Social, Logistical and Development Issues in The Global Infor-
mation Infrastructure. Penn State University, USA. 
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economic developmental history, telecommunication infrastructure has played 
an important role in supporting the economic development of counties. There 
are numerous documented examples about the direct relationship between 
investment in telecommunication infrastructure and economic growth. The 
growth of global telecommunication development will bring rapid expansion 
of new and advanced information services, attract more domestic and foreign 
investments, and improve economic development and global competitiveness, 
as well as a better living standard of health care and education. 
III. Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and Telecommunications 
The MAI is a new international investment agreement currently being 
negotiated at OECD that establishes rights for foreign investors. It is designed 
to make it easier for individual and corporate investors to move capital across 
international borders. The MAI is mainly based on the investment provisions 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and expands these 
provisions into all economic sectors in the 29 members of OECD. Non-
OECD members will also be asked to join this agreement. The major aim of 
the MAI is to ensure that foreign investment from individuals and multi-
national corporations can move capital in and out of countries without govern-
mental interference. 
1. Historic Overview - OECD and MAI 
a) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Founded in Paris, France, the OECD was originally established as the Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to help rebuild the European 
economies after World War П.43 In 1961, after economic reconstruction in 
Europe was mostly accomplished, USA, Canada and the European countries 
decided to form OECD in place of OEEC to serve as a forum to conduct 
research and negotiations on global trade and investment.44 Currently, there are 
29 members representing the most high-income countries in OECD. The 
4
~ See http://www.preamble.org/mai/bits.html 
43
 See http://www.oeed.org/about/origins/index.htm 
44
 See http://www.oeed.org/about/general/index.htm 
45
 See http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htm. OECD member states 
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, 
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OECD has previously created two codes on investment liberalization: the Code 
of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the Code of Liberalization of 
Current Invisible Operations.46 Unlike the UN, OECD is not a quasi-parliamen-
tary body, and has no supranational legal authority over individual members. 
Instead, OECD members have relied upon "peer pressure" to encourage 
compliance with the Codes.47 
b) Brief History of MAI Negotiations 
The seeds of the MAI can be traced back to the 1960s, when member countries 
adopted two binding OECD Codes on investment liberalization.48 Since 1995, 
formal discussions and negotiations were initiated at OECD, but the MAI was 
opposed by many developing countries.49 In 1997 OECD held a ministerial 
meeting to discuss the MAI and had set a deadline of May 1998 for completion. 
However, after several negotiations, the Ministers still could not complete the 
MAI by the deadline and had to delay further talks. At the end of 1998, French 
withdrawal from the latest round of discussions and the failure to make 
progress made the future of the MAI at OECD doubtful.30 It was believed that 
there was very little chance that the MAI negotiations would make further 
progress at OECD.51 
2. Future Development — WTO and MAI 
Since the demise of the MAI negotiations in the OECD, some supporters of the 
MAI model have stepped up efforts to move the negotiations to the WTO. In 
January 1999, the EU and Japan formally proposed that they would push the 
MAI negotiations into WTO to be completed by 2003.32 However, because a 
WTO agreement would likely be much weaker than the draft that was emerging 
at OECD, the US has currently opposed the MAI negotiations moving to the 
WTO.53 But if OECD process continues to falter, the US may accede to the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
46
 See http://www.preamble.org/mai/oeed.html 
47
 See http://www.preamble.org/mai/maihist.html 
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change in venue.54 Many developing countries and non-governmental organi-
zations have stated that WTO is neither democratic nor transparent and that an 
MAI in the WTO would be more unacceptable than in the OECD.55 There have 
been other attempts to suggest that future MAI negotiations may take place at 
the UNCTAD instead of OECD or WTO. UNCTAD is considered to be a better 
forum for developing countries, but critics still have charged that UNCTAD 
has tended to favor the interests of multinational corporations in recent years.56 
Many developing country members objected to the WTO intervention in 
the area of investment policies. The WTO prohibitions on Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures (TRIMS) require its members to eliminate certain policies that 
impose conditions on foreign investment. TRIMS is a precursor to the MAI 
and eliminates requirements that foreign investors use local materials or suppliers 
when doing business in developing countries. Full-fledged investment rules in 
WTO would prevent its members from adopting policy requirements designed 
to ensure that local businesses, workers and citizens enjoy the benefits of 
foreign investment.57 Unlike OECD that lacks the power to enforce regulations, 
WTO is an institution with dispute settlement instrument that addresses issues 
that many least-developed and developing countries worry about. Its appalling 
track record on the critical issues of labor rights, environmental and public 
health protection, and sovereignty and democratic accountability constitutes 
ample evidence that those countries will protest against an MAI negotiated 
under WTO auspices. In addition to WTO and UNCTAD, there are many 
venues where they are simultaneously pursuing similar agendas such as the 
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (ТЕР), and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.54 
3. Main Provisions of MAI 
The MAI is designed to ease the movement of capital—both money and 
production facilities—across international borders by limiting the power of 
54
 See http://www.preamble.org/mai/maiinwto.htm 
55
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58
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governments to restrict and regulate foreign investment. The investment 
provisions of MAI are based on those of NAFTA. Unlike NAFTA that only 
applies to the U.S., Mexico and Canada, the MAI will amplify and apply its 
provisions worldwide.60 
These basic rules of the MAI include61: 
National Treatment—It requires countries to treat foreign investors and 
investments no less favorably than domestic ones. Under National Treatment, 
countries may not place special restrictions on what foreign investors can own, 
or maintain economic assistance programs that solely benefit domestic 
companies or require that a corporation hire a certain percentage of managers 
locally.62 
Most Favored Nation—It requires governments to treat all foreign countries 
and all foreign investors the same with respect to regulatory laws. Laws 
prohibited by MFN would include economic sanctions that punish a country for 
human rights violations by preventing corporations from doing business there.63 
Limitations on Performance Requirements—Performance requirements are 
laws that require investors to invest in particular channels of a local economy 
or to meet social or environmental goals in exchange for market access. Under 
the MAI, these requirements would be banned where they discriminate against 
foreign investors.64 
A Ban on Uncompensated Expropriation of Assets—The MAI would require 
governments, when they deprive foreign investors of any portion of their 
property, to compensate the investors immediately and in full. Expropriation 
would be defined not just as the outright seizure of a property but would also 
include governmental actions "tantamount to expropriation." Thus, certain forms 
of regulation could be argued to be expropriation, potentially requiring 
governments to compensate investors for lost revenue.65 
A Ban on Restrictions on the Repatriation of Profits or the Movement of 
Capital—Countries could not prevent an investor from moving profits from 
60
 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: A "Bill of Rights" for International 
Investors? See http://www.preamble.org/mai/4-pager.html 
61
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the operation or sale of a local enterprise to that investor's home country. Nor 
could countries delay or prohibit investors from moving any portion of their 
assets, including financial instruments like stocks or currency. It ensures that 
corporations and individuals can move their assets more easily. However, 
there are some exceptions that will be made in the case of national financial 
66 
crises. 
Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution Mechanism—Under the MAI, it gives 
corporate or individual investors the right to sue local governments and seek 
monetary compensation in international court in the event that a law violates 
investor rights as established in the agreement. International investors would 
have the option to sue a country before an international tribunal rather than in 
the country's domestic courts. This investor-to-state dispute mechanism is a 
significant departure from previous international economic agreements like 
GATT, which allow only governments to bring complaints against other 
governments.67 
Moreover, the MAI includes "Roll-back" and "Standstill" Provisions68 that 
require nations to eliminate laws that violate MAI rules and to refrain from 
passing any such laws in the future. Currently, the MAI does not contain 
language on the responsibilities of corporations regarding treatment of employees, 
environmental protection, fair competition or other issues. There is discussion 
of including an existing OECD code of corporate responsibility in the MAI, 
but these provisions would be non-binding.69 
4. Differences between MAI and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are investment agreements negotiated by 
two countries to establish equal or preferential investment treatments for each 
other. Most BITs are signed by a developed and lesser-developed country. Unlike 
the BITs, the original MAI signatories are capital-rich countries and major 
exporters of international investment. Those countries can lever the dispute 
process to their advantage and challenge local governments' policies on 
health, safety and environment, etc. Under the MAI, the investor-state dispute 
mechanism will be exercised to challenge local regulatory regimes perceived by 
66
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67
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investors as onerous barriers to investment.70 In addition, the MAI will apply to 
more economic sectors than the BITs. The MAI's provision on expropriation goes 
further than that of the BITs, and could force local governments to compensate 
investors for regulations that cost investors money.71 The MAI will also ban a 
wider range of performance requirements than the BITs concern such as 
mandatory local job creation, mandatory joint ventures with local firms, and so 
72 
on. " Based on these differences, several critics have focused on the MAI's 
negative potential impacts on state sovereignty over economic development. 
5. Influences of MAI in Global Economy 
a) Arguments of MAI's Proponents 
The most prominent non-governmental proponents for the MAI are business 
groups. They claim that the agreement will provide needed protections for 
international investors against discrimination and expropriation, reduce the 
distortions and inefficiencies caused by excessive regulation, increase access 
to foreign markets on favorable terms and help businesses, consumers and 
workers. Increasing foreign direct investment will also benefit developing 
countries through the transfer of technology and improve the efficiency of the 
73 
global economy. The MAI will protect the rights of investors to free, equal 
and safe access to markets, and resolve the conflicts that are inevitable bet-
ween governments and transnational corporations (TNCs).74 Proponents also 
regard investment, like trade, as an engine of economic growth, employment, 
sustainable development and rising living standards in both developed and 
developing countries. The MAI would establish mutually beneficial interna-
tional rules that would not inhibit the nondiscriminatory exercise of regulatory 
powers by governments, and ensures such exercise of regulatory powers would 
not amount to expropriation.75 
b) Arguments of MAI's Opponents 
There are, however, substantial concerns of opponents against the MAI from 
a large numbers of environmental, labor, consumer, and women's organiza-
70
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tions.76 They claim that the MAI will accelerate an economic and environ-
mental "race to the bottom." This could hasten job flight from industrialized 
countries and increase the pressure on all countries to compete for investment 
capital by lowering wages, labor and living standards, as well as weakening 
environmental and consumer-safety standards. In addition, the MAI will allow 
investors to challenge legitimate regulatory safeguards that enjoy widespread 
public support but are viewed by investors as impediments to the free flow of 
capital.77 The MAI provides legal protections for the rights of investors, but 
imposes no obligation for investors regarding labor rights, environmental 
standards, or anti-competitive business practices. The MAI allows investors to 
sue governments for compensation if they believe that any national, or local 
law violates their rights or poses a barrier to investment. Based on this point, it 
will undermine national sovereignty by requiring the roll-back of laws that 
violate MAI rules. Many laws and policies that could be challenged are designed 
to protect the public interest such as local economic development programs, 
laws designed to conserve valuable natural resources or land, community 
78 
reinvestment laws, and bans on the production of dangerous products. 
Opponents have argued that the only real provision of the MAI is its 
nondiscriminatory basis for investors. Weighted toward business, it will cause 
difficulty for local governments to protect their environment, health, or safety 
of its citizens.79 The OECD also has been strongly criticized for its failure to 
include developing countries in negotiations. Developing countries, led by 
India, Egypt, Pakistan and Malaysia, have expressed strong suspicions and 
oppositions toward the MAI agreement and its presumed bias towards 
developing countries.80 The MAI would spell an end to boycotts and trade 
sanctions against countries or businesses violating environmental, labor, and 
human-rights standards.81 The MAI would make it more difficult to implement 
7fi
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Guerillas, Financial Times, 1998; and Drohan, M.: How the Net Killed the MAI. One World 
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these kinds of self-reinforcing actions in the future. ~ The MAI would also 
make it more difficulty for governments to prevent or regulate international 
mega-mergers like BP Amoco or Daimler-Chrysler that will the interests of 
multinational corporations ahead of the public interest.83 
Customarily, under international law, only countries have rights arising 
under the treaties they negotiate. The MAI creates rights that can be invoked 
directly by individuals or corporations, as a legitimate precedent for protecting 
very broad investor rights. A corporation need no longer persuade any govern-
ment of the legitimacy of its complaint before seeking enforcement under an 
agreement to which it is not even a party. Such panels would operate under 
international law and according to procedures established for resolving inter-
national disputes arising under commercial contracts, but not by local legal 
principles and procedures. These MAI procedures are in many ways antithetical 
to the principles of open, participatory and democratic decision-making that are 
the hallmarks of contemporary legal systems.84 
6. MAI and Telecommunications 
Unlike the GATS on telecommunication under the WTO, the MAI lacks any 
related regulations on telecommunications. In addition, the MAI is a proposal 
under negotiation; therefore, its influences on telecommunication industries are 
not yet visible. Due to the importance of information and communication, most 
telecommunication industries are state-operated and monopolized in many 
developing countries. Many developing countries fear that by opening up their 
markets to competition and foreign investment without restrictions will cause 
the loss of control of this strategic industry. The MAI forbids governments to 
compel foreign corporations to transfer technology. This rule will deprive 
developing countries of an avenue to access technology in telecommunications 
and reap economic benefits from the foreign country's economic activities.83 It 
will also constitute an obstacle for national telecommunication infrastructure 
and universal service in underdeveloped as well as developing countries. The 
82
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dilemma is that, on the other hand, foreign investment in telecommunications 
generally will bring increased technological skills, funds and market compe-
tition that will benefit national telecommunications development. Adopting the 
MAI rules such as national treatment will provide an opportunity to benefit from 
an emerging "single market" for telecommunication services. Those countries not 
making commitments under the agreement may find difficulty in attracting 
foreign capital for infrastructure investment.86 The rapid technological develop-
ment in the field of communications has necessitated the development of 
global telecommunication marketplace. 
Under the MAI, industries will have access to technologically advanced 
methods of manufacturing, which will be produced more efficiently and result 
87 
in less waste. Though, with a more open foreign investment regime in tele-
communications, we risk possible damage to national telecommunication 
sovereignty and universal access for citizens. Telecommunications have 
substantial and essential influences to national security, social stability, and 
economic development and also encompass many industrial sectors. Considering 
the particular character of telecommunications, some regulations of the proposed 
MAI should be exempted. Performance requirements are essential safeguards 
in local laws for market access and foreign investment commitments to be 
effective. Rules pertaining to competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal 
service, licensing, the establishment of an independent regulator and the use of 
scarce resources like the radio spectrum are necessary for local telecommuni-
cations development. 
IV. Conclusion 
During the past few decades, foreign investment has rapidly increased among 
countries and has enhanced global economic growth. The evidence shows us 
that there was indeed a correlation between economic development and 
investment in telecommunications. FDI brings the promotion of economic 
growth, the obtainment of technology transfer and the creation of employment. 
Although FDI brings huge economic benefits, many countries are still only 
partially open to foreign investment. Developing countries fear that by opening 
up markets to competition and foreign investment without any restrictions, 
86
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they will lose control of their strategic industries. They have used performance 
requirements to control the categories and sizes of FDI, such as exporting 
requirements or technology transfer agreements. Balancing economic gains 
from FDI with the power to control national economic sovereignty is a 
dilemma with substantial history. To possibly solve many of the disputes bet-
ween foreign investment and national sovereignty, a proposed MAI has been 
negotiated at the OECD. 
The MAI is potentially a model of international investment agreement based 
on non-discrimination and is designed to make it easier for individual and 
corporate investors to move capital across international borders. The MAI will 
provide needed protection for international investors against discrimination 
and expropriation, and will reduce the distortions and inefficiencies caused 
by excessive regulations. Increasing foreign direct investment will benefit 
developing countries through technology transfer and economic gains. However, 
this study has shown that the MAI could hasten job flight from industrialized 
countries and could increase the pressure on all countries to compete for FDI 
capital with related fears pertaining to lower wages, lower living standards, and 
weakened environmental standards. The MAI also creates a new investor dispute 
mechanism that could undermine national sovereignty and challenge legitimate 
regulatory safeguards based on widespread public interests. Developing countries 
worry that a loosened environment for FDI through the MAI would supersede 
many of their developmental strategies and industrialization processes. Economic 
differences between developed and developing countries necessitate a level of 
sovereignty in developing countries that would allow them to attain their 
economic developmental plans and industrial strategies in parallel with the 
MAI's pro-investment environment. 
The discussion throughout this article has also pointed out that a more open 
foreign investment environment does not always violate national economic 
sovereignty. Although developing countries need stronger control to guide 
their developmental directions and industrial strategies, such countries often 
lack necessary capital and technological skills to attain their industrialization 
goals. Foreign investment brings abundant capital, advanced technologies and 
huge economic profits, which can easily resolve developing countries' economic 
problems. However, a stable, transparent and non-discriminatory regulatory 
system is the best way to attract more foreign investment. Because of increased 
global economic competition, more and more developing countries already 
relax control over foreign investment and provide a more favorable investment 
environment and accompanying laws to foreign investors. Since there will be 
more countries competing to attract more foreign investment, a mandated 
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investment agreement, i.e., the MAI, is ultimately not necessary for the global 
market. With neither transparency nor full-participation, the MAI may ruin 
many developing countries' economic profits and undercut their national 
sovereignty. 
In sum, foreign direct investment is a necessary mechanism for developing 
countries to promote their economic growth; however, a uniform global invest-
ment instrument, the proposed MAI, is unsuitable to meet the different demands 
from different countries. With different developmental models and suffering 
different economic difficulties, underdeveloped and developing countries would 
be expected to strongly oppose such an international investment agreement. The 
proposed MAI is simply treated as an unfair attempt by developed countries that 
is designed to take advantage over developing countries. Moreover, the MAI 
forbids governments to require foreign corporations to transfer technology. 
This provision will deprive developing countries of an avenue for accessing 
technology in telecommunications that would reap economic benefits for the 
foreign country's economic development. Such a provision will also constitute 
an unnecessary obstacle for further local telecommunication infrastructure 
and universal service in developing countries. Considering the particular 
character of telecommunications, regulations of the proposed MAI should be 
exempted or set aside in favor of the needs of developing countries. A way to 
resolve this problem is to combine market competition, privatization and foreign 
investment in order to create an appropriate environment for telecommuni-
cations development that recognizes the special status of developing networks. 
Additional investment in telecommunications from aboard should bring 
technology transfer, more abundant capital, and increased market competition, 
which should benefit national telecommunications development. By introducing 
foreign investment into developing countries, a workable local telecommuni-
cation infrastructure and universal access can be more easily reached. We have 
shown that increased foreign investment and privatization in telecommuni-
cation markets will result in substantial progress in meeting developing 
countries' basic telecommunications requirements. Of equal importance, tele-
communications also have a substantial and essential influence on national 
security, social stability, economic development and many industrial sectors. 
In response, the opportunities for foreign investment in the telecommunication 
services sector historically have been limited and most developing countries 
have monopolistic and state-owned telecommunication carriers. An efficient 
trade and investment regime for telecommunication cooperation will have to 
recognize these two competing factors for a successful agreement between 
developing and developed countries. 
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Abstract. The article offers an overview on the forms and contents of the declarations 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ made under Article 36. para. 2. of the 
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1. Rules of the two Statutes 
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the principal 
judicial forum of the United Nations may be accepted by states by, inter alia, 
making unilateral declarations of acceptance under the optional clause as 
embodied in Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute.1 The Statutes of the ICJ and its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), contain very 
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defined in Art. 36 of the Statutes. Three possibil i t ies are envisaged here: 1. the part ies in 
a special agreement bilaterally agree to submit an already exis t ing dispute to the court; 
2. the part ies in dispute concerning treaties or conventions in force conferred jur is-
diction to the Court (compromissory clauses); 3. unilateral declarat ions made under the 
optional c lause. 
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few provisions concerning the making of such declarations and the texts 
thereof. 
Art. 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice is 
confined to stating that "The member states of the League of Nations and the 
States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or 
of ratifying the Protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later 
moment, declare that they recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without 
separate agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court as being compulsory in 
relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the juris-
diction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning..." 
Under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the ICJ, "The States parties to the 
present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting 
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court..." 
The cited articles of the two Statutes seem rather similar at first sight, 
suggesting that the provisions set forth in the Statute of the former Court were 
practically reproduced in this respect during the negotiations on the establish-
ment of the new Court at the San Francisco Conference after World War Two.2 
The San Francisco Conference effected in fact two changes in regard to 
optional clause declarations. 
On the proposal of the Conference's Committee IV/1, it added a new 
paragraph to Art. 36. (para. 4.) providing that "Such declarations shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit 
copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court". 
Accordingly, the optional clause declarations, which are usually signed on 
behalf of the state by the foreign minister or the representative to the United 
Nations, are to be forwarded to the United Nations' Secretary-General, who 
must transmit them to the member states of the Organization and to the parties 
to the Statute of the Court, and publish them in the United Nations' Treaty 
Series, and transmit them to the Registrar of the Court for publication in the 
Court's Yearbooks. 
The other change was that while, at the time of PCIJ, a state had the 
possibility of accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction only in respect of 
one or more categories of disputes under subparas, a) to d), however, under the 
new Statute a state should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 
2
 On the elaboration of the Statute see, Rüssel, R. M.—Muther, J. E.: A History of 
the United Nations Charter. Washington, D. C. 1958, 864-896. 
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respect of all the four specified categories of disputes enumerated in a)-d) 
subparas, of para. 2. Art. 36.3 
There is, however, an essential difference, apart from the paragraph inserted 
by the San Francisco Conference, between the aforementioned provisions of the 
Statutes of the two International Courts concerning declarations made under the 
optional clause. In effect, under the Statute of the PCIJ, declarations accepting 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction could only be made by states, which had at 
least signed the Statute, meaning that a state could make a declaration of 
acceptance even before the Statute had entered into force in respect of that 
state. By contrast, the Statute of the ICJ refers to states that are parties to the 
present Statute, which allows the compulsory jurisdiction of the new Court 
to be accepted only by states that are already parties to the Statute, namely 
they have signed and ratified the Charter of the United Nations, of which the 
Statute forms an integral part, or by states that are not members of the world 
organisation but have acceded to it, as Switzerland and Liechtenstein, for 
example, became parties to the Statute as non-members of the United Nations,4 
1
 According to the Statute of the PCIJ, the Members of the League of Nations and 
the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant states recognize the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court "in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning: a) the 
interpretation of a treaty; b) any question of international law; c) the existence of any 
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d) the 
nature of or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation." The Statute of the ICJ speaks of the acceptance of "the jurisdiction of the 
Court in all legal disputes concerning:...". 
At the time of the PCIJ, Iran was the only state that made a declaration under the 
optional clause recognizing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction with respect to one of 
the categories of disputes. 
The relevant part of the 1930 declaration reads as follow: 
"The Imperial Government of Persia recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, 
that is to say, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
Court, in any disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard 
to situations or facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or 
conventions (my italics—V. L.) accepted by Persia and subsequently to the ratification 
of this declaration, with the exception of :...". 
4
 For the resolution on Switzerland, see: ICJ Yearbook, 1946-1947, 105-106. For 
the resolution on Liechtenstein, see: ICJ Yearbook, 1949-1950, 32-33. Also, see: ICJ 
Yearbook, 1953-1954, 36-37. 
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and concurrently with the acceptance of the Statute they made optional clause 
declarations.5 
During the consideration of different cases, both the PCIJ and the ICJ were 
seized by the problem of whether, pursuant to the cited provisions of the Statute, 
certain states were at all in a position to make declarations under the optional clause. 
At the time of the PCIJ, it was in the Gerliczy case that the question arose of 
whether a declaration of acceptance by a state which was not included among 
those mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations or 
which was not a member of the League of Nations could be deemed to be valid. 
In the dispute submitted by Liechtenstein against Hungary in 1939, on the basis 
of the declarations of acceptance by the two states, the Hungarian Government 
announced its intention to file a preliminary objection, for Liechtenstein was not 
among the states listed in the Annex to the Covenant, nor a member of the 
League of Nations and made optional clause declaration on the basis of the 
Council's decision of May 17, 1922.6 However, the decision expressed that, in 
the absence of special agreement, such a declaration could not be invoked 
against a member state of the League of Nations which, mentioned in the Annex 
of the Covenant, had signed or would sign the 'optional clause'. The Gerliczy 
case remained pending because of the war, so no answer was given to the 
question relating to Liechtenstein's declaration of acceptance. 
More than half a century later, the International Court of Justice was faced 
with a problem, somewhat similar to that of the Gerliczy case, with regard to 
Yugoslavia in the context of whether it was possible for a declaration of 
acceptance to have been made by a state on whose membership in the United 
Nations was uncertain. The opinion of the international community was rather 
divided, to say the least.7 
5
 The declarations by Switzerland and Liechtenstein were dated July 6, 1948, and 
March 10, 1950, respectively. Both instruments contained, among other things, the 
statement that the declaration was effective from the day on which the particular state 
became a party to the Statute. 
" The decision was adopted pursuant to a request addressed by the Court to the 
Council and was concerned with, inter alia, the conditions under which the states listed 
in the Annex to the Covenant and states not members of the League of Nations were 
entitled to resort to the Court. On this point, see: Hudson, M. O.: The Permanent Court 
of International Justice. 1920-1942. Arno Press, New York, 1972, 386-387. 
7
 The membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the United Nations 
was uncertain from April 27, 1992, i.e., from the date of its establishment. The problem of 
Yugoslavia's membership in the United Nations was on the agenda of General Assembly 
from 1992. Long debates and a quasi political compromise led to the adoption of General 
Assembly resolution 47/1, which stated that the General Assembly "1. Considers that the 
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During the days of the Milosevic regime, the Belgrade Government made a 
declaration under the optional clause on April 25, 1999, and a few days later, 
on April 29, 1999, during the NATO air strikes, it addressed an application 
to the Court against 10 NATO member states by invoking violations of the 
prohibition of the use of force and of the Genocide Convention (Cases 
concerning Legality of Use of Force). 
During the consideration of the Yugoslavian request for the ordering of 
provisional measures, certain responding states, such as Belgium, argued 
that the FRY was not a successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, nor a party to the Statute and not therefore in a position to make a 
declaration under the optional clause. 
For its part, the Court gave no answer to this question and in connection 
with declarations of acceptance, it found it sufficient to point out that, in view 
of the reservation ratione temporis (concerning future disputes) included in the 
Yugoslav declaration, it was without jurisdiction even prima facie, for, given 
this limitation, the Court had jurisdiction only in disputes relating to situations 
and facts subsequent to the signature of the declaration, whereas the dispute 
between the parties arose before April 25, 1999, for the air strikes by NATO 
states had begun on March 24, 1999.4 
So, while, in the phase of the proceedings concerning provisional measures, 
the Court endeavoured to sidestep the issues relating to Yugoslavia's member-
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the 
membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations 
and therefore, decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it should not participate in the 
work of the General assembly." Thereafter, the FRY took part in the activities of only some 
UN organs. After the downfall of Milosevic and company, FRY's submission to membership 
was admitted on November 1, 2000. 
The dispute about the FRY's membership in the UN was ended by the Court's Judgement 
of February 3, 2003, after the Court had spelled out, in connection with the Yugoslavian 
request for a revision of the judgement of July 11, 1996, in the dispute between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the FRY regarding the case on the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, that between 1992 and 2000 the 
status of the FRY was sui generis in respect of the UN and the ICJ (para. 71 of the judge-
ment) as the FRY took part in the work of certain UN organs but did not in that of others. 
8
 In the case, with six out of the 10 NATO member states—Belgium, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom—the FRY also invoked, inter 
alia, Art. 36, para. 2, of the Court's Statute, notably the optional clause, as the basis for 
the Court's jurisdiction. 
4
 Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) request for the 
Indication of Provisional Measures. Order of June 2, 1999, 134-135. 
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ship in the United Nations as well as the possibility of Yugoslavia having 
made a declaration under the optional clause at all, several members of the 
Court were quite insistent on pursuing this issue further. Judge Kooijmans 
wrote this: „How can the Court say that there is no need to consider the 
validity of Yugoslavia's declaration whereas at the same time it concludes that 
this declaration, taken together with that of the Respondent, cannot constitute a 
basis of jurisdiction?" According to the Dutch judge, this reasoning implies the 
presumption that the Yugoslavian declaration is valid, at least in the present 
phase of the proceedings.10 Rosalyn Higgins, the British member of the Court, 
showed some understanding of the Court's failure to have thoroughly examined 
the rather complicated question of Yugoslavia's status, since the Court constantly 
has to make extremely speedy decisions on provisional measures." On the 
other hand, Judge Oda, one of the Court's most experienced members, was 
clearly of the position that the FRY was not a member of the United Nations 
and hence had no right to institute proceedings before the Court.12 Oda 
maintains that even if the FRY is supposed to be a party to the Statute, with its 
declaration of acceptance registered as required by law, it in no way acted in 
good faith as it made its declaration of acceptance under the optional clause a 
13 
few days before the filing of the application. In other words, Judge Oda, in 
dealing with the Yugoslavian declaration accepting the optional clause, also 
raised the question that had been the subject of debate even in the Right of 
Passage case during the 1950s, namely that of whether a state was entitled to 
submit an application to the Court a few days after it had made a declaration of 
acceptance. 
These cases and particularly those concerning Legality of the Use of Force 
go to suggest that the Court is loath to examine whether a given state was or 
was not entitled to make a declaration of acceptance. Such attitude reflects the 
Court's view that the declaring state assumes, of its own will, certain extra 
obligations regarding the Court's jurisdiction and that the Court should take 
such obligations into account. We may add that the Court must do so all the 
more as the international community took cognizance of those obligations at 
the time they were assumed. 
10
 Ibid., 117. 
" Ibid., 167. 
12
 Ibid., 145-146. 
13
 Ibid., 148. 
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2. Contents of declarations and relevance of the principle of will 
The idea that it would be advisable to elaborate a model document concerning 
declarations of acceptance had emerged as early as the negotiations for the 
establishment of the PCIJ. Although the so-called Third Committee did not 
suggest a model, the elaboration of such a document, a draft of the "optional 
clause", or declarations was also attached to the Draft Protocol of Signature of 
the Statute when it was submitted to the Council of the League of Nations on 
December 14, 1920. In Hudson's opinion, that draft seems to have been 
approved by the Council and, as a separate protocol, it was opened for signature 
on December 17, 1920.14 Called "optional clause", this additional protocol was 
not a separate document but a subsidiary one intended to serve as a model for 
declaration to be made under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute.15 At any rate, 
Hudson emphasises that the said document was only a suggested version for the 
first part of the text of declarations and that states were free to disregard it in 
making their declarations.16 
Thus, in spite of the existance of a certain kind of model document, the 
states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ paid little attention to 
it and developed diverse contents and forms of declarations of submission in 
the years following the establishment of the Court. 
The declarations of acceptance by some states practically reproduced Art. 36, 
para. 2, of the Statute, stating that the declaring state "recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, on condition of reciprocity" the 
jurisdiction of the Court. While others departed from it, with completely 
different wordings inserted in their declarations. Another group of states declared 
in a single sentence, quite short and to the point, that they accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court. During the interwar period, some states accepting the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction incorporated their declarations of acceptance 
in the instruments of ratification of the Statute of the PCIJ, while others submitted 
their optional clause declarations to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations in the form of a letter. Considering that, as noted previously, the Statute 
contained no provision for making declarations under Art. 36. para. 2., any form 
of optional clause declaration became accepted. This was recognized by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaraguan case through its statement that: 
"The Statute of the Permanent Court did not lay down any set form or procedure 
14
 Hudson: The Permanent Court... op. cit., 127. 
15
 Ibid., 451. 
16
 Ibid., 452. 
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to be followed for the making of such declarations, and in practice a number of 
different methods were used by States."17 
The formal questions concerning declarations of acceptance were touched 
upon by the International Court in several cases. In its very first judgement, in 
the Corfu Channel case in the preliminary objections, the Court held that 
"...neither the Statute nor the Rules require that this consent should be expressed 
18 • in any particular form." The same was spelled out in the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case, in which the Court sought to answer the question whether 
Thailand's letter of May 20, 1950, addressed to the United Nations Secretary-
General in accordance with Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute, was to be regarded, 
in substance and form, as recognizing compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to Art, 
36, para. 2, of the present-day Court's Statute.14 The Court stated: "The precise 
form and language in which they do this (the declaration—V. L.) is left to 
them, and there is no suggestion that any particular form is required, or that 
any declarations not in such form will be invalid. No doubt custom and 
tradition have brought it about that a certain pattern of terminology is normally, 
as a matter of fact and convenience, employed by countries accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; but there is nothing mandatory about the 
employment of this language. Nor is there any obligation, notwithstanding 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36, to mention such matters as periods of 
duration, conditions or reservations, and there are acceptances which have in 
one or more, or even in all, of these respects maintained silence."20 
With regard to the contents of the optional clause declarations, the Court 
stressed that "... the sole relevant question is whether the language employed 
in any given declaration does reveal a clear intention, in the terms of paragraph 
2 of Article 36 of the Statute, to 'recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
17
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 
ICJ Report, 1984,404. 
18
 The Corfu Channel, ICJ Recueil, 1948, 27. 
14
 In its declaration of September 30, 1929, Thailand originally accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ for a period of 10 years, and in 1940 and 1950 it renewed its 
declaration with other declarations, containing the previous conditions and reservations, for 
additional periods of 10 years. In its first preliminary objection in the Preah Vihear case, 
Thailand advanced the argument, along with others, that in 1950 there was a mistaken view 
of the status of her earlier declaration of 1940 as it had renewed its declaration of acceptance 
in respect of a court that no longer existed. 
20
 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. Preliminary Objections. ICJ Reports, 
1961,32. 
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obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes' concerning the 
21 
categories of questions enumerated in that paragraph". 
As can be seen, the Court attached no importance to formal questions of 
making declarations and deemed the intentions of the parties to be the 
determining incident. Relying on private-law examples, it pointed out that 
international law "... places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the 
parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to choose what 
22 
form they please provided their intention clearly results from it.'""" All this was 
summed up by Sir Percy Spender in these terms: "No requirement of form are 
called for paragraph (2) of Article 36. If consent to recognize this Court's 
jurisdiction in terms of that paragraph is clearly manifested, it matters not in 
23 
what form the declaration containing that consent is cast." 
3. The problem of collective declarations accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction 
For nearly seven decades since the establishment of the PCIJ, states had made 
individual declarations of acceptance, and it was not until the end of the 1980s 
that, in the Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, the 
possibility arose of recognizing the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by 
collective declarations.24 
In that dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras, the applicant state, 
Nicaragua, founded the Court's jurisdiction on Article XXXI of the American 
Treaty on Pacific Settlement,23 officially known, as the Pact of Bogotá, signed 
21
 Ibid., 32. 
22
 Ibid., 31. 
23
 See Sir Percy Spender's individual opinion in the case concerning the Temple of 
Preah Vihear. ICJ Reports, 1961, 40. 
24
 On this point see Buffet-Tchalakoff, M. E.: La compétence de la Cour Internationale 
de Justice dans l 'affaire des „Actions frontalières et transfrontalières" (Nicaragua-
Honduras), Revue Générale de Droit International, Tome 93, 1989, No. 3, 623-653. 
28
 Art. XXXI of the Bogota Pact reads as follows: „In conformity with Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting 
Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the juris-
diction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special 
agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature 
that arose among them concerning. 
The interpretation of a treaty; 
Any question of international law; 
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on April 30, 1948, and on the declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court by the two states.26 These two instruments serving as the basis for the 
Court's jurisdiction—and the possibility of making collective declarations of 
acceptance that actually arose in connection with them—highlight the specific 
feature that Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá is virtually identical, almost word 
for word, with Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute. 
Before the Court, Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá on judicial settlement of 
disputes was linked by Honduras with declarations of acceptance under Art. 36, 
para. 2, of the Statute. According to Honduras, Art. XXXI, which, as mentioned 
above, is almost literally identical to Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute, "contains a 
jurisdiction which can be more precisely defined by means of a unilateral 
declaration", notably in unilateral declarations, under Art. 36, para. 2, of the 
Statute, by each party to the Pact.27 Starting with this, Honduras was of the 
position that any declaration made under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute and the 
reservations attached thereto applied to Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá as 
28 
well. In connection with all this, Honduras interpreted Art. XXXI of the Pact in 
two ways with respect to the present case. First, it argued that, under this Article, 
the Court had jurisdiction only if a declaration of acceptance was also made 
under the optional clause, but later it claimed that such a unilateral declaration 
was not necessary but only possible and that Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá 
The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation." 
~
6
 The Honduran declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was dated 
February 2, 1948, and was renewed several times, first on May 24, 1954, for a period of 
six years and on February 20, 1960, for an indefinite period. It was modified by a 
declaration on May 22, 1986, inserting a paragraph under which the present declaration 
and the reservations contained therein may at any time be supplemented, modified or 
withdrawn by giving notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Nicara-
guan declaration of acceptance was made on September 24, 1929, and its legal effect 
was, according to Nicaragua transmitted to the ICJ by Art. 36, para. 5, of the Statute. 
This declaration of acceptance by Nicaragua was the same as that which was at issue in 
the legal dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America. 
Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, ICJ Pleadings, 1988, 
Vol. I, 65. 
28
 Ibid., 74. Honduras relied on this for objecting to the Court's jurisdiction on the 
ground that, owing to the reservations attached to the 1986 declaration, the Court's 
jurisdiction did not extend to the present case on the basis either of the optional clause 
or of Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. 
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29 
Pact was valid irrespective of any declaration relating thereto. Then again, it 
claimed that Art. XXXI was to be seen as recognition of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction under the optional clause understood as implied in the Pact of 
Bogotá.3" In other words, according to Honduras, Art. XXXI of the Pact of 
Bogotá was nothing more than a collective declaration of acceptance. 
The Court's opinion on these argumentation was the following: "The first 
interpretation advanced by Honduras—that Article XXXI must be supple-
mented by a declaration—is incompatible with the actual terms of the Article. 
In that text, the parties "declare that they recognize" the Court's jurisdiction 
"as compulsory ipso facto" in the cases enumerated. Article XXXI does not 
subject that recognition to the making of a new declaration to be deposited 
with the United Nations Secretary-General in accordance with Article 36, 
paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Statute. It is drafted in the present indicative sense, 
31 
and thus of itself constitutes acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction." With 
regards to the second interpretation, the Court noted that the parties had come 
forward with two possible interpretations on the relationship between Art. 
XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá and the Statute: on the one hand, they conceived 
the said Article as a treaty provision conferring jurisdiction upon the Court 
under Art. 36, para. 1, of the Statute and, on the other, they deemed it to be a 
collective declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36, 
para. 2, of the Statute and incorporated in the Pact of Bogotá.32 
Without going too deeply into the case concerning Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions, we should note that the quotation from the Court's judgement 
indicates that the International Court did not entirely preclude the acceptance 
of its compulsory jurisdiction by a collective declaration of acceptance but, 
4
 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, ICJ Reports, 1988, 83. 
30
 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, ICJ Pleadings, 1988, 
Vol. I, 75. 
31
 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, ICJ Reports, 1988, 84. 
32
 Honduras advanced the latter interpretation in the Case concerning Border and 
Transborder Armed Actions. In 1984, in its legal dispute with the United States 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions against Nicaragua, Nicaragua claimed that 
Art. XXXI should be regarded as a declaration made under Art. 36, para. 2, of the 
Statute, that is to say that its position was identical to that of Honduras in the case of 
1988. On the other hand, in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case, Nicaragua 
argued against Honduras that Art. XXXI of the Bogota Pact came under Art. 36, para. 1, 
of the Statute, providing a reason why it was to be deemed a reservation to the Treaty 
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court. Cf.Case concerning Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions, ICJ Reports, 1988, 84. 
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keeping in mind the consequences of its aforesaid finding, it preferred to point 
out that 
"There is however no need to pursue this argument. Even if the Honduran 
reading of Article XXXI be adopted, and the article be regarded as a collective 
declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made in accordance 
with Article 36, paragraph 2, it should be observed that declaration was 
incorporated in the Pact of Bogotá as Article XXXI. Accordingly, it can 
only be modified in accordance with the rules provided for the Pact itself. 
Article XXXI nowhere envisages that the undertaking entered into by the 
parties to the Pact might be amended by means of a unilateral declaration 
made subsequently under the Statute, and the reference to Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute is insufficient in itself to have that effect."33 
The Court concluded by stating that the said silence was all the more 
significant since the Pact clearly determined the obligations of the parties. The 
commitments contained in Art. XXXI applied ratione materiae to the disputes 
enumerated in its text and rations personae to the American States parties to 
the Pact, while remaining valid rations temporis so long as the present 
instrument was in force between those states.34 
With this statement, the International Court has made it abundantly clear 
that it considers Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá to be a treaty provision 
conferring jurisdiction on the Court with a text similar to declarations of 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, to be in fact a compromissary clause, 
one that is deemed to be acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under Art. 36, 
para. 1, of the Statute rather than under para. 2.35 
Thus, in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case, the Court found 
that Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá could not be considered to be a collective 
declaration of acceptance, yet it took no definite stand on whether it was possible 
33
 Cf. Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, ICJ Reports, 1988, 84. 
34
 Ibid. 
35 
A similar view was held by Jiménez de Aréchaga, a most prominent international 
expert of international law of Latin America and a former member of the Court, who wrote 
that, despite the similarity of terminology, Art. XXXI of the Bogota Pact was a document 
coming under Art. 36, para. 1, of the Statute. Yet he added that in their mutual relations, 
the Latin American states, having regard to the close historical and cultural ties between 
them, placed the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on much stronger foundations than those 
ensuing from the system of declarations under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute. 
Cf. Jiménez de Aréchaga, E.: The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice under the Pact of Bogota and the optional clause. In: International Law at a Time 
of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (ed. Yoran Dinstein), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1989, 356-357. 
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to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by a collective declaration of 
acceptance.36 
Without elaborating on problems relating to eventual collective optional 
clause declarations, we wish to note that recognition of Art. XXXI of the Bogotá 
Pact as a collective declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
could have entailed interesting consequences. In the first place, the Court 's 
compulsory jurisdiction would have operated not only in the inter se relations of 
the states parties to the Pact of Bogotá, but also in relations between the rest 
of states parties to the regime of the optional clause. Moreover, it would have 
raised the question of how such a collective declaration of acceptance is related 
to individual optional clause declarations by the Latin American states 
parties to the Optional Clause system. This problem should not be treated as 
a speculative one, for 13 of the states parties to the Pact of Bogotá have made 
individual declarations, many of them with reservations attached thereto. 
Consequently, there is a need to answer the question whether the basis for the 
Court's jurisdiction is provided by individual declarations of acceptance or by 
the Pact of Bogotá as a collective declaration of acceptance in cases where a 
state that is party to the Optional Clause system intends to institute proceedings 
against a state that is a party to the Pact of Bogotá and at the same time has 
made an individual declaration of acceptance. This may give rise to a problem, 
particularly when it is bome in mind that certain disputes are excluded from the 
Court's jurisdiction by reservations attached to individual declarations of 
acceptance, while such disputes may still happen to come under the jurisdiction 
of the Court on the basis of a collective declaration of acceptance. 
4, Ratification of declarations of acceptance 
In relation to the rather few formal requirements for declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the two World Courts, mention should also be made 
of the fact that, during the existence of the PCIJ, a number of states made their 
16
 However, some members of the Court, including Judge Oda, expressly conceded the 
possibility of collective recognition of compulsory jurisdiction. According to the Japanese 
judge, acceptance of jurisdiction under Art. 36, para. 1, of the Statute can, in the case of 
certain general treaties on dispute settlement, can be equated, in effect, with acceptance of the 
Court's jurisdiction under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute, but such an obligation must be 
assumed in an unequivocal manner. He instanced the 1949 Revised General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the European Convention on Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes. See Judge Oda's individual opinion. ICJ Reports, 1988, 124. 
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declarations subject to ratification. In other words, a state did not recognize 
compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36 of the Statute as binding on itself until 
after it had ratified its declaration. Incorporation of such reservations in decla-
rations of acceptance was actually superfluous as declarations of acceptance 
cannot be deemed to be treaties and there is no rule requiring ratification thereof. 
Furthermore, as Hudson wrote, "...both the English and French versions of the 
optional clause refer to the recognition or acceptance of jurisdiction "from this 
date" (Fr., dès à présent), i.e., from the date of the declaration, it would seem 
that the declaration was intended to take effect at the time of signature."37 
This notwithstanding, a number of states made their declarations subject to 
ratification, as noted earlier. Interestingly, there were also cases in which a state 
ratified its declaration, although the instmment did not call for ratification. Some 
of the relevant cases include Bulgaria's declaration of 1921, Ethiopia's 
declaration of July 12, 1926, and Lithuania's declaration of October 5, 1921. 
The fact that, during the existence of the PCIJ, provisions in declarations of 
acceptance for ratification thereof were rather frequent, may in all certainty be 
attributed to unestablished practice concerning the declarations under Art. 36. 
para. 2. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that, of all the declarations 
currently in force, only the Belgian declaration of 1958 provides for ratification. 
Numerous optional clause declarations expressly requiring ratification were 
not ratified at the time of the PCIJ and, therefore, did not enter into force. 
Cases in point are the declarations of Costa Rica, Liberia and Luxembourg in 
1921, of Latvia in 1923 and of France in 1924,38 of Guatemala in 1926, of 
Czechoslovakia in 1929, of Argentina in 1935, of Iraq in 1938 and of Egypt 
and Hungary in 1939. 
Though not required, inclusion of reservations concerning ratification of 
acceptance was by all means of great importance as declarations containing 
such reservations could not enter into force until ratification thereof. That 
situation was further complicated by the fact that—since the Protocol of 
Signature of the Statute of the PCIJ was to be ratified—the declaration of a state 
could not come into force until a ratification of the said Protocol. Consequently, 
if a state ratified its declaration of acceptance earlier than the Protocol of 
Signature of the Statute, the declaration could not enter into force. 
It was nearly four decades after the dissolve of its predecessor that the 
International Court of Justice was confronted with the problems concerning 
37
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38
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ratification of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the PCIJ in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v.United States) in the 1980s. In that case, the dispute centred on, 
inter alia, the validity of a declaration of acceptance made by Nicaragua between 
the two world wars. Nicaragua signed the Protocol of Signature of the Statute 
of the PCIJ in September 1929 and made a declaration under Art. 36. para. 2. of 
the Statute. However, the Protocol of Signature of the Statute had not yet been 
ratified, and it was more than 10 years later, on November 29, 1939, that 
Nicaragua notified the Secretary-General of the League of Nations by cable that 
"the Statute and the Protocol" had been ratified and that the instrument of 
ratification would be transmitted to Geneva. However, according to available 
information, that instrument of ratification did not reach the League of Nations. 
In view of all this, the United States contended, in the Case concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, that Nicaragua 
had never become a party to the Statute of the PCIJ and was therefore not 
in a position to make an effective acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the PCIJ.34 On the other hand, Art. 36, para. 5, of the Statute could not 
consequently transfer the legal effects of the 1929 Nicaraguan declaration to 
the International Court of Justice, since the relevant article of the Statute did 
not cover but the declarations submitted to the PCIJ and "still in force.40 
Contrary to this, Nicaragua construed that the provision of the Statute was 
designated to exclude from the operation of the article only declarations which 
had already expired and had no bearing whatever on a declaration like that of 
Nicaragua, that had not expired, but which had not been perfected for various 
reasons at the time. In the view of the Nicaraguan Government, Nicaragua was 
in exactly the same situation under the new Statute as it had been at the time of 
the old Statute, and in both cases the ratification of the Court's Statute would 
perfect its 1929 declaration.41 
On this point, the Court held "...that Nicaragua having failed to deposit its 
instrument of ratification to the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court, was not a party to that treaty, Consequently the Declaration 
made by Nicaragua in 1929 had not acquired binding force prior to such effect 
as Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
might produce."42 
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On the basis of the findings of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaraguan case, it can be stated that, according to the Court, the ratification of 
the new Statute had the same effect in the case of Nicaragua as if the Protocol 
of Signature of the old Statute had been ratified. 
The Court's reasoning boils down to the fact that, at the time the new Statute 
came into force, Art. 36, para. 5, of the Statute transmitted to the ICJ the legal 
effect of optional clause declarations made to the PCIJ and still in force. 
The related arguments adduced by the Court can be questioned in certain 
aspects, if only for the reason that the English and French texts of Art. 36, 
para. 5, of the Statute are somewhat different, the English version reading 
"declarations ... which are still in force" whereas the French "declarations ... 
pour une durée qui n'est pas encore expirée" is not the equivalent of the former 
(encore en vigueur), but can be rendered as "declarations ... for a period not yet 
expired".43 Both texts refer, in point of fact, to declarations which had not yet 
lapsed at the time of the entry into force of the new Statute, and as such were 
still applicable. However, in the case of the Nicaraguan declaration, what was 
at issue was not the non-expiration of the declaration at the time of the new 
Court's Statute or the continuing effect thereof, for during the existence of the 
PCIJ this declaration had never become effective in reality and was therefore 
inapplicable. In our view, the argument that Nicaragua was for decades 
regarded by the international community as a state party to the Court's Statute 
and was recorded in the different publications of the Court as a state party to 
the optional clause system, would have appeared much more convincing in 
favour of the applicability of the Nicaraguan declaration in that particular case. 
Both Nicaragua and the other states parties to the optional clause system 
agreed with this, that is to say that Nicaragua had the clear intention to be a 
party to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and that the other members of 
the international community were in agreement on this point.44 
5. Problems relating to deposit of declarations 
As mentioned earlier, the San Francisco Conference inserted a new paragraph 
in Art. 36 of the Statute, which provides that declarations of acceptance are to 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is to 
43
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circulate thereof to the parties to the Statute and the Registrar of the Court. The 
Statute contains nothing more and does not specify the date at which decla-
rations of acceptance enter into force or begin to take legal effect. 
According to the pertinent literature and the Court, para. 4 of Art. 36 
essentially refers to two elements that are practically independent of eachother.45 
On the one hand, declarations accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
are to be deposited by the declaring state with the Secretary-General and, on the 
other hand, there is the duty incumbent on the Secretary-General to transmit 
copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 
Rosenne is of the view that the deposit of declarations of acceptance with the 
Secretary-General entails the following consequences for the declaring state: 
1) the declaration becomes effective rations personae on the day of deposit 
except where the instrument contains a special reservation in this respect; 
2) if the declaration requires some additional act, such as ratification, such an 
additional act is also to be performed through the agency of the Secretary-
General, namely the instrument of ratification is to be transmitted to the 
Secretary-General and its legal effects arise from the date of that deposit; 3) the 
terms on which the compulsory jurisdiction are accepted by the declaring state 
at a given moment are those terms last deposited with the Secretary-General; 
4) while the said provision of the Statute refers to the deposit of declarations, 
it also applies to modification, withdrawal and of denunciation, etc. of 
declarations.46 
The problems relevant to the deposit of declarations of acceptance with the 
Secretary-General have been considered by the International Court in several 
cases. The best-known case of this category is the Right of Passage Through 
Indian Territory, in which Portugal made a declaration of acceptance on 
December 19, 1955, and filed an application with the Court against India under 
the Optional Clause a few days later, on December 22, 1955. India contended 
that the filing of the Portuguese application violated the generally recognized 
principle of equality, mutuality and reciprocity to which India was entitled 
under the optional clause, as the Portuguese application had been filed before 
the expiration of a period of time—between the acceptance by Portugal of the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction and the filing of the application—which, 
under normal circumstances, would have enabled the Secretary-General to 
45
 Cf. Rosenne, S.: The Law and Practice of the International Court. A.W. Sijthoff-
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transmit the Portuguese declaration to the states parties to the Statute of the 
Court, including India.47 
The Court found that the filing of the Portuguese application on December 
22, 1955, was not contrary to the Statute and constituted no violation of India's 
rights. It stated that "...by the deposit of its Declaration of Acceptance with the 
Secretary-General, the accepting State becomes a Party to the system of the 
Optional Clause in relation to the other declaring States, with all the rights and 
obligations deriving from Article 36. ... The legal effect of a Declaration does 
not depend upon subsequent action or inaction of the Secretary-General."48 
The Court pointed out that "...unlike some other instruments, Article 36 
provides for no additional requirement, for instance, that the information 
transmitted by the Secretary-General must reach the Parties to the Statute, or 
that some period must elapse subsequent to the deposit of the Declaration 
before it can become effective. Any such requirement would introduce an 
element of uncertainty into the operation of the Optional Clause system. The 
Court cannot read into the Optional Clause any requirement of that nature."44 
Several members of the Court objected to this passage of the judgement. In 
his dissenting opinion, Judge Badawi stressed the contractual nature of the 
regime that was established on the basis of the optional clause and tried to 
prove that "The notification of Declarations to the Secretary-General, or their 
deposit with him and his obligation to communicate them to other States, are 
merely intended to take place of direct communication."30 Since the decla-
ration was made on the day preceding the filing of the application, no one 
could suppose that the Secretary-General had been able to transmit the decla-
ration to the other states within 24 hours, the result being a situation as if no 
declaration of acceptance had been made.31 In his dissenting opinion, ad hoc 
Judge Chagla argues that Art. 36, para. 4, of the Statute consisted of two parts, 
one making it incumbent upon the declaring states to deposit declarations with 
the Secretary-General, and the other incumbent upon the Secretary-General for 
the transmission copies thereof to the states parties to the Statute and to the 
Registrar of the Court. The ad hoc Judge found it objectionable that the 
Court's decision had deemed only the first element to be mandatory, for, in his 
view, it would have been absolutely necessary that a certain period of time 
47
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should elapse between making the declaration and filing the application. In 
the 1960s, Rosenne also made the point that, during a future revision of the 
Statute, it would be worthwhile considering the introduction of a short period 
between the date of deposit of declarations and the date on which such 
instruments begin to produce legal effects.33 
More than 40 years after its decision in the Right of Passage case, the Court 
was again faced with the problem of a dispute being submitted to it under the 
optional clause before the respondent state could have been informed of the 
applicant state's accession to the system of the optional clause. 
This problem arose in the second part of the 1990s in the case concerning 
the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, because on 
March 3, 1994, Cameroon made a declaration accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction and the United Nations Secretary-General transmitted it to the 
parties to the Statute eleven-and-a-half months later. Consequently, when 
Cameroon's application was filed on March 29, 1994, the respondent state, 
Nigeria did not know or was not in a position to know that Cameroon had 
acceded to the optional clause system.34 This led Nigeria to conclude that 
Cameroon "acted prematurely", had violated "its obligation to act in good faith 
..., acted in abuse of the system established by Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute". 
Nigeria asserted that the Court's decision in the Right of Passage case was an 
isolated one and that it was time the Court revised its findings in this case in 
connection with the making of optional clause declarations. It stressed that the 
interpretation of Art. 36, para. 4, of the Statute in 1957 should be reconsidered 
in the light of changes that had since taken place in the law of treaties, and in 
this context it referred to Art. 78 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which provides: 
"Except as the treaty or the present Convention otherwise provides, any 
notification or communication to be made by any State under the present 
Convention shall: 
c) if transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State for 
which it was intended only when the latter State has been informed by the 
depository." 
52
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No matter how logical the above-mentioned arguments may appear to 
be, the elements thereof referring to the law of treaties may be strongly 
questioned, notably on the ground that, during the elaboration of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission, 
in dealing with deposit of instruments of ratification, accession, etc., referred 
precisely to the findings of the ICJ in the Right of Passage case, stating that in 
an analogous situation, notably in respect of the entry into force of declarations 
made under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute, the Court had considered the date 
of deposit of the relevant instruments to be the determinate factor.55 
In the judgement on the preliminary objections, the Court notes "...that 
régime for depositing and transmitting declarations of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction laid down in Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the Court is 
distinct from the régime envisaged for treaties by the Vienna Convention."56 
Then, repeating the findings of the Nicaraguan case, it emphasised "Thus 
the provisions of that Convention may only be applied to declarations by 
analogy."57 Indeed, the Court said nothing more, and it examined Art. 78 of the 
Vienna Convention on notifications and communications, Art. 16 on exchange 
of instruments of ratification, acceptance and accession, and Art. 24 on the 
entry into force of treaties. The Court found that the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention did not have the scope that Nigeria inferred on them. Regarding 
Art. 78, the Court held that this article "...is only designated to lay down the 
modalities according to which notifications and communications should be 
carried out. It does not govern the conditions in which a State expresses its 
consent to be bound by a treaty and those under which a treaty comes into force, 
those questions being governed by Articles 16 and 24 of the Convention."58 
Articles 16 and 24 contain a general rule, notably that, unless otherwise 
provided by a treaty, a state's consent to being bound by a treaty is expressed 
by the deposit of the instrument of ratification, accession, approval, etc. and 
the treaty comes into force in respect of that state on the day of deposit. The 
Court emphasised that these rules of the Vienna Convention correspond to the 
solution adopted by the Court in the Case concerning the Right of Passage 
through Indian Territory and that this solution should be upheld.59 
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In the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, Vice-President Weeramantry, 
among the members of the Court, voiced his opinion that the Court's decision 
in the case concerning the Right of Passage through Indian Territory should be 
revised. He adduced arguments similar to those of Judge Chagla in the Right 
of Passage case, emphasizing that, of the actions prescribed in para. 4 of 
Art. 36, the Court attached importance only to one, namely the deposit of 
declarations with the Secretary-General, and actually disregarded the other, 
namely the transmission of declarations to the parties to the Statute and to the 
Registrar of the Court. Judge Weeramantry summed up in 8 paragraphs the 
reasons why he thought it necessary to revise the findings in the Right of 
Passage case.60 Judges Koroma and Ajibola similarly stated the case for revision 
of the findings contained in the judgement of 1957, saying that international 
law had developed considerably since the 1950s and that the Court could not 
choose to ignore that fact.61 
Thus, for its part in the Land and maritime Boundary case, the Court 
maintained its view as set forth in the Right of Passage case and stated again 
that a declaring state should not be concerned with the actions of the Secretary-
General or with his performance or non-performance thereof, that "The legal 
effect of Declarations does not depend upon subsequent action or inaction 
of the Secretary-General." Unlike other documents, Art. 36 of the Statute 
prescribes no additional requirement whatsoever, such as the information 
transmitted by the Secretary-General to reach the parties to the State or the 
entry into force of a particular declaration after the lapse of a specified period 
of time.62 The Court expressed that, in contrast to Nigeria's contention, its 
decision in the Right of Passage case could not be regarded as an isolated one 
as its findings in this case had been reaffirmed by those in the cases concerning 
the Temple of Preah Vihear and the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua. 
Furthermore, in the cases filed by Yugoslavia against 10 NATO member 
states involving legality of use of force, the Court followed its legal practice 
that was established in the Right of Passage case.63 Considering the political 
background of the applications submitted by the repressive Milosevic regime 
against the NATO member states, we believe that, if the Court had wished to 
depart from its earlier legal practice in the least measure, these cases would 
have offered a good opportunity for it to abandon its position as expressed in 
60
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the Right of Passage case. In all likelihood, the approval of the international 
community would have been won by some sort of statement by the Court to 
the effect that Yugoslavia's being a party to the optional clause system at the 
time of Filing the applications and hence its right to submit disputes to the 
Court under the optional clause were strongly questionable. However, in the 
cases concerning the Legality of the Use of Force, in deciding on the interim 
measures of protection, the Court did not concern itself with this issue and 
accepted the right of Yugoslavia to file an application against 10 NATO states 
4 days after having made its declaration of acceptance in April 1999. 
6. The United Nations Secretary-General and declarations of acceptance 
In relation to the deposit of optional clause declarations of acceptance with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is worthwhile to touch briefly on 
the Secretary-General's actions connected with declarations and chiefly on 
how similar his actions are to those associated with treaties. 
In this context we should examine two of the said functions related to 
treaties. The Secretary-General's first function is a general, individual and 
special one, based on Art. 102. of the United Nations Charter and applies to all 
treaties deposited with him. Its essence can be said to consist of securing due 
publicity for treaties.64 The other function is related exclusively to those 
treaties of which the Secretary-General is the depositary, is governed by the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and is the same in 
respect of the Secretary-General as in respect of any other depositary.65 
The Secretary-General's functions related to declarations of acceptance are 
similar in some measure to those connected with the deposit of treaties. In both 
cases, the Secretary-General receives certain documents and transmits them to 
specified states. His functions related to optional clause declarations are 
practically fulfilled by these actions, but his functions as depositary involve 
much more than this and are much more substantive. On this point, it is worth-
while to keep in mind what Humphrey Waldock stated about the depositary's 
function during the elaboration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
64
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Treaties, namely that "The regular performance of the duties of the depository 
is of critical importance to the operation of the modern system of multilateral 
treaties. Nor does it seem correct to regard the provisions of article 1966 as 
purely procedural; for they establish not only the duties of depositories but also 
the rights of the interested States with respect to the procedure."67 
The question at issue is whether, in relation to treaties, the depositary also 
has the function of examining the instruments deposited with him, e.g., from 
the point of view of whether they are in conformity with the treaty, and if they 
are not, he may call the attention of states to such deficiencies, etc.68 The 
Secretary-General as depositary may likewise have a highly important function 
in determining the dates at which treaties enter into force. Such is the case 
particularly with treaties containing reservations whose admissibility is not 
covered by a particular treaty.69 
On the other hand, the Secretary-General's functions concerning optional 
clause declarations are limited to receiving declarations and transmitting them 
to the Registrar of the Court and to the parties to the Statute. Declarations 
henceforward pass out from the Secretary-General's purview, for, as mentioned 
above, the Secretary-General has no additional functions related to declarations 
of acceptance owing to the fact that reservations or limitations attached to 
declarations of acceptance need no approval or consent by the other states that 
are parties to the optional clause system and that, as the Court has emphasized 
in several cases, the only formal requirement for declarations is that they be 
deposited with the Secretary-General. 
In light of the foregoing, it can be reasonably claimed that the Court was 
right in upholding its view that declarations of acceptance enter into force on 
the day of deposit with the Secretary-General. 
The Court's position is justified by the fact that an element of uncertainty 
would be introduced into the system70 by accepting, as the date of entry into 
force of declarations of acceptance, the date of receipt of declarations by the 
parties to the Statute or to the optional clause system, because in that case a 
66
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declaration would in fact enter into force in different periods, depending on the 
date at which the individual states receive the relevant notification. 
If, however, declarations were to become effective after the lapse of a 
reasonable period of time, as was proposed by many, the question naturally 
arises of what that reasonable period—30 days or 3 months—should be. Yet 
the example of Cameroon's declaration of acceptance shows that not even a 
few months is necessarily sufficient for declarations to reach the states that are 
parties to the Statute. Thus, the significance of the deposit of declarations with 
the Secretary-General arises due to the fact that, as is suggested by Rosenne, 
the date at which declarations become effective and hence the Court's 
jurisdiction, both rations personae and rations material, are linked to the day 
of deposit. 
It can be stated that the formal questions concerning declarations accepting 
the optional clause have emerged in a number of cases. The two Courts have 
recognized as valid declarations of practically any wording regardless of their 
content, their date of making and other circumstances. Disputes actually arose 
as to the entry into force of declarations, and, under its latest practice in the 
dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, the ICJ reaffirmed the postulate, 
enunciated in its earlier decisions, that the only formal requisite for 
declarations of acceptance is that they be deposited with the Secretary-General. 
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Vis maior (basic ius commune remarks) 
Abstract In 1989 European Parliament declared within its Resolution on Action to bring intq 
line the private of law of the Member States (OJ 1989 С 158/400) a request to start necessary 
preparatory work on drawing up a common European Code of Private Law. Five years later, 
European Parliament expressed in Resolution on the harmonisation of certain sectors of the 
private law of the Member States (OJ 1994 С 205/518) its strong disillusion as far as preparatory 
works aimed at emergence of European Code of Private Law are considered. In response, in 
2001 European Commission outlined in a Communicauon [COM (2001) 398 final] current and 
prospective issues relating to such codification. Generally speaking, ius commune shall not be 
accepted as some academic freak, nonetheless, as extremely serious challenge for future of 
European legal system(s). The aim of the article is to discuss, in comparison to the whole 
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concept of force majeure in ius commune by analysing related solutions under German, 
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I. Introduction 
Pacta sunt servanda, basic and universally accepted principle of contract law,1 
by Viktor Knapp even acknowledged as the highest legal principle2 means that 
each contractual party is responsible for nonexecution of its obligations, albeit 
grounds of the failure are beyond his power and were not or could not be foreseen 
at the time of celebrating the agreement. In fact, this basic legal principle was 
never carried through without exception. Strict following of contractual 
sanctity may lead to the opposite of its aim. It indicates that situation at the 
moment of the contract's conclusion may afterward have been modified so 
dramatically that ". . . parties, acting as reasonable persons, would not have 
made the contract, or would have made it differently, had they known what was 
M. A. et Msc. Masarykova Universita v Brnë, Maastricht Universiteit in Maastricht. 
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going to happen."3 Character of the pacta sunt servanda principle should not 
have an absolute character. Restriction of that notion is apparent through the 
existence of force majeure, so-called doctrine (clausula) rebus sic stantibus4 
or good faith.5 Aforementioned doctrines constitute limitation of obligor's 
obligation,6 however, as Treitel1 emphasizes force majeure applies to situations 
where the performance of contract is substantially impossible, and (clausula) 
rebus sic stantibus in case of substantially changed economic conditions. 
Force majeure does not have its closed-enumerative legal definition and 
usually means unforeseen and unexpected event outside the control of the 
parties, which makes performance of the contract substantially impossible. As 
Nicholas remarks, consequence of force majeure is exclusion of liability of a 
8 9 
party for non-performance of the contract. Rimke citing Puelinckx states that 
force majeure "...occurs when the law recognizes that without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed 
because the circumstances in which the performance is called for would render it 
impossible." Mestadu> articulates that a force majeure rule ought to have at least 
four following elements: i) a definition of relevant causes, ii) a requirement 
that performance is prevented, iii) a requirement of a causal nexus between the 
events and the fact that performance is prevented, and iv) consequences of the 
3
 Chengwei, L.: Remedies for Non-performance: Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT 
Principles & PECL, 2003, not paged, footnote No. 12 citing Schmitthoff, С. M.: 
Schmitthoff s Export Trade, 8th ed., 1986. 146. 
4
 Perhaps developed by Baldus, see in Dalhuisen, J. H.: Domestic Contract Laws, 
Uniform International Contract Law and International Contract Law Principles. International 
Sales and Contractual Agency. European Business Law Review, 2000. 237. 
5
 Hasselink, M. W.: The New European Private Law. Essays on the Future of Private 
Law in Europe. The Hague, 2002. 208. 
6
 Jones, G. H.—Schlechtriem, P.: Breach of Contract (Deficiencies in Party's 
Performance). International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. VII, Ch. 15, J. С. B. 
1999. 135. 
7
 Cited in: Weitzman, T.: Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention. Journal 
of Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, 1997. 265-290, footnote No. 1. 
8
 Nicholas, В.: Rules and Terms—Civil Law and Common Law. Tulane Law Review, 
Vol. 48, 1974. 
4
 Rimke, J.: Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice 
with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods. 1999-2000. 200. 
10
 Cited by Southerington, T. in: Ämmälä, T. (ed.): Impossibility of Performance and 
Other Excuses in International Trade, Private Law Publication Series В 55, Faculty of Law 
of the University of Turku, Turku, 2001. not paged, footnote No. 36. 
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three prerequisites being fulfilled. In addition to these essential elements the rule 
may pursuant to Mestad also include stipulations as to v) foreseeability, vi) 
avoiding or overcoming the event, and vii) procedural matters the party claiming 
force majeure should follow. 
Typical illustrations of force majeure events are for instance war, if declared 
or not (invasion and occupation of Kuwait),11 state of siege, riots, insurrections, 
acts of sabotage, strikes or other labour unrests, fire, explosion or other unavoidable 
12 
accidents, flood, storms, earthquakes, perils, dangers and accidents of the sea, " 
governmental or judicial actions, epidemics13 or other abnormal natural events. 
Force majeure rule is in accordance to Zimmermann s analysis rooted in 
Roman law. Under Roman law a priori and a posteriori impossibility of 
contract performance is distinguished.14 Contractual party was excused in case 
the relevant contractual performance was ab initio, moreover, for any other 
contractor—in modern legal expression—objectively impossible, generally 
speaking, "[i]t must be beyond anyone's power."15 Fulfilment of contractual 
obligations could become impossible consequently; party under such situation 
was liable only in case of his fault, for example lack of ordinary care or most 
cautious carefulness—culpa levissima. In such case party had to demonstrate 
vis maior so the fact that even the most cautious carefulness would not lead to 
prevention of unwanted state of affairs.16 Similar clarification is apparent in 
Southerington11 but not in Rimke who perhaps does not realize the difference 
between the roots of force majeure and its first explicit occurrence in 
contemporary legislature, i.e. in French Code Civil (hereinafter "C. civ.").18 
11
 Governments and International Organizations with Claims Arising out of Iraqi 
Invasion of Kuwait, Court: Panel of the Commissioners, Panel F l : Recommendation 
S/AC.26, 23.09.1997. 
12
 J. LauritzwenAS v. Wijsmuller В V, The Supeservant II [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1, CA 
in Collins, H.: Regulating Contracts. Oxford, 1999. 163-164. 
13
 Bund, J. M.: Force majeure Clauses: Drafting Advice for the CISG Practitioner, 
Journal of Law and Commerce. 1998. Vol. 17. 400. 
14
 Cf. Zimmermann, R.: The Civil Law in European Codes. In: Regional Private Laws 
and Codification in Europe (eds.: Mac Queen, H. L.—Vaquer, A.—Espiau, S. E.), 
Cambridge, 2003. 57-58. 
15
 Gordley, J.: Contracts in Pre-Commercial Societies and in Western History. Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. VII, Ch. 2, J. C., Tübingen, 1997. 37. 
16
 Zimmermann, R.: The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition, op. cit., 192-197 and 687. 
17
 Southerington, T. in: Ämmälä, T. (ed.): Impossibility of Performance... op. cit. 
18 
Rimke, J.: Force majeure and hardship... op. cit., 199. 
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Legal systems solve the issue of substantial impossibility to perform the 
contract in various ways. Aspiration of the following text is to analyse and 
compare possible emanation of the French concept of force majeure in German, 
English, Czech and Polish Law, within European Union's attempts and selected 
hard and soft law subsumable under international commercial law. 
2. French approach 
As stated in Article 1134 C. civ., French law strictly refers to the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda,19 In French private law just only two possible positions 
concerning performance of contracts are acknowledged, either contracting party 
performs contract or contractual relations occurred under such onerous conditions 
that a contract is impossible to perform and contractor or performer is freed. In 
reality, French courts are not entitled to moderate a civil law contractual 
relation. 
In view of force majeure French jurisprudence was used to differentiate 
among three legal institutions appointing contractual impossibility, i.e. cause 
étrangère (Article 1147 C. civ.), force majeure or cas fortuit (Article 1148 С. 
20 21 
civ.) and cas fortuit (Article 1722 С. civ.). Talion' or Whittaker declare force 
majeure to be a general term without any distinction, which nowadays applies 
only, on the one hand, and Nicholas22 or Zweigert and Kötz23 still ascribe weight 
to aforementioned division, on the other hand. Building following on Talion s 
attitude in accordance with Articles 1147 and 1148 C. civ., force majeure 
possesses three following elements i) irresistibility, ii) unforeseeability, and iii) 
externality. Southerington24 does not subsume like Whittaker impossibility under 
irresistibility, but he identifies impossibility as the fourth element of force 
14
 Sichert, M.: The Legal Effect of Supervening Events. Article 2.117 EP—A European 
Principle Compared with German, English and French Law, European Contract Law, 1994. 
415. 
Beale, H.—Kötz, H.—Hartkamp, A.—Talion, D.: Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law lus Commune Casebooks on the Common Law of Europe, Oxford-Portland, 
2002. 592-593. 
21
 Bell, J.—Boyron, S.—Whittaker, S.: Principles of French Law. Oxford, 1998. 342, 
footnote No. 270. 
-i, 
" Nicholas, В.: Force majeure and Frustration. American Journal of Comparative Law. 
Vol. 27, 1979. 231-245. 
23
 Zweigert, К.—Kötz, H.: Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford, 1998. 502. 
"
4
 Southerington, T. in: Ämmälä, T. (ed.): Impossibility of Performance and Other 
Excuses... op. cit., not paged. 
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majeure, besides, Weitzmann25 speaks of insurmountability and, moreover, 
Rimke26 stresses another element grounding in the fact the debtor must not be 
at fault. Analysing irresistibility, Whittaker comes to the conclusion that such 
requirement has got two aspects, firstly, "the event is not one which the party 
could have prevented" and, secondly, "once occurring, it renders performance 
impossible rather than simply more onerous."27 Thus mere hardship is not 
sufficient to excuse contractual performance; only impossibility is reckoned as 
its prerequisite, unless there is a contractual clause to the contrary. Additionally, 
French courts do not apply an absolute standpoint via impossibility. Never-
theless, in case party could have executed any step avoiding relevant event, 
such situation shall not be viewed as force majeure, even if performance has 
become impossible. Bearing in mind unforeseeability, it shall not be observed as 
an absolute concept (cf. reasonable man's view). Once an event is unavoidable, 
even though foreseeable, it forms force majeure itself. In Montagnani v. 
28 
Hotel des lices Co. v. Concorde Group Case" Cour de Cassation applied 
unforeseeability test and concluded, "armed robbery ... did not constitute a 
case of force majeure, since not all the possible precautions necessitated by its 
foreseeability had been taken." In consideration of externality, it can be 
construed as a fact being outside the sphere of the debtor's responsibility. For 
• • 29 
instance in Héliogravure Jean Didier v. Electricité de France Case" Cour de 
Cassation emphasized that externality shall not affect one respective litigant 
only, but public as a whole, in Marie-Laure Dupuy v. Essonne Clinic Case 
and La Mutuelle d' Assurance du Corps Médical Française Case30 Cour de 
Cassation lined that internal undetectable defect had not been amounted to 
external event. 
Force majeure cancels party's obligation(s) in unilateral contract; conversely, 
impossibility to fulfil in bilateral contracts is more complex. Mostly, French 
courts are familiar with the fact that contract under force majeure is terminated 
ex lege", therefore an application for the judicial termination is not needed (cf. 
contradiction between Article 1147 and Article 1722 C. civ. in particular on the 
one side and Article 1184 C. civ. on the other side). According to Article 1148 C. 
25
 Weitzmann, T.: Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention. Journal of Law 
and Commerce. Vol. 16, 1997. 265. 
~
6
 Rimke, J.: Force majeure and hardship... op. cit., 206. 
~
7
 Bell, J.—Boyron, S.—Whittaker, S.: Principles of French Law. op. cit., 342. 
28
 Cass. Civ. Ire, 9th March 1994, RTD civ. 1994. 871. 
29
 Cass. civ. Ire, 24th January 1995, RTD civ. 1995. 237. 
30
 Cass. civ. Ire, 12th April 1995 (2nd judgment), JCP 1995. П. 22467. 
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civ. contractor does not have to perform obligation, he is not obliged to pay 
damages, interest.'11 
Force majeure operates autonomously of parties' will, which means that it 
will protect any obligee even if the contract does not contain a force majeure 
clause. 
French contract law does not provide relief for changed circumstances which 
make contract performance more onerous but not impossible. So-called doctrine 
of imprévision in administrative law is applied by Counceil d'Etat in cases 
where private parties enter into the contractual relations with administrative 
bodies involving public services. This doctrine derives from state practice and 
is indirectly based on Article 1134 C. civ. Conceil d'Etat in Compaignie d' 
' 32 
Eclairage de Bordeaux Case based its verdict on the continuity of the public 
service and protection of contractor's capability to fulfil his obligations through 
increasing price of supplied gas, otherwise the private contractor would go 
bankrupt. Nevertheless, French courts and civil law scholars refuse exploiting 
imprévision in standard civil law contracts. In Canal de Craponne Case11 Cour 
de Cassation rejected jurisdiction, although the solution seemed to be unjust. 
Only in limited number of cases French courts accepted changed circumstances 
and subsumed frustration of the contractual purpose under force majeure.M 
3. German approach 
Mommsen essentially influencing drafters of German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(hereinafter "BGB") created so-called impossibility doctrine by conceptualising 
all cases in which the debtor was unable to perform.13 BGB maintained Roman 
law rule pertaining to initial impossibility. Howbeit, concept of culpa levissima 
in the case of subsequent impossibility was disannulled.16 
Article 275 BGB sets up impossibility of performance, the doctrine of 
Unmöglichkeit, as one of grounds of non-performance conceded by BGB, which 
implies performance to become impossible due to circumstances for which the 
31
 Crabb, J. H.: The French Civil Code Revised Edition (as amended to 1st July 1994). 
De venter, 1995. 222. 
32
 CE 30 Mar. 1916, D 1916.3. 25. 
33
 Civ. 6. 3. 1876. DP 1876. 1. 193. 
34
 Jones—Schlechtriem: Breach of Contract... op. cit., 136. 
35 
Zimmermann: The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 
op. cit., 809-810. 36
 Gordley, J.: An American Perspective on Unidroit Principles. Centra di studi e 
ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero. Rome, 1996. 27. 
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debtor is not responsible. Additionally, Article 323 BGB regulates outcomes of 
impossibility in two-sided contracts, as for instance rulings by Amtsgericht 
Mannheim in Budapest Symphony Orchestra Case37 or Oberlandsgericht 
Düsseldorf in Illuminated Sign Case38 brought about impossibility of personal 
obligation due to conductor's death or refusal for administrative authorization 
in which finally neither of the parties was condemned. The denotation of BGB 
sounds in the way that each contract does have its basic purpose stemming 
from intention of contracting parties not capable to achieve it. The incapability 
is caused by altered political, social, monetary, fiscal, economic etc. conditions. 
The doctrine of Unmöglichkeit signifies that debtor's contractual duties would 
lapse if their performance was determined as impossible for reasons other 
than negligence, his own fault or negligence of his employees, since Article 
276 BGB reads "debtor is responsible for deliberate acts and negligence" and 
under Article 285 BGB "debtor is not in a delay provided that the performance 
does not take place for the reason of a circumstance for which he is not 
responsible." Debtor is for that reason responsible only for damages caused by 
him intentionally or negligently.34 Furthermore, it is worth to stress the 
doctrine of Unmöglichkeit does not require unforeseeability. 
Moreover, although at present days its application especially by comparison 
with hyperinflation period after First World War40 is reasonably limited, the 
doctrine covering destruction of the basis of the contract, so-called Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage, theoretically introduced by Oertmann41 as one of pillars 
in Sieberf s trichotomy, can be employed.4" Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
was erected on Article 242 BGB and pursuant to Zimmermann43 it can be 
regarded as one of the most famous examples of judge-made legal doctrine. 
37
 Amtsgericht Mannheim, 20th October 1990, NJW 1991. 1490 and Oberlandsgericht 
Düsseldorf, 30th December 1964, NJW 1965. 761. 
38
 Beale—Kötz—Hartkamp—Talion: Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law... 
op. cit., 605-606. 
34
 Horn, K.—Kötz, H.—Leser, H. G.: German Private and Commercial Law. Oxford, 
1982. 112. 
40
 See Whittaker, S.—Zimmermann, R.: Good Faith in European Contract Law: 
Surveying the Legal Landscape in: Good Faith in European Contract Law. Cambridge, 
2000. 20-21. 
41
 Zweigert—Kötz: Introduction to Comparative Law. op. cit. 522. 
4
" Hesselink: The New European Private Law. Essays on the Future of Private Law in 
Europe, op. cit., 200. 
43
 Zimmermann, R.: Remedies for Non-Performance. The Revised German Law of 
Obligations, viewed against the background of the Principles of European Contract Law. 
Edinburgh Law Review, No. 6, 2002. 183. 
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Article 242 BGB, as a general clause, but, as Markesinis remarkably comments: 
"[i]n reality ... it is not a general clause but the case law of the courts which 
produce the rule,"44 requires contract to be performed in a good faith. When 
conditions have unforeseeably and significantly altered, basis of the contract 
has been devastated and parties to the transaction are not bound to original 
obligations. Corresponding to Chengwei, "[requesting the original performance 
of the contract would constitute bad faith...".45 Accentuating the principle of 
good faith is obvious in Bad Sugar Beet Harvest Case,46 in which Reichs-
gericht held that defendant could not be required to do more than he could 
reasonably perform. The stance of the court represents the idea that the party is 
released when performance is reasonably impossible and there is no party's 
fault and "good faith ... which further reinforces the subjective nature of 
impossibility."47 Consequently, as Oberlandesgericht Hamburg48 recently ruled 
that triple rise of market price did not amount to a sacrificial sale price and did 
not establish "force majeure" event. Nowadays, after the Reform des Schuld-
rechtes of BGB effective since 1st January 2002, the doctrine of Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage has its legislative representation embodied by Article 313 
BGB, under the title "Interference with the basis of the contract" (Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage). 
Finally, a number of judges and academics elaborated about so-called 
Opfergrenze doctrine, by reason of which a debtor could not "be forced to 
comply with efforts or sacrifices which are beyond what parties reasonably 
envisaged in good faith."49 
4. English approach 
Till 1863 when Taylor v. Caldwell Case was released, English courts applied 
so-called doctrine of absolute contracts established on the idea that any event 
should not be regarded as an excuse for nonperformance, unless parties to the 
contract expressly for such cases framed exemption of liability.50 Conversely, 
44
 Markesinis, B. S.: The Legacy of History of German Contract Law. In: Good Faith 
in Contract and Property (ed.: Forte, A. D. M.). Oxford, 1999. 175. 
45
 Chengwei: Remedies for Non-performance... op. cit., not paged. 
46
 Reichsgericht, 3rd February 1914, RGZ 84.125. 
47
 Beale—Kötz—Hartkamp—Talion: Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law... 
op. cit., 604. 
48
 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997. 
44
 Rimke: Force majeure and hardship... op. cit., 207. 
50
 Dalhuisen: Domestic Contract Laws... op. cit., 236. 
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English frustration doctrine accepts circumstances, which have radically changed 
(subsequent legal changes, destruction of contracted matter etc.). Frustrating 
circumstance(s) must have occurred without fault of either contractor. When a 
contract is frustrated it becomes by operation of law (Hirjimujli v. Cheong Yue 
SS Co Ltd Case51) not only void but also parties are released from any liability 
in damages for non-performance, mere hardship is not vice versa recognized as 
sufficient reason to discharge. 
In watershed Taylor v. Caldwell Case the Queen's Bench decided that strict 
rule should only be applied when the contract is positive and absolute, and not 
subject to any condition either express or implied.52 It has been acknowledged 
that contracts contain implied condition residing in the impossibility to perform 
as a consequence of disappearance of the person or thing. Such impossibility 
then liberates an obligor. Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractor Ltd v. Fareham 
CDC Case53 formulated implied term doctrine in relation to frustration portraying 
it as a situation recognized by law without the fault of parties, when occurred 
circumstance radically differs from that which was undertaken by the contract 
and incapables its performance. Afterwards, Taylor v. Caldwell notion was 
extended to cases of supervening illegality and acts of government,54 when 
contract is discharged "even thought its performance might not be impossible."55 
Since Krell v. Henry Case56 of 1903 the frustration doctrine finally expanded 
to cases with frustrated commercial object or purpose of the contract about 
which the other contractor is aware, thus additionally, to impossibility of 
performance frustration of the common venture was introduced.57 
English courts do not have any legal instrument to intervene into contract in 
order to alter or adapt it. In fact, parties under common law very often ex 
contractu specify in force majeure clauses various circumstances to avoid 
58 
possible liability from non-performance, they cover such events as acts of God, 
war and strikes,54 even where the strike is anticipated, riots and embargoes,60 acts 
51
 Hirjimujli v. Cheong Yue SS Co Ltd. [1926] AC 497. 
52
 Rimke: Force majeure and hardship... op. cit., 202. 
53
 Davis Contractor Ltd v. Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696. 
54
 Sichert: The Legal Effect of Supervening Events... op. cit., 414. 
55
 Birks, P.: English Private Law. Oxford, 2000. 154. 
56
 Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. 
57
 Atiyah, P. S.: An Introduction of Law of Contract. Oxford, 1989. 251-252. 
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Matsoukis v. Priestman [1915] 1 KB 681. 59
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Comparison. Deventer, 1992. 154-155. 
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of public enemies,61 civil strife,6" refusals to grant licenses,63 abnormal weather 
conditions,64 even abnormal increases in prices and wages65 and others.66 
To sum up, modern English frustration doctrine, originally applied as 
"frustration of the adventure" in maritime contracts,67 comprises frustration by 
impossibility, frustration of the common venture and illegality.68 Frustration 
cannot be claimed where the contract has suddenly become more difficult or 
expensive for one of the parties, if the party was partly responsible for the 
intervening event, which for example destroyed the object of the contract or if 
the event was foreseeable. Furthermore, frustration has to be contrasted with 
rescission where the contract is treated as if it had never been. Finally, Fibrosa 
Case69 with the total failure of consideration, where any solution had not been 
satisfactory, led to introduction of 1943 Law Reform (Frustrated Act). 
5. Czech approach 
Czech private law is not codified in one act but it is formed by Obcansky 
zákoník70 (Civil Code, hereinafter "CiC"), Obchodní zákoník71 (Commercial 
Code, hereinafter "CCod") and Zákon о rodine72 (Family Act). CiC distinguishes 
between subjective liability preconditioned by fault and objective liability 
where fault is not required but responsible party can claim the existence of vis 
maior disabling performance of obligation. Article 420a Paragraph 3 CiC reads 
that from liability shall exonerate that party, which proves the damage was 
61
 Collins, H.: Regulating Contracts. Oxford, 1999. 163-164. 
6
" Dunné, J. M.: 'Act of God', Overmacht en onvoorziene omstandigheden in het 
bouwrecht. Deventer, 1998. 196. 
63
 Coloniale Import-Export v. Loumidis Sons [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 560. 
64
 Toepfer v. Cremer [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 118. 
65
 J. Lauritzwen A S v. Wijsmuller В V, The Supeservant II [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1, CA. 
66
 cf. Chitty on Contracts. General Principles, Vol. 1, London, 1994. 710-711. 
67
 Beatson, J.: Anson's Law of Contract. Oxford, 1998. 501. 
68
 Lord Hailsham in National Carriers v. Panalpina Case [1981] AC 675 found out 5 
theories. 
69
 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn, Lawson, Combe, Barbour Ltd. [1943] AC 32. 
70
 Zákon с. 40/1964 Sb., obcansky zákoník, v platném znëni [Act No. 40 of 1964 Civil 
Code, as currently in force]. 
71
 Zákon с. 513/1991 Sb., obchodní zákoník, v platném znëni [Act No. 513 of 1964 
Civil Code, as currently in force]. 
72
 Zákon с. 94/1963 Sb., о rodinë, v platném znëni [Act No. 94 of 1963 about Family, 
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"caused by unavoidable event without its origin in operation or in own activity 
of injured party" (neodvratitelná událost nemající pùvod v provozu nebo 
73 
vlastním jednáním poskozeného), which is generally designated by courts ' as 
vyssi moc (vis maior). To achieve liberation through vis maior a party has to prove 
that event was unavoidable, not originated in the activity of relevant party itself 
or to counterclaim providing evidence that damage was caused by the activity of 
injured party. Courts just testify that claimed circumstance should be regarded as 
vis maior event. For instance, in 1933 the Supreme Administrative Court in Black 
Ice Case74 did not reckon "mood" of weather grounding in a snowfall (finally 
proved to be a weak one) as vis maior. The Supreme Court in Railway Accident 
Case75 adjudicated that collision with railway vehicle should not be regarded as 
a consequence of vis maior and held Railway Company to be liable. 
The concept of CCod emanates from objective liability. Pursuant to 
Article 373 CCod a party shall not be held liable if "it proves that breach of 
obligations was caused by circumstances eliminating liability (okolnost 
vylucující odpovédnost)." In Paragraph 1 of following Article 374 lawgiver 
states that circumstance eliminating liability is such "obstacle, which arose 
independently of the will of the obligor and prevents from performance of his 
obligation, if it is not reasonable to presume that the obligor would be able to 
prevent or overcome this obstacle or its effects, and moreover, that in moment 
of celebrating the obligation that obstacle anticipated." But liability is not 
eliminated if such obstacle originated in period during which the obligor had 
been in a delay or arose from his economic situation. It denotes that obligor has 
to prove that obstacle caused impossibility to perform contractual obligation is 
objectively unavoidable and in moment of celebration of the contract unfore-
seeable. Such impediment can derive not only in standard events as mentioned 
in introduction but even by refusal by state authorization76 or administrative 
prohibition. 
Idyllically, regarding consequences of proving that obstacle completes all 
elements of Article 420a Paragraph 3 CiC in civil law relations or Article 374 
CCod in commercial law relations, an obligor is not legally bound to any 
73
 25 Cdo 852/2000, 25 Cdo 1946/2000 or Pl. ÚS 11/01. 
74
 [Boh. A 10570/33 (9469/33)]. 
75
 Rc 7458 Rv И 211/27 [Vázny. 27, IX.b: 1695]. 
76
 Cf. Czechoslovakian reward SG 130/170 (1976) cited in Nassar, N.: Sanctity of 
Contracts Revised: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-term International Commercial 
Transactions. Dodrecht, 1995. 205. 
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performance. Specific situation initiates, as noted by Bejcek,77 in regulation of 
contractual penalty by CiC and by CCod. On the one hand, contractual penalty 
under Article 545 Paragraph 3 CiC is of ius dispositivum character, parties are 
able to settle such covering under any circumstance and not only when fault 
appears. On the other hand, Article 300 CCod brings in absolute obligation to 
compensate contractual penalty irrespective of its origin. Article 300 CCod in 
relation to Article 545 CiC is lex specialis, so in commercial relations first 
mentioned provision absolutely suspends lex generalis. Mentioned lex specialis 
is of a dispositive character and again contracting parties can adapt contractual 
penalty. 
6. Polish approach 
78 
1964 Kodeks Cywilny in Article 435 Paragraph 1 regulates objective res-
ponsibility addressed to entities running business and using for such purpose 
powers of natural character like stream, gas, electricity, and fuel on gas basis. 
Such kind of entity is liable for any damage, unless it proves that damage was 
caused by fault of the third person, for whom it is not responsible or as a result 
of vis maior (sila wyzsza).74 Vis maior as such is not defined by any Polish 
legal source. Radwanski for instance lays down the existence of two possible 
concepts, i) subjective, rising from the fact that party could not prevent an 
unwelcome accident even exerting the most scrupulous care, and ii) objective, 
established on the idea that none of the parties can influence such event.80 
Polish Supreme Court constantly holds that vis maior shall be characterized by 
following conjunctive factors: i) externality of an event, ii) unforeseeability, 
which does not mean an absolute improbability but suddenness or strangeness, 
and iii) practical unavoidability in spite of using accessible technology. For 
instance in Coal Mine Case81 court decided that although the damage on real 
estates fulfils two elements of vis maior test, i.e. unforeseeability and practical 
77
 Bejcekcek, J.: Právní úprava a interpretacní problémy smluvních pokut a úrokű z 
prodlení [The Regulation and the Problems of Interpretation with Regard to Penalties for 
Non-performance and Interests on Overdue Payments]. CPVP. 1995, No. 1. 31. 
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Ustawa Kodeks cywilny, Dz. U. z dnia 18 maja 1964 r. [Act Code Civil, Dz. U. 18. 
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 Further in Matecki, R.—Karniol, J.: The Civil Law of Poland. Warsaw, 1999. 5. 
80
 Radwanski, Z.: Zohowiqzania—Czgsc Ogólna, [Obligations—General Part.] Warszawa, 
1997. 77. 
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VIS M AI OR (BASIC IUS COMMUNE REMARKS) 61 
unavoidability the externality element was not accomplished and hence the 
mining company was held liable. 
7. 1980 Vienna Convention on International Sales of Goods 
As far as force majeure is concerned, 1980 Vienna Convention on International 
Sales of Goods (hereinafter "CISG") avoids any reference to related municipal 
concept. The excuse for non-performance pursuant to Article 79 CISG is es-
tablished i) by impediment, presumably legal or physical82 (or "time impediment" 
in Vine Wax Case83 ruled by Bundesgerichtshof) or impediment insisting in 
not conforming delivery of goods, beyond the control of the party concerned 
(impediment), that could not ii) reasonably have been taken into account at the 
84 
time of the conclusion of the contract (unforeseeability), and iii) could not 
have been reasonably avoided or overcome including its consequences 
(unavoidability), then provided iv) he gives notice of this to the other party 
according to Paragraph 4 even though such circumstance shall be regarded as 
notoriously known,85 the non-performing party is exempt from liability in 
damages.86 Of course, the non-performing party, most suitably supported by an 
expert report87 shall prove an impediment incorporating causation,88 unfore-
89 
seeability and unavoidability. Furthermore, temporary impediments exempt 
8
~ Ziegel, J. S.—Samson, S.: Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good. 1981. 
83
 Bundesgerichtshof, VIII. Zivilsenat, 24.03.1999, VIII ZR 121/98, interpretation 
discussed in Bernstein, H.—Lookofsky, J.: Understanding the CISG in Europe. Deventer, 
The Hague, 2003. 150-151. 
84
 Cf. forseeability caused by prohibition already in force at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract in Bulgarska turgoskopromishlena palata, 56/1995 (Bulgaria), by already 
declared suspension in ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris, 7197/1992, by knowledge of 
related regulations before conclusion of the contract in Rechtbank's-Hertogenbosch, rolnr. 
981/HA ZA 95-2299 (The Netherlands), or by fluctuations of prices in international trade 
in Rechtbank van Koophandel, Hasselt, AR 1849/94 (Belgium). 
83
 Russian Federation Arbitration Proceeding 328/1994 of 10 February 1996, Article 1.5. 
86
 See argument a contrario in ICC Arbitration Case No. 7197 of 1992. 
87
 Handelsgericht St. Gallen, Switzerland, 3rd December 2002 [HG. 1999.82-HGK], 
Paragraph 9. 
88
 Magnus, U.: Force Majeure and the CISG. In: The International Sale of Goods 
Revisited (eds.: Sarcevic, P.—Volken, P.). The Hague, 2001. 18-19. 
84
 Russian Federation Arbitration Proceeding 406/1998 of 6 June 2000, Article 1.3. 
contra Federal Arbitration Court for the Moscow Region Resolution of the Cassation 
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performance of the obligation only temporarily. Under Paragraph 2, the obligor 
is liable for the conduct of a third person, acting independently neither within 
90 
his organizational sphere nor under his responsibility, under such situation 
he has to prove not only exemption in relation to him but also exemption 
related to the related third person.91 
Exemption delineated in Article 79 CISG is a revised version of non-liability 
stated in Article 74 of 1964 Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 
which in Flambouras'92 words referring to Nicholas93 "unjustifiably facilitate^] 
the promisor's excuse for non-performance." Contemporary Article 79 CISG only 
releases the non-performing party from his liability for damages. The only dis-
crepancy may be raised in connection with hardship circumstances. Applying 
general rule on interpretation expressed in Article 31 of 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, pursuant to travaux préparatoires and purpose of 
uniformity, CISG is not based on (clausula) rebus sic stantibus doctrine and 
therefore it is clear that mere disturbance implying into more difficult, onerous 
or not profitable performance of obligation (sudden increase in the price on FX 
markets or commodity exchange, lack of FX9494 etc.) shall not be recognized as 
events of exemption. However, uniform interpretation has not been reached 
yet.95 De facto CISG confirms elements of force majeure on one site and 
frustration, impossibility of performance96 or imprévision on the other site.97 
Since Article 6 CISG enables parties to adjust its provisions (ius dispositi-
vum) experienced merchants regularly do so and insert into their contracts force 
Board on the lawfulness and reasonableness of decisions of the Arbitration Courts, 4 
February 2002 [No. КА-А40/308-02]. 
90
 Amtsgericht Alsfeld, 31 С 534/94. 
91
 Schlechtriem, P.: Uniform Sales Law—The UN-Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods. Vienna, 1986. 104. 
9
~ Flambouras, D. P.: The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and clausula 
rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis. Pace 
International Law Review, Vol. 13, 2001. 261-293. 
93
 Nicholas, В.: Force majeure and Frustration... op. cit., 232-238. 
94
 Arbitration at Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry [No. 
123/1992 of 17 October 1995]. 
95
 See Weitzmann, T.: Validity and Excuse in thé U.N. Sales Convention, op. cit., 272 
et seq. and Schlechtriem, P.: Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. München, 
2000. 774 et seq. 
%
 Bridge, M.: The International Sale of Goods, Law and Practice. Oxford, 1999. 106. 
97
 Vilus, J.: Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and the Buyer. In: 
International Sale of Goods (eds.: Sarcevic, P.—Volken, P.). Oceana, 1986. 254-255. 
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majeure or special risks clauses.48 Contrasting to majority of national legislations, 
which recognize and regulate doctrine of force majeure, in the sphere of inter-
national trade relationships occurrence of force majeure does not automatically 
lead to termination of the contract and traders often stipulate two-stages treatment 
with respect to force majeure (so-called two stage force majeure clause). If 
event constituting force majeure is permanent or continues after the expiration 
of specified period, each party will be entitled to terminate the contract. 
8. 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (hereinafter 
"UP") present general soft law rules, which are basically conceived for inter-
national commercial contracts.100 In case of escape from the liability of non-
performance, two kinds of contracts are distinguished. Firstly, in accordance 
with Article 5.4.1 a party is obligated "to achieve a specific result." In that case, 
party "is bound to achieve that result," but he escapes, if he proves force 
majeure. The definition efforce mejeure is given in Article 7.1.1 UP pursuant 
to which non-performance was a result of an impediment beyond its control, it 
could not be reasonable to expect to take into account such impediment at the 
time of celebrating the contract or to have a possibility to have avoided or 
overcome it or its consequences. Secondly, according to Article 5.4.2 UP a 
party has a "duty of best efforts," that means he is not liable if he makes "such 
efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances." Analysing force majeure, UP seem to be very similar to CISG, 
nevertheless, the scope of Article 79 CISG is reduced to claims for damages 
only and Article 7.1.7 UP asserts idea that excuse is general, except provision 
stated in Paragraph 4 determining certain claims which are not affected by force 
majeure including right to "terminate the contract or to withhold performance 
or request interest on money due." The case of force majeure, performance, as 
well as damages and penalties, cannot be claimed. Article 79 CISG does not 
contain a gap that could be filled by UP's force majeure. However, Article 
48
 Rozehnalová, N.: Právo mezinárodního obchodu [International Trade Law]. Brno, 2001. 
353. Moreover ICC Force Majeure clause in Klotz, J. M.—Barrett, J. A.: International Sales 
Agreements, An Annotated Drafting and Negotiating Guide. The Hague, 1998. 241 et seq. 
44
 Schmitthoff, С. M.: Schmitthoff's Export Trade, The Law and Practice of Inter-
national Trade. London, 1990. 200. 
100
 UNIDROIT: Principles of International Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT, Rome, 
1994. 1. 
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7.1.7 UP does not contain any provision relating to third persons such as the 
"double force majeure" rules Article 79 Paragraph 2 CISG. And as Rimke 
states "[t]here are no compelling reasons, therefore, to substitute the provision 
of Article 79 CISG with that of Article 7.1.7 of the [UP]."101 
9. Situation in European Union 
Within the European Union, rules on force majeure have not been harmonized 
102 
yet. Nevertheless, as Lando states, European Court of Justice (hereinafter 
"ECJ") plays important role by developing rules on the subject of force majeure. 
For instance, ECJ in NV De Jong Case103 pointed at two basic characteristics of 
force majeure, i.e. unforeseeability and unavoidability of the circumstance. In 
Denkavit France SARL Case104 ECJ specified force majeure as "unusual and 
unforeseeable circumstance beyond [one's] control, the consequence of which 
could not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised," in case 
C-124/92105 ECJ added another characteristics (as highlighted in Case 284/82106 
107 
or Valsabbia Case as well) denoted to non-absolute impossibility. Besides, 
case law by ECJ distinguishes force majeure under private and public law 
108 
branches. As far as the European Commission (hereinafter "Commission") is 
concerned, in 1988 de facto following ECJ case law Commission summarized 
in its materials characteristics of force majeure (not absolute impossibility, 
externality, unavoidability of the unusual circumstance).104 
101
 Rimke, J. Force majeure and hardship... op. cit., 238. 
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Regarding Principles of European Contract Law (hereinafter "PECL") 
developed by Lando's Commission, they indicate force majeure in Article 8:108 
(ex Article 3.108) headed "Excuse Due to an Impediment." In fact, there is a 
similarity with Article 79 CISG. Nevertheless, reading Comment A to the 
PECL110 the concept differs in its scope ". . . Article 8:108 has to apply only in 
cases where an impediment prevents performance" and Comment С expressly 
states that the circumstances of the impediment are corresponding with those 
"traditionally required for force majeure ". Impediment has to be as follows: 
external, not predictable and insurmountable. If the impediment is of temporal 
character, the excuse is temporal as well; approach apparently influenced by 
Article 79 Paragraph 3 CISG. Concerning other conditions, obligor has to 
inform the other party about the existence of impediment in a reasonable time, 
apparently similar with Article 79 Paragraph 5 CISG. 
10. Conclusion 
In civil law systems force majeure is related to the obligation of one party, 
whereas in common law it affects the whole contract. French force majeure 
doctrine and vis maior under the Czech and Polish private law in contrast to 
English frustration doctrine shall be regarded as narrower. In fact, regimes within 
the first group do not recognize commercial difficulties as an exemption. There 
is a little difference between the reasoning in the classical force majeure and 
the German reasoning as regards the notion Unmöglichkeit. Analysing PECL, 
its notion of impediment has been mostly touched by French force majeure 
doctrine. EC J's case law pursues the same impact. 
Furthermore, generally speaking, French courts in case of pure private 
contractual relations do not apply imprévision doctrine. Identically, in case of 
Czech and Polish legal orders do not recognize such possibility. Differently, 
English judge is entitled to release parties from their contractual obligations, 
where either the transaction was altered or the purpose was frustrated. 
Similarly, German courts in case of the Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
intervene into contractual relations, but in comparison to English courts at a 
lower level of onerosity. The other attempts in relation to the discussed topic, 
UP's force majeure explicitly covers common law and civil law doctrines of 
force majeure, Unmöglichkeit, frustration, impossibility of performance and 
CISG de facto invokes similar concurrence as well. 
110
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Abstract Hungary ratified Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances. This event is not a surprise since the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared 
capital punishment unconstitutional in 1990. Retrospectively, the development of the safe-
guards against capital punishment in Hungary might seem as a stretch of self-evident 
consequences. The present paper attempts to situate the decision of the Constitutional Court in 
its broader context and reflect upon the significance of symbolic founding gestures in times of 
democratic transition. 
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Introduction 
Hungary ratified Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms [hereinafter: European Convention] 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances on July 13, 
2003.' Protocol No. 13 made the important move to remove the narrow exception 
for the application of capital punishment in times of war or imminent threat of 
war left open by Protocol No. 6 (Art. 2) two decades ago. A similar exception is 
also familiar from Art. 2 of the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter: ICCPR], aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty.2 Thus, Protocol No. 13 became the instrument 
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1
 Protocol No. 13 was adopted in Vilnius, on May 3, 2002 and entered into force on July 
1, 2003 upon 10 ratifications. In respect to Hungary, it entered into force as of November 1, 
2003 (currently under promulgation). 
2
 UN General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989. 
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providing yet the most forceful demonstration of international commitment to 
doing away with capital punishment. 
Hungary's ratification of Protocol No. 13 is not a surprise. Decision No. 
23/1990 (X. 31.) AB of the Hungarian Constitutional Court abolished capital 
punishment over a decade ago, in the early days of the country's democratic 
transition. In the case the Constitutional Court found that capital punishment 
imposes a limit on the essential content of the right to life and human dignity 
[Art. 54(1), Constitution], thus it is not compatible with Art. 8 (2) of the 
Hungarian Constitution precluding any limitation on the essential content of 
fundamental rights." The decision is one of the best known and most influential 
decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.4 
Since 1990 there was no serious attempt to restore the death penalty in 
Hungary, the restoration of capital punishment is not an issue in mainstream 
public discourse.5 
Hungary's ratification of Protocol No. 13 provides an excellent opportunity 
to explore the interplay of strategic action and unexpected events surrounding 
the Constitutional Court's decision at the dawn of the transition process, and to 
identify the permanent traces the Court's decision left on democratic institutions 
and constitutional rights. A glance at the Constitutional Court's decision in its 
broader context is hoped to contribute to understanding better the inner me-
chanics of abolitionist strategies for the benefit of future applications. Indeed, 
two important caveats shall be emphasized from among all lessons derived from 
the Hungarian success story. 
Retrospectively, the development of the safeguards against capital punish-
ment might seem as a stretch of self-evident consequences. Shortly following 
the Constitutional Court's decision,6 Hungary became a member of the Council 
of Europe and in two years, it ratified the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and its eight protocols, among them 
Protocol No. 6.7 
3
 References are to the Hungarian version. All translations from the Hungarian are mine. 
4
 Sólyom, L: To the Tenth Anniversary of Constitutional Review. 21-47, in: The 
Constitution Found? The First Nine Years of Hungarian Constitutional Review on Funda-
mental Rights (ed.: Halmai, G.). Budapest, 2000. 22 and note 3. E.g. in the South African 
Constitutional Court's decision abolishing capital punishment in S. v. Makwanyane, CCT 
3/94; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1995] ZACC 3 (6 June 1995) 
3
 Marginal political forces did indeed resort to the rhetoric of reinstitution. Such 
attempts are going to be discussed in their broader context in detail. 
6
 Hungary became a member of the Council of Europe on November 6, 1990. 
7
 The ratification took place on November 5, 1992; promulgated in Act No. 31 of 1993. 
Subsequently, Hungary ratified Protocol No. 11 on April 26, 1995 (promulgated in Act No. 
LESSONS FROM THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN HUNGARY 69 
Thereafter Hungary ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 and finally, Protocol No. 13 to the 
European Convention. The decision of the Constitutional Court abolishing capital 
punishment in Hungary was formative of this safety net proscribing capital 
punishment. This is not to suggest, however, that the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court found the ultimate constitutional justification to keep capital punishment 
outside the array of state-imposed criminal sanctions. The Constitutional Court 
was not unanimous in its holding. Except for a lone dissenter, Hungarian consti-
tutional justices agreed about the outcome of the case [i.e. the unconstitutionality 
of capital punishment], while they still differed about the reasons supporting a 
decision on unconstitutionality and filed concurring opinions accordingly. Indeed, 
the Hungarian capital punishment decision is a good example of a situation 
that could be characterized as a "incompletely theorized agreement" in Cass 
Sunstein's terminology.9 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court's decision provides an excellent 
opportunity to reflect upon the significance of symbolic founding gestures of 
times of transition the lasting effects of which permeate constitutional and 
democratic processes long after the fury and fever of transition has cooled. The 
present paper attempts to situate the decision of the Constitutional Court in its 
broader context, covering numerous domestic and international political, legal, 
judicial and intellectual influences and trends, which have delegitimized 'death 
talk' in post-communist Hungary. In matters of strong and diverging public 
sentiment, it is especially interesting to pay attention to the interplay of strategic 
moves and unexpected events reflecting on each other, thus creating strains of 
continuity essential for legitimizing stances taken by the agents and institutions 
of a new democracy. 
1. The immediate context of the Constitutional Court's decision abolishing 
capital punishment 
Although in Hungary capital punishment as a criminal sanction was available 
until 1990, at the time of its abolition the application of the death penalty was 
42 of 1998). Hungary also signed but has not ratified yet Protocol No. 12 concerning the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
8
 Ratified by Hungary on February 24, 1994, entered into force with respect to Hungary 
on May 24, 1994, promulgated by Act No. 2 of 1995. 
9
 See Sunstein, C.: Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, New York-Oxford, 1998. 
35-62. 
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fairly limited. Capital punishment it was available for the most severe crimes and 
executions were not numerous. At the time it was abolished, capital punishment 
was an alternative sanction for genocide and certain war crimes, the most serious 
instances of homicide (murder, typically aggravated murder), terrorism, 
hijacking and for various military offences. The Criminal Code prescribed 
capital punishment altogether in 18 instances, out of which 11 constituted 
military offences.10 Death penalty was not a mandatory sanction: it was always 
an alternative to imprisonment. One of the standard casebooks on criminal law 
suggested in 1980 that in society with a stabile government capital punishment 
may become superfluous, as life imprisonment might be an adequate alternative 
to capital punishment.11 According to official records in the last 40 years, 
altogether 636 executions were performed, out of which 393 sentences were for 
political or military crimes. Between 1980 and 1989 altogether 29 persons were 
sentenced to death (there were 5 or less executions per year), and executions 
were not performed in all cases. At the time the population of the country was 
around 10 million and around 200 sentences were handed down for voluntary 
manslaughter. 
These factors are not meant to trivialize the significance of the mere 
availability of capital punishment in a legal system. Still, it is important to see that 
prior to its abolition capital punishment was seen in Hungary as an extraordinary 
• 12 
criminal sanction: capital punishment was applied in a limited number of 
cases, capital sentences were subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, subject to 
executive pardon. 
1.1 Capital punishment and the Roundtable Talks 
The immediate context of the abolition of capital punishment in Hungary was 
the period of democratic transition in 1988-1989. The transition process was 
significantly influenced by the strategy and actions of the Communist Party 
10
 Capital punishment was provided for in the Criminal Code [Act No. 4 of 1978]. 
Persons who were below 20 at the time of committing the offence could not be executed 
[Art. 39(1) of the Criminal Code, while in force]; for military offences the age limit was 18 
years [Art. 126 of the Criminal Code, while in force]. The detailed rules on genocide and 
certain war crimes providing for capital punishment were contained in separate legislation. 
"Békés, I.—Földvári, J.—Gáspár, Gy.—Tokaji, Gy.: Magyar Büntetőjog, Altalános 
Rész [Hungarian Criminal Law, General Part]. Budapest, 1980. 338-339. 
12
 The Criminal Code emphasized that capital punishment was an extraordinary measure 
[Art. 84, while in force]. 
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before and during the Roundtable Talks.13 Important safeguards were introduced 
to protect fundamental rights already in the early days of democratic transition. 
Although abolition of capital punishment was not at the forefront of the Talks, 
the issue of abolition was notably in the air. For instance, during the debates of 
constitutional revision in the still-communist parliament a former speaker of the 
communist legislature felt it necessary to note that he was for the abolition of 
capital punishment. As this episode clearly suggests that abolitionist voices were 
present in the discourse. 
As surprising as it may sound, the Communist Party was not keen on 
preserving the death penalty. Indeed the last Communist minister of justice, 
Kálmán Kulcsár—entering office in June 1988—was an abolitionist. Recently 
he recalled that while criminal courts still handed down death sentences in June 
1988 and the last execution took place one day before he entered office, the 
Presidium of the Communist Party agreed to granting pardon to all offenders 
sentenced to death. This de facto moratorium lasted until the Constitutional 
Court abolished capital punishment in 1990. Nonetheless, while the Communist 
Party did not make efforts to preserve capital punishment, the Party did not 
propose the overall abolition of capital punishment during the Roundtable Talks 
either. 
In the course of the roundtable negotiations the abolition of the death penalty 
received little attention from the opposition. Documents reveal that when 
drafting the new constitutional rules on fundamental rights, the Communist 
Party was willing to act on the proposals of the opposition.14 Instruments of 
human rights protection were often consulted by the participants of the Round-
table Talks and many provisions of the Hungarian Constitution concerning 
rights are translations of similar provisions of international instruments. The 
ICCPR was ratified by and promulgated in Hungary,15 at the time of the 
Roundtable Talks, however, Hungary did not belong in the Council of Europe. 
In addition to relying on instruments of human rights protection in the process 
13
 For a concise overview of the Hungarian Roundtable Talks see András Sajó's report 
in: Hungary in The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (ed.: Elster, J.). 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996. The annotated documents of the Roundtable 
Talks were published in Hungarian in multiple volumes in: A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, 
Kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben [The Script of Transition, Roundtable Talks in 1989]. 
Budapest, 1999. 
14
 The written proposal of the opposition is not available. A rendszerváltás forgató-
könyve... op. cit., vol. 6, 107, note 63. The consent of the Communist Party is expressed in 
the minutes of the meeting of August 2, 1989. A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve... op. cit., vol. 
6, 101. 
15
 Law-decree No. 8 of 1976. 
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of constitution making, outside the Talks there was a movement to raise human 
rights awareness and to direct attention to human rights instruments and 
'rights talk'. For instance, the Alliance of Liberal Democrats (an opposition 
movement turned into a political party) organized a rally on the occasion of the 
200th anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1789. Such meetings certainly had the function of keeping the 
public aware and informed about developments at the Talks. 
The draft of the Hungarian constitution's rights chapter under preparation 
prohibited only the arbitrary deprivation of life and human dignity, and did not 
preclude deprivation of life per se.16 The text was proposed by the Communist 
Party. Indeed, the provision is a translation of Art. 6 (1) of the ICCPR. The 
opposition accepted the proposal of the Communist Party and the draft was 
adopted as Art. 54 (1) in the democratic constitution in identical terms. The 
minutes of the drafting negotiations do not contain references to the abolition of 
capital punishment.'7 Despite the obvious limitations of its language, in the 
circumstances the fact that the proposed constitutional provision on the right to 
life and human dignity was a translation of an international instrument might 
have appeared as a sufficient safeguard of the right to life and dignity. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the participants of the Roundtable 
Talks, the Communist Party and the representatives of the opposition alike, were 
unaware of the shadow of capital punishment. In 1988-1989, at the time when 
the opposition movements started to become more and more visible, most 
political activities directed against the hegemony of the Communist Party were 
illegal and the majority of them constituted a serious crime [typically treason, 
felony and alteration of the existing regime of governance (conspiracy, et al.)]. 
During the Talks, the Communist government moved to partially decriminalize 
acts that could affect the existing system of government. Although by the time 
the amendment entered into force, the Opposition Roundtable had been in 
session since March 1989 and the National Roundtable had already started on 
June 10, 1989.18 
While capital punishment was abolished as a sanction for crimes against the 
state, under the existing rules of criminal law technically all participants of the 
Roundtable Talks and those who actively worked on behalf of the new 
16
 For the text of the proposal of the Communist Party (draft of the Ministry of the 
Justice) see Л rendszerváltás forgatókönyve... op. cit., vol. 6, 115-116, note 6. 
17
 In the minutes of the meeting of the experts' sub-committee [sub-committee 1/1 
dealing with constitutional revision] there is no record of any discussion concerning the 
language of Art. 54 ( 1 ). 
18
 Act No. 16 of 1989 as promulgated and entered into force on June 15, 1989. 
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opposition could have been prosecuted for 'conspiracy'. Retrospectively it is 
possible to argue that participants of the Roundtable Talks most probably could 
not have been charged with the more serious degree of conspiracy (armed 
conspiracy or wartime conspiracy) that was subject to capital punishment before 
the amendment of the Criminal Code. Certainly, today's wisdom was not so 
apparent in the summer of 1989, not even in the light of the Communist govern-
ment's self-imposed moratorium on executions. Still, the Communist govern-
ment's move to amend the Criminal Code was regarded as a sufficient safeguard 
against prosecution, at least at the initial stage of the Talks. Nonetheless, even 
after the Criminal Code's amendment, participants of a conspiracy endangering 
the existing political, social or economic regime could be subject to 2-8 years 
of incarceration while organizers could have been incarcerated for 5-15 year 
(Art. 139 (l)-(2), Criminal Code). Arguably, activities like attending the Talks 
or assisting the Talks most probably would have sufficed for the application of 
these provisions. Therefore, it is not surprising that amending certain provision 
of the Criminal Code on crimes against the state was a major issue during the 
Roundtable Talks. 
Indeed, participants of the Roundtable Talks—while drafting the funda-
mentals of a future, constitutional government—had to create a legal framework 
which guaranteed their personal security during the Roundtable Talks. Also, the 
constitutional and legal rules devised had to be such as to provide sufficient 
safeguards after the elections following the Talks, independent of the outcome 
of the first democratic elections. Experts' sub-committees negotiated and drafted 
new rules applicable to elections, political parties; were developing amendments 
to provision on crimes against the state in the Criminal Code and had to create 
safeguards against aggressive political actions, and constitutional amendments 
necessary thereto. It was clear for all sides of the Talks that the amendment of 
the Criminal Code on crimes against the state necessitated a constitutional 
amendment. The committee of experts was focusing on crimes against the state 
and crimes restricting the freedom of speech.19 Apart from rules on specific 
crimes, procedural guarantees in criminal procedure were a major concern for 
the participants of the Talks.20 
While crimes against the state were exempted from capital punishment due 
to the Talks, this development is best characterized as a side effect of the Round 
Table negotiations. Although the political forces did not prefer the retention of 
the death penalty, neither the Communist Party, nor the opposition forces moved 
14
 A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve... op. cit. [minutes of a meeting on August 24, 1989 
(Kutrucz, K.)], vol. 3, 375. 
20
 See e.g. ibid. (Hack, P., Kutrucz, K.)], vol. 3, 376, 386. 
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to abolish capital punishment altogether. The parties agreed that the new consti-
tution should contain a provision on the protection of the right to life (i.e. Art. 
54(1)). The wording of the provision as adopted is based on Art. 6(1) of the 
ICCPR, a respectable international human rights instrument, although it does not 
preclude capital punishment per se. Note, however, that the provision was 
drafted at a time when a de facto moratorium on executions was already in force. 
1.2 Beyond the Roundtable: strategic action and unintended consequences 
Despite all promising developments, in the course of the Roundtable Talks the 
participants did not move to abolish capital punishment altogether. At this time 
the issue of de iure abolition of capital punishment was addressed by a single-
issue pressure group formed predominantly by lawyers: the League Against 
Capital Punishment [Halálbüntetést Ellenzők Ligája].21 In the beginning of 
1989, immediately after such political movements were legalized," the League 
Against Capital Punishment became very visible in mainstream press. News-
papers ran short notes on the first session of the League, published interviews 
and essays by the founders of the organization. These pieces presented a variety 
of arguments known from the international abolitionist discourse. It was also 
reported in the news that the League petitioned the Presidium of the Communist 
Party about the de iure abolition of the death penalty. The significance of the 
actions of the League Against Capital Punishment was also acknowledged on 
the international scene." In the meantime, papers also ran views from the 
retentionist side. 
It is interesting to note that the League Against Capital Punishment placed 
the abolition of capital punishment in the context of the Hungarian liberal 
tradition. References were made to the works of 19th century legal academics 
Körösényi, A.: A magyar politikai rendszer [The Hungarian Political System (in 
Hungarian)]. Budapest, 1998. 181. Besides the League Against Capital Punishment a number 
of single-issue organizations appeared on the political scene in 1988-1989. For the problems 
of the formation and operation of political associations in Hungary before such political 
associations were expressly legalized at the beginning of 1989 see Halmai, G.: Az egyesülés 
szabadsága, Az egyesülési jog története [Freedom of Association, The History of the 
Freedom of Association], Budapest, 1990. 
"That happened when the Communist Parliament passed Act No. 3 of 1989 on the 
freedom of association in early 1989. See also Elster, J.—Offe, C.—Press, U. K. et al.: 
Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 70. 
See e.g. Amnesty International, Al-index: ACT 50/006/1997 at http://www.web. 
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT500061997 [last visited on March 2, 2004]. 
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and politicians committed to liberal ideals (Ferenc Deák, Bertalan Szemere). For 
instance, in 1990 the League against Capital Punishment published, more 
precisely, reprinted Szemere's essay, an elegant and brilliant exposition of 
abolitionist views originally written in 1839 for an essay competition organized 
by the Hungarian Society of Sciences. Szemere's abolitionist essay won the 
competition and had a major influence on the understanding of criminal law and 
justice in the second half of the 19th century in Hungary. The draft criminal 
code of 1843 is an example of that development. Although the draft code was 
never enacted into law, it is noteworthy, that it did not contain capital punish-
ment among criminal sanctions."4 
While the League Against Capital Punishment had a well-planned and 
straightforward abolitionist strategy, unforeseen and unintended developments 
had a major positive effect on the success of their case. In the public discourse 
the reconsideration of the 1956 revolution and the need to serve justice to the 
victims of 1956, primarily to Prime Minister Imre Nagy, became strongly 
associated with the abolitionist cause. The execution of Imre Nagy and his 
accomplices became the most exposed unjust execution of the Communist 
regime, giving thrust to arguments promoting the abolition of capital punish-
ment. 
Without discussing the details and the vast literature of the subject, it is 
important to point out the relevance of the 1956 revolt and the execution of Imre 
Nagy from the perspective of democratic transition in Hungary. During the 
Communist era the events of 1956 revolt were usually characterized as a 
'counter-revolution'. In the course of the Communist Party's reform attempts, 
the Party moved to evaluate the past 30 years of its operation. It was in this 
context that Imre Pozsgay, the chairman of the sub-committee dealing with 
historical inquiry, stated in a talk on the radio on January 28, 1989 that "based 
upon recent research the events of 1956 constituted a popular revolt". The 
position taken by Pozsgay—a high ranking Communist Party politician—clearly 
indicated a reversal in the Communist Party's long-held position regarding the 
significance of the events of 1956. Reactions followed promptly. Independent 
political organizations were welcoming the Communist Party's re-evaluation of 
25 
the 1956 events in a memorandum." As it turned out later, the memorandum 
was signed by all major political organizations that later took part in the 
Szemere, В.: A büntetésről s különösebben a halálbüntetésről [On Punishment and in 
Particular, on Capital Punishment]. Budapest, 1990. 
2S
 See the memorandum of February 18, 1989. A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve... op. cit., 
vol. 1,50-51. 
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Roundtable Talks. Public discourse on the reconsideration of the events of 1956 
immediately started to flourish and continued all along the Talks. 
The failed 1956 revolution was transformed into a symbol of democratic 
transition.26 In 1989, the essence of 1956 was represented by the execution of 
Imre Nagy and his accomplices. The rehabilitation of Prime Minister Imre Nagy 
evolved into a political issue of considerable significance. Over 200 000 people 
were present at the public funeral (reburial) of the unjustly executed. The funeral 
was one of the first instances when the Communist Party refrained from inter-
fering with the large-scale assembly in a public space organized by the opposition 
forces.27 Irreparable injustice committed by a branch of government in the name 
of law has never been more apparent than at the reburial ceremony. 
Over the years the reburial of late Prime Minister Imre Nagy has been 
transformed into a 'narrative' shared by many political movements. It became a 
complex symbol of democratic transition in Hungary and as a symbol it helped 
establish continuity in public memory within Hungarian history via reposi-
tioning (re-emploting) the 1956 revolt. The formation of the new democratic 
government was announced on October 23, 1989, on the anniversary of the 1956 
revolution and October 23 also became one of the three major national holidays. 
Academic institutions were founded to investigate the events of 1956. Further-
more, as government agencies and civil organizations relied on the events of 1956 
in the course of demanding and designing restitution, it was also institutionalized 
in a more indirect sense. Numerous victim groups were formed and they 
became very visible in the media, their action and inaction was also attributed 
28 
meaning. 
In the long run the discourse and re-evaluation of 1956 left its imprint on the 
fundamental structures of post-Communist politics in Hungary.29 While the 
League against Capital Punishment did not refer to the 1956 revolution and the 
executions, the reburial and the rehabilitation of the executed directed attention 
26
 See e.g. Fletcher, G. P.: Searching for the Rule of Law in the Wake of Communism, 
Brigham Young Law Review, 1992. Vol. 1992, 146-150. 
27
 The reburial of Imre Nagy's companions took place on June 16, 1989. On July 6 of 
1989 the Supreme Court acquitted the executed prime minister and his accomplices. 
"
8
 Körösényi: op. cit., 180. (Note that the scope of the restitution legislation covers 
crimes committed in the period of 1944-1990.) 
' Also see Éva Kovács finding that the 'Imre Nagy narrative' shifted over the years from 
being a victim narrative to a perpetrator narrative and was then inflated into an alibi to 
support political endeavors. According to Kovács this transformation (inflation) was fueled 
by revenge. See Kovács, E.: íme az Istennek ama báránya, aki elveszi a világ bűneit. Etűd a 
rendszerváltó mítoszokról [Essay on the Myths of Transition], Világosság, 2000. Vol. 41/6-
7, 28, 35. 
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on the cause of abolition of the death penalty. Although these developments 
were not calculated by the League, the re-evaluation of the events of 1956, and 
the reburial of Imre Nagy and his accomplices served as the strongest argument 
against retaining capital punishment. 
In Hungary the impact of the 1956 revolution and Imre Nagy provided 
unexpected, yet, significant in fueling the abolitionist cause in the public 
discourse. History and reflection on history created a context that prompted 
political actors to remove capital punishment from the system of criminal 
30 
justice and to prevent the restoration thereof in Germany as well. Memory of 
past injustice, however, does not command an evident case for abolition of 
capital punishment. In South Africa capital punishment was regarded my many 
31 
as a symbol of terror and political oppression. Death penalty was applied 
32 
disproportionately, primarily against black South Africans. ~ Being mindful of 
this history of capital punishment one might have expected strong resistance 
against the death penalty. When the South African Constitutional Court 
abolished capital punishment under the interim constitution in R. v. 
Makwcmyane, the terms of the final constitution were still in the making. 200 
000 petitions—one tenth of all petitions—requested the drafters of the final 
constitution to restore capital punishment. The amount of petitions is still 
shocking in itself as the restoration of capital punishment was the third item on 
the top-list—following the petition to preserve Afrikaans as an official 
language and keeping the parliament in Cape Town.33 The contrast between the 
Hungarian, German and South African experiences, therefore, is an important 
warning for movers of national abolitionist movements when it comes to tying 
the ropes of past injustice, memory, hopes and expectations into an applicable 
strategy. 
30
 See Art. 104 of the Basic Law precluding capital punishment. 
31
 Bogie, D.: Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the United States and the New 
Republic of South Africa. Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law, 1996. Vol. 
3, 229, 230 and 233. 
32
 Bouckaert, P.: Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital Punishment 
in South Africa. Stanford Journal of International Law, 1996. Vol. 32, 287, 313. 
33
 Gloppen, S.: South Africa, The Battle over the Constitution. Aldershot, Darthmouth-
Ashgate, 1997. 257. 
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2. The Constitutional Court's decision abolishing capital punishment: the 
essential content of the right to life and dignity 
The decision abolishing capital punishment is one of the first major judgments 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.34 The challenge against the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment did not surprise the justices: the abolitionists 
made their case visible in the public discourse. Indeed, by the time the justices 
of the Constitutional Court entered office, the petition filed by the League 
Against Capital Punishment was already awaiting them.35 For the benefit of the 
Constitutional Court the League Against Capital Punishment 
"set forth in detail the European traditions of the movement against capital 
punishment, offered a survey of the state of capital punishment and its 
abolition, respectively, in the world, treated the history of capital punishment 
in Hungary, and discussed the reason for its abolition".36 
Although the procedure of the Constitutional Court is not constrained by 
deadlines, the constitutional justices decided the case within 9 months. 
(a) The case reached the Constitutional Court in the period when the Court's 
procedure was still under formation. Before deciding the case the Constitutional 
Court requested the expert opinion of various prominent lawyers.37 The law 
professors argued that capital punishment was cruel and unusual punishment and 
urged the Constitutional Court to abolish capital punishment on substantive 
grounds. It was also submitted that the availability of capital punishment has no 
38 
effect on crime in society. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the 
34
 An English translation of the decision is available in Sólyom, L.-Brunner, G.: 
Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy, The Hungarian Constitutional Court, Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 118-138. 
35
 With five justices, the Constitutional Court started its operation in January, 1990. The 
first judgment was handed down on February 12, 1990. The League Against Capital Punish-
ment submitted its petition on January 17, 1990 challenging the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. By the time the death penalty case was decided, the Constitutional Court had 9 
justices on the bench. 
36
 Horváth, T.: Abolition of Capital Punishment in Hungary. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
1991. 153, 155. 
37
 Since the early cases it has been the general practice of the Constitutional Court to 
request expert opinions from a wide variety experts, or to request the opinion of relevant 
government agencies. See Holló, A.: Az Alkotmánybíróság, Alkotmánybíráskodás Magyaror-
szágon [The Constitutional Court, Constitutional Review in Hungary]. Budapest, 1997. 98. 
Professors Tibor Horváth and András Sajó who were requested by the Constitutional Court to 
provide expert opinions were also founding members of the League Against Capital 
Punishment. 
38
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 90. 
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Attorney General appeared in a hearing in front of the Court. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court submitted that according to his moral and legal convictions 
the death penalty is unacceptable and it cannot be justified as a criminal 
39 
sanction. 
While taking a clearly abolitionist position, the Attorney General also 
mentioned that the constitutional provision on the right to life and dignity (Art. 
54(1)) did not form a sufficient ground for deciding the case. The Attorney 
General argued that the Constitution's right to life provision should be read in 
conjunction with the clause on permissible limitations on fundamental rights. 
The Attorney General also submitted that the most legitimate forum for taking a 
decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty would be the parliament, 
nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has sufficient legislative authorization to 
decide the case.40 
(b) The Constitutional Court's decision is very concise: following the 
assessment of the relevant constitutional provisions, the reasoning itself hardly 
exceeds two printed pages. Eight out of nine constitutional justices concurred in 
judgment, while one justice filed a dissenting opinion.41 The Constitutional 
Court read the constitutional provision on the right to life and dignity [Art. 
54(1)]42 in conjunction with the Constitution's limitation clause which prohibits 
the tampering of the essential content of constitutional rights [Art. 8(2)].43 The 
Constitutional Court found that as the imposition of capital punishment allows 
for the total and irreparable extinguishing of the right to life and human dignity, 
capital punishment constitutes a limitation on the essential content of the right to 
life. Thereupon the Constitutional Court established that capital punishment was 
unconstitutional.44 The Constitutional Court thus abolished capital punishment 
upon general, substantive considerations. This way the Court did not review the 
procedural safeguards guiding the application of capital punishment, and the 
34
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 90. 
40
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 90. 
41
 Dissenting opinions are authorized in Art. 26 of the Act on the Constitutional Court 
[Act No. 32 of 1989]. The dissent shall be filed with written reasons. Justices may also 
submit concurring opinions to the judgment as a matter of Court practice. The capital 
punishment case was the first decision in which the justices filed concurring opinions. 
4
" Art. 54(1) of the Constitution provides that "in the Republic of Hungary everyone has 
the right to life and dignity, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of ' . 
43
 Art. 8(2) of the Constitution provides that "in the Republic of Hungary fundamental 
rights and obligations shall be regulated in act of parliament, the essential content of 
fundamental rights may not be limited". 
44
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 92. 
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Court also refrained from analyzing the details of the practice of death 
sentencing. 
(c) The aspect of the judgment which subjected the reasoning followed by 
the Constitutional Court to criticism was indicated by the Constitutional Court's 
reasoning.45 The justices pointed to that the tension between the Constitution's 
provision on the right to life and dignity [Art. 54(1)] on the one hand, and the 
general limitation clause [Art. 8(2)] on the other. The majority opinion makes it 
clear that while the Court relied on its interpretation in abolishing the death 
penalty, it was the duty of the parliament (in its capacity of a constitution-
maker) to resolve the tension within the constitutional text.46 
In his dissent Justice Schmidt argued that it was ultra vires of the Constitu-
tional Court to resolve this tension via inteipretation, since an interpretation of 
this kind amounts to constitution-making. Dissenting Justice Schmidt, did not 
question the legitimacy of judicial review as a means of deciding about the 
abolition of capital punishment. The dissent is based on the argument that it is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to resolve a contradiction 
within the text of the constitution. According to the dissent, the most the 
Constitutional Court could do when facing such a textual deficiency is calling 
the attention of the constitution maker (parliament in the Hungarian case) to the 
problem. According to the dissent, lack of jurisdiction would however not 
preclude the Court from disclosing its arguments against capital punishment.47 
Justice Schmidt unfortunately did not elaborate on the possible implications of 
this position. In this context it is important to note that although the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has a power to hand down advisory opinions in cases of 
abstract constitutional interpretation, following the decision abolishing capital 
punishment the Court has construed this jurisdiction narrowly 48 
(d) The tension generated by the relevant constitutional provisions is easy to 
trace 49 Art. 54(1) on the right to life clearly allows for instances of non-arbitrary 
45
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. Note that this finding is in the reasoning 
of the decision, and not in the holding. 
46
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. 
47
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 94-95. 
48
 Arts. 1(g) and 21(6) of the Act on the Constitutional Court. See 31/1990 (XII. 18.) AB 
decision holding that upon a request for constitutional interpretation the Court is going to 
answer a constitutional question in the context of an actual problem. Note also that standing 
to request abstract constitutional interpretation is limited. 
44
 For a detailed analysis of this tension and the possibility of its resolution see Kis, J.: 
Az első magyar Alkotmánybíróság értelmezési gyakorlata [The First Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court's Practice of Interpretation], 48-98, in: The Constitution Found? (ed.: Halmai). 
52-58. 
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deprivation of life. The limitation clause [Art. 8(2)] at the same time precludes 
any limitation on the essential content of constitutional rights. In the case the 
Court found that any deprivation of life is arbitrary per se. 
János Kis argues convincingly that the construction chosen by the Court 
violates basic rules of constitutional construction and in essence alters the text of 
the constitution.50 Furthermore, according to Kis the Court could have relied on 
the narrow reading of both the right to life provision and the limitation clause.51 
Although this solution would have eliminated the tension within the c< insti-
tutional text, it does not resolve the issue of constitutionality of capital punish-
ment. More precisely, it does not offer a general, substantive resolution. Instead, 
it would have directed the Constitutional Court to test the arbitrariness of the 
rules of procedure and the practical application thereof. As another viable 
alternative Kis submits that the justices could have argued that the Court's 
perception of the right to life as an inviolable, absolute right is based on 
generally accepted moral grounds. This solution would have accounted for yet 
another problematic premise of the decision. As Kis notes concerning the nature 
of deprivation of the right to life, it is important to see that all intentional acts 
resulting in the deprivation of life are 'total and irreparable' in the sense used by 
the Constitutional Court. 
(e) The Constitutional Court's reasoning did not enter into an analysis of 
moral considerations and shared beliefs about capital punishment in this manner. 
However, Chief Justice Sólyom's concurring opinion is a helpful guide in 
understanding how the Constitutional Court reached its interpretation of 
conflicting constitutional provisions. The introductory part of the Chief Justice's 
concurring reasons is entitled "The Liberty of the Constitutional Court in 
Concluding its Judgment".53 The Chief Justice argued that the Constitutional 
Court shall develop its own interpretation of the right to life and human dignity. 
This interpretation should be part of a coherent jurisprudence, a jurisprudence 
that is beyond the reach of daily politics, transcending the written constitution. 
This 'invisible constitution' shall be the standard of constitutionality applied by 
50
 Kis: loc. cit., 57. The Court equates 'arbitrary deprivation' with 'deprivation' of life. 
The concurring opinions dealt with the meaning of arbitrariness in detail. See the concurring 
opinion of Justices Lábady and Tersztyánszky at 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 
96 and Chief Justice Sólyom at 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 107. 
51
 Kis: op. cit., 58. 
52
 Kis: op. cit., 56. 
"23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 96. Chief Justice Sólyom's concurring 
opinion also appeared as a separate article as Sólyom, L.: A halálbüntetés ellen [Against 
Capital Punishment]. Világosság, 1990/12,908-915. 
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the Court. In creating the invisible constitution the Constitutional Court is 
constrained only by the requirements of constitutionalism.54 
The concept of the invisible constitution immediately became subject to 
criticism.55 Although the concept is one of the most-known jurisprudential 
premises developed by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in its practice the 
Constitutional Court did not rely on this technique of interpretation extensively.56 
Nonetheless, the Chief Justice's concurring opinion explains at least in part the 
Court's perception of its own role and its attitude towards the inconsistency 
faced in the abolition case. 
3. The aftermath of the Constitutional Court's decision 
The above analysis focused on the central argument of the abolition decision: on 
the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the right to life and dignity. The 
Court decided about the unconstitutionality of capital punishment in abstract 
terms and the relevant part of the reasoning is concise. Although the essence of 
the decision may be summarized very briefly, numerous additional points were 
made in the reasoning of the Court and in the concurring opinions. Most of these 
issues are relative to the broader context of the abolition of capital punishment 
and will be analyzed in the context of future developments. 
To begin with, the Constitutional Court's decision abolishing capital punish-
ment was formative of constitutional jurisprudence: the lasting effects of the 
Court's reasoning have become traceable in constitutional decisions ever since. 
Thus, the capital punishment decision—initially a benchmark of the success of 
democratic transition—slowly permeated constitutional jurisprudence thus 
triggering effects that last well past the early days of democratic institution 
building. 
54
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 97-98. 
55
 In the literature the concept of the invisible constitution was associated with sheer 
reliance on natural law. For a comparative analysis of the concept of the invisible constitu— 
tion as a technique of interpretation see e.g. Trang, D. V.: Beyond the Historical Justice 
Debate, The Incorporation of International Law and the Impact on Constitutional Structures 
and Rights in Hungary, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1995. Vol. 28, 33. 
56
 According to Kis it is possible to show that the Constitutional Court gave up on a 
natural law based theory in 1992 in the course of reviewing restitution legislation. Kis: op. 
cit., 64-65. Giving up on this approach, however, did not set back the Court's rights-
activism. 
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Furthermore, note that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and 
binding, they have an erga omnes effect.57 All provisions regulating capital 
punishment and listed in the Constitutional Court's decision were omitted from 
the books accordingly. In this sense, the judgment of the Court was self-
58 
executing. The Constitutional Court's decision, however, took the cooperation 
of the other branches while also supplying them with useful perspectives in a 
number of respects. To being with, the decision pointed to an inconsistency 
within the text of the Constitution, a matter awaiting resolution that might also 
require constitutional amendment. Second, with removing capital punishment 
from among criminal sanction, the Constitutional Court added new points of 
consideration for the coming reform of the Criminal Code. The Court's decision 
provided a set of principled underpinnings for governmental responses to a wave 
of violent crimes, an undesirable phenomenon to be dealt with in a newly 
emerging democracy. Outside the immediate context of criminal law and 
criminal policy making the Constitutional Court's decision also contributed to 
Hungary's entry into international organizations and undertaking international 
obligations that are conditioned upon a domestic observance of the dictates of 
the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
It is not to suggest that the Constitutional Court's decision set the course of 
events as a grand plan of action. Although some of the steps to be undertaken in 
pursuance of the Constitutional Court's decision were more or less foreseeable, 
the Court did not prescribe a strategy to be carried into execution by the political 
branches. Rather, the Constitutional Court's decision permeated the open 
discussion of public affairs and supplied the participants of the public discourse 
both with a framework of argument and a set of premises, infusing the ongoing 
exchange of ideas with a rhetoric of constitutionalism and rights talk. Participants 
of the discourse were free to rely on these premises and often responded to each 
other's moves using the Court's decision as a yardstick. The Constitutional 
Court's decision and international engagements undertaken by Hungary in its 
aftermath were used routinely and efficiently to undermine (otherwise marginal) 
attempts to restore capital punishment. These developments were crucial for 
democratic institution building and have been instrumental ever since as they 
57
 Art. 27 of the Act on the Constitutional Court. 
78
 In the course of the restitution process Act No. 17 of 1993 extended the scope of 
crimes exempt from the statute of limitations. Among the newly included crimes there were 
crimes which were already barred before 1993 and were subject to capital punishment. Act 
No. 17 of 1993 however abolished capital punishment for these crimes [Arts. 81-82]. 
Affirmed by the Constitutional Court in dictum in 2/1994 (I. 4.) AB decision, ABH 1994. 49. 
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clearly demonstrate the force of safeguards in curbing attempts to limit rights in 
the name of unsubstantiated fears and public sentiment. 
Due to the multiplicity of issues, it would be impossible to provide a detailed 
analysis of all potential aspects and consequences of the capital punishment 
decision. Instead, the following part attempts to draw a sketch of the develop-
ment that arose upon and in response to the Constitutional Court's decision 
abolishing capital punishment. 
3.1 Tension within the text of the Constitution 
In the capital punishment decision, the Constitutional Court pointed to a textual 
inconsistency within the Constitution itself. In addition, the Court noted that it 
was the duty of the legislative to resolve this tension. Although since 1990 
numerous constitutional amendments were passed, the Constitution's Art. 54(1) 
on the right to life and dignity allowing for a non-arbitrary deprivation of life 
has not been amended.59 Thus, the inconsistency of the constitutional text 
persists. This fact, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of the parlia-
ment's hesitance to commit to the abolition of capital punishment. From the 
perspective of the abolition of capital punishment the relevance of this tension, 
or the non-conclusive constitutional language has been minimized in 1993, when 
Hungary became a member of the Council of Europe, ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol No. 6 and was practically 
eliminated with the ratification of Protocol No. 13. As for the elimination of the 
tension that has been lingering around the text of the constitution ever since Art. 
54(1) was formulated, the bold spirits hope for more compelling language to 
appear in the new constitution to be adopted, the latest. 
3.2 The relevance of the decision in jurisprudence building: references to 
international trends and the multi-layered understanding of human dignity 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in the capital punishment case became 
formative for a number of techniques of constitutional reasoning and juris-
prudential concepts over the years. From the very start of its operation, the 
Constitutional Court consciously undertook a project of jurisprudence building. 
The decision abolishing capital punishment is a clear example of this endeavor, 
the traces of which are easy to identify in the Court's reasoning. On the one 
hand, in underscoring their conclusion the justices relied on sources of inter-
59
 Pursuant to Art. 24(3) of the Hungarian Constitution, Parliament may amend the 
Constitution with the concurrence of 2/3 of all MPs. 
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national human rights law. This methodological move was crucial in legitimizing 
the outcome reached in the case. As for the substantive aspect of the decision, in 
the case the Court continued to build the foundations of a constitutional juris-
prudence heavily informed by the protection of human dignity. As more recent 
decisions suggest, while the protection of human dignity is still of significance 
in Hungarian Constitutional jurisprudence, the Court's approach to human dignity 
has not been without uncertainties. 
(.International instruments of human rights protection.) At the time of the 
Constitutional Court's decision in the capital punishment case the ICCPR was 
the only major international instrument of human rights protection was that was 
ratified and promulgated in Hungary. As was mentioned before, the provision in 
the Hungarian Constitution protecting the right to life and human dignity against 
arbitrary deprivation (Art. 54(1)) follows the language of the ICCPR's Art. 6(1). 
Note, however, that in the capital punishment decision in addition to various 
provisions of the ICCPR the Constitutional Court did refer to European instru-
ments of human rights protection which Hungary did not ratify at the time. Sure, 
membership in the Council of Europe was literally days away, but it took almost 
an additional two years to ratify the European Convention itself. Therefore, it is 
interesting to investigate the reasons behind the Constitutional Court's reference 
to such international instruments of human rights protection. 
The Constitutional Court's reliance on the European Convention and Protocol 
No. 6 at the time cannot be explained with mounting international pressure. It 
was only in 1994 that the Council Europe made imposing a moratorium on 
executions a condition of accession for aspiring members, the moratorium being 
the first step on the road to abolition.60 Expectations were nowhere near what for 
instance Russia is exposed with regard to adopting Protocol No. 6,61 and it was 
years before abolition of capital punishment could have been presented as a 
silent precondition of EU accession, as was the case with regard to the Baltic 
republics.6" Thus, lacking international pressure the Court's references to 
international instruments are even more curious. 
60
 See Resolution 1044 (1994) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
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 For an insightful analysis on the relationship of Russia and the Council of Europe in 
the context of the death penalty see Ritter, К. H.: The Russian Death Penalty Dilemma: 
Square Pegs and Round Holes. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2000. 
Vol. 32, 129. 
6
" Capital punishment was abolished by legislative action in Estonia (1998) and Latvia 
(1999). In Lithuania capital punishment was abolished by the Constitutional Court (ruling of 
December 9, 1998). 
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Note that the Constitutional Court did not apply these international 
instruments to the issue before the Court. Rather, the justices referred to these 
instruments as indicators of an international trend towards the abolition of 
capital punishment.63 This finding might be a strong hint towards abandoning 
the view that the Court used these international human rights instruments as 
mere decorations. One has to keep in mind that the Constitutional Court was 
struggling with a prima facie tension between relevant constitutional provisions 
in one of its first major decisions. 
Whether it is permissible for a constitutional review forum to resolve a 
tension between relevant constitutional provisions is a question that runs to the 
core of any theory on constitutional adjudication. Interestingly, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court is not the only constitutional review forum that took a 
rather pragmatic approach avoiding such theoretical problems. In a recent case 
the South African Constitutional Court was of the opinion that 
"... A court must endeavor to give effect to all the provisions of the 
Constitution. It would be extraordinary to conclude that a provision of the 
Constitution cannot be enforced because of an irreconcilable tension with 
another provision. When there is tension, the courts must do their best to 
harmonize the relevant provisions, and give effect to all of them. ...,,&x 
In the capital punishment case the Hungarian Constitutional Court harmonized 
this tension in part via resorting to international human rights instruments. This 
solution might be seen as an example of the justices' aspiration to build a 
coherent jurisprudence, in conformity with foreign and international law and 
jurisprudence. The Hungarian Constitutional Court is certainly not the only 
"new" constitutional court to rely extensively on comparative analysis. In South 
Africa the drafters of the interim and then the final constitution regarded foreign 
and international examples as a source of guidance and external constraint on 
the interpretation of the constitution.65 The jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court is often informed by careful comparative analysis. 
In Hungary, in the constitutional jurisprudence of an emerging post-
communist constitutional democracy, international standards became important 
on the domestic scene as they provide an external reference point which is hard 
63
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. 
64
 United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa and others, 
(CCT23/02) 2003 (1) SA 495; 2002 (11) BCLR 1179; [2002] ZACC 21 (4 October 2002), 
para 83. 
65
 See Art. 35(1) of the interim Constitution, and Art. 39 of the final Constitution. Webb, 
H.: The Constitutional Court of South Africa. University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 1998. Vol. 1, 205, 208. 
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to question for those who intend to stay in mainstream public discourse.66 As 
Chief Justice Sólyom explained: 
"The adoption of constitutional notions and doctrines has not only provided 
a legitimate basis for the Constitutional Court but it has also compelled the 
challengers of a decision to enter into an internationally endorsed discourse 
with internationally impartial definitions."67 
In its jurisprudence the Hungarian Constitutional Court have ever since 
consulted foreign and international sources at some length, even in cases where 
the justices decided not to make explicit mention of the foreign example. Since 
the ratification of the European Convention the Constitutional Court routinely 
reviews the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and also pays 
attention to leading cases from established democracies. A detailed analysis of 
cases in which the Hungarian Constitutional Court consulted foreign or 
international jurisprudence, and the implications thereof, would far exceed the 
limits of the present analysis. The approach followed by the Constitutional Court 
in the capital punishment case nonetheless remains an important example of a 
conscious judicial effort of jurisprudence building in a democratic transition. 
As the Hungarian example shows, international human rights instruments can 
provide sound grounds for such an exercise even in such cases where inter-
national conventions cannot but stand as evidence on emerging international 
trends in the field of human rights. 
{Human dignity in Hungarian constitutional jurisprudence.) Reliance on inter-
national human rights instruments was not the only means of early jurisprudence 
building applied by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the capital punish-
ment decision. It was also in this case that the Constitutional Court established 
an important pillar of its jurisprudence on human dignity. Over the years the 
Constitutional Court established a 3-level system for the protection of 
constitutional rights which was followed by the Court until the late 1990's. 
Interestingly, in its initial form all three levels of rights protection were 
connected with an aspect of the right to human dignity. A gradual erosion of this 
tripartite system, an important cornerstone of which was laid down in the capital 
punishment case can be sensed in more recent decisions on homosexual 
sodomy68 or physician assisted suicide.69 
66
 On the significance of international sources in East European constitutional 
adjudication see Trang, op. cit., 1. 
67
 Sólyom: To the Tenth Anniversary of Constitutional Review, op. cit., 22. 
68
 Decision 37/2002 (IX. 4.) AB 
69
 Decision 22/2003 (IV. 28.) AB 
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In its jurisprudence the Constitutional Court distinguished three types of 
constitutional rights from the perspective of constitutionally permissible 
limitations (standards of review). In a sense the concept introduces a hierarchy 
of constitutional rights.70 On top of the imaginary hierarchy is the right to 
human life in indivisible unity with human dignity [Art. 54 (1), Constitution] 
that cannot be limited or restricted.71 This is how the Constitutional Court 
constructed the unity of right to life and dignity in the capital punishment case. 
And it was on this ground where the Constitutional Court held that capital 
punishment amounts to the total and irreparable annihilation of the right to life 
and human dignity. 
Note that the Hungarian Constitutional Court is not the sole constitutional 
review forum of the view that the constitutionality of capital punishment should 
be seen as a deprivation of human dignity. Justice Cory of the Canadian Supreme 
Court argued in Kindler v. Canada that 
"[t]he death penalty not only deprives the prisoner of all vestiges of human 
dignity, it is the ultimate desecration of the individual as a human being. It is 
the annihilation of the very essence of human dignity."72 
Also, the justices of the South African Constitutional Court found in 
Makwanyane that capital punishment violated the constitutional right to human 
73 
dignity. Such a view is not unprecedented even in the U.S. where Justice 
Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court famously said in his concurring opinion in 
Furman that 
"Although pragmatic arguments for and against the punishment have been 
frequently advanced, this longstanding and heated controversy cannot be 
explained solely as the result of differences over the practical wisdom of a 
particular government policy. At bottom, the battle has been waged on moral 
grounds. The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity 
of the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental 
inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members 
to death."14 (emphasis added) 
70
 Despite some similarities, the Hungarian concept is distinct from the German 
Constitutional Court's doctrine of objective hierarchy of values. 
71
 See also Holló, A.: Az Alkotmánybíróság létrejötte és hároméves működése [The 
Establishment of the Constitutional Court and its First Three Years of Operation]. 63-107, in: 
Alkotmánybíráskodás [Constitutional Adjudication] (ed.: Kilényi, G.). Budapest, 1993. 102. 
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 Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R 779, 817 (Cory, J.). 
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 S. v. Makwanyane, CCT 3/94; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1995] ZACC 3 
(6 June 1995). 
74
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Justice Brennan, concurring) In 4 
years, Justice Brennan repeated his views in dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
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In these cases, justices formulated their objections against capital punish-
ment in the context of human dignity. The most important difference between 
these positions and the understanding followed by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court is that unlike the other justices, the Hungarian justices understood the 
human dignity in unity with the right to life to be absolute and not allowing for 
any constitutionally acceptable limitation. In essence, the position developed by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court is echoes the words of Art. 1(1) of the 
German Basic Law declaring human dignity as inviolable. The major difference 
between the Hungarian and the German approach is that while the inviolability 
of human dignity is stated clearly in the German Basic Law, in Hungary Art. 
54(1) of the Constitution proscribes only arbitrary deprivations of the right to 
life and human dignity: the principle of inviolability of human dignity was 
established by the Constitutional Court. 
Except for the right to human dignity read in conjunction with the right to 
life, constitutional rights are subject to limitations in accordance with Art. 8(2) 
of the Constitution. Under the limitation clause the Court first reviews whether 
the challenged norm infringes the essential content of the right. If the limitation 
does not touch the essential content of the right in question, the Constitutional 
Court determines the constitutionality of the limitations by the so-called 'necessity-
proportionality' test. This approach is essentially similar to proportionality 
analysis widely applied by such courts as the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Canadian Supreme Court (Oakes test), the European Court of Human 
Rights or the European Court of Justice. 
In Hungarian jurisprudence the proportionality test applies not only to consti-
tutional rights mentioned expressly in the text of the Constitution, but also to 
constitutional rights that were derived from the so-called 'comprehensive 
(general) personality right' (a 'mother right') recognized by the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court derived the 'comprehensive (general) personality 
right' from the right to human dignity before the capital punishment decision.75 
The comprehensive personality right was derived from the right to human 
dignity read in conjunction with the right to life and was construed by the 
Court to protect the persons' decisional autonomy or self-determination. The 
comprehensive personality right has a subsidiary character: it may be invoked to 
(1976), the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital 
punishment. 
75
 8/1990 (IV. 23.) AB decision. At the time of the decision of this case, the petition for 
the abolition of the death penalty was already filed with the Court. 
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protect personal autonomy if there is no specific right enumerated in the 
constitution.76 
Although in the capital punishment decision the Constitutional Court did not 
mention the comprehensive personality right, in its jurisprudence of the Court 
applied a concept of human life and dignity which includes elements from the 
understanding of human life and dignity developed therein.77 The Constitutional 
Court relied on the broader concept of right to life and dignity also known as 
'comprehensive personality right' and 'right to personal autonomy' in a wide 
range of cases including the right to retain control over motions in civil cases,78 
to the right to privacy79 or the right to establish fatherhood in a civil case.80 
The Court also used the concept to establish its jurisprudence regarding 
81 82 
religious freedom or freedom of speech. " One may find that the Constitutional 
Court used the concept of right to life and dignity to widen the scope of rights 
protection via defining and redefining constitutional rights. 
Rights not belonging to the above mentioned categories may be limited at 
the wide discretion of the legislative. Limits imposed may not be arbitrary and 
shall treat persons as subjects with equal dignity [Arts. 54(1) and 70/A (1), 
83 
Constitution)]. " This standard is lower than the proportionality review applied 
under the limitation clause, essentially it calls for simple reasonableness review. 
The standard of treatment of persons as subjects with equal dignity is typically 
applied in cases where the law draws a distinction on a ground that is not 
mentioned expressly in the Constitution's non-discrimination clause [70/A(l), 
Constitution] or where discrimination was not made with regard to a consti-
tutional right. 
76
 Cf. Arts. 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law. See also the German Constitutional 
Court's decision in the Elfes case. 
77
 The Constitutional Court referred to these two decisions as founding decisions of the 
concept of 'comprehensive personality right' e.g. in 36/1994 (VI. 24.) AB decision 
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 9/1992 (I. 30) abolishing the prosecutor general's right to appeal for review of a final 
judgment in the interest of legality; 1/1994 (I. 7.) AB abolishing the prosecutor's right to 
intervene in civil procedures in the interest of legality. 
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 56/1994 (XI. 10.) AB decision. In the case the Court noted that although the constitution 
does not mention a right to privacy, it follows from the comprehensive personality right. 
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 75/1995 (XII. 21.) AB decision. 
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 4/1993 (II. 12.) AB decision. 
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 E.g. in 36/1994 (VI. 24.) AB decision; 20/1997 (III. 19) AB decision. 
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 See the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Sólyom in 35/1994 (VI. 24.) AB decision 
on agricultural lands, ABH 1994. 215-217. Also Kukorelli, I.: Az alkotmányozás évtizede 
[The Decade of Constitution-making], Budapest, 1995. 96-97. 
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The interplay between dignity as a constitutional right and equal dignity as a 
constitutional standard is best demonstrated by the Constitutional Court's 
approach towards restitution. The Court ruled in one of its first decision on the 
constitutionality of restitution, that restitution is an ex gratia donation and not a 
matter of constitutional right [e.g. dignity].84 Throughout its jurisprudence the 
85 
Court has been consistent about this premise. In the restitution cases the Court 
was of the view that when paying restitution the state does not settle claims in a 
legal sense, rather, it offers a grant. The government has a wide discretion in 
distributing such ex gratia donations. From a constitutional perspective this 
discretion is limited by the requirement of treating people as subjects with equal 
dignity. Partial restitution clearly satisfies this criterion, and so does periodical 
distribution of the amounts.86 The limits of legislative discretion were, however, 
revealed in a recent case where the Constitutional Court held that providing 
1 ООО 000 000 HUFs to one group of persons and 30 000 HUFs to the others 
87 
violates the standard of treatment of equal dignity. 
The standard of review in non-discrimination cases becomes problematic, 
when the Constitutional Court does not specify clearly its reasons for interfering 
with legislative discretion. This is what happened in the following cases: 
although the justices hinted that the challenged rules violated an aspect of 
human dignity, the Court did not offer a more detailed reasoning thus leaving 
88 
considerable room for doubt. In the incest case of 1999 the Constitutional 
Court found that the incest provision of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional 
to the extent it prohibited consensual homosexual sodomy between siblings. The 
challenged rule did not prohibit sodomy between heterosexual siblings. The 
decision of the Court in the incest case was based on the premise that the 
distinction drawn between homosexual and heterosexual siblings amounts to 
discrimination on "another ground' under Art. 70/A of the Constitution. In the 
84
 16/1991 (IV. 20.) AB decision. 
Note that as a rule the justices do acknowledge monetary relief as compensation for the 
infringement of dignity and for other non-material (non-pecuniary) damages. The Constitu-
tional Court heavily relied on its dignity jurisprudence in abolishing the statutory restrictions 
imposed by the Civil Code on the recovery for non-pecuniary damages. 34/1992 (VI. 1.) AB 
decision. 
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 28/1991 (VI. 3.) AB decision; 15/1993 (III. 12.) AB decision; 26/1993 (IV. 29.) AB 
decision; 1/1995 (II. 8.) AB decision; 22/1996 (VI. 25.) AB decision, 36/1998 (IX. 16.) AB 
decision; 46/2000 (XII. 14.) AB decision. 
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 16/1991 (IV. 20.) AB decision. 
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 46/2000 (XII. 14.) AB decision. 
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 Decision 20/1999 (VI. 25.) AB. 
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1999 decision the Court found that the distinction in the Criminal Code was not 
based an objective and reasonable justification. 
89 
Thereafter, in the homosexual sodomy case the Constitutional Court was 
dealing with a challenge concerning provisions of the Criminal Code setting a 
different age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual. The Court found that 
the in the sodomy provisions the distinction based upon sexual orientation. 
Sexual orientation pertains to the core of human dignity, thus, any distinction 
between persons in this respect shall be justified by particularly serious reasons. 
Still, the Constitutional Court held that the applicable standard of review is not 
the one under the necessity—proportionality test, instead, the Court decided to 
follow its approach in the incest case and applied a "reasonableness" test. Thus, 
while the Constitutional Court did place sexual orientation in the context of 
human dignity, keeping the standard of review at the lowest level is a clear sign 
of hesitation as to the proper approach to be followed. Such an uncertainty was 
preserved despite the unique significance of the protection of human dignity 
once emphasized by the Constitutional Court. 
The tripartite approach, providing different levels of constitutional protection 
to various aspects of human dignity is not without further problems. It was in the 
90 
abortion cases where the Constitutional Court acknowledged the collision 
between the right to autonomy (self-determination) and the state's interest to 
protect the life of the fetus. In the abortion cases the Constitutional Court 
refused to follow the language absolutes used in the capital punishment case, as 
such an approach would have resulted in a complete ban on non-therapeutic 
abortions. This solution was in part reached on the ground that the Constitu-
tional Court was not ready to declare that the fetus was a person under the 
Constitution with all rights protected therein. Instead, the Constitutional Court 
emphasized that this decision was for the constitution-maker or the legislator to 
take. In the case, the Court performed a balancing act between the woman's self-
determination derived from her human dignity on the one hand, and the state's 
duty to protect the life of the fetus on the other hand. The state's duty to protect 
unborn human life was derived from Art. 8(1) of the Constitution and is 
commonly associated with the state's duty to provide for (institutional) 
guarantees necessary for the enjoyment of constitutional rights (institutional 
protection). 
The limits of this balancing act applied successfully in the abortion cases 
without compromising the absolute of human dignity as recognized in the 
capital punishment decision were nonetheless highlighted in the Constitutional 
89
 Decision 37/2002 (IX. 4.) AB. 
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 64/1991 (XII. 17.) AB and 48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB. 
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Court's recent decision concerning the constitutionality of physician assisted 
suicide.41 In the euthanasia case the Constitutional Court found that the decision 
to end one's life with the active participation of a physician does not belong to 
the essential content (core) of the right to self-determination (autonomy). The 
limitation imposed by this prohibition must be in line with Art. 8(2) and shall be 
tested under a necessity-proportionality test. According to the longstanding 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the limitation of a fundamental right is 
acceptable if the protection of another fundamental right or liberty, or the 
92 
protection of a constitutional value cannot be achieved by other means. In the 
case of euthanasia the limitations imposed on the right to self-determination 
(autonomy) derive from the obligation of the state to protect human life, as 
expressed in Art. 8(1) of the Constitution. It is the duty of the state to establish 
such procedures (safeguards) that protect the integrity of the terminally ill 
patient's decision and eliminate the effects of potential interference by family 
members, friends and medial professionals on the patient's decision. The 
appropriateness of the procedure established by law depends on the current state 
of human medicine, the overall quality of health care infrastructure and the 
availability of well-trained professionals to examine the patient's decision and to 
carry it out. 
Note that in the euthanasia case the Court departed from its jurisprudence 
and found that the unity of the right to life and human dignity does not apply in 
contexts where one's life is taken by another person. In the context of euthanasia 
this approach is problematic. Although referring to the accomplice might seem 
as an obvious observation, it seems to avoid the core of the intellectual and 
constitutional problem presented by the relationship of the right to life, human 
dignity and self-determination (autonomy) in the euthanasia context. In the long-
standing jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the right to self-determination 
was derived from the unity of the right to life and human dignity, and not from 
human dignity alone. It was the inviolable unity of the right to life and human 
dignity that made it possible for the Court to declare capital punishment 
unconstitutional in its historic decision. After all, the very wording of Art. 54(1) 
of the Constitution securing protection for the right to life and dignity provides 
not only that these rights are inherent, but also that they might be subject to 
deprivations other than arbitrary ones. In the capital punishment case the 
Constitutional Court indicated an inherent tension in the language of Art. 54(1) 
of the Constitution, a tension which has not been resolved yet. This textual 
91
 Decision 22/2003 (IV. 28.) AB. 
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 See decision 30/1992 (V. 26.) AB. 
94 RENÁTA UITZ 
uncertainty could be yet another reason for constitutional anxiety, when the 
Court is departing from its long established jurisprudence with such ease. 
3.3 Criminal law after the abolition of capital punishment 
In addition to calling for the amendment of the constitution, the Constitutional 
Court remarked in its decision that the abolition of capital punishment necessitates 
the reconsideration of the system of criminal sanctions.93 The Constitutional 
Court was not the first to raise the idea of recalibration. As that was already 
mentioned, the reform of the criminal justice system was under consideration 
since the Roundtable Talks and the democratically elected political forces also 
found it necessary. When talking about the potential abolition of capital 
punishment before the Constitutional Court's decision, Minister Balsai also 
mentioned the need to reform the system of criminal sanctions as a logical 
consequence of removing death penalty. The large scale, strategic reform of 
criminal sanctions and sentencing along with adjustments called for by the 
Constitutional Court's decision abolishing capital punishment did not 
commence until 1993.94 
The Criminal Code provides that while observing the aim of criminal punish-
ment, sentences should correspond with the seriousness of the offence, the 
degree of culpability and other aggravating and mitigating factors [Art. 83, 
Criminal Code]. Depending on the personality of the offender and the motive of 
the crime committed, the judge may depart from the provisions prescribing the 
form of incarceration [Art. 45(2), Criminal Code], Prior to 1993, as an exception, 
the judge was entitled to apply a sentence lower than the one prescribed in the 
Criminal Code, provided, that even the lowest sanction was too sever in the 
circumstances [Art. 87, Criminal Code]. In 1993 criminal judges were granted 
more discretion in sentencing: the rule for reducing sentences below the level 
prescribed by the Criminal Code was made a rule of general application.95 The 
amendment was expected to result in more individualized criminal sentences. 
93
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990. 93-94. See also the concurring opinion of Justice 
Szabó at 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990. 109. 
94
 Act No. 17 of 1993 
The criminal law reform is a comprehensive one and far exceeds the reconsideration of 
the system of sanctions and transitional justice legislation. For the purposes of the present 
paper the changes in the system of sanctions and sentencing are the most relevant aspects of 
the reform. 
95 
Act No. 17 of 1993, Art. 19 (1). As in other cases, the discretion of criminal courts is 
guided by the decisions and guidelines of the Supreme Court. 
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The legislature intended to rely on the internal mechanisms of the criminal 
justice system in readjusting the system of criminal sanctions.96 
According to the chief prosecutor for the capital city, Hungarian criminal 
sentences are harsh compared to similar sentences in Western Europe, although 
in the meantime Hungarian crime rates are lower compared to Western 
democracies. He added that in Hungary, unlike in many Western states criminal 
sanctions other than incarceration are not regarded as punishment in the public 
eye. However, the government's survey of the effects of the 1993 amendment 
97 
made in 1997 suggested that criminal sentences were still very light. 
The government believed that elevating already existing terms of imprison-
ment in the Criminal Code was not going to result in heavier sentences. Instead, 
a set of amendments changed the rules applicable to sentencing, parole and 
probation, reducing sentences, accumulation and life imprisonment.98 Since 
the 1998 amendment life imprisonment means a minimum of 20 years in a 
maximum security prison.99 
The first day of possible release shall be determined by the trial court. Further-
more, in its judgment the trial court may preclude the release of the convict 
100 
sentenced to life imprisonment. In effect, this rule of sentencing introduced 
real life imprisonment in Hungary in 1998. However, note that life imprison-
ment never stands as a mandatory sentence under the Hungarian Criminal Code. 
Note that the German Constitutional Court found real life imprisonment un-
constitutional in 1977. Relying on its dignity jurisprudence in the case, the 
German Constitutional Court attributed special significance to physical and 
psychological factors ['hope'] in preserving the inmate's dignity. In addition, it 
is important to note that the German Constitutional Court found it imperative 
that life imprisonment be backed up with a coordinated parole policy as opposed 
to an individualized, merit based parole system. While Hungarian constitutional 
96
 Art. 87(2) of the Criminal Code defined the lowest possible term of imprisonment in 
reduced sentences. 
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 See official commentary to Act No. 73 of 1997 introducing the first wave of amend-
ments to the rules on sentencing. 
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 Official commentary of Act No. 87 of 1998 amending the rules on sentencing. The 
amendments were enacted by Act No. 73 of 1997 and Act No. 87 of 1998. 
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 Art. 47/A(2) of the Criminal Code as amended in 1998. For crimes to which the statue 
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incarceration, the convict is released on parole. 
Before 1998 life imprisonment meant incarceration with the possibility of parole not 
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justices tend to listen to the wisdom of German constitutional jurisprudence, it 
remains to be seen whether such arguments would have similar weight before 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court once the constitutionality of the current rules 
on life imprisonment comes under review. The relevance of the 'hope' factor, 
IQ9 
however, was acknowledged. 
Although, the reasons for the government's attempts to raise criminal 
sanctions are manifold, it would be a little far fetched to say that the government 
was acting under an obligation derived from the Constitutional Court's 
statement in the capital punishment case. Indeed, the reform of sentencing rules 
might be better understood in the light of the revision of the criminal justice 
system as a whole. With transition to constitutional democracy and market 
economy there was clear need to reconsider guarantees in criminal procedure, 
to amend the rules applicable to young offenders and to introduce alternative 
sanctions economic crime. The opening up of the political system, however, 
brought unwelcome phenomena such as drug-related offences, the use of guns 
and explosives, money-laundering and the shocking brutality of a number of 
crimes against human life. The new trend of curbing judicial discretion and 
attempts to raise criminal sentences are attributable to a large extent to policy 
considerations aiming to fight organized crime.103 Indeed, in its general intro-
duction the official commentary of the legislative amendment distinguished the 
real life imprisonment from capital punishment. This comment might be read 
as a reassurance that the government has no intention to restore the death penalty. 
Conclusion 
This paper aimed to show how the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court abolishing capital punishment was formative of a context that prevents 
the restoration of the death penalty in Hungary. Amidst a web of influences 
supporting the abolition of capital punishment, such as the efforts of the Leagues 
Against Capital Punishment or the reinterpretation of the 1956 revolt, the 
Constitutional Court handed down its decision abolishing the death penalty in 
very abstract terms. The Constitutional Court was deciding the case not with-
in the narrow constraints of the moment. For instance, although the public 
discourse at the time of abolition was heavy with sentiments about the 1956 
102
 Büntetőjog, Általános Rész [Criminal Law, General Part] (ed.: Békés, I.). Budapest, 
2002. 272. 
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 See the official commentary of Act No. 87 of 1998. Note that the act is called the 
'Mafia package' in popular parlance. 
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revolution, in its decision the Court did not mention the events of 1956 or the 
unjust and shameful executions in express terms. The concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Sólyom contains a subtle and elucidating reference in this regard. 
The abolition of capital punishment is more than the symbolic rejection of a 
system that sacrificed human lives for political purposes. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court abolished capital punishment because it is incompatible 
with the principles of constitutional government as perceived by the Court.104 
The decision of the Constitutional Court paved the way for Hungary's 
membership in the Council of Europe and made the ratification of Protocol No. 
6 exceptionally smooth, undertakings followed by the ratification of Optional 
Protocol No. 2 of the ICCPR. These international commitments altered the terms 
of the domestic discourse about capital punishment as they introduced new 
points of reference and new safeguards. The Constitutional Court's decision was 
already a major step towards eliminating death talk from domestic public 
discourse. International obligations provide a further safeguard against the views 
of those who question the legitimacy or appropriateness of the Court's decision. 
It only demonstrates the integrity of this context that one of the newer appointees 
to the Constitutional Court, Justice János Strausz is a retentionist. Also, due to 
Hungary's international obligations there is no room for referenda on capital 
punishment anymore. In recent years there were two referendum initiatives sought 
the restoration of capital punishment. The National Elections Commission 
rejected the initiatives as pursuant to Art. 28/C(5) of the Constitution there 
should be no referendum concerning the fulfillment of international obligations. 
The Constitutional Court affirmed.105 The recent ratification of Protocol No. 13 
to the European Convention on the unconditional abolition of capital punish-
ment was the last move to make in perfecting the abolitionist web. 
An examination of the Hungarian capital punishment case in its broader 
context provides an excellent opportunity to observe the making of a discourse 
space and the development of a constitutional culture from its inception. When 
deciding about the constitutionality of capital punishment, the justices of the 
Constitutional Court intended to hand down an enduring decision. The judgment 
withstood trials at least in two distinct senses. On the one hand the decision 
became the foundation for building a system of safeguards against attempts 
seeking to restore capital punishment. These safeguards proved to be effective in 
104
 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 99-100. 
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 See 11/1999 (V. 7.) AB decision on the referendum initiative to restore capital 
punishment. See also 2/1999 (III. 3.) AB decision on a referendum initiative for the 
temporary restoration of capital punishment. The National Elections Commission rejected the 
initiative and the petition for review by the Constitutional Court was late. 
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controlling the needs and aspirations of daily power games. The Constitutional 
Court's decision became a reference point and a source of limitations for the 
purposes of the public discourse. On the other hand, an analysis of the juris-
prudence of the Constitutional Court reveals that the decision—itself a piece of 
creative judicial interpretation—was developed further by the Court and became 
a starting point for a number of jurisprudential concepts and means of right 
protection. In the light of these developments the exciting question of the day in 
the field of criminal is not whether there is room for restoring capital punish-
ment in Hungary, but whether "real" life imprisonment is constitutional.106 
The success of abolition in Hungary is not to suggest that abolition of capital 
punishment via judicial review should be more successful per se than abolition 
107 
via constitution-making, referendum or legislation. One may go as far as 
finding that unless a constitution clearly precludes capital punishment (such as 
Art. 102 of the German Basic Law), no judicial review forum can establish 
reasons, which are capable to prevent the restoration of capital punishment. 
Judicial review fora have the final say in the case before the bench, but they do 
not have a final say on the matter in its larger context. Following the decision of 
any constitutional tribunal, political branches may resort to amending the 
constitution or enacting new legislation, thus contributing to an ongoing 
discussion of public affairs. Therefore, the authoritative interpretation of the 
constitution by a constitutional review forum cannot prevent per se the political 
108 
branches from reopening the discourse about capital punishment. Also, when 
newly established constitutional courts decide on the constitutionality of capital 
punishment among the first cases, the review forum may use this opportunity to 
lay the foundations of its jurisprudence, as was in Hungary or in South Africa. In 
comparison, old courts—the US Supreme Court being one of them—are 
106
 See an interview with the well-know defense attorney Orosz, В. in Fundamentum, 
1998. Vol. 2/4, 38. 
107
 Analysing the legitimacy of judicial review as a means to abolish the death penalty 
would exceed the limits and aspirations of the present paper. 
108 
For the concept of the political process as discourse see Habermas, J.: Between Facts 
and Norms, Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy [Faktizitaet und 
Geltung, Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates], 
REHG, W. (trans.) Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1998, especially chapter 6 on the 
judiciary and the legislature and Stone, A. S.: Governing with Judges, Constitutional Politics 
in Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Cf. the words of Chief Justice Sólyom in his concurring opinion to the judgment 
abolishing capital punishment: "The legislative may sustain or abolish capital punishment at 
its liking—until the Constitutional Court delivers the final word on the constitutionality of 
the death penalty." 23/1990 (X. 31.) AB decision, ABH 1990. 93. 
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constrained by the mass of previous case law. Thus, whether the decision on 
the abolition of capital punishment is taken by a constitutional tribunal or is 
the expression of political will, in order to fully understand its motivation, 
significance and implications, the decision shall be considered in its broader 
context. The timing of the Hungarian Constitutional Court's decision abolishing 
capital punishment shall also be taken into account. At the time of the decision 
the Constitutional Court was a newly established institution untainted by the 
previous regime, a factor that rendered the Court immense popular (institutional) 
legitimacy. This phenomenon is not unique to Hungary. Another post-
authoritarian constitutional tribunal, the South African Constitutional Court, also 
benefited from similar legitimacy.110 
If viewed so, the context built with the active participation of the Consti-
tutional Court is stabile while capable of accommodation and transformation. 
Indeed, the recipe offered by the Hungarian Constitutional Court turned out to 
be a highly successful one. Still, as the analysis suggests its success is due as 
much to careful planning as to the interplay of unforeseen but at least partly 
favorable factors. However, as these factors were in constant interaction with 
each other, the ratio of logic and luck might be impossible to determine. When 
describing phenomena in democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
'rebuilding the ship on the open sea' (Jon Elster) and 'working at the drawing-
board' (Stephen Holmes) are established metaphors. These metaphors suggest 
conscious planning, forward-looking intellectual exercises, the actors' control 
over the project to a certain extent. Although the decision of the Court is regarded 
as an indispensable step in the evolution of the abolitionist context, careful 
analysis shows that while some components of the abolitionist context stem from 
strategic action or at least a forward-looking approach, unexpected and unfore-
seeable events also played a significant role. Since the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court's decision, the emphasis has shifted from certain aspects of this context 
and put other issues in the limelight of attention. A term in the word-game of 
democratic transition, or rather, of transitology, which captures such interplay of 
intended and unexpected consequences is probably Timothy Garton Ash's 
'refolution'. An examination of the Hungarian case demonstrates the significance 
constitutional and legal safeguards in keeping the often rhapsodic sentiments 
about capital punishment at bay during and beyond 'refolutionary' times. 
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 See Harcourt, B. E.: Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent Death 
Penalty Cases. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1996. Vol. 9, 255. 
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Abstract The present study undertakes the review of one of the essential authorities of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court: the issue of abstract subsequent norm control, which 
is currently amongst the most significant questions. The possibility of the constitutional 
review of the Supreme Court's directives on unifying the case law is subject to debate in 
legal literature and in the intercourse between the two organs as well. This study intends 
to elicit the nature of the problem through the elaboration of relating regulation and by 
utilizing certain Constitutional Court decisions concerning the subject. It will arrive at 
the conclusion that the present regulation also gives scope to the Constitutional Court 
review of directives on unifying the case law. The paper gives a survend evaluation of the 
solutions involved in the draft of the new Constitutional Court Act too. 
Keywords: Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, directives on unifying the case law, 
constitutional control, hierarchy of legal sources, the principle of the separation of 
powers. 
In the Republic of Hungary, the Constitutional Court, since the beginning of 
their operation, 1st January 1990, have significantly restricted the legislative 
activity of the Parliament and the Government, because the body has enforced 
the provisions of the Constitution against actual-political influences without 
any compromise. Beside these two branches of power, however the Consti-
tutional Court has relatively few points of contact with the third branch: the 
courts. Because the Constitutional Court may review or refuse the review of 
the directives of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may come into on 
unifying the case law conflict with the Constitutional Court. It is of special 
actuality at present, because the reform of the regulation on the Constitutional 
Court is the question of the day. The Ministry of Justice has published the draft 
of the amendment of the Constitution (hereinafter Constamendl) and the draft 
of the new Act on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter ConstCourt bill 1 > in its 
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home page1 and in an altered and revised form they soon appeared in the home 
page of the Parliament too.2 (Hereinafter the revised version will be referred to 
as Constamend2 and ConstCourt bill2.) These drafts may obviously be revised 
before adoption. In this respect the declarations of certain public figures; 
ministers, the President of the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court justices 
will help to understand this issue more properly. 
The present study will examine the question from two angles. On the one 
hand, from the point of view if upon the present regulation the Constitutional 
Court is entitled to review the constitutionality of the directives of the Supreme 
Court on unifying the case law, on the other hand from the aspect if the future 
regulation should coercively involve this possibility. 
I. The possibility for the examination on the ground of the prevailing 
legal situation 
In the Hungarian constitutional system according to the Constitution, the 
highest judicial forum is the Supreme Court (Article 47, Paragraph 1) and the 
highest organ safeguarding the Constitution is the Constitutional Court. Never-
theless, the Constitutional Court does not form part of the regular judicial 
forum-system and there is no subordinating or superordinating relation between 
the two organs. The Hungarian legal system, as opposed to the German solution, 
does not make the possibility to review the constitutionality of the judicial 
decisions by the Constitutional Court. Making use of the authority of the 
Constitutional Court, which is named constitutional complaint in Hungary, the 
unconstitutional law forming the ground of a concrete case may be contested 
before the Constitutional Court and if it turns out right, the procedure may be 
restarted in a legal environment compatible with the fundamental law. 
The Constitutional Court thus is not entitled to examine single judicial 
decisions. It is doubtful, however if the directives of normative character 
unifying the case law, handed down by the Supreme Court may be the subject 
of a constitutional control, and whether it was necessary and proper to involve 
them in the new draft. The question arises because the directives on unifying 
the case law are of normative character, but neither the Constitution nor the 
Act on the Constitutional Court provide an expressis verbis statement on the 
possibility of a Constitutional Court review. The question of a review is due to 
the normativity of the directives on unifying the case law. 
1
 www.im.hu 
www.mkogy.hu 
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1. A few characteristics of directives on unifying the case law 
a) Pursuant to Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution the Supreme Court 
shall assure the uniformity of the administration of justice by the courts and 
its resolutions concerning uniformity shall be binding on all the courts.4 The 
role of the directives on unifying the case law is to ensure the uniformity of the 
judicature. In the course of judicial discretion it may happen that given legal 
principles are construed in different ways, consequently in cases of similar 
character, decisions of different content may be passed. The uniformity of law 
enforcement should be ensured in order to eliminate this problem. For the sake 
of the course, the Supreme Court5 pass directives on unifying the case law6 and 
3
 This provision of the Constitution does not preclude that an act would amplify the 
ways of task fulfilment of the Supreme Court—beside directives on unifying the case 
law—for the sake of the fulfilment of this constitutional duty. It was done by the Act on 
the Judicial System when provided on the publication of court decisions of principle. On 
the ground of the provisions of the Act on the Judicial System, it can be stated the 
regulation of the publication of court decisions of principle wanted to entitle all the judges 
and courts to contribute to the improvement of legal legislation. 12/2001 (14.05) Const. 
Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 173. 
4
 Due to this provision of the Constitution, the force of directives on unifying the case 
law necessarily has an effect on litigants through the application of law, by transmitting the 
ruling based on the obligatory interpretation of law. This general force of directives on 
unifying the case law ensuing from Article 47, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which is 
binding on the courts, may be effective after it has been passed. Cases involved in the acts 
of procedure may be different if the directives on unifying the case law (may) directly 
allude to the basic case(s) as well. 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 
163, 173. 
5
 Article 33 of the Act on the Judicial System regulates the role of colleges in the 
procedure of the Paragraph 1 analyses the practice of the courts and forms an opinion in 
contested questions of law enforcement, so as to provide a uniform litigation practice. 
According to the Constitutional Court this provision does not infringe legal security, 
because in this case the problem is not if the colleges of the Supreme Court or county 
courts decide in certain professional matters definitively and with a binding force. The rule 
concerning college opinion in questions of law enforcement involved in the Act on the 
Judicial System merely a provision that promotes the ruling upon a disputed question of 
law. The other rules of the Act on the Judicial System, which provide proposal making and 
initiative right to college leaders for the launching of a unity of law procedure, also 
corroborate this fact. It may happen—according to the wording of the act "if necessary"—, 
when the uniformity of law enforcement requires more than a college opinion. 12/2001 
(14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 174. 
6
 According to the view of the Constitutional Court, the Act on the Judicial System 
lays emphasis on the uniform judgement of questions of principle and for this sake within 
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proclaim judicial decisions of principle.7 The directives on unifying the case 
law must be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Hungary. 
According to the Constitutional Court, this provision has fulfilled the require-
ment relevant from the point of view of legal security, namely the cognizability 
and predictable application of the directives on unifying the case law, since the 
persons and institutions concerned may get knowledge of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in a proper way. Thus, a directive on unifying the case law is a 
normative decision of the Supreme Court released in a procedure regulated by 
an act, which is binding on all the courts so the content involved in a directive 
on unifying the case law has a binding force upon all the subjects taking part in 
the judicial procedure. As a consequence of this, the specification of the 
directives on unifying the case law among the normative provisions is debated 
even in the special literature. Related to this the following remarks must be 
made. 
b) The system of sources of law in the Republic of Hungary is regulated 
partly in the Constitution and partly in Act 11 of 1987 on Legislation. The 
system of sources of law is divided into two parts by the Act. On the one hand, 
it distinguishes provisions entailing rights and duties upon subjects, on the 
other hand specifies other legal means of the so-called state administration, like 
decisions and directives. The latter have no binding force on subjects, their 
function generally is to provide the uniform direction within the given 
the court organisation system regulates the "mechanism", through which court decisions 
deciding questions of principle may get to higher judicial forums, finally to the Supreme 
Court. Thus, the procedure concerning decisions of principle is regulated in the Act on the 
Judicial System. If the court decision of principle is submitted to the Supreme Court, the 
duties and rights of the Supreme Court, laid down in the Constitution are to be followed: 
namely: the uniformity of the law enforcement of the courts. If the Supreme Court require 
to form an opinion of principle expressed in a court ruling widely known in the litigation 
practice, the decision may be published. In this way, judicial practice may be properly 
oriented. The Act on the Judicial System does not refer to the observance of court rulings, 
and does not contain provisions like the Constitution does in relation to the directives on 
unifying the case. According to the Constitutional Court, a directive on unifying the case 
may be initiated if the reverse practice has developed due to the neglect of a court ruling 
previously published by the courts. Nevertheless, the directives on unifying the case law as 
a consequence of this, have a binding force on the courts. Thus the possibility that court 
rulings of principle may be published, will not bring about legal insecurity, because, 
contrasted with unity of law resolutions, it is not compulsory. 12/2001. (14. 05) Const. 
Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 173-174. 
7
 Petrétei, J.: Magyar alkotmányjog II. Államszervezet. [Hungarian Constitutional Law 
II, State Organisation], Budapest-Pécs, 2000. 213. 
8
 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution, ABH 2001. 163, 169. 
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organisation. The directives of the Supreme Court on unifying the case law are 
mentioned neither among the laws, nor among the other legal means of state 
administration. 
c) By virtue of Article 32/A of the Constitution the Constitutional Court 
shall review the constitutionality of laws and attend to the duties assigned 
to its competence by law. On this ground does Act 32 of 1989 on the Consti-
tutional Court relegate the subsequent constitutional review of other legal 
means of state administration within the competence of this body.9 
d) There may arise the question, however if the Constitutional Court is entitled 
to review, besides laws and statutes and other legal means of state administration, 
other acts of normative character, not relegated within its authority, for 
instance directives on unifying the case law. In order to find the answer it is 
worth examining the major characteristics of relevant directives. First of all, it 
must be stated that besides unifying the case law directives, certain decisions 
of the court may also have a normative content. In a certain sphere, for 
instance the formally binding force of judicial precedents has been recognised. 
Namely pursuant to Article 29 on the Act on the Judicial System,10 a division 
of the Supreme Court in legal matters may reach a divergent ruling from that 
of another division of the Supreme Court, if the unifying the case law directive 
passed in the unifying procedure on its initiation provides that." Nevertheless 
the primary aim of the above mentioned provision of the Act on the Judicial 
System is not to express the normative character but to safeguard legal security 
by providing the uniformity of litigation within the supreme forum of juris-
diction. Normative character refers here just to the relation among the unifying 
the case law divisions of the Supreme Court, and its purpose is to eliminate 
their different interpretation of law. Because of this, it has no direct effect on 
the litigation of the lower courts. They are effected exclusively by a directives 
on unifying the case law passed in the procedure referred to above, which— 
due to its abstract character—has a binding force on all the courts, thus, 
9
 Cf. with 27/1995 (15. 05) Const. Court resolution. ABH (the collection of the 
resolutions of the Constitutional Court) 1995. 129, 135. 
10
 Act 66 of 1997. 
" Rácz, A.: Alapvető jogok és jogforrások [Fundamental rights and sources of law]. 
In: Emlékkönyv Adám Antal egyetemi tanár születésének 70. évfordulójára [Book published 
in honour of Professor Antal, Ádám on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of his birth] 
(ed.: Petrétei, J.). Pécs, 2000. 187. In relation to this it is worth mentioning that binding 
force related to the courts can be regarded only as temporary since it will exist until the 
directive on unifying the case law is passed in the subject. After that, precedents will lose 
their—very narrow-ranging—binding force. 
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concerning the subjects in the judicial process it has an effect of de facto 
provision. 
e) As concerns unifying the case law, in 1976 a member of the Constitu-
tional Court István Kukorelli, expounded his still pertinent opinion related to 
normative acts—directives, decisions of principle—of that time, which cannot 
be passed at present, however the existing ones cannot be neglected either.12 
According to this, general norms, which are launched by the governing organs 
within a given organizational system upon the right of hierarchy, may be 
regarded as controlling norms. The major function of these norms is to ensure 
the uniform and concerted operation of different organs within the given 
organization. "Governing norms join provisions bearing a general binding 
force, interpret and explain their content but they should not primarily regulate 
social relations."13 The practice of the Supreme Court puts directives on 
unifying the case law closer to controlling norms. The approach, according to 
which the directives on unifying the case law of the Supreme Court form a 
separate group of legal directives, is similar to this. Namely, these norms of 
law interpretation—as opposed to other directives—pursuant to the provision 
of the Constitution are binding also formally on the courts.14 
f) Nevertheless, according to other opinions directives on unifying the case 
law not even in their effect bear provisional characteristics. Pursuant to this 
view, directives on unifying the case law is a constitutional institution of law, 
which joins the exclusive jurisdictional authority of the courts and upon the 
authorization of the Constitution falls within the power of the Supreme Court. 
This is the highest level judicial interpretation of law, bearing the aim to 
ensure the constitutional obligation connected to the principle of legal 
12
 According to the statement of the Constitutional Court the survival of directives, 
decisions of principle and divisional opinions will not infringe legal security until a 
unifying the case law of different content is created. In order to provide the uniform 
litigation practice, compared to the previous rather complicated means of professional 
administration, directives on unifying the case law denote a new "quality", by no means. 
Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution does not prove necessity to review unjustified en 
masse previous directives, decisions of principle and divisional opinions limited to 
deadlines. The issue of directives, decisions of principle and college opinions had adequate 
constitutional and statutory basis (Act 46 of 1972, Article 46 and 499, passing them—just 
like in the case of unity of law resolution—falls within the authority of the Supreme Court. 
12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court resolution. ABH 2001. 163, 175. 
13
 Kukorelli, I.: A Legfelsőbb Bíróság normaalkotó tevékenységéről [On the norm 
creating activity of the Supreme Court]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1976/11. 658. 
14
 Rácz: op. cit., 187. 
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security.15 According to the representative of this viewpoint, interpretation can 
never get to the field of law enforcement by chance. At this point, it must be 
noted that it is true as a requirement, but as a possibility, it cannot be excluded. 
Since there is quite a large number of similar, colliding views, it is worth 
examining the place of the directives on unifying the case law in the system of 
normative acts, and through this, the possibility for a Constitutional Court 
review. 
2. On the Constitutional Court review of the directives on unifying the case 
a) The normative character as the preliminary condition for the 
Constitutional Court control 
The institution of the Constitutional Court, as a basic rule, was intended to 
review normative acts.16 Article 46, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Judicial 
System has taken the individual decisions expressively off the review of the 
Constitutional Court, since they are not decisions of a normative content. The 
Constitutional Court has rejected the constitutional review of individual 
parliamentary decisions several occasions on the ground that they are single 
acts without a normative binding force, thus pursuant to the Act on the Judicial 
System, their review falls off the authority of the Constitutional Court.17 A few 
other exceptions, which however fall within the regulation sphere of special 
acts, were also made. The exceptions are as follows. 
Pursuant to the Act on the Electoral System on matters of a national 
referendum or popular initiative, a complaint can be submitted to the Constitu-
18 
tional Court. In cases like that, the Court obviously acts upon single decisions. 
The competence of the Constitutional Court safeguarding the self-govern-
ments and autonomy of institutions of higher education also form an exception. 
On the ground of the Act on Higher Education, provisions and single decisions 
15
 Szabó, Gy.: A bírói precedensjog kezdetei Magyarországon [The origins of judicial 
precedent law in Hungary]. In: Ötödik Magyar Jogászgyűlés [The Fifth Hungarian Jurist 
Assembly]. Budapest, 2000. 52. 
18
 Individual, concrete court rulings can be regarded neither as norms, nor as legal 
sources, thus the review of their constitutionality does not fall under the powers of the 
Constitutional Court. However, no genuine constitutional examination of Constitutional 
Court acts of normative effect has been performed yet. 
17
 Cf. e.g. with 52/1993 (07.10) Const. Court resolution ABH 1993. 407, 408) and 
15/1999 (03. 06) Const. Court resolution ABH 1999. 407, 401). 
18
 Act С of 1997, Article 130, Paragraph 1. 
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infringing the self-government and autonomy of higher educations can be 
challenged before the Constitutional Court.14 
In the case of the dissolution of a local self-government, the Constitutional 
Court may express its opinion on the unconstitutional operation of the body, 
thus it will take measures definitely in a single case.20 
Participation in the impeachment procedure against the President of the 
Republic may also be regarded as a single case.21 
To sum up, the Constitutional Court generally exercises a norm control, but 
within a well-defined sphere, it may also undertake the constitutional review of 
acts of a normative character, and a Constitutional Court procedure in other 
single matters. 
In the Hungarian law, within the acts of normative character there are also 
specified judicial decisions, since there are some provisions to express the 
normative character of certain court rulings.22 Nevertheless, single court 
decisions—rulings and injunctions—show up with a binding force mainly in the 
relations between the parties. The directives on unifying the case law referred to 
above are undoubtedly bear a normative character: their normativity arises from 
Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. According to this, "the Supreme 
Court shall assure the uniformity of the administration of justice by the courts 
and its directives on unifying the case law shall be binding for all the courts". 
b) Constitutional Court procedure against provisions of normative character 
ba) By virtue of Article 32/A of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court shall 
review the constitutionality of laws and attend to the duties assigned to its 
jurisdiction by law. On the ground of laws and under Article 1 of the Consti-
tution, the different legal means of state administration are also under a 
subsequent Constitutional Court norm control. Directives on unifying the case 
law however formally do not belong to any categories and no other provision 
refers these acts under the procedure of the Constitutional Court. Notwith-
standing, directives on unifying the case law are obviously of a normative 
19
 Act 80 of 1993, Article 65, Paragraph 2. The bill on the Constitutional Court intends 
to take this authority off the Constitutional Court. 
20
 Article 19, Paragraph 3, section 1 of the Constitution. The Act on the Constitutional. 
Court would refer the act of dissolution within the authority of the Constitutional Court. 
21
 Article 31/A, Paragraph 6 of the Constitution. 
"Pursuant to Article 7 of the Act 66 of 1997 on the Judicial System of the courts, 
court rulings have a general binding force, even if in a case the court verifies its sphere of 
authority or the lack of its authority. Nevertheless, it must be stated that in the latter case it 
is a question of procedure and not of a content obligation. 
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character, they are binding directly on the courts but indirectly they have a 
binding force on all the subjects who are concerned by the court procedure."3 
Related to the problems scrutinised, it must be emphasized even if the 
Constitutional Court is the supreme organ safeguarding the Constitution, still it 
has no overall right for review, and a right to nullify acts. There is not a single 
provision to state that the Constitutional Court has a right of review concerning 
all the acts bearing a normative content. The fact that every provision and other 
legal means of state administration are under Constitutional Court control does 
not mean that all the norms should fall under the control, since provision as a 
notion is not the synonym of provision of a normative content. It does not 
mean however that the organs that issue provisions of normative content could 
neglect constitutional aspects drafted by the Constitutional Court.24 Because of 
this, it is an important requirement that directives on unifying the case law 
should meet the Constitution and this appropriateness can be provided 
exclusively by the Constitutional Court. 
bb) A frequent argument against the Constitutional Court review of 
directives on unifying the case law is that directives on unifying the case law 
expound only the content of decisions, consequently they cannot create a new 
normative content so their review is not justified. Notwithstanding, expounding 
and making the norm content concrete denotes that one potential meaning of 
the norm is made compulsory. As a consequence of this, directives on unifying 
the case law—by selecting one of the several interpretations and regarding it as 
a norm—make the legislators' wish more precise and unambiguous and in this 
way it will appear for the subjects as a new binding interpretation, quasi a new 
25 
norm." It can be regarded as that, because the original norm bears several 
23
 In this respect, it is interesting that under Article 32, Paragraph 6 of the Act on the 
Judicial System "directives on unifying the case law, if the law makes no exception, has 
no binding force on the parties". On this ground it can be stated that within a certain sphere 
the law may extend the force of directives on unifying the case law to the parties. Thus at 
this time these directives can be directly binding on the parties too. According to the 
Constitutional Court, whether this provision corresponds to the Constitution must be 
examined upon the concrete regulation case by case. Cf. with 12/2001 (14. 05) Const. Court 
resolution. ABH 2001. 163, 172. 
"
4
 Sólyom, L.: To the Tenth Anniversary of Constitutional Review. In: A megtalált 
Alkotmány? A magyar alapjogi bíráskodás első kilenc éve [The Constitution found? The 
First Nine Years of Hungarian Constitutional Review on Fundamental Rights] (ed.: 
Halmai, G.). Budapest, 2000. 25. 
25
 The norm-character in itself is established by taking one of the several inter-
pretations and recognising that as exemplary. This, however means the narrowing of the 
potential narrowing of the norm, thus it can be regarded as the creation of a new norm. 
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potential meanings and content, the application of which—with one exception— 
is excluded by a directive on unifying the case law. This exclusion, besides the 
exposure of the content, leads to the restriction of the norm content. Thus, the 
argument mentioned above is not suitable for the denial of the Constitutional 
Court review of directives on unifying the case law. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court—in accordance with its constant practice—judges acts 
according to their content and not to their names. In this way has the judicial 
body examined circular letters, ordinances etc.,26 which do not belong either to 
laws, not to other means of state administration, but according to their content 
they act in that way. In an analogue way, thus directives on unifying the case 
law may also fall within this sphere of examination, since they appear as new 
27 
norms. 
be) Directives on unifying the case law reveal the content of provisions and 
provide compulsory interpretation on the content of laws. If the Constitutional 
Court is entitled to the constitutional review of laws, they must be entitled to 
the review of an unconstitutional interpretation as well." A decree however 
rarely becomes independent, administered law: in most of the cases, the 
legislators' activity is also required. Provided that the norm reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court is the subject of a directive on unifying the case law as 
well, the directive on unifying the case law, together with the norm must be 
referred within the examination sphere of the Constitutional Court. The 
position taken by the Constitutional Court in this respect is that the former and 
present compulsory directives of the Supreme Court are regarded as norms."4 
26
 Cf. e.g. with 60/1992 (17. 11.) Const. Court resolution. ABH 1992. 275, 277. 
27
 Kukorelli, István in relation to this speaks expressively about the "legislative 
practice" of the Supreme Court. Kukorelli: op. cit., 659. 
28
 "It cannot be neglected that the Constitutional Court should judge and nullify the 
directive or principle of a decision of the Supreme Court which supplements the ambiguous 
law enforcement with an unconstitutional law interpretation..., since from the fact that the 
Constitutional Court is entitled to judge the constitutionality of an act, it follows that it is 
empowered to judge the authentic interpretation of the act too." Ádám, A.: A jogszabályok 
alkotmánybírósági ellenőrzéséről [On the constitutional Court control of provisions]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1992/12. 528. Sólyom, László states "like in the more the less, in 
the right of annulment of a provision, the exclusion of certain unconstitutional applications 
is also included." Sólyom: op. cit., 32. 
29
 Holló, A.: A bírói precedensjog kezdetei Magyarországon [The origins of judicial 
precedent law in Hungary], In: Ötödik Magyar Jogászgyűlés, op. cit., 44. 
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c) Further arguments on the Constitutional Court control of directives on 
unifying the case law 
ca) The Constitutional Court—as I have already referred to—has taken measures 
in acts which according to their names could not belong to the procedure of the 
Constitutional Court, but in their content their effect is equivalent to acts falling 
under the review of the Constitutional Court. At the beginning of its operation 
the Court faced the fact that the central administrative organs issued their acts of 
normative content not under the name specified in the Act on legislation, such as 
• • • 30 
e.g.: injunction, but under different names like circular letter or information. 
Organs of lower level applied these provisions of normative content during their 
procedure, thus they had a binding force on the subjects. These circular letters 
and ordinances did not have a provisional ground, but due to the right of 
injunction etc. of the superior organ, in their effect were equal to the directives 
on unifying the case law.31 Their force—apparently—covered well-defined 
groups of well-defined organs, but in an indirect way, they made an effect on all 
the subjects who had any contact with the organization system. In a formal way, 
merely on the ground of their name the Constitutional Court could not have 
reviewed these acts, but it expounded that these provisions of normative content 
actually qualified as acts named in the Act on legislation, thus according to their 
content they were regarded as that and the procedure was applied. An analogue 
argumentation may be applied upon directives on unifying the case law too: on 
the ground of their names—formally—their Constitutional Court review is made 
impossible, but due to their content, because of their character and concerning 
other constitutional principles and fundamental law provisions referred to above, 
they can also undergo a norm control. It must be added that the acts mentioned 
did not bear a provisional base (merely because of this fact, promulgating them 
was unlawful and unconstitutional), but directives on unifying the case law have 
a constitutional basis too. These acts, due to the force of the Constitution bind 
subjects in an indirect way and they are enforceable. Notwithstanding, the force 
of a directive on unifying the case law indirectly extends on the parties by all 
means, since the courts are obliged to apply them.32 The requirement concerning 
30
 Cf. with 60/1992 (17. 11.) Const. Court resolution. 
11
 This equal character naturally appears within a different organization. 
By virtue of Article 32 of the Act on the Judicial System "directives on unifying the 
case law, if no exception is made by the law, have no binding force on the subjects". 
Regardless that this provision does not harmonize completely with Article 47 of the 
Constitution, because that makes directives on unifying the case law obligatory for the 
courts, this regulation seems to be senseless. 
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the review of directives on unifying the case law thus seems to be well 
grounded. 
cb) The Constitutional Court expounded that Article 32/A of the Constitution 
gives rise only to the authority of a subsequent norm control, but this authority 
is "forcible and comprehensive".33 The historical interpretation of the constitu-
tional rule makes clear that according to the intent of the legislation all decrees 
and other legal means of state administration, without exception, should fall 
under a Constitutional Court control. 
cc) Beyond this, since the courts constitute the third branch of power in the 
system of the separation of powers, it is unjustified to exclude acts which are 
promulgated within the judicial system and which make - either directly or 
indirectly - a normative effect on the subjects, from under the control of the 
Constitutional Court. Whilst the normative acts of the other two branches of 
power - the legislative and the executive power - fall under this control, what 
is more, form the essence of the activity of the Constitutional Court. László 
Sólyom, states if "the monopoly of the Constitutional Court to interpret the 
Constitution has a positive legal basis, it can be an effective aid to justify the 
relationship among the courts. In lack of an express provision this provision 
may be deduced from the duty of the Constitutional Court."44 
d) Further viewpoints and proposals for solution, published in the special 
literature 
da) According to a clear-cut opinion, since all the courts are bound to apply the 
directives on unifying the case law of the Supreme Court, directives on 
unifying the case law indirectly bear a binding force and character on all the 
participants of the judicial procedure. Directives on unifying the case law thus 
have a normative force, they act as norms: a directive on unifying the case law 
is an abstract judicial decision with a normative force providing principles, 
which should be followed by judges in subsequent cases. Thus, directives on 
unifying the case law, concerning the way of their application and consequences 
obviously bear similarities with legal norms.36 The difference between directives 
on unifying the case law and legal norms is in the regulating subject, in the 
33
 4/1997 (22. 01) Const. Court resolution. ABH 1997. 41, 49. 
34
 Sólyom: op. cit., 26 8 (italics mine—P. T.). 
35
 Gadó, G.: Az alkotmányjogi panasszal és a jogegységi határozattal összefüggő sza-
bályozási kérdések [Questions of regulation related to constitutional complaint and 
directives on unifying the case law]. Magyar Jog, 2000/9. 540. 
36
 Ibid. 
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matter regulated and in the manner, the rule is recognised. The effectiveness of 
the created norm and in connection with this, the relation of the norm with the 
37 
Constitution, there is no difference. Pursuant to this opinion, when facing 
unconstitutional directives on unifying the case law the Constitutional Court can 
choose from two possibilities. The first one is to undertake a review in the form 
of a subsequent norm control—if this right is not denied—, the second one is to 
nullify the legal norm38 upon the concept of "living law". However, the latter 
version could prevail if the so-called "genuine" constitutional complaint was 
involved in the Hungarian legal system. "In lack of this, the constitutional 
39 
control of directives on unifying the case law cannot be neglected." Unlike 
the author, I regard the nullification of directives on unifying the case law and 
not that of basic provisions as expedient and justified. 
db) The present president of the Constitutional Court holds an opposite 
view. According to his opinion the Constitutional Court review in relation to 
directives on unifying the case law should be confided to the verification of the 
constitutional requirement. If the Supreme Court neglected the constitutional 
requirement in the process of carrying a directive on unifying the case law,40 
the Constitutional Court review of live law could be realized. The author 
states41 "a constitutional requirement thus will not institutionalise in the 
primary scope for action of the Constitutional Court, namely in legislation, but 
it functions as the aiming of law enforcement." Starting from the constitutional 
position of the Constitutional Court, it can be verified the Constitutional Court 
is authorized to classify constitutionality, to state the conformity to the 
Constitution and to provide the official interpretation of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the interpretation, given in a directive on unifying the case law by 
the Supreme Court, if it is different from the interpretation of the Constitutional 
" Gadó: op. cit., 51. According to Gadó there is no real difference between directives 
on unifying the case law and legal norms concerning the relation between the norm and the 
Constitution. 
38 
Naturally, it is an unconstitutional interpretation of law, distorted by "living law". 
w
 Gadó: op. cit., 541. The author states that the creation of the statutory conditions of 
an abstract norm control towards directives on unifying the case law requires a consequent 
regulation. 
40
 In this case, it is obviously the drafting of a new directive on unifying the case law or 
the amendment of an old one, because the Supreme Court could not consider the subsequent 
Constitutional Court direction in the process of reaching directive on unifying the case law. 
41
 Holló, A.: Az alapvető jogok védelme [The protection of fundamental rights]. In: A 
magyar alkotmányosság ezer éve [Thousand years of Hungarian constitutionality]. 
Scientific conference (ed.: Mikolasek, S.). Esztergom, 1999. 16. 
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Court is not a competent interpretation.42 According to his view, there should be 
developed "a procedure of the Constitutional Court and that of the Supreme 
Court built on each other in all the directives on unifying the case law in which 
the interpretation of the given thesis of the Constitution can be regarded as a 
genuine preliminary question. The procedure on a directive on unifying the 
case law - on the standard of the legal solution referred to above - should be 
suspended until the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the "preliminary 
question" of the given provision of the Constitution, initiated by the President 
of the Supreme Court. In such a "complex" procedure, the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court would express their own constitutional position. 
Otherwise, the constitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law may be 
the subject of a Constitutional Court review."43 It is worth mentioning here that 
the previous deputy-president also stated that the constitutional review of the 
directives on unifying the case law should fall within the competence of the 
Constitutional Court.44 
dc) According to the previous Minister of Justice the Constitutional Court's 
review of directives on unifying the case law may be justified, because they 
bear a normative function. Since the competence would be introduced in the 
Constitution, the problem of constitutionality could not occur either. She 
thinks the competence would not transform the hierarchy of jurisdiction, 
because it is a concrete matter of the Constitutional Court, thus the Court had 
no competence to review decisions in concrete cases. The minister outlined 
two variants of legal consequence. In this way, the Constitutional Court should 
either nullify the unconstitutional directive on unifying the case law or verify 
the unconstitutionality and ask the Supreme Court "for remedy". In her opinion, 
in that case nobody would influence the Supreme Court. It is important to state 
that because the review is of constitutional respect and does not extend on 
concrete matters, it would be irrelevant in the first case too. Consequently, the 
place of the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of the judicial system would 
remain intact. 
dd) Nevertheless, even well-known constitutional lawyers think that 
according to the regulation in force, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to 
review these acts, and had it been allowed by the amendment, the result would 
"Ibid. 
« Ibid. 
Lábady, T.: A helyét kereső alkotmánybíráskodás [Constitutional jurisdiction 
seeking its place]. Világosság, 1993/1. 38. 
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be the amplification of the sphere of norms reviewed.45 In connection with the 
introduction of the institution they expounded that because of the ex nunc 
nullification, that would not infringe legal security. At the same time, they 
found it constitutionally perilous that while legal sources are involved in the 
Act on Legislation, there is no reference to directives on unifying the case law, 
although in their content they may be regarded as legal norm. In their opinion, 
in this case review would over-extend the law. 
de) The ex-deputy president of the Supreme Court also argued against the 
Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the case law. He stated 
"Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the 
interpretative activity of the Court extends on the constitutional review of an 
applicable law and during this procedure they take a stand on the fact if the 
law may have an interpretation to ensure the compliance with the Constitution. 
Due to the creation of directives on unifying the case law, the legislator 
exclusively entrusted to the Supreme Court with the power at the highest-level 
of constitutional review of judicial interpretation. That is why pursuant to the 
Constitution in force, the Constitutional Court is not entitled to give a 
constitutional review of directives on unifying the case law."46 
The viewpoint of the author, however at several points is not properly 
grounded. Firstly, under Article 38 of the Act on the Constitutional Court 
judges may really examine the constitutionality of a law, but Article 38 
provides that the review of constitutionality of law falls within the authority of 
the Constitutional Court. Pursuant to Article 38, Paragraph 1 of the Act on 
the Constitutional Court, "the judge—besides the suspension of the judicial 
procedure—shall initiate the procedure of the Constitutional Court if in the 
case before him he has to apply a law or any other legal means of state 
administration in his judgement, the unconstitutionality of which he perceives." 
Secondly, the provision of the Act on the Constitutional Court cited above 
does not refer to directives on unifying the case law but to laws providing the 
ground of judicial decisions. Thirdly, the fact that a judge may have a constitu-
tional review of laws during the procedure does not entail that the creation of 
the institution of directives on unifying the case law entrusted to secure the 
constitutionality of judicial law interpretation exclusively on the Supreme 
Court. Notwithstanding, there is no logical relation between these two 
statements. The aim of the creation of directives on unifying the case law was 
not to provide constitutionality, but to guarantee the uniformity of judicial 
45
 Interview with Albert Takács, and Ibolya Dávid. Radio Kossuth, Program 'sixteen 
hours'. 09. September 2000. 
46
 Szabó: op. cit., 52. 
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interpretation of legal norms. Above this, it is worth mentioning our concern is 
not to secure the constitutionality by directives on unifying the case law but to 
secure the constitutionality of directives on unifying the case law and there is a 
sharp difference between these two. Fourthly, by virtue of Article 38 of the Act 
on the Constitutional Court constitutional review can not be exclusive, because 
if the judge does not turn to the Constitutional Court, any of the parties may 
do so within sixty days after the decision enters into force. Namely, pursuant 
to Article 48 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, "Anyone whose rights 
safeguarded in the Constitution are infringed, may lodge a constitutional 
complaint to the Constitutional Court, if his grievance is due to the application 
of an unconstitutional law and has exhausted all his resource of remedy or no 
other remedy is provided for him. The constitutional complaint may be lodged 
in, in writing, within sixty days after the delivery of the effective decision." If 
the constitutional complaint is well grounded, the court must provide remedy 
for the individual. I think these counter-arguments can refute the view-points 
above, thus even the statement that the Constitutional Court is not entitled to 
review the constitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law carries no 
conviction. 
df) The deputy president of the supreme judicial body expressed his 
opinion in connection with the amendment of regulation too. According to this, 
the examination of the constitutional requirement decisive in the application of 
the norm, would be performed within the framework of a norm control, thus it 
was unreasonable and inappropriate to provide an independent sphere of 
authority for the Constitutional Court for the constitutional review of directives 
on unifying the case law. Thus even if the constitutional requirements were 
specified in a different way, the Constitutional Court could not decide on 
directives on unifying the case law (could not repeal or amend them).47 
Concerning the proposal however it may be criticised that the Constitutional 
Court will not examine but specify the constitutional requirement: the 
examination may cover just facts involved in the constitutional requirements, 
in a subsequent Constitutional Court procedure. On the other hand, from the 
citation it follows that the author does not consider the directives on unifying 
the case law as norms, since he makes a distinction between the review of 
directives on unifying the case law and norm control, which in my opinion is 
logically unjustified. 
Finally, some conclusions may be drawn from the previous decisions of the 
Constitutional Court on the interpretation of its competence, on the ground of 
47
 Szabó: op. cit., 53 
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which directives on unifying the case law may be involved into the sphere of 
examination too. 
3. Some decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning the 
interpretation of its competence 
It is worthy to scrutinize here the decisions of the Constitutional Court in 
which the body exercised its competence ambiguously recorded in law, in a 
concrete way. The existence of such cases however may prove in itself that a 
Constitutional Court's procedure does not need to have an expressis verbis 
provisional ground if the procedural competence may be deduced from other 
provisions or legal principles. Since the Constitutional Court's right for the 
review of directives on unifying the case law is not obligatorily specified by 
law, that must be deduced, provided it is possible, from different constitutional 
or other provisions. The supporting arguments are the following: 
a) The Constitutional Court held48 that the constitutionality of an inter-
national treaty may be reviewed not only pursuant to Article 1 a) of the Act on 
the Constitutional Court, within a preliminary norm-control procedure, but 
also by virtue of Article 1 b) of the Act on the Constitutional Court within a 
subsequent norm-control procedure. In the codification work of the Act on the 
Constitutional Court and the Constitution, there is not a single data to prove 
that legislators wanted to evade from below the norm control any kind of 
acts—for instance the act promulgating international treaties. The potential 
conditions that—with special regard to the circumstances of constitutionali-
sation and to the drafting of the Act on the Constitutional Court—this case of 
subsequent norm control was not considered separately that time, will not have 
any effect on the right of the Constitutional Court to concretise its sphere of 
authority by interpretation of legal norms. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court construing the authority of its own have a general binding force, just like 
any other of its decisions. In this interpretation the Constitutional Court is 
guided partly by the wish to fulfil its specific duty, partly by the example of 
other constitutional courts and in this way it follows the solutions required by 
the development necessary for the administration of the Constitutional Court. 
The definition of "constitutional requirements" for instance has rendered the 
solution of "constitution-conform interpretation" which is generally applied 
constitutional courts all over the world—but it frequently bears a separate 
statutory ground—introduced into Hungarian law and adjusted it to the 
standpoint expounded on the competence to interpret legal norms. In accordance 
48
 Const. Court resolution 1997, 41, 49. 
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with its previous decisions on the interpretation of competence, the Consti-
tutional Court besides completely performing the constitutional authority 
concerning a subsequent norm control takes also the foreign examples of the 
constitutional review of international treaties into account. Finally, the 
Constitutional Court refers to the fact that the review of the constitutionality of 
international treaties remains within the framework of its constitutional duty: 
subsequent norm control and does not allude to the sphere of authority and 
duty of other branches of power.44 
The Constitutional Court thus through the interpretation of competence, 
by the correlation of constitutional provisions and through the application of 
different—historical, logical etc.—interpretation methods stated and corrobo-
rated the existence of an authority not declared expressis verbis in a provision, 
but which may be deduced from the text of the law. The Court descriptively 
showed that not even in the subsequent norm-control procedure did they apply 
the right of annulment provided by law, but the constitution conform inter-
pretation of the Constitution, a method which conforms to the protection of the 
Constitution and the principle of constitutionality which however bears no 
statutory ground. Thus through the interpretation and analysis of the principles 
and provisions of the Constitution certain issues of authority may be deduced, 
which otherwise are not named definitely among the provisions. 
b) The Constitutional Court applied the method of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation several times and in connection with its different competences. 
These decisions construing the sphere of authority well demonstrate that the 
Court fulfil their authority by taking the principle of the separation of powers 
into account, in accordance with their constitutional status.50 According to the 
Constitutional Court, in the process of the interpretation of their authority "the 
principle of the separation of powers should be taken into account to a greater 
extent, since that is the most important organizational and operational principle 
of the Hungarian state organisation".51 The Court thus exercises its authority 
by considering its constitutional legal status, by respecting the principle of the 
separation of powers not merely through the mechanic application of express 
provisions but by taking all the relevant legal principles and values,52 arising 
from the Constitution into consideration. The same can be referred to the acts 
DQ 
Const. Court resolution 1997. 41, 49. 
50
 E.g. 16/1991 (20. 04) and 31/1990 (18.12) Const. Court resolutions. 
51
 Const. Court resolution 1990, 136, 137. 
52
 In connection with constitutional values see Ádám, A.: Alkotmányi értékek és alkot-
mánybíráskodás [Constitutional values and constitutional jurisdiction]. Budapest, 1998. 25-
83. 
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reviewed: in the course of the constitutional review the Court takes other 
provisions, principles and values into account. In relation to the directives on 
unifying the case law—by having regard for the content involved in the 
Constitutional Court decisions referred to above—it can be verified that in the 
process of a potential constitutional review the principle of the separation of 
powers is not infringed. As a consequence of the constitutional review of 
directives on unifying the case law, the Constitutional Court will not become a 
part of the judicial system, will not rise above the Supreme Court, because it is 
entitled to review the normative acts of the Supreme Court exclusively from a 
constitutional point of view, and cannot be in favour of the fact if their content 
is right or wrong, well-grounded or unfounded. The Constitutional Court is not 
entitled to verify that the standpoint of the Supreme Court taken up in a directive 
on unifying the case law is legally improper, misinterpreted, or mistaken 
concerning civil, criminal, administrative etc. law. The Constitutional Court 
may take a stand exclusively in question of constitutionality but in those, they 
may definitely take a stand. 
c) On the ground of the fact sorted out above, it can be seen that the 
Constitutional Court may exercise the review of the directives on unifying the 
case law of the Supreme Court in lack of an expressis verbis constitutional or 
statutory authorisation as well. This right would be excluded only by an express 
prohibition of the Constitution or an act. Because of this, the Supreme Court 
(the intention of which is that the Constitutional Court could not proceed against 
their normative acts), in order to realise their intention, should "persuade" the 
Parliament to exempt directives on unifying the case law from below the 
Constitutional Court control with an express statutory prohibition. It is 
important, if the Supreme Court does not wish to provide the possibility for the 
review, it is not enough to attain or urge that the Parliament should leave the 
issue unregulated. At this time, however it will be transferred to the competence 
of the Constitutional Court and that body will decide in the question what sort 
of possibility exists against directives on unifying the case law, related to a 
concrete matter. In lack of an unambiguous constitutional or statutory 
prohibition, if only the regulating element concerning the review is "made to 
be omitted" from the act, the Constitutional Court may—without an express 
provisional ground, just by taking other principles, derivable from the 
Constitution and by providing the highest level safeguard of the Constitution, 
fulfil the review and in a given case, the annulment of a directive on unifying 
the case law. The Constitutional Court however, has undertaken a similar 
activity. Because of this, even if the new text of the Constitution or the new 
Act on the Constitutional Court did not express the possibility of a Constitu-
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tional Court review of directives in unifying the case law, it would not 
definitely restrict the activity of the Constitutional Court in such matters. 
4. The concrete Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the 
case law, the correlation between living law and constitutional 
requirements 
a) Provided that the Constitutional Court review in relation to directives on 
unifying the case law is recognised, in the case of unconstitutionality the Court 
can choose from two solutions. One of them is to annul the directive on 
unifying the case law bearing an unconstitutional interpretation.53 The other is 
to apply their statements concerning the correlation between the interpretation 
of "living law" and constitution conform interpretation.54 Accordingly, the consti-
tutional protest (constitutional complain) related to judicial law enforcement 
may call forth a two-step Constitutional Court procedure. If the judicial practice 
applies the given provision in an unconstitutional way, the Constitutional Court 
will express the constitutional content of the provision in a decision. Provided 
that the judicial practice neglects the decision of the Constitutional Court, and 
because of this the law will enter into force as the result of unconstitutional 
law enforcement, the Constitutional Court will annul the given law on the 
ground of the principle of "living law".55 Referring all this to directives on 
unifying the case law, the Court first would verify a constitutional requirement, 
and if the Supreme Court, and other courts later on did not recognise this 
requirement, the Constitutional Court would annul the given directive on 
unifying the case law on the principle of "living law". It is important to realise 
53
 Pursuant to Article 40 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, if the Constitutional 
Court verifies the unconstitutionality of a law or of any other legal means of state adminis-
tration, they will annul the law or any other legal means of state administration totally or 
partly. 
54
 1/1993 (13. 09)—internal opinion—on the Constitutional Court practice to be 
followed in the process of the constitutional review of judicial law enforcement. 
55
 The principle of "living law" in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
denotes in the process of the constitutional review of laws that the body reviews not 
exclusively the text of the law but if necessary, its meaning used in uniform law enforcement. 
If from among the potential interpretations of the law only one is applied by the legal practice 
and this interpretation is unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court will verify the unconstitu-
tionality of the norm, or depending on the case, will specify the "constitutional requirements" 
important for the application of the norm. Nevertheless, the review of "living law" is quite 
frequent, since because of an individual character it may be significant in constitutional 
complains, but even in that case it is not regular. 
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that in this case not the given law but the directive on unifying the case law 
should be annulled. The reason for this is that the annulment of the directive 
on unifying the case law—even if the ex nunc annulment is taken as a base— 
would result in the—probably only partial—"fall o f f ' of an act from the legal 
system. It may happen, however that a directive on unifying the case law is the 
result of the interpretation of a number of laws. Because of this, in some cases, 
it would lead to difficulties and in other cases; it would be impossible to decide 
which of the laws construed should be annulled to restore constitutionality. On 
the other hand, if the Constitutional Court reached the same result through the 
annulment of several acts instead of nullifying just one, legal security would 
also be affected. It is also expedient to refer to the separate opinion of Géza, 
Kilényi justice of the Constitutional Court, related to the theory of "living 
law". He states "if the legal practice by the unconstitutional interpretation 
come up against law, the organs exercising law enforcement must be enforced 
to undertake the constitutional interpretation and application of the act (or other 
provision) by the use of the appropriate legal means. It is not the legislator 
who should be punished because of the unconstitutional law enforcement of 
legislative organs, which means the Constitutional Court annuls the law, which 
upon a correct constitutional interpretation would not be unconstitutional".56 In 
my opinion, this argument is very acceptable in the respect that not the 
fundamental rule (provisions) but the unity of law decision drafting the 
unconstitutional interpretation should be annulled. Unconstitutionality thus, 
besides complying with the requirements arising from constitutionality may be 
redressed in a single way: by the annulment of the unconstitutional directive 
on unifying the case law. 
b) In relation to the examination of living law it must be seen "the 
Constitutional Court reviews the norm content, appearing in the permanent 
judicial practice, namely handles court interpretations as a fact and judges the 
constitutionality of a norm existing in practice. By the review of living law the 
Constitutional Court undeniably supervises the constitutionality of judicial 
practice, however not in a concrete case but in a general form having consolidated 
into a norm: Constitutional Court control refers not to the concrete litigation 
but to the norm creating activity of the judicial power. Judge made law, which 
has prevailed invincibly and uniformly for a long time, is a legal form just like 
the decisions of the Supreme Court, which specify uniform law enforcement 
with an obligatory force. The Constitutional Court review of these provisions 
leaves the independence of judicial litigation intact. May unconstitutionality 
arise, the Constitutional Court will nullify the norm or specify the potential 
56
 Cf. with 57/1991 (08. 11) Const. Court resolution. ABH 1991. 272, 287. 
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constitutional applications of the norm, but will not deal with court rulings."57 
Constitutional requirement is also a norm: the Constitutional Court "in the 
tenor specifies it with the generality of a norm"58 The possibility for the consti-
tutional review of "living law" corroborates the requirement that directives on 
unifying the case law should be, by all means, placed under the review of the 
Constitutional Court. 
c) Since the potential consequences of Constitutional Court decisions arise 
concerning the planned new regulation as well, these and the significantly 
dissenting ideas of legal literature will be discussed together with the new 
concept on regulation. 
II. New ideas about the Constitutional Court, which concern directives on 
unifying the case law 
1. The pertinent sections of the previous regulation concerning the 
Constitutional Court 
The review of the regulation concerning the Constitutional Court has been in 
process for quite a long time. In favour of the amendment, the Ministry of 
Justice have prepared a number of bills already in 2000 and attached a "Propo-
sition" to the conception to give grounds for the necessity of an amendment. In 
the Proposition, there is a summary of the arguments for and against the notions 
concerning the new regulation, and the necessity of the modification and the 
certain professional and political opinions connected to the ideas are accounted 
for in detail. Different viewpoints are contrasted in relation to the Constitu-
tional Court review of directives on unifying the case law and the advantages 
and risks concealed behind the ideas are also demonstrated. By virtue of the 
persuasive argumentation of the Proposition, it is not justified that while the 
normative decisions of the other two branches of power fall under a Constitu-
tional Court control, there is no such possibility concerning directives on 
unifying the case law. Nevertheless, the Proposition sorts out arguments— 
which, in my opinion do not seem to be persuasive—against the review as well. 
a) According to one of the arguments, in this way the Constitutional Court 
may have a review of judicial law enforcement. Pursuant to the proposal "the 
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 Sólyom: op. cit., 30. 
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 Sólyom: op. cit., 45. Notwithstanding Sólyom also refers to the legitimating force of 
express legal regulation: "If the constitution conform interpretation gains an express 
constitutional ground, the courts will probably follow this". 
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alternative means against the courts may be grounded by the special character 
of this branch of power." The judicial branch of power is of a special character; 
decisions are not influenced by politics thus, there is no definite reason for a 
legal and professional sifting of the decisions (norms). 
b) Pursuant to the other counter argument, the above authority would not 
comply with Article 47, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, because it states; the 
uniform law enforcement of the courts is provided by the Supreme Court. 
Beyond this, the normative content of directives on unifying the case law is not 
equivalent to a law; since it will not verify a new legal content: just expound that 
of the law. Not even their binding force is equal, because directives on unifying 
the case law oblige the courts only. The Proposition, reflecting the political 
standpoint of the government finally states: "The professional arguments under-
line the variant that the Constitutional Court should not be entitled to the 
review of directives on unifying the case law."59 
These counter arguments, I think have not been deliberate enough or they 
are not relevant to settle the issue. As to the first counter argument, it is not 
persuasive that the review of the normative acts of the legislative and 
executive power is justified because their decisions are effected by politics, 
thus their professional sifting is justified however, that of the courts, in lack of 
a political character, is not justified. Constitutional Court control is not simply 
a "professional sifting", but a special sphere of that: constitutional control. In 
questions of constitutionality, however there is no difference between directives 
on unifying the case law and the normative acts of the other two branches of 
power. It is no doubt that the Parliament and the majority of ministries, alike 
the Supreme Court, have expert advisory panels to justify and enforce constitu-
tionality. Notwithstanding, uniform constitutionality may be ensured only if all 
the acts of normative character, which are based on law fall under the control 
of the Constitutional Court. 
The second counter argument was not well grounded either. Securing the 
unity of law enforcement is not equal to the control of the constitutionality of 
the norm providing "security". The uniformity of law enforcement, totally 
independently from the Constitutional Court control, would be exercised by 
the Supreme Court further on, because the Constitutional Court would not 
exercise a control on criminal-, civil-, and administrative law interpretation, 
different from that involved in directives on unifying the case law, but would 
have an exclusive constitutional control. 
54
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2. The amendment of the Constitution intended in 2003 
In connection with the subsequent norm control, the Constamend2, as a 
significant amplification and important progress, would also provide the 
constitutional foundation to the constitutional review of directives on unifying 
the case law.60 In the Constamend2, the review of conflict with international 
treaties would also have constructed a separate section and the scope of norms 
reviewed would have been amplified—among others—with directives on 
unifying the case law. It must be mentioned that the proposal made by the 
Minister of Justice of the previous Government involved the same solution, so 
there is an apparent political consensus in this respect. Notwithstanding, 
there is a significant difference between the drafts as regards that the first 
Constitutional amendment would have authorized the Constitutional Court to 
annul directives on unifying the case law conflicting with the Constitution, in 
the second draft there is no reference to a possibility on the annulment of 
directives on unifying the case law. The reason for this is that the revised 
version would refer the obligation to withdraw directives on unifying the case 
law declared unconstitutional, within the authority of the Supreme Court. 
3. Notions related to the drafts of the new Act on the Constitutional Court 
a) General rules 
aa) The original draft of the Act on the Constitutional Court would have 
provided the possibility for the suspension of the application of a directive on 
unifying the case law and it would have been referred under the authority of 
the full session. The revised draft however would not provide this possibility. 
The reason for the annulment is the withdrawal concerning directives on 
unifying the case law, which would make the proposal null and void. 
ab) As regards directives on unifying the case law, provided that a proposal 
related to such an act of the Supreme Court would be presented to the body, 
they were obliged to pass it to the President of the Supreme Court for an 
opinion.61 Pursuant to the Act on the Constitutional Court2, the decision on the 
unconstitutionality of a directive on unifying the case law should be published 
in the Official Journal too. Its basis is Article 38, Paragraphs 1, and 2 of the 
60
 Because of the considerable resistance of the Supreme Court, however the success of 
recognition is doubtful. 
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new draft, according to which the Constitutional Court must publish their 
decisions, besides their own official gazette, in the Official Journal as well. 
ac) The Act on the Constitutional Court2 would not let the Constitutional 
Court apply a temporary provision in connection with a directive on unifying 
the case law. 
b) Conceptions related to certain procedures 
ba) In relation to the review of conflict with an international treaty, the 
following conceptions have appeared 
baa) The scope of reviewable norms would be extended on other legal means 
of self-governmental administration and directives on unifying the case law, 
which would lead to the mild differentiation of the procedure. 
Pursuant to Article 43, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, 
if the Constitutional Court verifies that a directive on unifying the case law 
conflicts with an international treaty, the Supreme Court will withdraw the 
decision within thirty days from the promulgation of the decision (namely the 
decision of the Constitutional Court). Concerning a directive on unifying the 
case law, there is no need to examine the level of legal source, because this act 
is not a law, thus its position could not be interpreted in relation to provisional 
hierarchy. However, it is doubtful why the Act on the Constitutional Court2 
makes it impossible for the Supreme Court to amend the directive on unifying 
the case law conflicting with an international treaty and why the draft 
immediately operates with withdrawal. This latter possibility should also be 
provided for the supreme judicial body. 
The Constitutional Court was not given the possibility to provide a 
constitution conform interpretation concerning the directives on unifying the 
case law of the Supreme Court. 
bab) Since a directive on unifying the case law can never occupy a higher 
level than a law promulgating an international treaty, thus it does not require 
any regulation, so related to this the Act on the Constitutional Court2 does not 
involve any specification. 
bb) In connection with the subsequent review of unconstitutionality— 
although the Constamend2 would permit the review of directives on unifying 
the case law, the ConstCourt bill2 would not provide the pro futuro annulment 
in relation to directives on unifying the case law. It has a base of principle and 
practice as well: on the one hand, the creation of a directive on unifying the 
case law would probably take less time than the amendment of another norm 
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or the creation of a new regulation. On the other hand—and this is the more 
important reason—if a directive on unifying the case law is nullified, it will 
not give rise to a lack of regulation, because for the organs of law enforcement 
the relevant provisions still exist, however in their regard a wider scope of 
freedom will appear. In addition to that, the requirements of principle, 
involved in the nullified directive on unifying the case law—if due to the 
character of the annulment it is not excluded—may be applied and taken into 
account concerning the decision of the Constitutional Court, together with the 
decision and the constitutional content. 
be) Above this, by virtue of Article 50, Paragraph 2 of the ConstCourt 
bill2, provided that the provisions of the bill are realised, the Constitutional 
Court could order the review of the criminal procedure determined on the 
ground of an unconstitutional law or directive on unifying the case law. 
bd) Besides this, the Constitutional Court could act in the concrete norm 
control procedure initiated by the judge, even against the directive on unifying 
the case law not in effect any longer. The same would be competent in the 
procedure of a constitutional complain. If the Constitutional Court acting 
within this latter authority would verify the unconstitutionality of a directive 
on unifying the case law referred to by the constitutional complain, the 
Supreme Court would be obliged to withdraw the unconstitutional directive on 
unifying the case law within thirty days after its promulgation. 
be) In connection with the constitutional complain the major elements of 
the present solution would survive in the ConstCourt bill2. The draft, on the 
ground of the infringement of rights included in the Constitution will provide 
the possibility for those, whose grievance is the consequence of the application 
of an unconstitutional normative act—among them directives on unifying the 
case law—and the infringement of rights may be the subject of the 
Constitutional Court's review, if he has exhausted all the other possibilities for 
remedy or there are no other possibility for remedy. 
bf) If the unconstitutionality is the result of the omission of legislative 
obligation, directives on unifying the case law should not be taken into 
account. The reason for this is partly that the effective acts and bills—count 
(would count) only an omission embodied in the omission of the drafting of a 
law by the legislative organ, under the effect of the action. The involvement of 
directives on unifying the case law in this sphere would recognise the legislative 
character of the Supreme Court expressis verbis, to which the legislators do not 
at present show any reluctance. On the other hand, since the already existing 
acts can be interpreted without the existence of a directive on unifying the case 
law, actually there is no omission related to them: the purpose and substance of 
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the creation of a directive on unifying the case law however, is not to draft a 
new provision but to clear up the meaning of a provision. 
III. Further potential solutions 
Since in the special literature there are several potential solutions concerning 
the review of directives on unifying the case law in the following, I will 
shortly introduce the variant not adapted in the drafts. The reason for this is 
that the regulation concerning the Constitutional Court is before acceptance, 
thus a proposal (or part of a proposal), which is not included in the draft may 
be reflected in the subsequent versions or in the final text of the law. The 
solutions not having inserted are different from the variants involved in the 
draft concerning some legal consequences proposed for the unconstitutionality 
of a directive on unifying the case law. 
a) According to the related proposal, the Constitutional Court would be 
entitled to verify the unconstitutionality but the possibility of annulment— 
alike in the ConstCourt bill2—would not be included among the means of the 
Court. Thus, unconstitutionality could be eliminated in the way that the 
Constitutional Court would withdraw the unconstitutional directive on 
unifying the case law within a definite time after the promulgation of the 
decision. It means that the Constitutional Court would retain its right of review 
but the actual authority of annulment would be referred to the Supreme Court. 
The present President of the Constitutional Court András Holló for instance 
has expounded "according to the standpoint of the Constitutional Court as a 
result of the constitutional review of a directive on unifying the case law, the 
Constitutional Court would reach a so called "verifying decision", namely 
would just verify that the directive on unifying the case law is unconstitutional 
but its legal consequence, the annulment of the directive on unifying the case 
law would remain within the authority of the Supreme Court."62 Notwith-
standing I do not think that the Supreme Court, based on the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court will be inclined to nullify the act of their own, because 
even in the issue of Constitutional Court review they show a sharply negative 
attitude. President Holló himself had a solution for the verification of the 
unconstitutionality of directives on unifying the case law. According to his 
opinion "if the Constitutional Court, instead of the annulment of the provision 
interpreted by a directive on unifying the case law, will specify the constitu-
tional requirements competent in the application of the law, this specification— 
62
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since the Constitutional Court decision has a general binding force—is 
normative on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court must harmonize directives 
on unifying the case law with the aspects specified under the constitutional 
requirements. As long as it has been fulfilled, the directive on unifying the 
case law cannot be applied."63 However, it is doubtful if in this case until the 
"harmonization" it is to be adhered to the decision of lower level courts, the 
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. It is to be feared that to the latter: 
notwithstanding, court rulings, through the forum system of remedy can get 
before the Supreme Court quite easily, where the will of this organ will be 
enforced. 
b) In relation to this solution it must be mentioned that concerning its 
substance it would not make any difference as if the Constitutional Court 
annulled the directive on unifying the case law, but it would bear a number of 
factors of uncertainty. 
ba) Partly, even if the standpoint seemingly seeks a compromise between 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, there are also some risks 
concealed in the proposal. Beyond the aspects of prestige, it is all the same if a 
directive on unifying the case law regarded as unconstitutional is nullified by 
the Supreme Court and not the Constitutional Court. The only argument for 
may be that in this case, the Supreme Court's amending potential will prevail, 
but this will remain under the pro futuro annulment possibility as well—which 
is however, intended not to be provided. A complicated and detailed regulation 
is required in the matter if the Supreme Court—by standing against the opinion 
of the Constitutional Court—would not annul a directive on unifying the case 
law. At this time, it may be problematic to provide the mode of the solution. 
One variation could be that in this case—within an appointed time—the 
Constitutional Court would be obliged to proceed in an obligatory way and 
practised the authority of annulment. The other proposal covers that the 
directive on unifying the case law, by virtue of the law, should become invalid 
within definite time. In my opinion, neither of the solutions deviates in their 
effect from the annulment coeval with the verification of unconstitutionality 
exercised by the Constitutional Court, but they would cause a significant waste 
of time and result in legal insecurity. 
bb) Notwithstanding, Géza Kilényi, former Justice at the Constitutional Court, 
states "indirect repeal is different from direct repeal not mainly concerning its 
sense but rather in the array of the procedure. The decision in this case is also 
made by the Constitutional Court but at this time, the body does it in a covert 
way and the legislative organ is forced to fulfil the task. The indirect repeal is 
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more polite than the direct repeal but undoubtedly much more circumstantial 
as well."04 I think putting the proposal into a statutory form could not be 
accepted by the Supreme Court either, and above this, if realised it would 
actually be equal to annulment, thus the application of a circumstantial and 
complicated regulation would not be obedient in the creation of the new act. 
c) The method of the so-called constitution-conform constitution interpretation 
generally applied by the Constitutional Court may be connected to the issue of 
annulment.65 According to the practice of the Constitutional Court it briefly 
means—although "living law", namely the "permanent and uniform" content 
appearing in the legislative practice must also be taken into account during the 
constitutional review of the norm—, and the annulment of a law should be 
avoided, if possible. Pursuant to the principle followed by the Constitutional 
Court, effective law should be preserved. Consequently the Constitutional Court 
will not necessarily annul the given provision, but if among its interpretative 
possibilities there is a variant of interpretation which conforms to the Constitu-
tion, the Court will specify the so called "constitutional requirements" competent 
in the application of the norm. Because of this, if there is a possibility to provide 
the prevalence of constitutionality by leaving the norm text unchanged, the 
requirements that should be applied or taken into account to make a law 
constitutional are specified in the clause of the decision. Obviously, if the 
legislative practice will not conform to this, the only way open for the 
Constitutional Court is to nullify the law. 
d) Notwithstanding, in my opinion the method to specify constitutional 
requirements related to a directive on unifying the case law could be applied in 
no way. In that case, namely the Constitutional Court actually may not decide 
about a constitutional issue, but about a problem belonging to another branch 
of power, thus would take over the role of the Supreme Court. The reason for 
this is that the directive on unifying the case law has made one sense of the law 
bearing several interpretations obligatory for the courts. If by specifying the 
constitutional requirement, it were narrowed down further on, it would either 
make the directive on unifying the case law devoid of content, or result in an 
interpretation regarded as incorrect by the Supreme Court. Concerning the 
principle of the separation of powers however, it would be inadmissible. The 
Constitutional Court may keep directives on unifying the case law within 
M
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constitutional limits if a constitutional requirement, related to the law that 
forms the basis of the directive on unifying the case law is specified. 
IV. Summary 
In my view the Constitutional Court review of directives on unifying the case 
law may be administered on the ground of the effective legal background. 
Notwithstanding, a satisfying legal solution will require the uniformity of 
positive law regulation. Since besides the point of view of prestige, there is no 
reason why the Constitutional Court should not review—obviously exclusively 
on the ground of constitutional respects—the directives on unifying the case 
law of the Supreme Court, for the sake of the protection of the fundamental 
law, this competence should be provided for the Constitutional Court with the 
possibility of annulment. 
Any different regulation would lead to the total disturbance of constitutional 
jurisdiction, which cannot be supported in a constitutional state. However, it is 
a healthy sign that in a recent decision of the Constitutional Court on the subject 
of a proposal initiating the constitutional review of a directive on unifying the 
case law, a decree of annulment was delivered because the person in question 
withdrew his proposal.66 Since a decree of annulment must be preceded by a 
genuine examination—because submissions not falling within the authority 
of the body are refused—in that case the genuine constitutional control of 
directives on unifying the case law in all probability has been in progress. 
Provided that an appropriate proposal is presented, the Constitutional Court 
will hopefully pass a resolution concerning the constitutionality of a directive 
on unifying the case law. 
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Minority Rights in Hungary and the Situation 
of the Roma1 
At present the Roma live primarily in Europe, they can be found in every country 
of the continent. Their number is estimated to be around 8 and 10 million in 
Europe, and the largest population of the European Roma—approximately 
70%—is to be found in Central and Eastern Europe. Statistics on the Roma are 
rather difficult to gather, and even where these exist they are unreliable. It has a 
number of reasons one for example is that Roma do not like to declare them-
selves Roma for fear of prejudice and discrimination. 
Many originate their antecedents from the North-West of India, from where 
they travelled several centuries ago. But wherever the antecedents of the 
European Roma come from, people who belong to the majority think they 
resemble each other recognisably, and they are bound together by the fact that 
non-Roma population regards and calls them gypsies. 
Numerous questions concerning the Roma in Europe have remained recently 
unanswered and it is still doubtful whether they will assimilate in the society 
of the majority or perhaps they will demand their special rights as a minority 
(and it may vary country-by-country). Of course beside social integration 
there is also a much gloomier alternative, namely that they will remain a 
disintegrated part of European society for a long time still to come. 
To achieve both forms of social integration, the states shall guarantee the 
equal enjoyment of human rights. However, in the era of human rights this 
might seem a minimalist objective and the need for it, which is often mentioned 
in documents adopted by international organisations as well, in a state 
governed by the rule of law cannot be subject to dispute any more." Beside the 
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equal enjoyment of human rights the social integration of the Roma now 
requires a form of additional positive distinction. 
If a national legal system decides to provide for special minority rights 
or the free choice of identity, theoretically the Roma will be granted two 
possibilities (assimilation or special minority rights) from which to choose. In 
spite of this, however, it obviously makes some difference which solution the 
state prefers and what legal and financial means it has to support its preference. 
On the one hand it may provide for special minority rights, on the other, as a 
different solution it may support the various forms of affirmative action 
promoting the assimilation process, like the quota system in the USA. 
The Minority Question and the Security Issue 
The minority question is, in part, being treated in the framework of human 
rights protection but as a security issue both in the East and the West and this 
attitude unambiguously presents itself at the international stage as well.3 (The 
security-based approach is not fortunate for several reasons. Consider, for 
example, whether it is compatible with the spirit of human rights that those 
who threaten security in certain cases are granted special rights or quite to the 
contrary that human rights are limited.) Yet, the way of thinking about what 
endangers the security of states has developed differently within Europe. 
While, according to the conclusion of Will Kimlycka, minority nationalism 
becomes imminent in the eyes of politicians and the majority population in the 
West only when it resorts to terrorism, even the most modest requests of the 
minority leaders can cause great panic in most countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.4 (Kimlycka mentions that when a few representatives of the indigenous 
population in Canada do not consider themselves Canadian, it is merely 
considered as a threat on solidarity in the North American context. As opposed 
to this, in the Central and Eastern European context similar declarations of 
the Roma leaders are sometimes considered problems that outright threaten 
the existence of the states.) It is not surprising, therefore, that there are 
1
 A proof of this opinion could be that it falls under the scope of activities of the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to intervene in situations threatening 
with a future conflict involving national minorities. In connection to this, see CSCE 
Helsinki Document 1992. The Challenges of Change II. 
4
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views according to which it would be beneficial to the managing of minority 
conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe just to convince the states of the region 
that the aspirations for autonomy they deem dangerous, instead of endangering 
the sovereignty of the state, may even become appropriate tools for the 
management of ethnic conflicts in certain cases. This persuasion becomes even 
more important considering the self-protecting mechanisms of the state, since 
the greatest of creatures, the great Leviathan, in the words of András Sajó: "...as 
opposed to dolphins, whales and people—is not inclined to commit suicide. On 
the other hand, the most natural feature of a state is that it protects itself: the 
objective of self-defence has made the gang of robbers (magna latrocinium) a 
state".4 If the state is successfully persuaded, then two further conditions need 
to be met. First, this approach has to be transformed properly into the legal 
system, second, the bodies created through autonomy need to be endowed with 
a real sphere of authority in order that the introduced new legal institutions 
could function effectively. Following the accomplishment of all this, it will 
become possible to use the means of law—although they are undoubtedly 
limited in themselves—for the protection of minorities. (However, when 
introducing the Minority Act the Hungarian legislator did not meet the latter 
requirement fully.) 
The Autonomy of Minorities 
A catalogue of the special rights of minorities would be difficult to compile, 
nevertheless, it is certain that at the top of this imaginative hierarchy of rights 
we would find the autonomy of minorities, which "constitutes the maximum 
legal status a minority may achieve within a state."6 
The autonomy of minorities established on a territorial or personal basis, 
has been part of the legal and political thought in Europe for long and, 
similarly to the concept of the nation, it has changed "together with the social 
circumstances and the conceptual structures corresponding to them in the 
5
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given ages".7 (What is more, antecedents of legal history can be cited with 
regard to the autonomy of groups separated from the rest of the population in 
some religious, linguistic or cultural respect already from times preceding the 
development of the modern concept of nation. An example to this can be the 
royal charter issued by King Zygmunt August in 1551, which provided for the 
personal autonomy transcending religious matters of the Jews in Poland.) 
The autonomy of national minorities is regarded as a development of the 
modern ages when the state delegates spheres of public power to organisations 
elected by the members of the minority through a democratic process. This 
can happen in two different ways: territorial autonomy may function when the 
national minority constitutes a integrated community in an area whereas 
personal autonomy may be established when the minority lives dispersed in the 
given area. Personal autonomy is often mentioned as cultural autonomy, since 
the public administration bodies organised on this principle are usually—but 
not necessarily—granted powers in the fields of education, culture and mass 
communication.8 These two types of autonomy can also be applied jointly 
within a state and the Hungarian legislators made an attempt at this, when they 
wanted to mix the principles of personal and local autonomy in the Act 
LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (hereinafter: 
Minority Act). However, this attempt turned out futile because of the 
inadequacies of the text of the Law. 
Besides putting other principles of minority protection into practice, special 
importance shall be attributed to the realisation of the autonomy of minorities, 
because it is only through this that the elected representatives of minorities can 
appear in the sphere of public administration. After all central state power—no 
matter what goodwill it demonstrates towards national and ethnic minorities— 
cannot be regarded ethnically neutral, consequently state officials are often 
biased in favour of the majority ethnic group. Therefore, persons belonging to 
a minority may with just cause present their legal claim at the establishment of 
their own institutions—elected by the members of the minority and de facto 
endowed with spheres of authority of public administration—at certain fields 
of public life.4 Such autonomy would be particularly important in the case of 
7
 Conversation of Andor Németh and Attila József on the change of the nation 
concept, see Németh, A.: József Attila. Budapest, 1991. 134-135. 
8
 See the brief summary of the two principles of autonomy in Hungarian professional 
literature. Ifj. Korhecz, T.: A kisebbségi autonómiáról címszavakban [In Brief on the 
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the Roma population because those belonging to this minority are over-
represented with respect to the latter party of the "authority—client" system of 
relations. Accordingly, through the autonomy of the minority, the Roma 
minority or, using the terminology of international law, the "persons belonging 
to the [Roma] minority"—even if not in all fields of life—could turn to their 
own public administration bodies with their problems and could have their 
interests represented by them. (In the case of the Roma population, because of 
the territorial extension of the minority the personal principle should be 
applied, mixed with the territorial principle on the local level.) 
Autonomy and the Hungarian Minority Act 
Minority legislation seems to be closely tied up with national policies in 
general, but today, as a result of a "globalised conscience" evoked in the name 
of universal human rights, Central and Eastern European countries have to 
comply with the norms of international law on minorities. The effort to lay 
down the rights of minorities in legal instruments appeared in Central and 
Eastern Europe after the collapse of the bipolar world order. The first minority 
act was promulgated in 1989 in Lithuania at a time when it was still part of the 
Soviet Union. It was followed by the promulgation of a corresponding act in 
Estonia in 1990, in Latvia and Croatia in 1991, in Ukraine and Belarus in 1992 
and finally in Hungary in 1993.10 The Hungarian Minority Act was adopted 
by the Parliament on July 7, with an overwhelming majority of 96.5%." The 
Act was formulated with due regard for the Hungarian Constitution which 
provides—uniquely in the whole region (not counting federal states)—that the 
minorities living in the country form a constitutive part of the state.12 As part of 
the travaux préparatoires, the legislators had studied and referred to effective 
international documents such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
10
 Brunner, G.: Die rechtliche Lage der Minderheiten in Mittel- Ost- und Südosteuropa. 
Osteuropa Recht, 1994, Vol. 40. 162. 
" The Act can be considered an "omnibus law": several other statutes contain 
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participate in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the 
State. 
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Paris Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. One of the 
goals enunciated in the Act was to bring about an institutional framework in 
which minorities can enjoy their identity, including facilities and opportunities 
for a "free and lively contact" with their mother countries and nations. 
The Hungarian legislator probably had two aims in view: to preserve a 
colourful and multicultural world for future generations on the one hand and on 
the other, no doubt with an eye to the interests of Hungarian minorities living 
in neighbouring countries, to set an example to the legislators of these countries. 
Neighbouring countries consider autonomy as a phenomenon threatening their 
security and sovereignty. However, because of the defects of the text the effort 
to create an Act, which is worth following, did not work out. 
The Act entered into force at a time when the minorities in Hungary were 
already in an advanced state of assimilation. (Minorities in Hungary represent 
a relatively low percentage of the overall population, live scattered over the 
country and often form minorities even at the local level.) The past few 
decades have seen a process of increasing linguistic assimilation especially 
among the Roma population, but the number of those professing to be native 
speakers of German, Romanian or Slovak has also decreased dramatically.11 With 
reference to German nationals, for example, the Research Centre of Hungarian 
Germans offers the following explanation: as a result of the lack of German 
schooling and the detachment from the mother tongue as spoken in Germany, 
the role of the Hochsprache was taken over by literary and colloquial 
Hungarian. The report describes the present situation as one in which the local 
dialect of German is spoken only by the older generation and depends on 
factors such as age, sex and situation.14 The loss of the minority language in 
many localities seems to be no longer reversible today and the problem is 
aggravated by the fact that most of those who still speak their vernacular do 
not know the literary register of their language. (Minority self-government 
meetings are usually conducted in Hungarian, occasionally coloured by the local 
dialect spoken by the minority.) Double or multiple identity seems to be the 
13 
See in this connection Kemény, L: A nyelvcseréről és a roma gyerekek nyelvi 
hátrányairól az iskolában [On Change of Language and the Linguistic Disadvantages of 
Roma> Children at School]. In: Nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek Magyarországon a 20. 
század végén [National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary at the End of the 20th 
Century] (ed.: Sisák. G.). Budapest, 1999. 268. 14
 A magyarországi németek [The Germans of Hungary] (ed.: Manhercz, K.). Buda-
pest, 1998. 46. 
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only option for those belonging to the more or less linguistically assimilated 
ethnic or national minorities.15 
The Minority Act was meant to halt, or possibly to reverse, this process of 
assimilation. It is doubtful whether a relatively advanced stage of assimilation 
can be reversed from above with the instruments of law. Due to the territorial 
distribution of minorities in Hungary the principle of territorial autonomy 
alone would not have been applicable, so the Act was formulated so as to 
combine the principles of personal and local autonomy. The legislator's aim in 
working out the principles of the minority self-government system was to offer 
minorities an opportunity to build up their own cultural autonomy in the 
framework of a system of self-government, which is seen as "the foundation 
of the democratic order". Minority self-governing bodies established in the 
wake of the Act started their activity in 1995 within the newly created 
framework.16 
The Persons under the Scope of the Act17 
The personal scope of the Act covers all Hungarian citizens, who profess to 
belong to a national minority recognised by the Act, and to the communities 
constituted by these persons, irrespective of their numbers. (All legal regulations 
15
 For a consonant opinion see Gerhard Seewann, Ungarndeutsche und Ethnopolitik, 
Budapest, 2000. 
16
 Some minority self-governments were elected indirectly, some directly. There were 
two types of indirect foundation: 
When more than half of the representatives in the representative body elected were 
candidates of the same national or ethnic minority, the representative body declared itself a 
local minority self goverment. 
If at least 30% of the representatives elected were candidates of the same minority, the 
representatives of each minority were entitled to establish minority governments consisting 
of a minimum of three members. A minority local government was to dissolve if the 
proportion of minority representatives in the body fell below 30%. 
Minority self-governments established by direct election: elections had to be called if 
requested by at least five voters professing themselves to be members of a minority and 
resident in the locality in question. A local spokesperson may be elected, if legal requirements 
were met, without a local minority government. National self-governments are elected by 
minority electors. Local authority representatives elected from minority candidates, local 
minority authority representatives and spokespersons qualified as minority electors. 
17
 See on this connection Küpper, H.: Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn. 
München, 1998. 
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on national and ethnic minorities govern the relationship between the state and 
the individual minority member, but, as a consequence, they also relate to 
relationships between majority and minority members.) The scope of the Act— 
according to the European practice—does not extend to refugees, immigrants, 
resident foreigners and stateless persons of whatever national identity. Both 
the scope of the Act and the definition of the notion of national and ethnic 
minority given in the Act is rather debatable. As regards the scope of the Act, 
besides narrowing the range of persons to whom the Act is applicable, it seems 
on the whole superfluous, since it is difficult to devise a legal category which 
will be equally applicable to the various autochthonous national minorities; 
altogether 13 as the Act enlists them in Article 61(1).18 (National legal systems 
often make a difference between autochthonous and non-autochthonous 
minorities and grant special rights only for the latter.) As regards the concept of 
minority, from among international documents on the protection of minorities 
we shall come across a definition of the notion of minority only in soft law 
documents and drafts, and domestic legal systems also suffice by enlisting the 
minorities living on their territories. 
According to Article 1(2) of the Hungarian Act "National and ethnic 
minority (hereinafter 'minority') is any ethnic group which have resided in the 
territory of the Hungarian Republic for a century, which constitute a numerical 
minority in comparison with the population of the state, whose members are 
Hungarian citizens distinguished from the rest of the population by a common 
language, culture and traditions, held together by a sense of community which 
is manifested in an effort to preserve that common heritage and to express and 
protect the interests of their historically evolved communities. " Comparing 
this definition and the list of autochthonous national minorities one shall do his 
utmost to find some overlapping. 
Perhaps the most questionable point of this definition is the one, which 
confines the recognition of a minority as an ethnic and national minority to 
ethnic groups, which have been living in Hungary for at least a hundred years. 
Presumably, this restriction was included in the Act because it refers to the 
presence of the ethnic group in Hungary for several generations. At the same 
time, the requirement of exactly a hundred years of residence as a precondition 
of recognition is rather debatable, indeed, arguably unnecessary. The require-
ment is made to look doubtful by the well-known fact that even the members 
18
 The national minorities qualified as autochthonous in Hungary are as follows: 
Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, 
Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian. 
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of national and ethnic minorities recognised by the Act arrived to the country 
in several waves of immigration and therefore not all groups within those 
minorities meet the criterion stipulated by the Act. 
Some of the thirteen minorities recognised by the Act will pass the test 
only on a very well-intentioned interpretation of the statutory text. To take an 
example: most of the Greeks living in Hungary are not descendants of the 
Greek minority by now assimilated, which has lived in the country for a long 
time. They are former Greek communist partisans and their children, who 
arrived in Hungary as the refugees of a lost civil war, and even some of those 
having arrived in 1949 profess to be Aegean Macedonians, and, in fact, some 
of them have considered establishing a minority self-government of their own. 
The Armenian minority is another case in point: most of its members are not 
descendants of the Armenians, who lived in Hungary in the 19th century and 
have been by now almost completely assimilated. They descend from the 
Armenians who fled to Hungary from the Armenian pogroms of the Young 
Turks in 1916. The Act can of course be interpreted to the effect that the earlier, 
by now assimilated Greek and Armenian minority groups have acquired a right 
to legal recognition. At the same time, it seems unreasonable that the law 
should make a distinction between the legal status of a Greek person, who 
arrived in Hungary after 1949 and an ethnic Chinese who has acquired Hungarian 
citizenship. Another question, yet unanswered, is whether a minority other 
than those so far mentioned can ever "grow old enough" to qualify for the 
hundred-year criterion, or whether it is able to gain legal recognition of its 
minority status by the state. 
A further contradiction results from the fact that while in principle the Act 
emphasises the complete equality of the thirteen minority languages, the 
Hungarian state assumed obligations in the language charter of the European 
Council with respect only to six minority languages, namely Croatian, German, 
Romanian, Serbian, Slovak and Slovenian.14 According to the census data, the 
largest linguistic minority of Hungary is constituted by persons speaking the 
Romani languages. At the same time, some of the minorities listed by the Act 
do not live up to the category of 'a language of their own', due to the advanced 
stage of the loss of language through assimilation. 
19
 Act XL of 1999 on the promulgation of the European Charter on Regional or 
Minority Languages drafted in Strasbourg on November 5, 1992. 
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The Situation of the Roma 
Today the Roma constitute the largest minority in Hungary. In the 2001 census, 
190 000 individuals declared themselves to be of Gypsy ethnicity. As opposed 
to this, sociologists estimate the size of the country's Gypsy population to be 
about 600 000 persons. The Hungarian Roma belong to three linguistic groups: 
the Romungro, who speak Hungarian and call themselves "musician Gypsies", 
the bilingual (Hungarian and Gypsy) Vlach Gypsies, who call themselves 
"Roma" or "Rom"; and the Hungarian-Romanian bilingual Romanian Gypsies, 
who call themselves "Boyash".20 
In the Hungarian Minority Act the legislator enlisted the Roma minority 
among national and ethnic minorities, which may have been a protest against 
the official Roma policy of the previous era. Under the reign of socialism, in 
1961 the Political Committee of MSZMP KB (Hungarian Socialist Working 
People's Party, Central Committee) declared that the Roma are not to be regarded 
as a national minority, thereupon the official politics aimed at assimilating the 
Roma through social-political measures improving their situation. Though 
there were some results of these measures, they came to nothing after the change 
of the regime. Since the acceptance of the Minority Act it has been discussed 
again and again in professional circles whether it was a good decision to enlist 
the Roma among national and ethnic minorities and whether it wouldn't have 
been better to uphold assimilation as a more prosperous alternative as regards 
social integration. 
István Kemény and Béla Janky in a study of theirs, for example, draw a 
parallel between the Romungro (a group of the Roma living in Hungary) and 
the Jews in Hungary, emphasising that both groups speak Hungarian as their 
mother tongue and in the course of the 2001 census the majority of both 
groups professed to be of Hungarian ethnicity.21 (When current legislation on 
minority rights was being drafted, it was proposed that Jews should figure 
amongst the ethnic and national minorities. It was a well-intentioned effort 
of the government but was rejected by a majority of Hungary's Jewish 
population.) 
20
 See in this connection Kemény, I.: Linguistics Groups and Usage among the 
Hungarian Gypsies/Roma. In: The Gypsies/the Roma in Hungarian Society (ed.: Kállai, 
E.). Budapest, 2002. 
21
 Kemény I.-Janky В.: A 2003. évi cigány felmérésről [On the 2003 Survey on the 
Roma], In: A magyarországi cigány népesség helyzete a 21. század elején (ed. : Kállai, 
E.). Budapest, 2003. 7-26. 
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The ancestors of the Jews who live in Hungary today entered the country in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, without of course having Hungarian as their 
mother-tongue. Now their native language is Hungarian, and it is likely that a 
great majority of them gave the response that they are Hungarian to the 2001 
census question on ethnicity. The ancestors of the Romungros entered Hungary 
from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Now their native tongue is Hungarian, 
and a large proportion of them—probably the majority of them declared them-
selves to be of Hungarian ethnicity at the time the 2001 census was conducted. 
However, as a result of segregation and exclusion, the number of those who 
declare themselves to belong to the Roma minority has increased, as opposed 
to the Vlach and Romanian Gypsies who—it appears—are on the way of 
assimilation. Anyway, researchers and Roma politicians frequently doubt the 
correctness of the decision of the legislator, though they generally admit that 
the dissolution of Roma minority self-governments that were established on 
the basis of the act is now absurd and impossible. 
Deficiencies of the Act and the Registration 
The decision of the legislator on what persons it regards as ones belonging to a 
given minority is not to be confused with the definition of minority. Whereas 
to define the notion of minority is not absolutely necessary, to delimit the 
scope of persons belonging to a minority is in certain cases of regulation 
indispensable. 
Personal autonomy ensures spheres of authority regardless of territory to 
the persons belonging to the minority. Therefore, many believe that it is 
necessary to define criteria needed for the realisation of this form of autonomy. 
On this basis, it can be circumscribed who belongs to the minority at issue. It 
is a conceptual precondition of the functioning of personal autonomy that the 
minorities and not the majority population should elect their representatives, 
moreover that not the government or the parliament should appoint them." The 
22
 See the identical opinion of Tamás Korhecz. Ifj. Korhecz, T.: A kisebbségi ön-
kormányzatok megválasztásának szabályai a magyar, a szlovén és a jugoszláv jogban 
[Rules of the Election of Minority Self-governments under Hungarian, Slovenian and 
Yugoslavian Law], In: Regisztrálható-e az identitás? Az identitásválasztás szabadsága 
és a nemzeti hovatartozás nyilvántartása (eds.: Halász, I.—Majtényi, B.) [Registrating 
identity? The Fee Choice of Identity and the Registration of National Affiliation], Buda-
pest, 2003. 90-126. 
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best way of meeting this requirement can be if "an electoral register of minority 
voters is created", since its absence might render the legitimacy of the established 
institutions questionable. However, because of the negative historical experiences 
the Hungarian legislator rejected registration when accepting the law. (In 
Central and Eastern Europe in the past, when a minority was prosecuted or 
discriminated against, data on ethnicity were frequently misused.) According to 
many it is the unresolved nature of these questions that will doom to failure the 
operation of Hungarian minority self-governments organised mainly on the 
basis of the personal principle.23 
The legal regulation of the minority issue in Hungary can be broadly 
described as permissive. This is shown by the fact that, in accordance with the 
legislative intention, minority local authorities can be established in almost all 
localities with a national or ethnic minority population irrespective of its 
numerical proportion to the rest of the population of the given locality. Indeed, 
if we allow ourselves a touch of irony, we may note that against the legislator's 
intentions the notorious phenomenon popularly dubbed "ethno-business" results 
in the establishment of minority local authorities even in places where there is 
no minority at all.24 
The concept of autonomy espoused by the Act addresses the individual 
Hungarian citizens belonging to one of the minorities listed, encouraging them 
to establish corporate entities in public and civil law in villages, towns, the 
districts of the capital and at national level. The idea was to set at the disposal 
of minority citizens a system of institutions, which will help them regain, 
develop and protect their non-Hungarian identity. According to the principle of 
territorial autonomy enshrined in the Act, minority local authorities were 
formed at local levels by direct vote. The village level is an appropriate 
framework for local autonomy because minorities tend to live in small villages 
and the village is the only regional setting in which they may even constitute 
the majority of population. If a minority does not represent the minority of the 
population of a village, they may establish local minority authorities organised 
along the personal principle. (Most of the issues dealt with by corporate entities 
23
 In connection to this, see Ifj. Korhecz: A kisebbségi autonómiáról címszavakban... 
op. cit. 
"
4
 This expression refers to the infamous practice that as the Hungarian Minority Act 
did not specify the criteria of belonging to a minority, on various occasions the subsidies 
provided by law for persons belonging to minorities were obtained also by persons who 
did not belong to any minority. 
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organised at local levels for representing minorities concern the minority 
language.) At the national level, the national minority authority, a quasi minority 
parliament with consultative powers, represents the interests of the minorities, 
and until the representation of minorities in the parliament is de facto introduced, 
representation by self-government authorities remains the only legitimate form 
of representation for minorities. The Act presently endows the national self-
government authority with the right to represent the interests of minorities at 
the national, regional and county levels the national minority authority for 
instance is entitled to build up the network of theatres, museums and libraries— 
in actual practice, however, the institutional framework, which came into being 
in the wake of the Minority Act shows signs of serious deficiency. 
The Hungarian electoral system has a peculiar feature: any voter is free to 
vote for the minority candidate in his district. As a result of this, most of those 
who vote for minority candidates belong to the majority, and they vote in 
accordance with their preference, prejudice and temporary caprice. This is due to 
the fact that the legislator specified the same day for minority self-government 
elections as for the local self-government elections. (Although no precise data 
on the minorities are available today, we can safely state that a great number 
of non-minority voters voted for minority candidates at the elections.) What 
is objectionable in this arrangement is that the basic right of minorities is 
infringed whenever those not belonging to the minorities decide on the person 
who will represent the minority members: in the final analysis this goes against 
the system of minority self-governments. 
Exploiting the deficiencies of the electoral system, many non-minority 
candidates entered the minority elections, who do not belong to minorities. 
(Under the law currently in force, it is the candidate who decides whether or not 
he wishes to stand for a minority, and it yes which one. All he has to do is to 
collect five of recommendations.) The financial support given to minority self-
governments is far from sufficient, but it seems sufficient enough to motivate a 
few people, who are not members of a minority, to exploit the imperfections 
of the minority self-government system and enter minority elections. 
Candidates may sometimes acquire an advantage in minority self-govern-
ment elections through the mere fact that their names place them at the 
beginning in the alphabetical list, knowing the tendency of voters to vote for 
the first candidate on the list, when they do not know the minority members 
listed. 
One of the deficiencies of the subsidy scheme, which is often criticised is 
its failure to give due consideration to the numbers of the different minorities. 
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It is doubtful, however, whether it would be possible at all, given the absence 
of registration. The distribution of subsidies obviously cannot be based on the 
total of minority and majority votes cast in the elections. 
Therefore the amendment bill which has been submitted to the Parliament 
plans to establish a register of minority electors. 
On Registration 
Naturally, requirements can be set up with respect to such a register. On the 
one hand the alliance of persons belonging to a minority has to be formed on a 
voluntary basis, so membership in it has to be preceded by the personal 
declaration of the will of the person in conformity with the principle of free 
choice of identity. Beyond this, on the other hand membership can also be 
linked to objective criteria, as in the case of the Lapp. 
They live dispersed, therefore the territorial principle is inapplicable to 
them. Their interests are represented by Lapp parliaments, which are organised 
along the principle of personal autonomy and elected by direct vote. The Lapp 
parliaments have consultative powers in all issues affecting the minorities. 
There has been a Lapp parliament in Finland since 1973, in Norway since 
1989 and in Sweden since 1993. In order that the requirement about Lapps 
representing the Lapp could be met, Lapp electoral registers have been 
established in all three countries, although the regulations on the conditions of 
how one can be included in these registers are different in the countries 
concerned. One condition, however, is always specified: the principle of the 
free choice of identity, namely, that the given person has to declare himself 
Lapp. Beyond this, objective criteria define the linguistic ties in the three 
countries. For example, in Norway—this is where the Lapp parliament has the 
strongest spheres of authority—, a person can be included in the electoral 
register if he declares himself Lapp and Lapp is his mother tongue or at least 
one of his parents were recorded in the Lapp electoral register. In Finland, in 
order to avoid that Lapps be elected by persons belonging to the minority but 
who have already assimilated, the Lapp Electoral Commission rejected several 
thousand votes cast at the election. (Some six hundred appeals were lodged 
against these decisions but the Supreme Administrative Court rejected most 
of them. The basis of the judgements was that origin was defined mainly on 
the basis of mother tongue, which could be traced back to four generations 
only.) 
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It is to be mentioned in connection to this that under the legal regulation of 
Slovenia, recording one into the minority register, besides the declaration of 
the person, is also made conditional upon objective criteria and the decision 
25 
of the minority community." The reason for this method of regulation can be 
that communities are usually reluctant to accept new members, while it is also 
difficult for them to tolerate when someone leaves them. (Another thing to 
point out about Slovenian legal regulation is that it guarantees special minority 
rights to the Hungarian and Italian minorities classified as indigenous, while 
also Roma, Serbs, Croatians and Bosnians also live in the territory of the 
country.) 
It is quite probable that no system of objective criteria could be found that 
would be applicable with respect to all minorities. For example, from among 
the criteria indicated in connection with the Lapps above, the one on the mother 
tongue could not be applied in the case of the Roma for certain. (In Hungary, 
for instance, the majority of the Roma population has already assimilated 
linguistically and the two main Roma languages spoken in the territory of the 
country, Romani and Boyash, are in a diglossal state. In addition to this, not 
even these two groups are homogeneous from a linguistic point of view. What 
is more, Roma groups can treat each other as strangers and they can even 
despise each other. In certain cases, the conflict can be harsher than the one 
between the Roma and the majority population.) In the case of the Roma, since 
their culture, lifestyle and identity cannot really be circumscribed the fact that 
their population does not form a clearly circumscribable group, also renders 
the definition of objective criteria with respect to the creation of a minority 
electoral register more difficult. (Among others, this is the reason why we have 
rather differing estimates on the number of the Roma living in the various 
countries.) 
In any case, on the basis of the principle of free choice of identity, in theory 
it is possible to conceive the creation of a minority register, which would form 
the basis of personal autonomy and into which the persons belonging to the 
minority would be entered out of their free will in conformity with the principle 
of self-determination concerning data protection. The definition of the free 
choice of identity as a requirement is essential, since—as noted by Gyula 
Fábián—in order to qualify as a minority, every ethnic group has to have an 
"awareness of survival" as well. Acknowledging one's the identity serves to 
5
 Ifj. Korhecz: A kisebbségi önkormányzatok megválasztásának szabályai... op. cit. 
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prove this awareness.26 Beyond this, the free choice of identity can be restricted 
through objective criteria, if its purpose is the guaranteeing of special minority 
rights. According to the conclusion of Judit Tóth, although "everyone is free to 
declare or conceal his national or ethnic identity, identification cannot be 
avoided according to the order regulated by domestic law." In the opinion of the 
author, the requirements originating from constitutionality and the requests of 
the minority itself have to be taken into account during the elaboration of this 
regulation.27 (The regulation set forth by the Constitution of Hungary creates a 
rather peculiar and contradictory situation: it considers the formation of a self-
government the right of the minorities, while suffrage comprises not only them 
28 
according to the provisions of the Constitution." ) 
Partly because of the negative experiences of the Hungarian Minority Act, 
when adopted the Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring 
Countries (hereinafter Status Law), the legislator introduced a kind of 
registration and thereby abandoned the more than hundred million potential 
beneficiaries living in neighbouring countries. In the case of the Status Law 
the principle of free choice of identity could not be applied in itself, without 
limitations. (This law provides assistance and grants for Hungarians living in 
neighbouring States.) It is an indisputable fact that the thus ensuing register 
differs from the internal registration system within the state in one important 
respect: namely, that the registered is administered not by the state in which 
the person is a citizen but by the mother country, with respect to which a 
Hungarian living beyond the borders does not have much to fear. In connection 
to this, many question whether this principle can be applied within a state in 
Eastern Europe at all, since minorities have no confidence in registers for 
historic reasons. It is, therefore, rather dubious, whether the persons belonging 
to minorities influenced by negative historic experiences are willing to have 
themselves recorded in such a register in the country of their citizenship, which 
has often showed a hostile behaviour toward them. 
26
 Fábián, Gy.: Az identitáshoz való jog Romániában a lakosság nyilvántartás tükré-
ben [The Right to Identity in Romania in the Light of Population Registration], In: Re-
gisztrálható-e az identitás?... op. cit., 189-212. 
27
 Tóth, J.: Többes mérce a kisebbségi hovatartozás megvallásánál [Multiple Scale at 
the Declaration of Belonging to a Minority]. In: Regisztrálható-e az identitás?... op. cit., 
37-72. 
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 In connection to this, see Article 68, Section 4 and Article 70, Section 1 of the 
Constitution. 
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In general, it can be said about every registration based on a voluntary choice 
of identity that should a register exist, only a part of the persons belonging to the 
minorities will have themselves registered: those who are the most active "in 
a public policy sense" in the representation of the minority. Here are some data 
to illustrate this: in Sweden, only 3 803 persons of the 5 990 citizens registered 
in the Lapp electoral register participated at the election in 1997. As opposed to 
this, the overall population of the Lapps is estimated to be between 17 000 and 
20 000 persons. On the other hand, in Slovenia, practically every citizen belong-
ing to the "indigenous" minorities was registered in the electoral register. The 
explanation to this is probably that these registers existed even prior to the 
29 
change of the regime and the independence of the country. 
It is a fact that—whether envisaging discrimination or the granting of special 
rights—authority and law will not cope without specifying the scope of the 
beneficiaries or those deprived of rights. As opposed to the argument which as 
a result of fears rooted in history absolutely excludes the possibility of creating 
a registration of minority electors, it has to be noted that for dictatorial 
regimes, whether there had been any registration before their coming into 
power or not, it never meant any difficulty to prosecute and defame persons 
labelled enemies. To abandon minority special rights and other forms of 
positive discrimination in the absence of specifiable subjects of law would 
equal a return to general human legal protection, a regress to the theoretical 
basis from where in the beginning international regulation not accepting 
minority rights started to evolve after Second World War. 
* * * 
Autonomy is becoming more and more popular in international organisations 
as well, since they increasingly see an instrument in it with the help of which 
national minorities can be protected in a way that the security of the states also 
remains intact. Autonomy based on the personal principle, although minorities 
concentrating in larger areas probably would not be content with it, could be 
used improve the situation of dispersed minorities, including the Roma minority. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that there are not many examples to prove 
that personal autonomy could also be realised and function successfully in the 
case of minorities with a larger population. In order that the situation of the 
Roma minority in Hungary could be improved, the actual establishment of 
~
9
 See the data Ifj. Korhecz: A kisebbségi önkormányzatok megválasztásának szabá-
lyai... op. cit. 
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other legal institutions would also be needed even in the case of an appropriate 
reform of the legal regulation regarding minority self-governments. If those 
belonging to a minority were not guaranteed that it would really be them to 
elect their representatives—not even with the amendment of the legal 
regulation—, than the existing legal institution would have to be put aside and 
another way of regulation would have to be found. Hungarian legislators have 
enough time at their disposal to elaborate this, since the current system received 
a mandate for four more years after the 2002 self-government elections and, 
therefore, will function without modifications for a total of 12 years. 
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Remarks on the Regulation of Company Limited by 
Shares in Romania 
The accession of Hungary to the European Union may have a beneficial effect 
on the commercial relations between Hungary and Romania, and is likely to 
influence the Hungarian investments on the territory of Romania. As it is known, 
Hungarian Act XXIII. of 1999 has promulgated the Agreement between 
Romania and Hungary, concluded in Bucharest on the 16th of September, 1993 
on the Actuating and Mutual Protection of Investments. This Act is devoted to 
the expansion of investments between the two countries. 
Taking into consideration the fact that an investment is rather often launched 
by forming a company, a special purpose company in the project-country, I 
think that it might be useful to have a brief summary of the regulation on the 
company limited by shares in Romania. There is no need to dwell on why the 
company limited by shares is considered as the most adequate form for foreign 
investors. To mention only two essential circumstances, the amount of capital 
and possible anonymity of owners might be very important factors for the foreign 
investors. In this brief study I am going to summarize some determinative 
elements of the Romanian regulation of the company limited by shares while 
referring to certain parts of the Hungarian law. 
It was the French jurisprudence and codification, which—besides the Roman 
law—had an elementary influence on Romanian jurisprudence and development 
of Romanian private law. This statement is true of civil law and commercial 
law, although it will be discussed in that the valid Romanian Act on Companies 
is also similar to the German provisions of company law in several aspects. 
The civil code of Romania, adopted in 1864 and effective even today in 
modified form, is influenced by the French law, especially by the Code civil of 
1804. This code is based on the system of the Institutiones. 
It was in 1887 that the Romanian commercial law was codified for the first 
time. The French Code de Commerce and the Italian Codice civile of 1882 
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gave significant inspiration to this code.1 It is worthy of mention that this Code 
did not lose effect even after 1948 in the new economic and social milieu. A 
draft of a commercial code was prepared in 1938, but it has never been 
adopted. In the period after 1948 the application of commercial law and the 
commercial code became limited in accordance with the modified social and 
economic relations. From that period one should mention the following rules of 
economic nature: 
— 424/1972 Law-Decree on Mixed Companies; 
— 3/1972 Act on Internal Trade, which contained provisions on foreign 
trade, as well; 
— The Act of 30 January 1954 on natural persons and legal entities." 
The political changes of 1989/1990 entailed significant reforms in economic 
legislation, too. The most important stage of this reform is Act 31/1900 on 
commercial companies, which repealed the majority of the previous regulations 
of economic nature. I also mention Act 26/1990 on Company Register and the 
Law-Decree 96/1990, which mied on the opening of Romania to foreign capital-
investments. A fundamental change in economic life is also marked by the 
establishment of the Romanian Commercial Bank. This Bank was established 
in the form of company limited by shares with a registered capital of 12 billion 
lei. It is the Act 15/1990, which regulates the transformation of state-owned 
companies into commercial companies. 
After the elections in November 1996, the new government fundamentally 
modified the Commercial code by Government-decree 32/1997 with immediate 
effect, the political background, to which was the intention to speed up the 
transition to a market-economy.3 This decree was promulgated on the 27th of 
June, 1997 in the official gazette Monitorul Oficial al Romanei, and it became 
effective on the 27th of July, 1997. The Commercial Code is divided into nine 
titles as follows: 
— General Provisions; 
1
 See esp.: Hamza G.: Az európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rend-
szerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok alapján. [Development of European 
private law.] Budapest, 2002. 206-208. In German: G. Hamza: Die Entwicklung des 
Privatrechts auf römischrechtlicher Grundlage unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Rechtsentwicklung in Deutschland, Österreich, der Schweiz und Ungarn. Budapest, 
2002. 219-223. 
See esp.: H. lzdebski: Les sources du droit dans les pays socialistes européens. 
RIDC 38 (1986). 
3
 See esp.: Sárközy T.: A magyar társasági jog Európában. A társasági és konszern-
jog elméleti alapjai [Hungarian Company Law in Europe. Theoretical Foundations of 
Company and Concern Law]. Budapest, 2001. 260. 
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— Formation of Commercial Companies; 
— Operation of Commercial Companies; 
— Modification of the Deed of Foundation; 
— Exclusion and Revocation of Associated Members; 
— Dissolution and the Merger of Commercial Companies; 
— Liquidation of the Companies; 
— Crimes; 
— Closing and Transitory Provisions. 
The code is divided into chapters within the titles. As it is indicated above, 
the Romanian commercial code—contrary to Hungarian Act CXLIV of 1997 on 
Economic Associations—contains the regulation on liquidation of companies 
and includes sanctions for certain economic crimes, as well. As it is well-known, 
the Hungarian legislator regulates liquidation, together with bankruptcy and 
voluntary dissolution in a separate act, while the crimes of economic nature can 
be found in the Criminal Code. 
The Romanian commercial code recognizes the following forms of 
company: 
— General partnership (societate in nume colectiv)', 
— Limited partnership (societate in comandita simpla)', 
— Company limited by shares (societate pe actiuni)', 
— Share joint stock company (societate in comandita pe actiuni)', 
— Limited liability Company (societate cu raspundere limitata). 
The Romanian company forms are identical with those recognized by 
Bulgarian law.4 
Beside the forms of company there is a fundamental difference between the 
Hungarian and the Romanian company law. Section 1 of paragraph 2 of the 
Romanian Commercial Code invests commercial companies of Romanian 
domicile with juristic personality, meaning that every form of Romanian 
company is considered a legal entity. 
The modification of 1997 introduced several changes in the Commercial 
Code. A basic change in its structure is that the formation of companies is 
regulated in a general way rather than by type of company. An exception is the 
public company limited by shares, which is regulated in a separate chapter in 
the second title. From a terminological point of view we may experience certain 
simplification compared with the Commercial Code before the modification of 
1997. The code employs the uniform term company capital (capitalul social), 
and it does not use the term stake capital for limited liability company or 
registered capital for company limited by shares. The officers of the company 
4
 See: Sárközy: A magyar társasági jog... ibid., 259. 
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are uniformly named administrators., and the deed of foundation is called act 
constitutive, which is signed by the founders (fondatori). 
The sui generis rules on the company limited by shares can be found in the 
fourth chapter of the third title except to the above mentioned second chapter 
of the second title. The fourth chapter of the third title (Companies limited by 
shares) is divided into six articles, i. e. smaller sections, as follows: 
— Shares (Despre actiuni)', 
— General Assemblies (Despre adunarile generale)', 
— Administration of the Company (Despre administratia societatii); 
— Cenzors (Despre cenzori)', 
— Issue of Bonds (Despre emiterea de obligatiuni); 
— Administrative Books and the Balance Sheet of the Company (Despre 
registrele societatii si despre bilant). 
A company limited by shares may be formed both publicly and privately. 
The public formation of the company has its own formal procedure, which is 
separately regulated by the second chapter of the second title of the Commercial 
Code. The registration of the company in Romania has a constitutive effect, 
which means that the legal personality of the company is created by registration. 
It is the Commercial Court, which decides the registration of companies. 
Although the register is administrated by the Commercial Chamber, the 
legality of the registration and the register is supervised by a judge (judecator 
delegat). The mandate is given by the head of the competent court on a yearly 
basis. As a general remark it should be underlined that the fundamental reform 
of the Commercial Code in 1997 simplified the procedure of registration, 
which meets the demands of investors, as well.5 
In case of public formation examination the Commercial Code requires by 
and a report of an independent expert concerning contributions-in-kind by 
shareholders. This expert must be appointed by the above mentioned judge. 
The Commercial Code also contains rules regarding conflicts of interest in 
connection with the expert. 
It should be pointed out that the amendment of the Hungarian Company 
Code by Act XLIX of 2003 has strengthened the role of auditors in connection 
with the contribution-in-kind. In contrast to the previous regulation this 
amendment provides that the contributions-in-kind should be supervised by an 
independent auditor. The permanent auditor of the company is not entitled to 
5
 Cf. G. Stalfort: Rumänien: Das neue Gesellschaftsrecht. Teil 1: Gründung einer 
Handelsgesellschaft. ROW 7/1997. 259-260. 
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this kind of supervision.6 (It is worthwhile to take into consideration that this 
regulation creates double protection. The auditor however must be independent 
in his activity under to Act LV. of 1997 on Auditing Activity and the Hungarian 
Chamber of the Auditors.) 
According to the Romanian law the joint capital of the company limited by 
shares the share joint stock company must be a minimum of 25 million lei. 
Before the modification of the Act in 1997 this amount was 1 million lei. The 
nominal value of a share must be at least one thousand lei. It is also the 
amendment of 1997, which allows a legal person to be a founder of a company 
limited by shares.7 
The shares registered by the company can be registered shares or bearer 
shares. According to paragraph (2) section 91, the bearer share must be regarded 
as a basic category. Where the deed of foundation contains no provision on the 
nature of shares, these are to be regarded as bearer shares. 
The Romanian Commercial Code is familiar with the term of preferred 
stock. The regulations however, differ from the Hungarian law in many aspects. 
Known to Romanian law the preferred stock for dividends and provides the 
nominal value of such shares must not exceed one quarter of the registered 
capital of the company. The most important difference between the Hungarian 
and the Romanian regulation in this respect is that the shareholder owning 
preferred stock for dividends has no voting rights and he is not allowed to 
attend the shareholders' general assembly, either. (These shareholders however 
may hold meetings, which are independent of the shareholders' general 
assembly.) As is known, Section 183, paragraph (4) of the Hungarian 
Company Act allows the company to issue shares, with no voting rights. One 
can have an economic explanation for this provision. It is very likely that in a 
giant company limited by shares a shareholder owning only a small number of 
shares may prefer receiving dividends in order to exercise voting rights, 
because otherwise he would have no real influence on the decision-making of 
the company. 
Nevertheless, in one aspect the Romanian commercial code grants voting 
rights to the shareholders owning preferred stock for dividends on rather 
indirect way. The general assembly of the company—which cannot be 
8
 Cf.: Biczi É.: A részvénytársaság szabályainak módosításairól [On the Modifications 
of Rules for the Company Limited by Shares], Gazdaság és Jog 9 (2003) 9-10. 
7
 See: G. Stalfort: Rumänien: Das neue Gesellschaftstrecht. Teil 2: Die Handels-
gesellschaft nach der Gründung. ROW 8 (1997) 295. It should be pointed out that under 
the Romanian law an one-man company may only be established in the form of a limited 
liability company. 
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attended by these shareholders—may make a decision on the transformation of 
shares. According to Section 116 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Code there 
is a condition sine qua non to the validity of such decision. The separate 
meeting of the shareholders owning preferred stock for dividends has to give 
their approval to the decision. Although the approval cannot be regarded as a 
sui generis voting right, it creates a special opportunity to these shareholders to 
have a fundamental influence on the structure and future of the company 
limited by shares. 
The Romanian Commercial Code lays down that the senior managers of the 
company and the members of the Supervisory Board cannot own shares 
without voting rights. 
The Romanian law gives a different regulation on the transfer of ownership 
of registered shares and bearer shares. In the case of bearer shares the transfer 
of ownership can be accomplished simply by delivering the shares. In the case 
of registered shares the parties or persons authorized by them have to make a 
declaration in the shareholder's book. Nevertheless, the deed of foundation 
may specify other procedures, as well.8 
As is known—under the Hungarian Company Law4—registration in the 
shareholder's book enables shareholders to exercise the shareholder's rights, 
which means that the transfer of shares should be regarded as effective from 
that moment. Nevertheless, registration in the shareholder's book is not a 
requirement for to the validity of the whole transaction from a civil law point 
r • 10 
of view. 
One can clearly detect the influence of the German Aktiengesetz promulgated 
on the 6th of September, 1965 on the Romanian Code in this respect of own 
share of the company." Accordingly, the company may not acquire its own 
share except if the extraordinary assembly of the company so decides. It is an 
important rule that such decision must be published officially and the deadline 
of the whole transaction may not exceed 18 months from this announcement. 
The Hungarian regulation—before the modification in 2003—has followed 
another conception. The amendment of 2003 fixed—inter alia—a deadline of 
8
 It is to be mentioned that the Romanian company law is also familiar with the 
term dematerialized shares. The transfer of ownership of dematerialized shares is 
regulated by the Act 52/1994. 
4
 Section 198, par. (2). 
10
 See: Fazekas J.—Harsányi Gy.—Miskolczi Bodnár P.—Ujváriné Antal E: Magyar 
társasági jog [Hungarian Company Law]. Miskolc, 2000. 299. 
" Cf. Aktiengesetz, par. 71. See esp.: Stalfort: Rumänien: Das neue Gesellschafts-
recht. Teil 2. 295. 
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18 months, as well. The Romanian company law also states that the quantity of 
own shares acquired by the company may not exceed ten percent of the 
registered capital. 
Tamás Sárközy points out that the original German system may be detected 
on the management of the Romanian company limited by shares in respect of 
the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board.12 The company limited by 
shares may have a chief executive officer (CEO) or a Board of Directors. In 
the aspect of the administrative manager of the company one should take into 
consideration the following important rule. The administrative manager must 
give a caution for the exercise of his activity. The caution may not be less than 
the nominal value of ten shares or the double his monthly salary. If the 
administrative manager himself is a shareholder he may fulfill this requirement 
by depositing ten shares with the company, which cannot be alienated during 
his mandate. It is worthwhile to mention that one can find several examples 
that someone is required to provide security for his trustee-activity. In the 
Roman law for example the so-called tutor legitimus had to provide security in 
the form of stipulation before the praetor. That security was called cautio rem 
pupil I i salvam fore and was aimed to protect the assets of person under 
guardianship.11 
It is a mandatory regulation of the Romanian company law that the chairman 
of the Board of the Directors, and at least 50% of the members must be 
Romanian citizens. If there is only one director (chief executive officer), then 
he must be Romanian citizen. The majority of the members and co-members of 
the Supervisory Board must be of Romanian citizenship. Prima facie this 
seems to be extraordinary and quite strange from the point of view of the 
foreign investors, but is not an unique legal solution. The Swiss Code of 
Obligations, Obligationsrecht (OR), containing 1186 articles at the present— 
which was promulgated on the 14th of June, 1881 and became effective on the 
30th of June, 1883—provides in the third part that in a Swiss company limited 
by shares the majority of the members of the Board of directors must be Swiss 
citizens. If the Board of Directors includes only one person, then this person 
has to be Swiss citizen.14 From this point of view one can see similarities 
between the Rumanian commercial code and the Swiss OR. 
12
 See: Sárközy: A magyar társasági jog... ibid.. 260 
13
 See: Földi A.—Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói [History and 
Institutes of Roman Law], Budapest, 20038. 263. 
14
 See: OR, Article 708. In connection with OR see esp.: Hamza: Die Entwicklung 
des Privatrechts... ibid., 58-61. 
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It should be underlined in connection with the Board of Directors that the 
Commercial Code allows some parts of the competence of the Board of 
Directors to be delegated to a leading board composed from the senior managers 
of the company. In my point of view this possibility should be open to bigger 
companies limited by shares, which have a huge administration. In these cases 
the Board of Directors can deal with the strategic questions, while this board 
can be active on the field of the company's operative management. 
As I have already mentioned, the Romanian commercial law is familiar 
with the term share joint stock company. The Hungarian legal system does not 
recognize this type of company. The most important difference between the 
company limited by shares and the share joint stock company can be found in 
the administration of the company. Under Romanian law only a person bearing 
unlimited liability for the company can be senior manager in the share joint 
stock company. 
In the system of the Romanian company law the Supervisory Board is 
intended for the classical controlling role. Hence there is no possibility to form 
a Supervisory Board, with competence to the strategic guidance (Tamás 
Sárközy), which is covered by the Hungarian Company Act in par. 33.15 The 
Romanian company law follows in this respect the provisions of the German 
Aktiengesetz.[b The Romanian commercial code refers the members of the 
Supervisory Board as cenzor. Concerning the cenzors the Romanian Commer-
cial Code contains strict personal requirements. A company limited by shares 
must have at least three cenzors and deputy-cenzors. (The number of cenzors 
must be odd.) The cenzors must be elected for a term of three years, and can be 
re-elected. The cenzors are obliged to give security, the amount of which is 
one third of that given by the senior managers. There are also strict rules of 
incompatibility for the cenzors. There is an example for the state-control in 
this respect. If in a particular company at least twenty percent of the company 
capital is owned by the state, one of the cenzors is to be delegated by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
It should be pointed out as a personal requirement for cenzors that one of 
the cenzors must be an accountant or an auditor. As is known, Hungarian law 
contains no provision in this respect. In my point of view, it can be an 
important guarantee for the proper operation of the Supervisory Board, if one 
member or even the president of the Supervisory Board is a lawyer or an 
15
 See: Sárközy T. (red.): Részvénytársaság [Company Limited by Shares], Budapest, 
1998. 148. 
16
 See: W. Zöllner (hrsg.): Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz. /. Köln—Bonn— 
München, 1988. 525-528. 
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auditing-specialist. During the reform of the Hungarian company law one 
should take this component into consideration. We should also emphasize 
that the members of the Supervisory Board must be shareholders under the 
Romanian law. 
The controlling activity of the cenzors is precisely regulated by the 
Commercial Code. It is to be mentioned that the cenzors must check on a 
monthly basis the cashbook of the company and the existence of the stocks 
owned by the company or their deposit at the company as pledge or security. 
This requirement places heavy demands on the time cenzors. 
The Commercial Code seeks to assure the cenzors' independence from the 
shareholders of the company by regulating that the cenzors must not give out to 
the shareholders or to third parties any pieces of information, which they obtain 
during their official activity. In my point of view this is a very important 
provision of the Romanian Commercial Code. Nevertheless the application and 
the enforcement of this provision seem to be quite problematical. 
The Commercial Code does not specify the liability of the Supervisory 
Board, which is to be classified by the cenzors themselves. One can neverthe-
less make out the corporate liability of the Supervisory Board. Under the Code 
the Supervisory Board must act as a corporate and the cenzors may act 
individually in exceptional cases only. According to the German literature the 
German legal practice has considerably influenced the German law on the 
liability of the Supervisory Board.'7 
The Romanian Commercial Code does not give a separate regulation on the 
raising and depletion of the capital of the company limited by shares but its 
relevant rules are formulated jointly with other companies. Nevertheless, there 
are rules in this context which can be applied only in the case of a company 
limited by shares given the nature of this sort of company. 
The modification of the Romanian Commercial Code in 1997 regulated in 
the merger and re-merger of the companies, including the companies limited 
18 
by shares. One has to underline that plans of merger or re-merger must be 
submitted in advance to the appointed judge (discussed above) for approval. 
Plans for the transformation must be officially published and the creditors of 
the company have the right to lodge protest against transformation. The most 
important legal consequence of the protest is that the transformation is 
suspended until a decision on the protest. The suspension will cease if the 
17
 See: K. Schmidt: Gesellschaftsrecht. Köln—Berlin—Bonn—München, 1989. 629-
631. For the liability of the members of the Supervisory Board see par. 116-17 of the 
German Aktiengesetz. 
18
 See: Stalfort: Rumänien: Das neue Gesellschaftsrecht. Teil 2. 297. 
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company is able to reach to agreement with the creditors or if the company 
proves that the debts are paid up, or if the company can provide acceptable 
warranties to the creditors. It is also important to mention that in case of re-
merger the companies will be held liable for the obligations of the former 
company in proportion of the assets acquired by the re-merging. Nevertheless, 
the parties have the right to stipulate a different proportion. If it cannot be 
clarified, which company should be held liable for a definite obligation then 
the liability of the companies will be regarded joint and several. 
I do hope that I have succeeded in highlighting the conception and the 
major guidelines of the regulation on the company limited by shares in 
Romania. I also hope that this article can be useful for lawyers dealing with the 
legal aspects investments in Romania and that some parts of this outline can be 
taken into consideration during the travaux préparatoires of the new 
Hungarian company law. 
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(Symposium held on 17-18 October 2003 in the Institute for Legal Studies of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 
This symposium was the second event following the conference on "Social 
Change and Legal Assistance: Lessons from the Hungarian Experience", held at 
Nagoya University in Japan within the frame of international cooperation 
between Nagoya University and the Institute for Legal Studies. The aim of the 
symposium was to examine the experience of Central European countries in a 
newly emerging international environment involving such relevant questions as 
the reception of a western-type legal system, the role of legal tradition and the 
legacy of the socialist legal structure. In addition, it was of great importance to 
explore the possibility of creating a new paradigm of legal assistance to countries 
in transition by sharing academic experiences. Internationally recognized 
lecturers were invited to take part in the academic discourse: Professor Mamoru 
Sadakata, Professor Kaoru Obata, Professor Katsuya Ichihashi, Professor 
Masanori Aikyo and Professor Yasunori Honma, members of the Nagoya 
University Graduate School of Law, Japan; Professor Vanda Lamm, Professor 
Zoltán Péteri, Professor András Bragyova, Professor Csaba Varga, Professor 
Attila Rácz, Assistant Professor Gábor Sulyok and dr. Réka Végvári, members of 
the Institute for Legal Studies, Hungary; Professor Jiri Priban, Charles 
University, Czech Republic; Professor Marek Smolak, Adam Mickiewicz 
University, Poland; Mag. Andrea Dubisova, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Slovakia; Professor Marfan Pavcnik, Academy of Sciences and Arts, Slovenia. 
The observer of the symposium was Mrs. Irina Kichingina from the World 
Bank, as this international organisation has made legal and judicial reform a 
priority in recent years. 
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The conference was opened by Prof. Vanda Lamm, Director of the Institute for 
Legal Studies and Prof. Mamoru Sadakata of the Nagoya University Graduate 
School of Law. 
1. In the first working session the speakers Prof. Kaoru Obata, Prof. Vanda 
Lamm and Mag. Andrea Dubisova analysed the theme "Integration into the 
European Union and Harmonization of Laws in Central and Eastern Europe". 
The first contributor was Prof. Kaoru Obata, whose lecture dealt with 
"Human Rights 'Conditionally' in the Process of EU Enlargement: Its Nature 
and Functions". The central questions of the lecture were the exact content of 
Human Rights conditionality and its role in the EU enlargement process. 
According to the speaker, applicants were treated individually in the enlargement 
process. The negotiations were conducted through bilateral conferences 
between Member States and each applicant state (but the Member States were 
not empowered to negotiate individually). During the process some procedural 
problems were also encountered, as in the case of common positions: during the 
negotiation conferences held to obtain the Council's approval and ratifications, 
the Member States were bound by the common position, meaning that the 
interest of each member state had to be taken into consideration, which made the 
member states act as a bloc. On the other hand, the power and weight of the 
acceding countries may be considered quite different both before and after the 
accession. Prof. Obata focused his speech mainly on the substantial conditions 
that were expressly stated for the admission of the new countries: he mentioned 
the Maastricht Treaty, which provides that an applicant must be a "European 
State ", while now the relevant EU Treaty sets criteria the "principle of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
of law". In this way only states observing these principles may apply for 
membership. These conditions called Copenhagen Criteria (laid down by the 
European Council) may be classified into three categories: political criterion, 
economic criterion and acceptance of the aquis. Prof. Obata referred to the 
first as "Human Rights criteria" since it enumerates in substance the elements 
relating to democracy and/or human rights. According to him, the criteria are 
durable in nature: although they are preconditions for opening negotiations, 
they can be invoked at any stage of the process. Also, whether or not a given 
applicant satisfies the criteria, is a matter of unilateral evaluation by the EU and 
the jiiember states. According to Prof. Obata, the superior position of the Human 
Rights concept is a logical consequence of the thesis that these rights constitute 
a fundamental principle of the EU. Non-fulfilment of the Human Rights criteria 
may block the accession negotiations. Although Human Rights concept operates 
to increase the force of conditionality, it is not because the relevant condition is 
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met by observance of universally recognized Human Rights, but because it is 
formally qualified as 'Human Rights' by the EU. The Human Rights criteria 
are sui generis in nature. The Commission identified problems in the light of 
the political criterion in the fields of prevention of corruption, functioning of 
the judiciary, protection of minorities, and implementation of administrative 
reforms. Only a small number of strictu sensu human rights problems were 
identified, which shows that human rights as defined in the Convention are quite 
different from political conditions. 
The next speaker was Prof. Vanda Lamm. Her lecture addressed "The 
Adaptation of the Hungarian Legal System to the Needs of Accession to the 
European Union". In recent legal history we could observe that membership in 
the European Communities or in the European Union was accompanied by the 
problem of adapting the constitutional system of a state to the requirements of 
being a member state. The problems arising from the need for adaptation are 
different: the reason for this lies, on the one hand, in the difference in con-
stitutional systems, and on the other, in the status of the country as an original 
member or as a member-to-be. The Treaty of Rome did not contain explicit 
provisions providing for the supremacy of the community law over the 
national laws of Member States, and therefore certain characteristics of com-
munity law—especially its primacy—were not regarded as principles accepted a 
priori by the founding states. This principle of the aquis communautaire 
was developed by judgements the European Court of Justice delivered in 1963 
and in 1964 in famous cases like the Case Van Gend en Loos and Costa vs. 
E.N.E.L., where the Court of Justice held that the Community constituted a 
"new legal order of international law" which "not only imposes obligations on 
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part 
of their legal heritage". This principle was confirmed again in other cases. 
The constitutional development of the Community and especially the ratification 
of the Treaty on European Union prompted even the founding States to amend 
constitutional provisions in order to adapt their constitutional systems to the 
obligations ensuing from the Maastricht Treaty. Some authors in Hungary have 
argued that the primacy of community law and its direct applicability in the 
Hungarian legal system must be secured by amending certain provisions of the 
Constitution on the relation between international law and internal law, and 
that Hungary's accession to the European Union calls for a monistic system 
based on the primacy of international law. According to the author this 
approach is mistaken because the primacy of community law is an issue, 
entirely different from that of dualism or monism and both solutions are 
acceptable as responsive to the demands of the European Union. 
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Mag. Andrea Dubisova's lecture on "Integration into the European Union 
and Harmonization of Laws in CEE" summarized the phases of the accession 
negotiations in Slovakia. Although the accession negotiations with that country 
were not officially opened until February 2000, the process of comparison of the 
European Union's legislation with candidate countries' legislation started with 
all candidate countries at the end of March 1998 following the decision of the 
Luxembourg Summit in 1997 to the effect that the enlargement process would 
involve all candidates, but that the negotiations would be confined to the most 
prepared countries. The screening part had a multilateral and a bilateral phase. 
First, the multilateral phase took place when the European Commission 
provided comprehensive information on the legislation of the European Union. 
Later on, in the bilateral phase, the representatives of candidate countries met 
individually those of the European Commission between March 1999 and 
February 2000. During the second phase the current state of legislation and of 
the administrative infrastructure was analysed with the aim of specifying areas 
where national legal norms did not conform to the requirements of the European 
Union's legislation, or the adoption of the acquis communautaire would give 
rise to financial and time-related problems. Furthermore, certain areas and 
exemptions connected with the transition period were discussed in general 
terms. During the negotiations, experts of the European Union examined 
whether a candidate country had harmonized its legislation with community law 
under a particular chapter. In addition, even if a chapter is provisionally closed it 
can be reopened during the negotiation process. The Accession Treaty has to be 
formed by agreements concluded between a candidate country and the EU in 
individual negotiating chapters. These also include the exact date of entry into 
the EU as well the kind and length of transition periods. Signing of the Treaty by 
a member state is followed by ratification by the legislation of each country. In 
Slovakia the ratification also requires approval by referendum of the accession 
to the European Union. 
2. The second working session, concerned with the topic of "Transition from 
Socialist Law and Resurgence of Traditional Law", was introduced by Prof. 
Katsuya Ichihashi, Prof. Csaba Varga and Prof. Marfan Pavcnik. 
Prof. Katsuya Ichihashi's lecture on the "Development of Administrative 
Law in Eastern Europe and Regions of the Former Soviet Union and Technical 
Legal Assistance" presented an overview of the impact of social changes in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Among other things administrative 
law underwent its own development process in breaking away from socialism 
in the Eastern countries. As Prof. Ichihashi explained, administration was placed 
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under the control of the government and the communist party. The related tasks 
carried out through the internal institution of the administration, not pursuant 
to legal norms determined by a department outside of administration. The 
administrative court system that had developed to a certain extent before 
World War II. was rejected for its incompatibility. At the time of transition to a 
market economy these countries launched administrative law reform programs. 
In countries like Hungary and Poland, which have established comparatively 
long records, long-standing traditions and cultures in developing their systems 
of administrative law since the 19th century, and have devised systems of 
administrative justice, procedures and court, the revitalization of these 
institutions serves to enhance today's reforms of administrative law. In countries 
like the former Soviet Union, which had no such historical background, the 
efforts for revitalization of administrative law do not directly promote the 
necessary reforms, but merely offer a theory for that process. As Prof. 
Ichihashi summarized, revitalization of a western-style administrative law as a 
kind of technical legal assistance may eventually succeed in countries where 
the history and tradition of western administrative law had existed prior to the 
socialist rule. Legal assistance provided by western countries, the main 
strategy of which is aimed to dismantle the centralized administrative system 
embodying the socialist legacies of the past and to transplant a new framework 
having no roots in these territories, will not lead to progress apart from the 
adoption of administrative legal theories by the former socialist countries. 
The next speaker was Prof. Csaba Varga, who read a paper on "Radical 
Change and Unbalance in Law—with Own Traditions Resurging in Transition 
from Socialist Law". As Prof. Csaba Varga said, radical changes in law have 
always been dangerous. At the time of the fall of the former regimes the public 
belief was that we only needed to do away with the remnants of the past and 
that the West would simply extend its borders over the former eastern bloc. 
However, the result was anything but different. The West could only offer its 
well-known everyday routine, the adaptation of which was just unrealizable. 
Prof. Csaba Varga mentioned the post-war situation of Germany and Japan as 
historical example. During the military expeditions the United States did not 
export the democratic tradition and the underlying rule of law; it focused on 
the culpability of the fallen regimes that had to be removed. It experimented 
with something new and opportune, which was obviously the right thing to do 
as one of the secure means for discontinuance of old practices and institutions 
in the doomed regimes. On the other hand, the allied military and occupying 
administration avoided implanting domestic democratic measures and instru-
ments in an empty space. When use of force was not enough, it proceeded to 
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apply the otherwise neglected natural law so that the law and the legal 
continuity of the defeated could be broken inside. As Prof. Csaba Varga said, 
that kind of legal borrowing was not only dangerous but risky as well. A 
characteristic feature of our transition process was that it had an exclusively 
liberalizing effect. Faced with the need to establish conventions, its pursuit of 
reform could not materialize except through causing damage to the commu-
nity. Direct interference with local social processes was mainly partial—for 
their own sake—without being incorporated in any systematic overall plan 
with community-wide dimensions. Behind this a rather limited rule of law can 
be found. During the transition process, national legal traditions are being 
moulded. They are formulated by reliance mainly on socialist routine, but also 
under Atlantic inspiration and by drawing upon European Union practices. As 
the speaker pointed out, a revival of past national traditions can only be hoped 
for in the long run, even though the process has got underway. 
As the third lecturer, Prof Dr. Marfan Pavcnik discussed "The Transition 
from Socialist Law and Resurgence of Traditional Law—The Case of Slovenia: 
The ( Inadequacy of Legal Positivism". Prof. Plavcnik started with a definition 
of the so-called socialist law. Socialist law was not a uniform and a generally 
accepted concept; there were some classical Marxist standpoints on the nature 
of socialist law, and different interpretations of and reactions to those standpoints 
according to the varying demands of practice in the socialist countries. The 
self-managing political system of former Yugoslavia allowed more room for a 
pluralistic concept of socialist law compared with the countries of "real 
socialism". Self-management law was not a new type or field of law; it was a 
question of new formal sources of law comprising legal norms. Prof. Pavcnik 
explained that traditional law was always closely linked to Yugoslavian and 
Slovenian law. It was used in areas to which socialist law did not penetrate, it 
filled legal gaps, and the system of legal education was mostly based on 
traditional law and legal thinking as well. The new socialist law was taught, 
but it was never dominant; because the older professors, who had studied 
between the two world wars, remained true to scientific legal positivism. So, 
the theories of pluralism and self-management were accepted but not institu-
tionalized legally and politically, and the legal system was de jure and de facto 
dominated by one political party. The system of checks and balances could 
not work, because the rules on the division of powers were no more than an 
ideological ornament. In the transition process the new Constitution of inde-
pendent Slovenia, centred on the classical constitutional material represented 
a milestone. It defines Slovenia as a social state under the rule of law; a 
catalogue of basic human rights and freedomsis compiled, competences of 
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central state bodies and their inter se relations are enunciated. According to 
Prof. Pavcnik, during the transition one has to take into consideration historical 
as well as legal traditions, but comparable foreign examples and solutions 
consistent with local conditions may also be adapted. It is of great importance 
that appropriate political groups and parties develop which would even de 
facto accept the values of a state under the rule of law and of a social state. 
3. The speakers of the working session on "Legal assistance in CEE and its 
Assessment" were Prof. Masanori Aikyo, Prof. András Bragyova and Prof. Jiri 
Priban. 
Prof. Masanori Aikyo spoke about "Legal Assistance and Themes for 
Comparative Legal Studies—Rethinking the World from an Asian Stance". 
The lecturer gave a short description of the historical background. As he 
mentioned, after the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, in the 
Soviet Union and in many Asian countries a transition process has started. 
Before that, Japan as an Asian country devoted but a few studies to Asian law. 
Now, the changes and the new circumstances made it important for Japan that 
these countries build a new system promoting legal and political stabilization 
in this region. In this connection, Japan as well as other donor countries and 
international organizations are implementing legal assistance projects under 
which questions like the role of contemporary Japanese law in this process are 
to be answered. Japan, taking part in legal assistance to countries in Asia, 
witnesses a new era of objective need for Japanese law and Japanese legal 
studies to serve as a source of information to be disseminated to other foreign 
countries. Provision of legal assistance for each country basically means 
asking ourselves the question as to which of the laws we have adopted so far 
are suitable as a legal message to be communicated abroad. Prof. Aikyo stated 
that although there were differences in the backgrounds of transition, the 
standards of legal education, the state of legal cultures, the process of legal 
reforms etc. in the former eastern bloc and in the Asian countries, the common 
characteristic of their transition processes was to change from an adminis-
tratively centralized legal system to a new legal system suitable to promote 
marketization. The lecturer explained that the transition of legal systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the formation of new laws offered interesting 
topics for comparative legal studies from the perspective of legal assistance 
and that there was a need to develop a new theoretical framework for 
comparative legal studies which would take into consideration different factors 
of legal culture based on a clear understanding of legal history and of the legal 
values involved. 
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The next lecture "Legal Assistance as Transfer of Legal Knowledge-A Case 
Study of the Constitutional Courts of Legal Knowledge" was delivered by Prof 
András Bragyova who explained the concept of 'legal assistance' as a special 
form of transfer of legal knowledge from one legal system to another. This 
demand might be "external" to the legal system, i.e. being of a social or political 
origin in general, and it might be "internal", i.e. arising within the legal system 
itself. A legal system involves legislative provisions asserted in "metalanguage", 
i.e. in a normative or legal language, without which a legal system cannot exist. 
The legal knowledge—called 'legal dogmatics' in the continental European 
legal system—may be considered as part of this normative language which 
includes the canonical formulations, the contents of the rules of positive law, 
the dogmatic statements about the law, standard forms of legal arguments, the 
accepted methods of interpretation, the doctrines and ideologies. The normative 
language of a legal system has functions to fulfill: the constitutional review is 
an efficient and speedy legal institution for transferring legal knowledge. Firstly, 
the constitutional review encompasses the legal system as a whole and has 
influence on it. Secondly, in the constitutional review, the legal argumentation 
or the theoretical elements—from the normative language or dogmatics—are 
more important by comparison with ordinary legislative language. Furthermore, 
transfer is facilitated by concentrating the constitutional review in a single court. 
Since there was no precedent for constitutional review in Central and Eastern 
Europe, there was a basic need for the transfer of constitutional argumentation, 
and this is the reason why they have turned to foreign models of legal argumen-
tation—such as those offered by the the German Bundesverfassungsgericht or 
from the European Court of Human Rights. 
The last contributor was Prof. Jiri Pribán, who dealt with the topic "The 
European Constitution-Making and the EU's Involvement in Central European 
Constitutional Transitions". The CEE countries integrating into the Union in 
2004 experienced a rather curious historic movement related to constitution-
making. On the one hand, after the collapse of communism they started to 
recreate national sovereignty, while weakening it in favour of the European 
Union. On the other hand, among the three major arguments, which theoretically 
supported the European constitution-making efforts, the identity argument is of 
great importance to the national constitution-making process in the acceding 
countries as well. According to its advocates, the primary function of integration 
is to keep "ethnos" outside the gates of European politics and to establish a new 
European identity as contrasted with different ethnic and national identities. 
Therefore, the European Union may be a symbolic alternative to ethnically 
burdened nation states. The EU backed the peaceful nature of post communist 
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transformation and democratization because it kept under control the threats of 
political authoritarianism, hostilities within a nation, and other consequences 
of the political changes. The neutralization function of the European integration 
was shown in several tense situations, e.g. disputes about ethnic and national 
minority rights between Slovakia and Hungary. Prof. Priban described the 
current situation of the EU, where 'the constitutive power is desperate to 
constitute its constituent power', the European constitution-making process 
based on sovereignty claims and the notion of supremacy have met with many 
criticisms. The Convention's work on the constitution, which is more than a 
social contract in the sense of an alliance of the affected parties having mutual 
responsibilities and rights, followed the logic of John Locke's horizontal 
version of social contract and the draft presented is a social contract between 
the peoples of Europe politically organised in their democratic nation-states. 
4. "Judicial Reform and Comparative Law" was the closing theme of the 
symposium treated by Prof. Yasunori Honma, Dr. Réka Végvári and Prof. 
Marek Smolak. 
Prof. Yasunori Honma delivered a lecture on "Judicial Reform and 
Comparative Law in Japan ". He described the historical background to the 
law of civil procedure and the present status of judicial reforms, which serve as 
a basis for finding similarities and differences between the eastern European and 
Japanese civil justice system. The Japanese Code of Civil Procedure framed on 
the model of the German Code of Civil Procedure, came into force in 1890. 
Although it had significant impact on judicial practice in civil cases, the local 
characteristics of the system did not disappear. As Prof. Honma explained, that 
Code based on a relatively liberal and adversary system, was easily to adopt at 
the time, but, as the adversary system was apt to cause delays in resolving 
litigation, its amendment became necessary in 1926, with the Austrian Code of 
Civil Procedure serving as the main work of reference and with the Hungarian 
Code of Civil Procedure also consulted. The lecturer stated that a few years 
later the problem of the delay in litigation reappeared owing mainly to the 
unsettled procedure for the taking of evidence. After World War II, the 
American legal system introduced new elements such as cross-examination, 
but this amendment had no radical impact on the law of civil procedure as it 
had failed to incorporate preliminary elements like revealing in advance the 
evidence possessed by other party. Finally, in 1998, when efforts were made to 
amend the Code, emphasis was laid on improving the procedure for the taking of 
evidence. Although, the Japanese Parliament, recognizing the importance of the 
issue, passed an act to expedite the procedure with litigations to be settled 
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within 2 years, the Judicial Reform Council submitted recommendations 
significant to the judicial system in the light of a more comprehensive reform 
in 2000. Prof. Honma mentioned the introduction of the saiban-in system, 
under which a layman as assistant judge takes part in serious criminal cases 
and in the hearings, as under the sanyo-in system in civil cases (mainly family 
matters involving divorce) where the judges takes into account the opinion of 
the layman. According to the lecturer, comparative law and comparative 
judicial systems have become essential elements in institutional reforms, as the 
civil justice systems of the different countries express the local cultures formed 
over many years, so it is more appropriate to harmonize them instead of having 
them regulated in a single procedural law. 
The next lecture on "Judicial Reform and Comparative Law" was deliv-
ered by dr. Réka Végvári. The lecturer gave an overview of the effects of the 
transition process on the judicial system. According to her, several modifi-
cations—seeking to protect and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
to widen the procedural guarantees, to simplify and speed up the processes and 
to achieve the compliance with the new requirements of the judicial system— 
can be observed in civil and criminal procedures as well as in the organization 
and supervision of the justice system. As far as the organization and supervision 
of the system is concerned emphasis was laid on increasing the financial 
independence of the courts. The integration into the European Union and the 
recommendations of the Council of Europe had influence to bear on the reforms 
both underway and complete in the region. Dr. Végvári emphasized that the 
changes in administration, effected with the aim of widening the procedural 
guarantees and pursuing to accomplish the precedents of the European Court 
of Human Rights could be clearly recognised in criminal law. New methods 
of witness protection had been drawn up, the conditions for the application of 
coercive measures and secret service means had been modified on the basis of 
the rule of law. Tendencies were in line with the independence of judges, as far 
as the judicial institutions are concerned. The lecturer mentioned that the 
question concerning the place of the prosecution, i.e.whether it should belong 
to the government or should be independent, was still on the agenda. Efficient 
and continuous control over the police and greater emphasis on the importance 
of proceedings before the court were required. The strengthening of the 
adversary elements and the simplification of the procedure were based partially 
on Anglo-Saxon analogy, so the solutions to speed up proceedings were 
questionable. It was underlined that the comparative method had a determinant 
role to play both in the preparatory work and in the reshaping of the Hungarian 
criminal procedure. 
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Prof. Malek Smolak's lecture on "Can Constitutional Courts bring about 
judicial reform? Polish and South African experience" was devoted to the 
legal problems of the so-called transitional constitutionalism defined as the 
way the Constitution functions at the time of a substantial political change. 
The institutional changes in Poland and South Africa may be characterized as 
ongoing processes, and the constitutional courts are playing a vital part in them. 
The courts in Poland and South Africa are expected to create—or to create 
together with the legislature and the executive—a new social and political 
order based on justice and law. The judicial decisions of the Constitutional 
Tribunal and the Constitutional Court will now have to take a position on this 
problem. Consideration of the role of constitutional courts in political 
transformations necessarily leads to the questions of the judges' understanding 
of the relationship between the role of the judiciary on the one hand and that of 
the legislature and the executive on the other, as well as of the problem of the 
democratic majority principle and the lack of democratic authorization of the 
courts. The speaker stressed that the impact of constitutional courts on political 
transformations was closely related to the said understanding. According to 
him the periods of political transformation reveal the fallacy about the political 
neutrality of constitutional courts and induce judges to show an inclination 
towards passing more politically oriented judicial decisions. From this 
perspective, the adjudication of the Constitutional Court in South Africa, 
perceived as an attempt at creating a constitutional culture, may be understood 
as a procedure for achieving a social and political compromise based on the 
authorities and citizens 'self-limitation'. Such agreements opened, and created 
the framework for a political discourse, and they are a positive example of 
building a "negotiatory constitutionalism". 
The discussants of the symposium were Prof. Zoltán Péteri in the session 
on "Transition from Socialist Law and Resurgence of Traditional Law", Prof. 
Attila Rácz on "Judicial Reform and Comparative Law", Prof. Csaba Varga on 
"Legal Assistance in CEE and its Assessment" and Dr. Gábor Sulyok on 
"Integration into the European Union and Harmonization of Laws in Central 
and Eastern Europe". 
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1. General Remarks 
Nowadays the constitutional aspects of the European Union (hereinafter EU) 
are especially popular: several authors have written about the Constitution and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU from different points of view, but 
almost always repeating the same. The question of enlargement is fashionable, 
too. The 'EU enlargement. The Constitutional impact at EU and National Level. '' 
is—in accordance with its title—therefore not unique. The book contains the 
proceedings of an international conference, which was held between 20-23 
September 2000 in the Hague.2 The purposes of this conference were to study 
the impact of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter IGC) in Nice 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and to show candidate countries 
the experience of the present Member States in the course of the adaptation 
of their constitutions to the obligations resulting from the EU membership.3 
The rapporteurs and speakers were representatives of European institutions, 
representatives of national governments and of national civil, administrative and 
Junior research fellow, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
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 Ed. by Kellermann, A. E.—Zwaan, J. W. de—Czuczai, J. T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague, 2001, lxi+601. 
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 It was organised by the T.M.C. Asser Institute in co-operation with the Constitutional 
and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI) from Budapest. See: in detail, Czuczai, J.: Az ún. 'Keleti 
kibővítés' alkotmányossági kérdései mind az EU, mind a tagjelölt országok tekintetében 
[The Constitutional Questions of the So-Called 'Eastern Enlargement' Regarding the EU 
and the Candidate States]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2001. 145-147, and the website of Asser 
Institute: www.asser.nl/Impact/default.htm 
3
 Cf., www.asser.nl/Impact/default.htm 
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constitutional courts as well as professors, research fellows from universities 
throughout Europe and the United States.4 
The book is a standard work and its authors are experts in the subject.5 
On the other hand, its theme—research on the constitutional aspects of the 
enlargement—is also original: the enlargement is often spoken of in general 
terms, but in this book the question is restricted to the most important aspect 
thereof, namely the constitutional one. The problems which the work deals 
with have remained significant also after Nice. Besides, all the main questions 
are examined on both Member State and candidate state levels, therefore a 
complex system of ideas is created. The volume constitutes a very interesting 
snapshot of the constitutional debate/' enabling us to see and comprehend all 
the constitutional questions of the integration. 
The present author relies on this book for introducing the readers to the 
main constitutional problems faced at both EU and national levels. These 
problems are of great importance for Hungary, as it became a member of the 
EU by 1 May 2004. After reviewing these questions this study will also address 
those which must be solved by Hungary in this context. 
2. The Main Constitutional Problems in Connection with the European 
Integration 
By presenting some studies of each main part of the volume, the review sheds 
light on the constitutional problems entailed by the progress of integration. The 
reviewer intends to highlight the current general constitutional questions of the 
EU, namely the pros and cons regarding the Constitution of EU and the Charter, 
and the constitutional challenges originating from the accession for Member 
States in the past and for candidate states at present. 
The book deals with the above-mentioned problems in four main parts: the 
first deals with the Constitution of the EU and the Charter. The second and third 
parts deal with the national level: the second part with the constitutional problems 
4
 Hungary was represented by Attila Harmathy, Member of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences and visiting professor Jenő Czuczai (College of Europe, Brugge). 
5
 Imre Vörös calls the authors 'big guns of the profession' in his book review. See 
Vörös, I.: Egy európai alkotmányjogi alapműről [On a Standard Work of European Consti-
tutional Law], Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2003. 112. 
6
 Cf. Walker, N.: Review of 'EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and 
National Level' (eds.: Kellermann, A. E.—Zwaan J. W. de—Czuczai, J.). Yearbook of 
European Law, 2002. 591. 
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and the developing practice of the national constitutional systems of Member 
States, the third with the candidate countries' constitutional challenges and the 
effects of enlargement on their national constitutions. The fourth part elaborates 
once again on theoretical issues, namely the expected effects of the Nice IGC, 
the future institutional changes and the constitutional impacts of the enlargement. 
The structure of the work is logical, so the reviewer will also follow its 
train of thought. 
2.1. Constitutional Order of the EU 
2. 1. 1. Constitution of the EU 
The first study deals with the Constitution of the EU. Its title is 'Europe 2000— 
The constitutional agenda: an outline'; it was written by Joseph Weiler, a 
professor of Harvard Law School and the European University Institute in 
Florence. He deals with the question whether the EU needs a constitution. 
The EU raises a lot of constitutional issues, for instance it insists on 
supremacy vis-à-vis national the legislature and on direct effect, vis-à-vis the 
judicature, it has a charter protecting human rights, subsidiarity prevails, etc. 
Thus the EU already has an uncodified constitution. There are five arguments 
for its enactment: 1. lack of legitimacy, 2. non-functionability of Treaties as a 
constitution, 3. necessity of a Constitutional Court, 4. need for a formal charter 
of rights, 5. limitation on the competence of the Union. 
The author expresses some scepticism about these arguments and expounds 
his views. In his opinion the change in the constitutional architecture is an 
urgent necessity, but it cannot be achieved by a formal procedure like adopting 
a constitution. He refutes the arguments one by one. 
First, the opening of a constitutional discourse among European peoples only 
serves to decrease, rather than increase stability. On the other hand, a codified 
constitution rules out the principle of 'constitutional tolerance' by introducing a 
formal hierarchy between Member States and EU like in federal states, instead 
of the present case: the constitutional organs of the Member States accept that 
EU is 'primus inter pares'. Consequently the EU would lose its originality. 
Finally, the Treaties could be reduced to their constitutional nature, and the 
other provisions could be transformed into other legal measures of Community 
law. This method may result in a formal, entirely new constitution. 
2. 1.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The necessity of a Charter of Fundamental Rights is a hotly debated question 
as well. Its supporters mentioned the lack of a catalogue of human rights as a 
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shortcoming of the EU, because its institutions are not bound by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The opponents of the Charter referred to many 
documents like the European Convention, UN treaties and national constitutions 
already dealing with human rights protection. They proposed that the EU 
investigate again whether or not accession to the Convention would be 
possible and feasible.7 
Those who are not supporting the Charter—like Professor Weiler—emphasised 
the absence of a human rights policy. He thinks there is no need for a Charter of 
Human Rights either, because the protection of fundamental rights has already 
been guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) has also stated that Community 
measures violating fundamental human rights must be repealed. 'The Union 
does not need more rights on its lists, or more lists of rights. What is mostly 
needed are programmes and agencies to make rights real, not simply negative 
interdictions, which courts can enforce. ' Relying upon these findings, only the 
Treaty should be amended by introducing the human rights policy. 
Henry G. Schermers, professor of the University of Leyden, in his study 
entitled 'Drafting a charter of fundamental rights of the European Union ', 
deals first with the question whether the EU is bound by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and whether the Member States having ratified 
the Convention could transfer powers to the Community. The problem arose in 
Germany, where the human rights are listed in the constitution and may not be 
changed under Article 79, so the powers of the EU are restricted by them. 
The second question is whether the Member States are responsible for 
infringements of rights committed by the Community. Since the Community is 
not a party to the Convention, the European Commission of Human Rights is not 
competent to examine its acts. States can transfer powers to international 
organisations, but this does not exclude their responsibility under the 
Convention. On the other hand, Member States cannot be obliged to examine 
the decisions of the Community because of the principle of supremacy and the 
idea of transferring powers to an international organisation. The adoption of 
the Charter of Human Rights could not provide a solution. It will add more 
rights to the existing ones, which must be exhausted before bringing the case 
to the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR). It will not replace 
the Convention, so it will only involve further delays in the procedure. It will 
result in parallel structures and even more conflicts of competence. The best 
7
 See www.asser.nl/Impact/default.htm Summary by Kellermann, A. E. 
8
 See the book reviewed 12. 
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solution could be if the Community became a party to the Convention, and it 
examined the conformity of its acts with the requirements of the Convention. 
This could create a clear legal situation. 
The starting point of Roger Errera, the author of the following study,9 is 
that the EC J has already developed the 'acquis communautaire' relating to 
fundamental rights. The ECJ borrows from the ECHR, but it interprets the 
rules in relation to the structure of the EU. The problem is that the present 
system is incomplete, lacks clarity and legal certainty, and the decision of ECJ 
can differ from the ECHR. The Charter is not necessary if its content is almost 
the same as the Convention's, because the divergences deriving from the 
differences of approach are inevitable but legitimate. 
Ernst M. H. Hirsch Ballin—the author of the next study10—thinks that the 
work on the Charter began in the interest of escaping from the question of 
accession to the European Convention. It causes difficulties in that, in case of 
accession, the Community loses its autonomy of interpretation. 
The Charter is a significant element of constitutional development: it limits 
the exercise of powers and helps to identify the scope of EU competence." 
According to the author, the Charter is more than a restatement of the 
Convention: it reflects the specific nature of the EU by stating the rights of 
Union citizens and the economic and social rights. It contains original rights 
such as the right to physical and mental integrity, protection of personal data, 
recognition of cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity in the EU, etc. 
The significance of the Charter lies in the identification of the EU as a 'public 
12 
law structure with a constitution' "—writes Professor Hirsch Ballin. 
In the study 'The impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
perspective of enlargement'14 Koen Lenaerts, a judge of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities, considers the constitutional challenges 
stemming from the Charter for candidate states. They are to meet rigorous 
requirements as concerns respect for fundamental rights, with extremely strict 
sanctions by the EU. The Europe Agreements and the 'Copenhagen criteria' 
also prescribed obligations in this field. If a state wishes to accede, it must 
respect the principles of the EU, including respect of fundamental rights. This 
4
 Its title is 'On human rights and the idea of a European Charter of fundamental rights'. 
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 Hirsch Ballin, E. M. H.: The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A building block 
for the European constitutional order. 
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is a legal condition for membership. However, there is no coherent approach to 
monitoring the actual status of human rights in the candidate countries. The 
EU relies on the Convention for ensuring respect for fundamental rights, hence 
a European State may be a member of the Union only if it accedes to the 
Convention. This problem will be solved by the Charter. 
The author also deals with the protection of minorities, which is a 
precondition for accession, but the EU is reluctant to solve the problem within 
its own borders. 
According to Evgeni Tanchev, Professor of Sofia University, the main 
effect of the Charter on candidate states is that they have to incorporate in their 
national constitutions the second and third generations of rights, i. e. economic 
and cultural rights. 
Charters often precede constitutions because they require less political 
consensus. Therein lies their significance. However, the Charter is of no use if 
it does not contain an obligatory list of rights.14 
2. 2. Constitutional Impacts of Enlargement on Member State Level 
The second main part of the work describes the Dutch, the British, the Irish, 
the Danish, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Greek, the Austrian, the Finnish 
and the Swedish constitutional order, and some general constitutional aspects 
of EU membership and the forthcoming enlargement. The reviewer will not 
describe the constitutional solutions of the Member States one by one, save the 
general problems and the British solution. 
'Constitutional aspects of European Union membership in the original six 
Member States: model solutions for the applicant countries?' is the title of the 
study written by Bruno de Witte. Its main question is whether an 'acquis constitu-
tionnel' exists, which the applicant countries should accept. The author examines 
the six founding States, because they created the institutional system, and did not 
have to face an existing one. They gave very different answers to the challenges 
incurred, so in this context there is no common 'acquis constitutionnel '. 
According to the author, there are three main aspects of the constitutional 
challenges in historical order: limitation of sovereignty in favour of international 
organisations, adaptation to the supremacy of European Community (EC) law, 
and reactions to the effects of Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter 
TEU). 
14
 See the book reviewed 36. 
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First, according to the 'Schuman Plan ' states had to surrender their powers 
in the two determined areas to a supranational body in order to prevent wars. 
The French, Italian and German post-war constitutions contain 'a provision 
permitting limitations of sovereignty or transfer of sovereign powers to 
international institutions'.15 The model of the three leading states was adopted 
by the Netherlands and Luxembourg a few years later, but Belgium followed 
them much later. However, none of the Benelux states made an express 
reference to the EC. 
The second challenge was the recognition of EC law's supremacy. The 
acceptance of the doctrine constituted no problem in the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, because in these countries the supremacy of international treaty 
provisions had been accepted earlier. In Belgium, the Supreme Court adopted 
the doctrine as it had been formulated in the Case Costa v. ENEL. In France, 
the Constitution contained a provision on the principle, but the courts were 
extremely slow in accepting this rule. In Italy, the Constitutional Court 
recognised the supremacy of Community Law on the basis of its 'special 
nature that distinguishes it from other international treaties'.'6 In Germany, 
the constitutional provision, which allows membership (Article 24), implicitly 
contains the primacy of Community law. 
The third constitutional problem came up with the TEU, which led to 
constitutional amendments in Germany and France, and resulted in the explicit 
constitutional recognition of the European Union. In Belgium and Luxembourg 
there was a contrast between the constitutional provisions and the TEU 
concerning local elections, yet these countries ratified the Treaty while 
postponing the revision of the constitution, a highly criticized method. Nor were 
constitutions amended in Italy and the Netherlands, but there was no conflict of 
norms there. 
Bruno de Witte deals also with the limits of 'absolute supremacy'. According 
to the Italian Constitutional Court, the EC law could only derogate the 
'ordinary' rules of constitutional law, but not the fundamental principles or 
inalienable rights. In Germany, the Solange-I. and Solange-II. judgements are 
of overriding importance. The result of these judgements is that the German 
Constitutional Court is empowered to control whether the general system of 
fundamental rights protection in the EC conforms to the German constitutional 
standards. This attitude means that Italy and Germany intend to protect what 
they consider the core of their constitutions even against the EU. In France, the 
15
 See ibid., 67. 
16
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enforcement of a norm of the EC running counter to a constitutional norm is 
also inconceivable. In Belgium, the Cour d'Arbitrage has the power to review 
the constitutionality of international treaties, but it has never done so in relation 
to the EC law. These cases show that constitutional courts 'cannot accept that 
any source of law might prevail over the national constitution itself , l7 Only 
the Dutch constitution ensures the absolute supremacy of treaties which have 
been ratified already. 
The last problem the author touches upon is the sharing of the exercise of 
sovereignty. It can be split horizontally as well as vertically. The Belgian 
constitution states that 'the exercise of delimited powers can be attributed by 
18 
treaty or by law to institutions of public international law.' The joint exercise 
of sovereignty is in the interest of the people of Member States, but as it is 
exercised by decisions made by qualified majority, particular states 'can be 
outvoted'.19 
After having discussed the main theoretical questions, we shall now see the 
problem from the point of view of each Member State. Francis G. Jacobs 
examines the constitutional impacts of accession state by state.20 First he deals 
with Denmark, Ireland and the U.K. In Denmark there was no need to amend 
the constitution, because it spelled out in 1953 that the powers of the Realm 
may, to an extent specified by statute, be delegated to international authorities. 
In Ireland, the Constitution was amended in 1972 with special regard to 
membership in the European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC). The new 
provision permitted membership and confirmed the primacy of EEC law. In the 
U.K., there is no formal constitution, so only an enabling Act of Parliament 
could be used.21 According to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 'no 
Parliament could bind its successor'"" and it was contrary to the recognition of 
the primacy of Community law. As a result, the European Communities Act 
included only an obscure sub-section, which ensured primacy 'as far as it was 
possible'23 and obliged the courts to follow the decision of the ECJ. 
The next state to accede was Greece in 1981. It already had authorization 
in its constitution of 1975 as to the transfer of powers and the limitation of the 
17
 See ibid., 77. 
18
 See ibid., 78. 
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exercise of national sovereignty, so there was no amendment. Neither in Spain 
arose a need for amendment of the constitution. In Portugal, there were several 
amendments until the constitution came to comply with the requirements of 
EC law. Non-conformity of the legal order in these two states is for ordinary 
courts to examine. 
Austria adopted a constitutional law expressly for the purpose of accession, 
but it did not settle the relationship between the EC and the national legal 
order, because it is the task of the Constitutional Court. In Finland, the 
Implementation Act proclaimed the membership and recognised the primacy of 
EC and EU law. In Sweden, the Constitution was amended to authorize the 
Parliament to transfer powers to international organisations. 
The author examines potential conflicts between national constitutions and 
Community law. The reviewer will merely point to some problematic questions: 
whether powers exercised do not go beyond the scope of those transferred; the 
conflict between exercise of powers by EU and fundamental rights protected by 
national constitutions; conflicts between specific constitutional provisions and 
the Treaty interpreted by the ECJ; the absence of adequate provisions for the 
primacy of Community law in constitutions. The constitutional amendments 
cannot solve these problems within a short time. Instead, the constitutional 
provisions should be inteipreted to give effect to EC law. 
Another problem is that some of the Member States still hesitate to 
recognise the absolute primacy of Community law. Moreover, the recent 
candidate countries are newly independent and the independence provisions 
are firmly rooted in their constitutions. However, it is necessary to make the 
constitutional amendments before the accession, or else the transposition of the 
acquis has no sense, as it could have no effect—emphasises the author. 
After the general overview of the question let us have a look at the United 
Kingdom, which has no written constitution and 'the Parliament can do 
anything'. It is very interesting how this state solved the problem of transfer of 
competence. The title of the essay, which demonstrates the problem, is 'The 
British way: the cohabiting with community law'. The author, Alan Dashwood, 
deals with the sovereignty of Parliament in the U.K., which means that the acts 
made by the Parliament prevail over all of the norms and the courts must obey 
them. According to the traditional view, the powers of Parliament are unlimited 
and illimitable, therefore the Parliament cannot bind itself for the future. In the 
EU, however, Member States should limit their sovereign rights, and in the 
European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) the Parliament did it as well. The 
courts follow without reservation the decision of the Parliament. The limitation 
would only be lifted if the U.K. withdrew from the Union. The possibility of 
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express derogation from the ECA was nevertheless acknowledged. It shows 
how the EU membership could alter one of the ultimate principles of the 
United Kingdom. 
2. 3. The Constitutional Problems of the Candidate Countries in Relation 
to the Accession 
The third part of the book portrays the constitutional challenges deriving from 
membership for candidate states. The constitutions of candidate states must 
be amended so as not to hinder accession to an international organization, for 
example the EU. The Commission neither mentions adaptation of national 
constitutions in its reports, nor gives directives, because constitutions are 
regarded as belonging to the people of the country.24 All states must find the 
constitutional solutions suited to the conditions of their own legal system and 
establish the framework for the success of community law, because there is no 
uniform model.25 Besides the constitutions, the decisions of national constitutional 
courts are also important in the interpretation of these constitutions. Training 
of judges, prosecutors and other lawyers in European law is likewise necessary 
for the proper operation of the judicature in candidate countries after the 
accession.26 
The constitutional obstacles should be removed before the accession, 
therefore this question is of the greatest importance for Hungary as well. It is 
very useful to examine the methods and solutions of the other candidate states, 
because one can learn and get ideas from them. At the conference it was decided 
to hold follow-up meetings in a multi-country project for the development of 
European models of constitutions. These European constitutional models could be 
helpful for the candidate countries in the process of amending their constitutions, 
and a comparative study of the problems could make the texts more transparent.27 
The reviewer will briefly consider some chapters elaborated on the 
constitutional problems and the preparation for the accession in some candidate 
states, to portray the position of Hungary in comparison with the others. It is 
24
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worth while to take a look at the Turkish, Polish, Slovenian and Hungarian 
constitutional orders. 
Miimtaz Soysal describes the constitutional problems in Turkey. The Turkish 
Constitution is incompatible with the system of the EU, because the transfer of 
sovereignty is not allowed, the supremacy of international law is not recognised, 
and the fundamental rights of persons are insufficient, etc. Thus there is a need 
for a thorough amendment of the constitution, which has to concentrate on two 
main points: first, recognition of the supremacy of international law and, second, 
transfer of certain sovereign powers to international organs or more specifically, 
to the EU. 
Janus Justynski presents the history of the Polish constitutional law. After 
1989 numerous constitutional amendments had to be passed. Finally it was 
decided to frame a new constitution, which was adopted in 1997. It recognised 
the supremacy of Community law, regulated the relationship between national 
and international law, and resolved the question of limitation of sovereignty. 
However, the sovereignty of Poland is defended by a two-thirds majority 
vote and a potential referendum. Poland did not accept the precedence of 
international agreements over the constitution, because it is the 'highest 
28 
manifestation of the nation's sovereignty'. This owing to the fact that the 
29 
'Community is still an organisation of States, not an organisation of nations. ' 
In Slovenia the transfer of sovereign rights is not allowed by the constitution 
as yet: all powers are derived from the nation and implemented by national 
institutions. The constitution is superior to all legal acts, and hence also to 
ratified international agreements. The Constitutional Court has the power to 
decide on the conformity of an international agreement with the constitution in 
an 'a priori constitutional review'. Although these are directly applicable, their 
direct effect is not automatic, but the courts decide on the question. Thus, an 
amendment of the constitution is required before the accession.30—writes 
Primoz Vehar. 
The preparation of Hungary for the accession is presented by Attila 
Harmathy.3I First, he deals with constitutional questions of a general character, 
See the book reviewed 284. 
29
 See ibid., 289. 
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such as the relationship between national constitutional law and EC law. After 
the general constitutional problems the author examines the situation of 
Hungary. He begins with presenting the relevant sections of the Constitution 
on sovereignty, the supreme body, referendum, and fundamental rights. He 
also outlines the roles of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. The 
Constitutional Court played a great role, because at the time of the political 
changes there was no new constitution, and it was the task of this court to 
develop the constitution into a coherent system. The Constitutional Court can 
declare a legal rule unconstitutional, but it has no effect on the obligations 
assumed under international law. The legislature is required in this case to 
achieve harmony between the two systems. Among the most important 
amendments of the constitution, he points out the transfer of some elements of 
sovereignty, the electoral rules and the regulation on the relationship between 
the Hungarian legal order and EC law. 
2. 4. Acquis Constitutionnel and the Enlargement 
This part of the volume deals with the enlargement from a different point of 
view. First Jenő Czuczai describes the changes in the constitutional challenges 
of candidate states according to periods. The first period is pre-accession and 
is connected with the Europe Agreements, which the author divides into three 
blocks. The first block was concluded with the forerunners and did not contain 
specific provisions on the EU constitutional acquis 41 The second (Romania and 
Bulgaria) and third (Baltic States and Slovenia) blocks, however, contained a 
'democracy clause' to give additional political and legal guarantees to the 
EU. The significance of the political criterion of Copenhagen is the political 
reorientation of the Europe Agreements, which could serve for a contractual 
legal and institutional framework in this period.33 
The second period was the era of constitutional reforms necessitated by the 
accession. The author examines the constitutions of Albania, Poland and the 
rest of the Central and Eastern European candidate states. Although Albania is 
not a candidate state, its constitution is remarkably progressive and could be a 
model for candidate states. The Polish constitutional solutions are very similar 
32
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to the Albanian ones. At the time this study was written Poland was the only 
candidate state which could even immediately join the Union, because it has 
already resolved the constitutional problems. In the group of the other candidate 
states the author indicates the minimum standards for the amendment of the 
constitution and deals with the question whether any international organisation 
or specifically the EU will be addressed. 
According to Czuczai, there is an existing constitutional acquis in the EU, 
and it is developing continuously. There is, however, no such chapter in the 
accession negotiations, because candidate countries must adopt the constitutional 
acquis in its entirety 'as it stands at the time of accession', and neither a 
derogation nor a transitional period can be given. 
Finally, the author presents the 'constantly evolving constitutional acquis 
of the EU' and draws three general conclusions. First, the constitutional 
traditions of acceding states should be an inherent part of the new constitutional 
architecture.34 Second, each candidate state must find its own constitutional 
way, which suits its national, historical traditions, because there is no 'ready-
made model'. Third, this part of the acquis of the EU should also be screened 
somehow, because its content is not clarified yet. 
Michael Bothe portrays the course of the German reunification. This issue 
is extremely interesting, as it was the first enlargement among the post-socialist 
states. 
There was no new constitution adopted, but the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany was opened for accession by the other German Länder. 
The former law of the German Democratic Republic (hereinafter GDR) remained 
valid only if it was compatible with the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany, including the EC 
treaties, had to be applied to the entire territory. The acquis had to be taken 
over, but a transition period was granted. The EC welcomed the reunification. 
No amendment of the treaties was made on that occasion. 
There were some problems during the process of the reunification, because 
the old currency of the GDR was revalued by 300 per cent, and the frontier 
defence was abolished. It resulted in massive unemployment and a dramatic 
fall in the gross national product. 
The German example constitutes a model for a smooth extension of the 
acquis, and warns us not to underestimate the problems involved in the 
economic differences—writes the author. However, there are also differences 
between the reunification and the forthcoming enlargement. The GDR was 
34
 Cf. ibid., 422. 
184 OLGA BORBÁLA MOLNÁR 
under an extreme pressure of time, while the currently acceding states have 
had an adaptation process of several years. The EC formulated the political, 
legal and economic conditions of accession in the so-called Copenhagen criteria. 
The question of homogeneity of economic conditions will only arise later in 
the case of the currently acceding states, but the GDR faced it already before 
the unification. 
By way of postscript, A. E. Kellermann deals with the causes of the outcome 
of the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice. He thinks that this treaty is too 
complicated for ordinary people, so either the support of people should have 
been increased or the treaty should have been accepted otherwise, e.g. by 
parliamentary procedure. 
3. The Hungarian Constitutional Problems in Connection with the 
Accession 
One cannot set up an order of importance among the contributions of the book 
reviewed, but for us, Hungarians, the most important question at present is the 
accession. Therefore, this question is worth examining in detail. 
Up to now the constitutional questions have not been considered important 
in Hungary. The politicians do not seem to understand the importance of the 
problem; they considered the amendment of the constitution to be another 
scene of political battles, 'fishing up' particular questions from the draft only 
to postpone them. They would like to set these matters straight in the future 
by two-thirds majority acts, which means suspending the settlement of the 
problem. 
The question of the transfer of powers and the relationship between govern-
ment and parliament were the most controversial issues for the four parties. As it 
was not only a question of politics, it would have required profound professional 
analysis and consideration. An amendment of the constitution would have been 
needed along comprehensive lines, and not only for the purpose of inserting the 
European Clause.35 
35
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3. 1. The Process of the Amendment of the Constitution 
László Kecskés thought that the amendment of the constitution was not urgent: 
it could have been done well after the accession, only the Act on Law-Making 
should have been amended and the decrees on international agreements should 
have been updated. He thought that the vague amendment resulted only in 
unsettled matters of outstanding importance. One can agree with him in that the 
amendment requires more profound and professionally supported consideration, 
but the message of the book reviewed contradicts his point of view regarding 
the date of amendment: 'it is also socially and politically important to confront 
the constitutional implications of membership of EU before, not after accession. '36 
The first Bill (No. T/1114) to amend the Constitution was proposed on 15 
October 2002. It expressed that the Republic of Hungary could transfer the 
exercise of its powers to the European Union or could exercise them jointly 
with the Member States. According to the opposition, the government was not 
prepared for the defence of national interests. 
On 5 November this Bill was withdrawn and a new Bill (No. T/1270) was 
proposed, which omits that Hungary transfers the exercise of its competence to 
the European Union, because the Union is by no means a party to the 
Accession Treaty. According to László Salamon, as the European Union is not 
a federal state, there is no one to transfer competence to; it is a confederation 
above which there is no common state organization, so the powers are exercised 
by the Member States jointly.37 
The political battles led to a compromise. On 17 December 2002 the Consti-
tution was amended:38 The Parliament passed the amendment to the constitution 
after a two-month forced period of constitutionalisation.34 Before that a working 
group—led by Imre Vörös—dealt with the constitutional questions of accession. 
Its members were Ibolya Dávid, former Minister of Justice, Antal Adám, 
former judge of the Constitutional Court, Pál Vastagh, former Minister of 
Justice, Jenő Czuczai, visiting professor, College of Europe, Brugge. The group 
pointed out a significant delay and regarded the amendment of the constitution 
as urgent. They formulated recommendations with a time-frame. Despite their 
work, nobody informed them about the amendment of the constitution. 
3f>
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The content of the amendment was judged differently by the experts. László 
Kecskés and János Martonyi accepted the integration clause. By contrast, Imre 
Vörös criticised it severely.40 According to Jenő Czuczai, the amendment has 
some parts which can be said to be professionally acceptable, but it is regrettable 
that there was no preparatory work. He would have preferred to have the 
questions concerning the accession settled in one chapter. 
3. 2. The Main Questions to Be Settled 
3.2. 1. European Clause (Section 2/A of the Constitution) 
A few experts think that the accession cannot affect sovereignty, because it is 
indivisible and illimitable. They think that it affects only the method of 
exercising powers by placing them in a 'pool'.41 The Member States actively 
participate in the life of the Community, so there is no limitation of their 
sovereignty; it is just put into a 'common pool' and practised collectively. In 
addition, states may even withdraw from the Community.42 
According to the Hungarian Constitution, the public authority cannot be 
transferred, but only the exercise of power can. One may agree that by the 
accession our sovereignty or a part of it will not be transferred, only the exercise 
of competence will, but our sovereignty will be limited voluntarily. Since the 
40
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state transfers competence voluntarily, this transfer itself does not impair 
sovereignty, because it is a decision of the state, which acts independently and 
autonomously. However, the consequences originating from this decision (i. e. 
the common exercise of competence) could be in conflict with the interests 
of the state, as they externally impair our self-determination. In the decision-
making of the Community, Hungary will have a small share, and it may happen 
that a decision will contradict the will and interest of the state. Furthermore, 
the main decision-maker in the EU is the Council, and if the government cannot 
represent the opinion of the Parliament, popular representation suffers a 
defeat.43 
One can accept that sovereignty has several meanings, which have further-
more undergone changes, but the substance of the notion is still autonomy and 
independence. In the most general approach to sovereignty, one can distinguish 
an internal and an external side thereof, the two sides creating a unity. In an 
internal sense, it means an autonomous establishment of organization and 
determination of the legal system, and in an external sense it means self-deter-
mination in the field of international relations.44 The EU limits sovereignty in 
both senses by making community law, by the primacy of this law, by the 
community court (ECJ) and by the Commission, which are independent of the 
instructions of Member States, by a common currency, by a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, etc. As the Community has an effect on Member States' 
interests of primary importance, and as the Community's law-making legally 
binds Member States and overrules domestic law, Member States cannot be 
regarded as fully sovereign states any more. However, the Community has no 
state sovereignty, because it is neither legally nor politically independent of its 
Member States.45 
For the transfer of the exercise of competence constitutional authorization 
is needed, because the application of unforeseeable norms and fulfilment of 
unforeseeable obligations will be undertaken, with limitations on state authority. 
Only a constitutional authorization can provide democratic legitimacy and 
43
 However, taking into account the factor of globalisation, Hungary is already bound 
by the decisions of the EU, and the Hungarian Parliament has not been an independent 
decision-maker for a long time. The real alternative for the country is whether it takes part 
in making decisions or only follows them without participation. See Martonyi, J.: Európa, 
nemzet, jogállam [Europe, Nation, Rule of Law], 1998. 64-65. 
44
 See Szabadfalvi, J.: Nemzetállam és szuverenitás [Nation State and Sovereignty], In: 
Államelmélet [Constitutional Theory] (ed.: Takács, P.). 1997. 135. 
47
 Cf. MacCormick, N.: A szuverenitásról és a posztszuverenitásról [About Sovereignty 
and Post-Sovereignty], Fundamentum, Vol. VII. No. 2. 2003. 11. 
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prevent control over Community law. By the amendment, the Constitution 
recognises an external power, thereby reaching beyond its own framework and 
breaking the tradition of nation state monopoly.46 
Of course, the existence and the content of the clause are indifferent from 
the standpoint of implementation of EC law; this is a question of national 
constitutional law, because the authorization is the source of legitimacy of 
accession. It is important from the point of view of internal coherence and 
constitutionalism. According to Vörös, the transfer of competence to the EU is 
not equal to transfer to an international organisation, so this is not a simple 
tightening, as Kecskés thinks, but a special case. 
Only certain powers deriving from the constitution can be transferred to the 
necessary extent, and the treaty requires two-thirds majority voting. Besides, 
the clause emphasises that the common exercise of competence serves the 
interest of participating as Member State in the European Union. This 
expression makes self-limitation functional and well-defined, which could not 
be found in Bill No. T/1114. 
If one sees the amendment to the constitution, one can notice some faults. 
As the accession clause affects the Treaties, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court will have to interpret them, but, according to Article 222 of the EC 
Treaty, interpretation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice. This conflict must be solved either in the Act on the Constitutional 
Court47 or in the Act on Law-Making.4S 
Another problem is that the clause provides authorization only for the 
future, but the current legislation must also form part of the Hungarian legal 
system. 
Furthermore, in a national constitution, there can be no reference to other 
states, so the expression that powers will be exercised jointly with other 
Member States is not correct; a relevant provision should be included in the 
Treaty on Accession.49 
The last part of the clause states that the exercise of competence can be 
realised either independently or by way of institutions of the European Union. 
This section involves two problems: first, institutions of the Union cannot be 
spoken of, only institutions of the Community can be under Article 7 of the EC 
49
 Cf. Vörös: Az EU-csatlakozás... op. cit., 407. or Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. 
cit., 60. or Vörös: The legal doctrine... op. cit., 163. 
47
 It would mean the introduction of a preliminary ruling in these cases, but this would 
add to the workload of the ECJ and would be an atypical solution. 
48
 Cf. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 139-141. 
49
 Cf. Ibid., 143. 
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Treaty. Second, the European Court of Justice and the European Commission 
are supranational institutions, which are fully independent of the will of Member 
States.50 On the other hand, common exercise of competence by oneself is a 
paradox, brought on by a grammatical error. 
A new Bill (No. T/4486) was proposed in July 2003. Even though it has not 
been passed yet, it is worth examining. Current Section 2/A (1) would become 
Section 2/B, and new Section 2/A (1) would be inserted, which is a general 
authorization for transfer of exercise of powers to an international organization. 
In comparison, Section 2/B is concrete: it refers specifically to the EU. It is an 
amendment of current Section 2/A (1): it changes the above-mentioned 
phrases from 'interest of participation' to 'during participation' and leaves out 
the foregoing last section, which was problematic: it eliminates the said 
deficiencies. 
3. 2. 2. The Relationship between the National Assembly and the Government 
(Section 35/A of the Constitution) 
According to the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, both the 
governments of the Member States and the Commission must inform national 
assemblies exhaustively, and, depending on whether parliaments have strong 
control over the executive in certain states, the executive must act in accordance 
with the position of the parliament.51 If the parliament has no chance to 
influence the European decision-making, this could threaten the domestic 
democratic legitimacy of integration, so the democratic deficit is likely to rise 
52 
most sharply between the government and the parliament. In the Czech legal 
system, the Parliament can express its opinion, but the government can ignore 
it. In Lithuania, the government submits its motions to the Parliament and takes 
its decision into account.53 A semi-strong model fits the Hungarian traditions. 
Regular information is not enough, because in this case popular representation 
disappears entirely and the government would have full powers in questions 
affecting the life of the country. The best solution would be for the Parliament 
to determine the position of the state and for the government not to depart from 
it on the European decision-making level without an authorization. This could 
guarantee interference of the Parliament in the shaping of European politics. 
50
 Cf. ibid., 144. 
51
 Igazságügyi Minisztérium — Külügyminisztérium IM/EUR/2000/TERVEZET/228/8.... 60. 
52 
See Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 35. or Vastagh: op. cit., 6. 53
 Cf. Sajó, A.: Az EU-csatlakozás alkotmányosságra gyakorolt hatása az új tagál-
lamokban [Effects of EU-Accession on Constitutionalism in the New Member States], 
Fundamentum, Vol. VII. No. 2. 2003. 21-22. 
190 OLGA BORBÁLA MOLNÁR 
Nevertheless, the question was not settled satisfactorily by the amendment 
to the constitution, which states only that Hungary is represented by the 
government in the institutions of the Union operating through governmental 
participation. According to Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats—Hungarian 
Civic Alliance) and MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), the government 
should not support but positions approved by the Parliament. This would 
guarantee that the citizens of Hungary take part in the decision-making of the 
Union through the Parliament. MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and SZDSZ 
(Alliance of Free Democrats) hold to be too strict.54 The parties could not 
agree, so they postponed the solution of the problem: it will be regulated by a 
two-thirds majority act. It was a result of heavy political battles, and in case 
the parties cannot come to an agreement on the issue, the government will 
have great freedom of action. The amendment also ignored the Convent, which 
intended to accord a greater role to parliaments.55 
3. 2. 3. The Supremacy of Community Law 
As the EC law is not international law, the primacy of community law does not 
depend on whether one agrees with the monist or dualist approach,56 because 
the relationship between international and national law is not applicable in 
this case.57 However, this question had to be settled as well. The new Bill 
(No. T/4486) formulates Section 7 of the Constitution, but, as norms become 
compulsory upon promulgation of the treaties, the dualist concept remains. In 
contrast to Bill No. T/1114, which made a modest attempt for the settlement of 
the relationship between community law and domestic law, Act LXI of 2002 
58 
does not deal with the question. 
The place of Community law must be found in the Hungarian hierarchy of 
the sources of law.59 If it were above the constitution, it would adversely affect 
sovereignty. There is a point of view according to which, if the constitution 
54
 Cf. Háttérbe szoruló nemzeti parlamentek [National assemblies pushed into the 
background], Magyar Hírlap 15. November 2002. 13. 
55
 Cf. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 148. 
56
 Cf. op. cit., 25. and Igazságügyi Minisztérium — Külügyminisztérium, op. cit., 11. 
Nevertheless, as the Hungarian legal system is dualist, the chance of implementation of 
directly applicable norms had to be stated in the constitution. 
57
 See Vörös, Az EU-csatlakozás..., 406. or Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 58. or 
Vörös, The Legal Doctrine... op. cit., 161. 
58
 Cf. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 145-147. 
59
 See Tóth: op. cit., 107-108. 
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declares the supremacy of EC law and gives it legitimacy, the constitution 
stands above EC law, because its application can be derived from the 
constitution.60 However, if the Community law were compulsory in Hungary 
by virtue of the Constitution, it would mean that all of the directly applicable 
norms could constitute a ground for instituting proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court.61 According to Vörös, as the EC law has precedence over 
national constitutions, it cannot be measured by the latter and, therefore, 
cannot be unconstitutional either.62 
Laying down the supremacy of community law in Hungarian laws and 
regulations would only be declarative, but would strengthen the rule of law. 
According to certain experts, the question should be settled in the Constitution, 
because a lower source of law cannot deal with the relationship between the 
Constitution and EC law.63 However, if it were declared in the Constitution, a 
national legal rule conflicting with EC law would at the same time be uncons-
titutional and would create a Constitutional Court case, which would be 
impossible, because this is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice. However, it could be possible if the limitation of the 
competence of the Constitutional Court were spelled out at the same time.64 
As the amendment of the constitution does not contain the primacy of 
community law, it has to appear in the Act on Law-Making, and the conditions 
for the direct applicability of community law have to be created.65 
3. 2. 4. Effects of Accession on the Judicature 
Personnel and material conditions are required for the Hungarian courts to 
become Community Courts: judges must be trained in Community law;66 the 
60
 See Kukorelli, I.—Papp, I.: A magyar alkotmány EU-konformitása [The EU-
conformity of the Hungarian Constitution]. Európai jog Vol. II. No. 6. 2002. 9, note 2. 
61
 Cf. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 150. 
6
" See Vörös: Az EU-csatlakozás... op. cit., 406. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 
58. or Vörös: The Legal Doctrine... op. cit., 161. 
63
 Kukorelli—Papp: op. cit., 4. 
64
 According to Péter Paczolay, there could be four options for stating the primacy of 
community law. The first is the earlier Bill (T/l 114), the second is no reference to it in the 
constitution, the third is stating it in the act promulgating the Treaty on Accession, and the 
last is stating it in the Constitution together with limiting the powers of the Constitutional 
Court 's competences. Cf. Fundamentum 2003/2. 63-64. 
65
 Cf. Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 145-147. 
66
 There was a training, but its efficiency is doubtful. See Grád, A.: A hazai igazságszol-
gáltatás felkészülése az európai uniós tagságra — avagy rövidesen kiderül: amit hallunk 
vészharang-e, vagy csak az utolsó kört jelző csengő [Preparation of Domestic Judicature for 
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EC law, the most important decisions of the ECJ have to be translated; the 
computer network has to be improved; Hungarian judges must learn at least 
one foreign language.67 
The directly applicable norms of Community law will be implemented in 
Hungary unaided. As private individuals may invoke Community law before 
national courts and as national courts will have to interpret national law in the 
light of Community law in the future, the attitude of the judicature must also 
be changed. 
There will be changes in the position of the Constitutional and Supreme 
Courts as well. The Hungarian Constitutional Court68 cannot examine the validity 
of Community law and the Supreme Court cannot play a mediating role 
regarding the application of EC law by the 'decision for the unification of the 
administration of justice', because examination of the validity of EC law and 
preliminary ruling belong to the exclusive competence of the European Court 
of Justice.69 It should therefore be stated that these decisions do not cover but 
the provisions of Hungarian legislation. 
This writing is intended to be no more than a broad outline, which highlights 
the main constitutional problems originating from advanced integration both 
within and outside the EU. Its aim is to draw attention to pending questions and 
attempts for solving them as well as to give some perspectives through the 
book reviewed, which identifies every constitutional problem concerning the 
integration, and the methods used by member or candidate states for solving 
them. 
Membership in the European Union—or Else It Will Turn Out Soon, What We Hear is Either 
an Alarm Bell, or Just the Ring Indicating the Last Round]. Európai jog Vol. III. No. 4. 
(2003) 37^12. and Észrevételek Dr. Grád András tanulmányára (Országos Igazságszolgál-
tatási Tanács Hivatala Személyzeti és Oktatási Főosztály) [Remarks on the Study of Dr. 
András Grád. Personnel and Educational Department of the National Judicature Council], 
Európai jog, Vol. No. 4. (2003) 43-44. 
67
 See Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás... op. cit., 82. 
68
 For further information, see Kecskés: Magyarország EU csatlakozásának alkotmá-
nyossági problémái... op. cit., П. rész. 9-11. 
69
 For further information, see ibid., 12-14. 
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A N D R Á S SAJÓ" 
The Impacts of EU Accession on Post-communist 
Constitutionalism 
Abstract. One of the persistent fears regarding the accession countries envisions that these 
countries will not catch up with the prevailing practices of constitutionalism and the rule of law 
that allegedly constitute the common tradition of Europe. 
It is believed, and in many regards rightly so. that accession to the Union will push Eastern 
Europe towards the values and institutional settings of modernity. Given the process and political 
consequences of the accession, as well as for other, historical and cultural reasons, the short 
term modernization effects of the membership might be limited, even counterproductive. This 
paper discusses the impact of the current "Europeanization" on the public understanding 
and institutional structures of constitutional democracy in the new member states. Further, it 
evaluates the foreseeable impacts of the emerging European Constitution on the constitutional 
structures (the new checks and balances) in the new member states, except the human rights 
aspects of constitutionalism. 
Keywords: accession constitutionalism European Union referendum sovereignty 
Introduction 
One of the persistent fears in the European Union is that the accession countries 
will be unable to catch up with the prevailing practices of constitutionalism and 
the rule of law that supposedly ground the common tradition of Europe. This 
fear is rationalized when considering that unbridled nationalism necessarily 
impacts upon territorial stability. There are other concerns regarding the weak-
ness of democratic tradition especially after the years of totalitarian rule. It is 
believed that the institutional systems in place for enforcing the rule of law1 
Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Professor of Law, Institute for 
Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30.; 
Professor, Central European University, Budapest, Legal Studies. 
E-mail: sajoand@ceu.hu 
1
 In fact, both new and old member states confront with some difficulty the aggressive 
enforcement of bureaucratic (excessively bounded) rationalism that relies on Union supremacy 
to the detriment of nation-state level constitutionalism. For the old member states see, e.g., 
the Alcan decision. С 24/95, Alcan II, [1997] ECR 1-1591. [German rule of law concept 
disregarded by the ECJ] . 
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merely exist in a formal sense rather than in terms of self-sustaining value 
commitments. The scope of this chapter does not allow for an analysis into the 
truth of such assumptions. It is undeniable that extremist nationalism is not 
absent in the rhetoric, and sometimes actual policies, of Eastern European 
political elites who in tum find popular endorsement for their nationalistic 
campaigns." These nationalistic sentiments will be echoed once the population 
of new member states will be confronted with negative experiences as a result 
of them being unable to successfully articulate their special interests in a great 
"empire"; unfavorable comparisons of "Brussels as the new imperial power" 
with the "yoke of the Soviet empire" has already been made in many former 
communist countries. 
One of the striking features of East European nationalism is that it is 
embedded in a value system that is (at best) indifferent to modernity as it 
grounds itself in past (ascribed and mystical) national glory. This belief does 
not generate much interest in the ethics of modernity as put forward in the rule 
of law (rational accountability for one's acts, transparency, predictability 
through formalism, etc). Modernists (modernizers) argue that accession will 
change attitudes toward modernization among large segments of the popu-
lation. However, given the process of accession and the way the new Union 
is shaped, firm, popular commitment to an efficient democracy as well as the 
belief in popular self-government, such an efficient responsive and responsible 
modern institutional system has limited opportunities to prevail beyond the 
institutional façade. Citizens of the new member states might become Zwangs-
demokraten (forced democrats).3 This is problematic because so long as the 
new European constitutional identity remains an unfinished and uncertain 
project (an imposed mask) there will be only limited offering of a modernizing 
identity. It is also true that the Eastern European political elite seems to have a 
very instrumentalist disregard4 for the rule of law even though formal legalism 
The Summer, 2003 Gallup poll indicates that although many Hungarians and 
Estonians identify themselves as citizens of the nation-state only (39 per cent) this is not 
particularly high compared to Great Britain (64 per cent). However, there was no Hungarian 
who would have identified himself/herself as "European only". Hungarian identity correlates 
with age but not with party affiliation. 
The term was used by a German journalist in regard to the late Bavarian Prime 
Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss. Of course, given certain historical circumstances the progress 
to genuine democracy might lead through imposed democracy. 
4
 It is quite telling that the Hungarian Government's chief delegate to the European 
Convention who joined overwhelming majority of the delegates signing a document 
proposing that the new Constitution should be adopted by national referenda, stated in 
Hungary that he does not find appropriate to call a referendum; his signature was added as 
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is at least accepted. (Even Meciar accepted unfavorable decisions of the Slovak 
Constitutional Court.) 
Instrumentalism and the hidden contempt of the rule of law and constitu-
tional values in general are confronted with a normative committment to 
constitutionalism and the rule of law which programmatically exists in the 
"older" member states. 
So long as "European solutions" are felt as being imposed and detrimental to 
local self-interests, "modernity" (i.e. efficiency considerations and pragmatism 
in decision-making, irrespective of traditional values and communitarian 
sentiments) will be detested. However it could be that those national institutions 
beyond national democratic control and interrelated with European institu-
tional networks may create institutions within the traditional national(istic) 
states that serve democracy. 
It is believed, and in many regards rightly so, that accession to the Union 
will push Eastern Europe towards the values and institutional settings of 
modernity. Modernity, in allowing for interest group collective action, can 
be considered a mixed blessing. Interest group politics behind European 
centralization is neither particularly conducive to a robust republican design of 
democracy nor does it contribute to fairness with regards to the protection of 
minority and other vulnerable groups.5 As a result of these shortcomings 
relating not only to the process but also the political, historical and cultural 
consequences of accession the effect of modernization might, in the short term, 
be limited and perhaps even quite the opposite. Furthermore, the ambiguities of 
the European project could reinforce pre-modern values within acceding 
states. The current practices of constitutional public politics are limited to 
electoral participation of limited relevance for the decision-making. In other 
words, the rational discourse that allows for intellectual formation, the acceptance 
of governmental decisions and a more engaging decision-making process is 
absent. 
In this paper I will look at the present impact of "Europeanization" on public 
understanding of constitutional democracy and the institutional structures put 
in place within new member states. I will then briefly consider the foreseeable 
part of the horse trading that took place at the negotiations. This is a telling, though by 
large not unique, example of the understanding of the binding force of contracts, both in 
the public and among the political elite. 
5
 On the new European constitutional design as a project of centralization related to 
special interest group interest representation where they are loosing at the national level, 
see Ruta , M.: The Allocation of Competencies in an International Union: A Positive 
Analysis, http://www/ecb/int/pub/wp/ecbwp220.pdf 
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impact of the emerging European Constitution on the constitutional structures 
(the new checks and balances) of new member states. Due to the scope of this 
chapter, I will not address the human rights dimension of constitutionalism. I 
will consider, in particular, the formation, and distortion, of constitutional 
democratic politics in the accession process particularly with regard to the 
referenda and the constitutional structures that have emerged thus far in the 
new member states. The politics of accession and other governmental practices 
remain highly instrumentalist. Such instrumentalism diminishes the likelihood 
that the general public will cherish the virtues of deliberative democracy and 
tempered majoritarianism. 
Relying primarily on the Hungarian experience I will analyze the potential 
changes in the democratic and constitutional ethos as a result of the emerging 
allocation of powers in the new Union. The constitutionalist inspiration that 
transpires from the debate on the European Constitution as well as the draft 
itself is highly problematic as a blueprint for "transformative constitution-
alism."6 
My first claim is that the accession process as well as the drafting of the 
European Constitution has reinforced a the irrelevance of constitutional 
democracy in the eyes of the public who continue to see it as a matter of 
majoritarianism. It remains to be seen how the emerging European Union model 
of pericentric separation of powers ("network constitutionalism") will be 
understood and used democratically by the citizens of the new member states. 
My second claim is that, outside of the genuinely free elections firmly 
entrenched within new member states, certain patterns of state socialism are 
going to be reinforced through membership to the Union. Democratic politics 
is understood for many people as a tool of maintaining free public services, 
irrespective of contribution or need (except the needs of service providers). 
Such trends might be reinforced whist converting local constitutional politics 
to the European level. The experiences of the accession process indicate that 
democratic participation and parliamentarism are often quite formal. Instead 
of genuine participatory politics and accountability, democracy becomes an 
opportunity to influence politics in order to maximize welfare services. Union 
ь
 Transformative constitutionalism is about openness to the future and it is based on 
a critical relationship to the past. In the distinction of preservative and transformative 
constitutions I follow Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 67. 
On the pre-modern traditionalism of post-communist constitutions see Sajó, A.: 
Preferred Generations: A Paradox of Restoration Constitutions. Cardozo Law Review. 14 
(1993)847-864. 
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law and policies reinforce the welfare entitlement attitudes of the East 
European public. The Union has its own social welfarist value system (or 
routine) which reinforces the inherited welfarist expectations in the new 
member states. In these countries the use of resources for the maintenance of 
European Union type welfare systems might be counterproductive and 
contribute to the difficulty in creating a robust democratic and constitutional 
culture. 
I. Constitutional structures and the thinning of niajoritarian democracy 
A. "Europe Clauses"—Preservative constitutionalism 
Eastern European accession countries have recent constitutions that were 
created after the collapse of communism.7 The Estonian Constitution (1992) 
(Art. l),s and the Czech and Slovak constitutions (1992) declare the respective 
countries to be sovereign, while Poland (1997), Hungary (1990 amendment), 
Latvia (1992), Lithuania (1992) and Slovenia (1991) refer to independence. 
Lithuania's Constitution also states that people's sovereignty cannot be limited. 
Even in cases where the Constitution is less unequivocal (as in Hungary) 
prevailing national sentiment is well represented in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court. Here a very traditional concept of sovereignty (see below) 
has been agreed upon which in turn has resulted in the restrictive wording of 
the Europe clause in Hungary. The transfer of public powers is not possible. 
Only the transfer of the right to exercise certain powers is allowed since such a 
transfer cannot be based on the ultimate source of sovereignty—the Hungarian 
people.4 
This concern with state sovereignty as a basis for independence is 
remarkable when compared with Western European constitutions where the 
matter is either not discussed at all, or is not made explicit (see e.g. Austria,"' 
The Hungarian Constitution is technically the Constitution of 1949 but it was fully 
amended in 1989 with several additional revisions since then. 
s
 "Estonia is an independent and sovereign democratic republic wherein the supreme 
power of the state is held by the people." The formulation follows closely Art. 1 of the 
1938 Estonian constitution which is the basis of the adoption by referendum of the 1992 
constitution, as expressly stated in the Preamble of the 1992 Constitution. 
' See for example Várhelyi, О.: Hungary. In: Ott, A.—Inglis, K. (eds.): Handbook on 
European Enlargement. The Hague, 2002. 264. 
111
 The Austrian Constitution states (Art. I ) that her legal order originates in the people. 
This, of course, can be seen as a reference to sovereignty. 
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Belgium), or is referred to in the context of the source of sovereignty: Italy, 
Art. 1.; France, Art. 3.—where sovereignty pertains to the people; Spain Art. 
1.2—where the people are the depository of sovereignty; Portugal is one of the 
few exceptions where there is direct reference to state sovereignty.) 
Since EU membership affects sovereignty, and arguably the independence 
of Eastern European states, it is understandable that the independence and 
sovereignty clauses are therefore seen as obstacles, to integration. The importance 
of these provisions is increased not only because they touch upon foundational 
issues but also as a result of the pro-independence public sentiment. The 
population in nation-states with newly recognized or regained sovereignty is 
understandably sensitive to issues of independence. Opposition politicians are 
ready to bring up the issue hoping for increased popularity in a society where 
popular culture traditionally honors (unsuccessful) heroes of independence. 
Moreover, the cultural and the legal elite are often keen on emphasizing 
independence as a fundamental constitutional principle (because of the consti-
tutional wording and independence dreams in the legal traditions). Both the 
general public sentiment and the ongoing political conflicts explain why 
constitutional amendments intended for accommodating the operations of the 
Union are sometimes rather narrow. 
By way of comparison it is worthwhile noting that the various approaches 
of transferring competence within the Europe clauses are essentially compatible 
with the prevailing continental constitutional solutions that emerged in the 
post-Maastricht context. The East European accession countries have carefully 
considered the constitutional solutions adopted in the Member States after 
Maastricht. The EU made it a priority to provide a knowledge base of expertise 
in this area. Given the increasing uncertainty of the nature of the Union, its 
identity, mission and decision making powers at the time the accession clauses 
were being written into the respective constitutions, it is understandable why 
some accession countries were reluctant to take a final position on the transfer 
of powers and competencies to the Union. The Latvian amendment, for 
example, expressly considers the accession to be subject to revision by way 
of a referendum that can be initiated by the people. Lithuania's amendment 
of Art. 136 also contains a safeguard clause: "The Republic of Lithuania 
participates in international organizations if such participation does not 
contradict interests of the state and its independence." However, the Europe 
clause states that it expressly "transfers to the EU the competencies of the 
national institutions in the fields foreseen in the Founding Treaties of the EU, 
so that it shall be entitled to implement common competencies with other EU 
member states in those fields." 
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B. Referendum—Instrumentalism and lack of deliberative democracy 
Given the concern with independence and (popular) sovereignty and because 
of the fundamental changes that will occur as a result of accession, all the 
Eastern European countries concerned opted for a referendum to sanction 
accession (or the accession treaty). This was irrespective of whether this form 
of popular support is prescribed by the constitution or not as was the case of 
Hungary until the 2002 amendments, or Poland (where this is a matter of choice). 
Indeed, some of the constitutions were amended so that they include the 
requirement of confirmation by referendum. It would be expected that those 
firm believers in popular sovereignty (i.e. that sovereign power resides in the 
people) would welcome this position. However, with the significant exception 
of Lithuania," the Eastern European accession countries (which do constitu-
tionally and doctrinally endorse the position of popular sovereignty) have been 
keen on avoiding referendum and plebiscite. For instance there was no 
referendum even in the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Mobilizing 
for a referendum has always been a problem because of the quorum difficulties. 
Hungary barely satisfied the fifty per cent participation requirement in the case 
of the Hungarian NATO accession referendum. All previous referenda ended 
unsuccessfully in Slovakia where the law on referendum requires (as it was the 
case in Hungary) that voter turn-out must be higher than 50 percent of all 
registered voters in order for the referendum to be valid. Also many previous 
attempts at holding a referendum were perceived by the Eastern European 
political establishment as populist attempts to undermine the parliamentary 
constitutional order. (For the actual destabilizing effects of the use of referenda 
see its use in the power struggles between the Parliament and the President 
of Ukraine and similarly in Moldova.1") It is quite telling that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, although in principle a protector of the individual political 
right to referendum, systematically restricted the applicability of referendum 
declaring various initiatives to be disguised attempts at amending the Consti-
" The Lithuanian constitution stresses the constitutional and constituent importance of 
referendum from its moment of creation. Art. 9.1 provides that on matters of fundamental 
importance affecting the population or the country referendum be held. Note that the 
independence of Lithuania was restored through a 1991 referendum that was the culmination 
of mass resistance to Soviet rule. 
12
 For a review of the use of referenda see Dorsen, N.-Rosenfeld, M.-Sajó, A.-Baer, S.: 
Comparative Constitutionalism. West, 2003. ch. 3. 
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tution. The Hungarian Constitution was amended in 1997 to the effect of 
curtailing the use of referendum as a device of change.13 
On the one hand a theory of constituent power that denies the right of 
popular initiative in this context is perhaps an odd one but, on the other hand, 
it is quite understandable with regard to constitutional stability: a value that 
was considered crucial in the early formative years of the new democracies. 
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional positions, and the remarkable 
legitimacy of the available specific parliamentary process,14 the political elites 
of all East European countries sensed (without any specific discussion) that 
accession needs a plebiscite-like popular endorsement. In a way, a referendum 
is not the preferred constitution amending procedure in the case of these easy-
to-amend constitutions, neither is the tool of referendum intended to become 
the choice even after the current round of amendments. In fact, in most 
countries the mechanism foreseen to handle future constitutional amendments 
resulting from EU developments excludes the referendum (although Estonia 
and Latvia are somewhat ambiguous exceptions). The governments' desire of 
popular legitimation resulted in one-time solutions regarding referendum, yet 
exceptionalism in constitutional matters is always a cause for concern. 
It is possible that the use of a referendum will create certain expectations 
with regard to future constitutional amendments and EU constitutional 
changes. The currently prevailing anti-referendum constitutional pattern seems, 
however, unchanged. Indeed, at least in Hungary (but not in the Czech Republic) 
the political elite finds that there is no need to accept the European Consti-
tution via referendum because low level endorsement would be seen as a vote 
of non-confidence in the government; a referendum would provide additional 
opportunities for the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition to 
11
 The amendment was adopted by the socialist-liberal coalition ruling at the time, which 
disposed of a parliamentary supermajority sufficient to constitutional amendment. The 
provision became an obstacle in 2003 for the same coalition which currently has only a 
narrow majority. Because the socialist-liberal coalition restricted the use of referendum 
they could not and will not be able to bypass the resistance of the opposition in accession 
matters by calling a referendum (where they probably would have a clear majority); the 
special terms of the one time referendum on accession required the consent of the opposition. 
14
 Wyrzykowski, M.: European Clause: Is it a Threat to Sovereignty? In: Wyrzykowski. 
M. (ed.): Constitutional Cultures [Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw M (2000)]. at 278 
indicates that a large coalition is needed for ratification. The Polish Constitution is prudent 
enough to enable parliamentary majority to go to the country via referendum in order to 
circumwent stalemate and opposition blackmail. The Hungarian socialists, when in power, 
ruled out that possibility through a constitutional amendment. That possibility, of course, 
determines the opportunistic behavior of the parliamentary opposition of the day. 
MAGYAR  
fWPÖMÄNYOS AKADÉMi A 
KONYVTA RA 
THE IMPACTS OF EU ACCESSION ON POST-COMMUNIST CONSTITUTIONALISM 201 
impose its will on the government. Such considerations are clearly pragmatic 
and instrumentalist. Of course, within the Union, as the 2002 Irish referendum 
indicates, the allowance for a referendum remains an important popular control 
device over executive activities. "It is clear that retained powers of the people 
may force government to bring about greater domestic scrutiny of EU 
legislative proposals in advance of the referendum."15 Without such a device 
the executive will gain further powers. 
C. A new separation of powers in the Union: further loss of popular-
democratic control 
The most fundamental (substantive and procedural) changes in the Eastern 
European constitutional systems, laws, institutions, and societies will occur in 
the years immediately proceeding accession. It is only at that significant 
moment that an entirely new institutional mechanism will redefine these 
relations. Most of these changes will not be reflected in the constitutions unless 
there will be fundamental changes in the Union itself through the emerging 
constitutional framework. The interpretation of the constitutions and the extra-
constitutional interpretation of sub-constitutional laws and institutions in 
political practices will, however, reflect these changes. 
The constitutions of the new member states so far poorly reflect the shifts 
in decision-making. The current amendments address the role of the legislative 
branch in the formulation of future European policies and legislation in a 
minimalist way, allowing in practice the increase of the power of the executive. 
The amendments were adopted following instrumentalist considerations and 
as part of ordinary party politics. The prevailing solution limits the role of 
national Parliaments in the shaping of European decisions to that of a 
consultative body."' 
In fact the powers of most parliaments will diminish and in some respect 
the powers of the executive will further increase especially in the case of those 
15
 Hogan, G.: European Union Law and National Constitutions: Ireland. FIDE XX 
Congress, London 2002) www.fide2002.org 24. 
16
 The model of consultative status for national parliament in the EU decision-making 
relies on the German model. Today many observers find this to be an insufficient solution 
for a parliamentary representative democracy, although contrary to Hungary or the Czech 
Republic the German government is subject to more stringent control, given the structure 
of joint-decision making in certain federal areas. In other words, because of the federal 
structure there is more power retained by Land legislative bodies, including through the 
Bundesrat. Of course, the Bundesrat does not genuinely fit the model of an elected 
representative body, since it is composed of non-elected Land government representatives. 
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Eastern European countries where the matter is simply pushed under the 
carpet. However because of the current cabinet dictatorship in most Eastern 
European countries the legislative branch is already weak by design. The 
emerging new division of powers takes away Parliament's legislative powers 
in matters that are of Union competence and renders unclear those legislative 
powers related to implementing legislation, that is if such powers will be 
retained by the national Parliament at all. In addition the present constitu-
tionally provided control powers of parliament (relating to fundamental rights 
protection that require some form of supermajority in some East European 
countries) will erode. These developments will contribute to an increasing 
sense of loss of popular control over the nation's destiny and the irrelevance of 
constitutional institutions. 
D. Does the European Constitutional System provide constitutionalism for the 
new member states?17 
The lack of transparent popular representation may not be the ideal beginning 
for the people of the new member states about to set foot on a common 
European path that is leading to a partially uncharted European decision making 
process without full representation (or with a new complex representative 
system based on partial representation). The representative element of the 
concept of the representative government is at stake. It is unlikely that people 
will be compensated for this loss of representative democracy by direct elections 
to the European Parliament. The further loss of importance of the national 
parliaments fits into an existing European trend. Weiler refers to a "flexible" 
Europe with a "core" "at its center" that "will actually enable that core to retain 
the present governance system dominated by the Council—the executive branch 
of the Member States—at the expense of the national parliamentary democracy. 
Constitutionally, the statal structure would in fact enhance even further the 
18 
democracy deficit." (Emphasis added.) The national legislative branches are 
the losers. Given the current constitutional arrangements, namely the lack of 
competence and information in national Parliaments as well as parliamentarians' 
defective capacity to handle the issues that are to be determined by the 
Council, Parliaments will not be able to defend the subsidiarity principle even 
if there were national or Union powers to that regard in the future. On the other 
171 am not considering here the rule of law and human rights enhancing contribution of 
the Union to the new member states-here the advantages are more obvious. 
18 
Weiler. J. H. H.: Conclusions, note 4. (Conference paper) Europe 2004-Le Grand 
Débat: Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options. Brussels, 15 and 16 October 2001. 
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hand the national executive will be in the position to push through policies in 
the Council that it would not be able to push through its own Parliament 
because opposing public opinion, or majority (or coalition) party interests, or 
supermajority requirements would present insurmountable obstacles.14 
On the basis that alternative forms of democracy are rather weak in East 
European civil societies, the European "democracy deficit" will be reproduced 
(in different forms) locally. However, this negative consequence might be 
countered by other consequences of membership. Furthermore given that 
European integration "has been, historically, one of the principal means with 
which to consolidate democracy within and among several of the Member States, 
both old and new, with less than perfect historical democratic credentials,"20 
accession may well have a beneficial overall effect on the quality and strength 
of the kind of democracy, or at least rule of law and political civility, practiced 
in the countries to join. 
The transfer of powers from national Parliaments to the Council reshapes 
the fundamental relations among the branches of power in the respective 
member states without any public participation or even any public cognition of 
the new development. One may argue that in the parliamentary systems that 
prevail in Eastern Europe the separation of powers does not offer much 
protection against abuse of power anyway. Parliamentary systems per se are 
weak substitutions of the working model of a robust democracy based on long 
standing traditions. Therefore there is not much to lose in the Europeanization 
process. However, the constitutional performance of the new states was 
surprisingly good in the last decade. Even if parliamentary representation and 
traditional checks and balances are weakened, there are other sources of 
legitimacy such as government efficiency. The above concerns are motivated by 
abstract principles of the theory of democratic representation. To use normative 
claims is perhaps somewhat misguided in this case. After all, the existing 
parliaments have never had a decisive influence on the executive but have 
merely served as transmission belts that convey the results of popular elections 
through the mechanism of the formation of the cabinet. 
It can certainly be said that from a constitutionalist perspective, and contrary 
to a democratic theory perspective, the new "allocation of powers" is not 
objectionable per se. In fact the likelihood of power concentration within a single 
hand is further diminished. The arrangement, however, does not automatically 
14
 Consider, among others Pernice, I.: Der Parlamentarische Subsidiaritätsausschuss. 
Walter Hallstein-Institut WHI-Paper 1 1/02. Berlin, September 2002), www.whi-berlin. 
de/pernice-psa. htm. 
20
 Weiler: above n. 18, 220. 
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increase the power of the people via improved self-determination. Given 
these preconditions and because of the fact that the accession constitutional 
amendments did not arise as a consequence of a crisis, one should not expect 
more robust national Parliaments debating European issues. The trends that 
emerged in the Nation State (the domination of the executive in the welfare 
administrative state) are not challenged through the process but were able to 
determine the constitutional regime of accession. A Constitutional safeguard of 
efficient governmental information to Parliaments and people regarding 
pending EU decisions, or lack thereof, makes no difference here. 
The consequences of the constitutionalisation of accession do not necessarily 
enhance constitutionalism. The whole process is marked by ad hockery and 
most steps taking the new member states into the Union remain within the 
ordinary and quite open horse trading between opposition and majority. The 
political elites of Eastern Europe opted for an accession referendum. This 
looks like a gamble: the issue is not popular deliberation but demonstration of 
loyalty via plebiscite. The legal discussion is primarily about expediency of 
the procedure (see Slovenia), and political discourse is replaced by guesswork 
about quorum and majorities. This is hardly an example of taking people 
seriously. 
At first glance it seems that national parliamentarism, the quintessential 
form of democratic government in the public imagery and a bulwark against 
executive tyranny, is going down the drain. However, this is not necessarily 
the message coming from the European Union. In view of the EU Treaty 
Parliaments remain important: 
— in exercising political scrutiny of the positions adopted by their 
respective governments within the Council; 
— in establishing cooperative relations with other parliaments in the EU; 
— in drafting and implementing EU law; 
In addition, the draft EU Constitution provided for additional opportunities 
and powers to national Parliaments. These new opportunities would have included 
direct and (more or less timely) notification regarding planned European 
legislation and opportunities of recourse, formally independent of the national 
executive in matters of abuse of the subsidiarity principle. One could argue, 
however, that these possibilities are not genuine possibilities for national 
parliaments as the identifiable instruments of representative government. The 
direct impact of national representative governments on the European Parliament 
(through national delegates of Parliaments who might have binding mandate) 
disappeared with the system of direct elections. The proposal to create a second 
chamber representing national Parliament has never been popular. It is true that 
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there is a certain sentiment that national Parliaments deserve special attention in 
the European legislative process for reasons of democratic representation, 
"being close to citizens"'1 rather than for reasons of national sovereignty. But 
the prevailing understanding is that powers in the Union emanate from the EU 
Constitution, even with regard to constitutionally established matters of sub-
sidiarity. 
Even with improved possibilities of early warning of Parliaments (as light of 
past experience, that national Parliaments will make use of these suggested in 
the European draft Constitution) one cannot take for granted, in the oppor-
tunities. Moreover, given the remaining opportunities of national parliamen-
tary involvment, the position of the parliament might be that of defensor of 
national interests. Especially in case of the subsidiarity recourse it might be 
embarassing for the majority to endorse a position against the one that the 
executive has endorsed. On the other hand, and with particular relevance to new 
member states which are in the shadow of suspicion of being inculcated by 
nationalism, the opposition of the day might be inclined to castigate the majority 
and the government for giving up the national interest by not taking a clear 
position against a Commission position or a piece of European legislation that 
might be challenged on subsidiarity grounds. In this scenario national Parlia-
ments may become the forum of nationalism. 
Of course, the demise of national parliaments, even if it occurs, does not 
rule out alternative forms of parliamentarism, and more broadly, a deliberative 
democracy. The European Parliament offers a form of expression of popular 
will. How deliberative the European legislative process will be is a matter to be 
seen. What is more obvious is that the European parliamentarism, deliberatly 
and to a great extent, offers representation for the European identity of their 
electors, as the system allows for less effective national interest representation 
(in the sense of primordial national interest). 
Certain features of the European Parliament might have negative impacts 
on the public in the new member states. For representatives coming from 
smaller countries there is little they can do about the nationalistic sensibilities 
of their electors. For small states the elected representatives will have no 
chance to represent successfully nationalistic interests. As they join big pan-
European factions where blocs of larger countries dominate they will be 
dissolved and disappear in this distant formation. It is unlikely that the activities 
of the Parliament will satisfy the nationalistic expectations of the public in a 
small country. This might increase a sense of abandonment of national interests 
21
 See e.g. French Convention representative Haenel, H.: http://european-convention.eu. 
int/docs/wd4/3640.pdf 
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and add to the feeling that there is no genuine representation at the European 
level. 
One could argue that Senate members in the US are also popularly elected 
in their state constituency without losing their state-interest representation 
capacity. But the differences are formidable both in terms of the constituency 
and the way the representation is organized in the two systems. The constituency 
difference can be explained in reference to the planned motto of the European 
Constitution: representation in Europe is about unity in diversity; in the US 
diversity within unity that prevails. As to the constituency, the European MP 
represents a nationality—his electors are mostly of the same nationality, and of 
the same state. All US Congressmen are elected by Americans, who might have 
local (state or substate level) interests or ethnic affiliation. A congressman 
elected in a predominantly black, Jewish or Irish district (and most districts do 
not have such profile) will represent Americans first, with some ethnic positions 
on a few issues. This is not the case in Europe where the districts create clearly 
national constituencies, however, the representatives are forced to abandon this 
implicit mandate where it is dictated by (party) ideology, by European party 
discipline, and, most of all, by sheer numbers. 
The logic of European legislation satisfies certain conditions of deliberative 
democracy, not necessarily because of the dialogue within the Parliament but 
because of the inter-institutional dialogue. Unfortunately this discussion is 
likely to remain non-transparent. Furthermore one cannot take for granted that 
the system has the potential to remedy the problem of bureaucratic-administrative 
homogeneity that characterizes executive legislation" and that is a major 
problem at the national level in regard to the implementation of European law 
(directives being implemented bypassing the legislation, via executive regulation). 
The problem of administrative homogeneity ("like-mindedness") remains where 
the interaction is between central (European) administrators and likeminded 
national administrators. (These latter are "like-minded" because of a pro-
European training.) And even where there is interaction with the elected 
European or even national Parliaments these might share the administrative 
European ethos too. (See the impact on legislation and robust democracy of the 
composition of the legislature in Germany where civil servants are elected to 
Parliament in great numbers.) 
22
 Executive legislation in the administrative state runs the risk "of a situation in 
which like-minded people are pressing one another toward an unjustifiable position." 
Sunstein, C. R.: Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do. New York, Oxford 
University Press 2001. 141. Sunstein argues that control of delegated legislation is a 
remedy. 
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The nature of European Union law further diminishes the positive impact 
of the inter-institutional dialogue as fundamental problems are left unsettled, 
either because of subsidiarity or due to unprincipled political, intergovern-
mental, or inter-institutional compromises that leave matters unresolved or for 
decision-making at the national level, which often means exclusively executive 
legislation, to the detriment of public deliberation. The politically uncotrolled 
executive regulation means that the implementing regulation is prepared and 
enacted within the civil service. It is here that the insufficient constitu-
tional/rule of law experience and the interest in democratic control will impose 
a high cost on the new member states. It is likely that in these countries there 
will be no public or institutional insistance that regulatory matters, other than 
dealing directly with fundamental constitutional rights restriction, be regulated 
in parliamentary processes. At least the Hungarian draft law on the legislative 
process prepared by the Ministry of Justice in 2003 intends to further restrict 
the domain of parliamentary law, enabling the executive to write the implenting 
legislation. One can already foresee the nature and qualities of regulations 
written by overwhelmed bureaucrats whose main concern is to have the norm 
pushed through without conflicts, and irrespective of constitutional, rule of 
law, or efficiency considerations. Of course, there are important reasons for 
this avoidance of Parliament: namely the dangers of delay and overpoli-
ticization. But given the lack of commitment in the public bureacracy to 
constitutional/rule of law values it is at this deeper level that the fears regarding 
insufficient commitment to the rule of law seem appropriate. The political elite 
is not ready (yet?) to reshape the procedure allowing for more costly, rule of 
law commited procedures, partly because the same elite has an instrumental 
attitude to law: it is satisfied with the semblance of due process etc. This is a 
political elite that looks at politics as a matter of interest based horse trading, 
where principled positions are laughed at. 
Note further that the East European civil service is not responsive to the 
public. Its leaders are not elected and for good reasons. Such arrangements 
contribute to diminished democratic accountability. Such trends might be 
reinforced in the environment of the European administrative state. The European 
administrative state has to work as an impartial entity (with regard to national 
interests). A democratically elected executive that controls the administrative 
structures would politicize the whole Union. The legitimacy of the civil service 
is unrelated to the democratic legitimation of the leaders, both at the European 
and member state level. The contrast is clear with the United States.21 National 
The prevailing US doctrine that allows administrative discretion is formulated in 
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Agencies are 
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courts have no power to review the implementation legislation as it is a matter 
of community law. 
Notwithstanding the above, the long term perspectives are not hopeless for 
constitutionalism in the new member states. After all, the emerging supra-
national separation of powers adds to that what remains of separation of 
powers at the national level. With regard to restricting the chances of elected 
dictatorship the changes are favourable to constitutionalism. It will take time to 
learn to live with, use and perhaps appreciate the new constitutional arrange-
ment where the traditional branches of power operate within (and complement) 
networks of interest representations which have limited democratic legitimation 
and partial representativity. It is possible that these alternative interest 
representations will operate as new checks and balances: it certainly does not 
satisfy traditional expectations of democracy and popular representation but 
may perhaps provide counterbalances and at the same time contribute to a 
more efficient steering of the European administrative state. To the extent the 
Union is indeed an administrative state (with an overloaded bureaucracy 
composed of generalists) it does not presuppose much democratic control 
through national parliaments, and even through a Union level parliament. 
II. Welfarism and the perpetuation of the state-socialist endowment effect 
Given that citizens of the new member states have limited political and practical 
opportunities as well as material and intellectual means to determine their own 
fate, and that this limitation is neither disguised nor regretted in prevailing 
Eastern European political cultures, the traditional patterns of a welfare 
dependent, anti-modernist complaint-subject might be reinforced. By "complaint-
subject" I mean citizens who behave like subjects of a paternalist state, who 
refuse to take responsibility for their fate through democratic participation, and 
whose "voice" (Hirschman) remains limited to complaints. People complain 
about their personal bad luck and the bad luck of their national history, and 
about mistreatment by insensitive politicians, and lack of honesty and decency 
of other people, in particular of those who appear to be successful. Political 
attitudes and action of the East European citizen remain one of complaint 
(hence the pattern of protest vote). The complaints include dissatisfaction with 
authorized to interpret ambiguous legislative terms as they think it fit, as long as the 
interpretation is reasonable. Courts are expected to defer to the administrative interpretation 
of statutes. However, contrary to Europe, the American executive is popularly legitimated. 
The European and member state bureaucracies are without any popular legitimation. 
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welfare provisions. It should be noted that welfarism is particularly present in 
Hungary with a 54 per cent rate of welfarist redistribution (that is 54 per cent 
of the GNP). Similar problems and welfarist-populist resistance to or reluctance 
to reduce welfare spending on the middle class is present in the Czech Republic 
and Poland. These three largest accession countries face considerable budget 
deficits. 
As mentioned above, popular democratic control in the post-communist 
countries will not be enhanced after accession. Moreover, and partly related to 
the emerging European decision-making process, the legacy of state socialism 
will be reinforced; namely socialist welfare dependence will be reinforced by 
the prevailing solidarity culture of the Union. The Union is programmed to 
promote welfare as the source or precondition of European homogeneity. This 
will have perverse effects in many new member states. The prevailing inherited 
attitude of the majority of the population in the new member states is that the 
State should provide all sorts of services for free, irrespective of individual 
contribution and need assessment. (Needless to say this may not correspond to 
the principle of social solidarity even though it may not be in conflict with the 
European practices that emerge in the name of social solidarity). Most political 
parties and governments have subscribed to this popular/populist attitude. This 
primitive theory of entitlements has been elevated to a theory of "subjective 
rights" in Hungary; that "theory" is voiced by government and opposition and 
sanctioned by the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.24 Social 
rights serve as the basis of government provided services, which are taken 
for granted for all citizens. The attitude is inherited from socialism—the state 
socialist system provided all sorts of services in exchange for political 
loyalty and to a great extent irrespective of merit and economic inefficiency 
consequences. The resulting inefficiencies made the state socialist system 
unsustainable. However, the welfare expectations continued to operate in 
conformity with what one could expect on the basis of the endowment effect. 
People are generally inclined to ask much more for selling a good they possess 
than they are ready to pay, if asked to buy it. People estimate very highly the 
services which were already provided, although they would be reluctant to pay 
for such services. Such attitude is generally quite irrational, especially where it 
24
 Likewise the Polish Tribunal, in the Pension cases. For Hungary, see Sajó, A.: How 
the Rule of Law Killed Welfare Reform, East European Constitutional Review, 5 (1996) 
31-41. 
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helps to maintain very inefficient and costly bureaucracies, as it is the case in 
25 
the post-communist countries (see, in particular the healthcare system). 
Endowed welfarism has proven to be quite popular. This popularity is not 
limited to Eastern Europe although richer countries may afford it more. It is a 
typical middle class attitude that favors, among others, the maintenance of 
universal services. The attitude was masterfully summarized in a dissenting 
opinion of Justice Kilényi of the Hungarian Constitutional Court."'1 Justice 
Kilényi argued that social rights are to be understood in conjunction with the 
constitutional right to social security. Social security is far more than the right to 
a social existence minimum (i.e. subsistence support). It is a constitutional right 
that pertains to all (individuals and families), "irrespective of differences in 
wealth". It includes the obligation of the state not to interfere with the material 
conditions of the citizens in a way that imposes on the masses of citizens 
burdens that are disproportionate and exceed their possibilities. At the beginning 
of 1995 the Hungarian Constitutional Court repeatedly protected existing, non-
contribution based social services as statutory entitlements amounting to 
acquired rights that cannot be repealed, at least not until the recipients had 
sufficient time and opportunity to find alternative protection. The Court and, 
increasingly, most political parties accepted that general entitlements, unrelated 
to needs assessment are "subjective rights" and pertain to all. 
The social welfare dependency that is rooted in the endowment effect had 
dramatic fiscal consequences. Universal services that were inherited from 
socialism were of a nominally high quality. As a result of different populist-
electoral policies, at least some of these services were further extended after 
the collapse of state socialism. The state could not sustain these services, or 
their level (quality), except at the price of excessive taxes with negative impact 
on investment and increasing government debt that imposed increasing fiscal 
burden on economic development. At the moment when the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact became a concern to the new member states and 
the governments, certain governments attempted to reduce the budget deficit. 
There was a general public outcry against any attempt to move towards a needs 
assessment based welfare system. It has to be admitted that the gross income 
of the population is HUF 1,1 m (4,000 Euros) with an average of 28 per cent 
income tax and approximately another 1 1 per cent social security tax. (Only 4 
1
 Posner argues that endowment effects are rational if the disparity reflects the unique 
character of the goods in question - unique in the sense of lacking close substitutes. This is 
certainly not the case of the welfare services which are (or would be) available on the 
market. Posner, R.: Economic Analysis of Law. 5"' edition, New York, 1999. 95. 
"
6
 26/1993 (IV.29.) AB hat. [annualized increase of pensions below inflation upheld]. 
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per cent of the taxpayers reported more than HUF 4,000.000 annual gross 
income. As long as the tax remains high (40 per cent above the 4,000 Euro 
bracket) there is no disposable income for social services and the population is 
not in the position to make informed choices, though in the given system the 
level of services deteriorates. 
It is likely that the welfare expectations attitude will be reinforced ideo-
logically in the Union. Further, to some extent such tendencies might be 
reinforced on the basis of the specific rules of the secondary legislation of the 
Union that reflect welfarist concerns but correspond to the possibilities of 
much more affluent societies. (It is a matter of conflict for the future how the 
new member states will satisfy the budget deficit, and national debt reduction, 
etc. requirements of the Euro zone.) The solidarity-inspired and other socialistic 
provisions of the Treaty/Constitution will enhance the attitude of middle class 
welfare dependence. 
The European attitude was well exemplified in draft Constitution that 
continued to enhance the idea that a high level of health protection is to be 
27 
provided under nationally determined systems as promoted by Union policies." 
To the extent that this points to an all-European standard the pressure on the 
weaker national economies to maintain free, or below market price services 
will continue. Note that the per capita health care spending in Germany exceeds 
at least sevenfold the Hungarian per capita expenditure, though in terms of the 
respective percentages of the national budgets the two countries are not funda-
mentally different. However, the Hungarian expenses are almost exclusively 
covered on the basis of a national insurance system that runs into major deficit, 
covered by the budget.2X 
I would like to illustrate the welfarist burden on the new member states 
(with the already mentioned consequences of welfare dependency reinforce-
ment and negative impacts on economic development) with a more specific 
example that originates in the secondary legislation on commercial activities. 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
27
 Art. II-35: Health care. 
Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from 
medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high 
level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of 
all Union policies and activities. 
The health care expenditure looks non-sustainable in its present system of administ-
ration based on an allegedly "acquired right". Attempts to reform the system run into the 
resistance of the well organized medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry, 
supported by the opposition of the day, claiming that any reform imposing direct costs on the 
population violates people's rights. 
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March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) requires 
that universal service be made available at "affordable price" (Article 3. 2.). 
Annex IV specifies that such duty implies averaged prices or the provision of 
specific tariff options for consumers with low incomes. The resulting loss to 
the operator has to be recovered from contributions from the other under-
takings (who will charge more to their users). I am sure that even Adam Smith 
would offer some arguments for such arrangements referring to public goods; 
modern economists would talk about positive network externalities. Further, 
solidarity might provide additional justification for such arrangements. For 
example emergency calls will be available to all. However, what are the 
implications of such logic where large numbers of the population are of low 
incomes? That the affected companies (sectors) will lose their competitivity. 
Welfarist provisions in European Union law, similar to the above mentioned 
examples are of considerable importance for reinforcing socialist mentalities 
of endowment and post-socialist welfare institutions with all the inherent 
inefficiencies, unfairness (middle class bias) and non-sustainability that it entails. 
After all, the quoted welfarist provisions of European Union law seem to 
reflect the same welfarist perspective that the national parliaments have inevitably 
accepted in response to democratic pressure. Such language and policies might 
be attributed to the self understanding of the administrative welfarist state. The 
Union's institutions and networks are not catering to welfarism and function to 
some extent as buffers against self-destructive welfarism of democracy at the 
national level. Nevertheless, the comprehensive language of the Union seems 
to mimic what would have resulted from traditional popular representative 
democracy. This may not be decisive where particular policies are left to 
independent networks without a welfare-oriented redistributive mission. It 
should be added quickly that all this is intended to indicate a possible trend 
only, a trend that at this moment is undermined by at least three facts. Firstly, 
the Union does not have much power of direct reallocation as this remains 
within the budgetary powers of national parliaments. Secondly, the transfers 
of the Union are certainly and perversly redistributive (see CAP). Thirdly, there 
are genuine efforts to recreate representative government or a network of 
representative governments at the Union level that might respond to (or resist) 
the same redistributionist democratic impulses that characterize national 
parliaments. 
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The purpose of this study is to describe the role played by company law in the 
codifications of civil and commercial law during the 19th century, with 
special attention to the models of uniform regulation on certain forms of 
company and to the general characteristics of different legal institutions as 
covered by company law. 
1. General features of the codification of company law 
The efforts at the codification of company law in the 19th century created a 
fundamentally new situation in legal development in this field of law. The 
adoption of related codes generally ran parallel to uniform regulations on 
commercial law, with company law forming part of commercial law and 
representing a special province thereof. 
Assistant Professor, Loránd Eötvös University, Faculty of Legal and Administrative 
Sciences, Department of Roman Law, Ft—1053 Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3 . 
E-mail: istvan.sandor@kelemen-lawf1nn.hu 
214 ISTVÁN SÁNDOR 
At the end of the 19th century private law was no longer confined to civil 
law as traditionally understood, to regulating the exclusive daily relations of 
private persons and families, but comprised the general domain of the law of 
organizations as well.1 The joint stock company form may be said to have 
generally emerged in the 19th century, which was also marked by the appear-
ance of limited liability companies, cooperatives and associations. The general 
economic reasons for the full development of the joint stock company lay 
primarily in the fact that economic life called for an organization with assets 
of its own, where members' interests were independently transferable and mem-
bers' rights in the company were linked to their shares, while their liability for 
the company's debts was limited. 
In the Middle Ages the predecessors of the joint stock company were 
companies licensed by certain royal prerogatives and established chiefly in 
response to the legal and organizational needs of carrying on trade with remote 
countries. As against this, a new factor in the 19th century was represented by 
those new economic sectors which, emerging as a result of the industrial 
revolution, needed rather great amounts of capital and included—among other 
things—the establishment of railway companies in the 1830s and 1840s and of 
certain financing institutions such as banks. There were two ways open to 
bolstering these industries, namely financing through loans and devising an 
organization whose members were those persons who secured the necessary 
capital for the given activity and whose interests thus obtained in then company 
were embodied in shares. 
Of course, partnerships (associations of persons) retained a role along with 
other companies (pooling capital), so the unlimited or general partnership (offene 
Handelsgesellschaft) and the limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft) 
continued in existence. Their disadvantage vis-à-vis capital pooling companies is 
to seek in the members' underlying unlimited liability and the limited trans-
ferability of their interests in case of change in members. Limited partnerships 
in Germany represented, mainly in the period preceding industrialization, a 
frequent form of company, the number of whose limited or silent partners often 
became considerable. This process led to the foundation of partnerships limited 
by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien). Legal regulation was similar 
in England, but known to England law was only the form equivalent to the 
unlimited partnership (partnership), limited partnerships not appearing until 
later, early in the 20th century. 
1
 Coing, H.: Europäisches Privatrecht. I. Älteres Gemeines Recht (1500 bis 1800). 
München, 1985. 95. 
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A great breakthrough in regulations on company law at the legislative level 
was marked by the adoption of the French Code de commerce in 1807. The 
French Code was the first to regulate the different forms of company on a 
comprehensive scale at the legislative level. Accordingly it was that Code, 
which set an example for the codification of company law in all states during the 
19th century. It is necessary to underline basically two main features of the 
Code de commerce. Already known to it were the so-called capital-pooling 
company and two types thereof, the joint stock company and the partnership 
limited by shares. Art 38 of the Code de commerce regulated the latter jointly 
with limited partnerships, with the exception that the provisions on limited 
partnerships were applicable as supporting rules. It should also be mentioned, 
however, that in the case of joint stock companies Art. 39 of the French Code 
followed the concession principle, meaning that the foundation of joint stock 
companies was subject to government permission. That arrangement was an 
intermediate solution, for it represented progress in comparison with the 
establishment of companies formerly based on royal privileges, while it did not 
grant private persons a full right of association, the main reason being the 
requirement to afford appropriate legal protection for creditors and shareholders. 
The société anonyme was given legal coverage by the third part of the 
French code. This amounted to raising to the level of written law the general 
practice of to hundred years preceding the Code. The relevant rules covered, 
inter alia, the stated capital of a fixed amount and its division into shares of a 
specified equal value (Art. 34), limited liability enunciated as a basic principle 
and limitations on cash contributions by shareholders (Art. 33), the appearance 
of the company under a firm name, with the obligation to use the mark "Corp." 
and the transferability of bearer shares and registered shares embodying the 
company's rights (Arts. 35-36). A revolutionary innovation was represented by 
the introduction of the concession system (Arts. 37, 40 and 45), which replaced 
the octroi system and is to be treated as an achievement by proclaiming at the 
statutory level the freedom of enterprise resulting from the French civil 
revolution. As it appears in the French Code de commerce, the joint stock 
company clearly separated the functions of the persons figuring in the name 
of the company (mandataires), who were eligible for a specified period and 
were recallable, and those of the general meeting representing the totality of 
shareholders. 
As regards the legal regulation of the joint stock company by the Code de 
commerce, emphasis should also be laid on the fact that Art. 33 of the Code 
provided for a limited liability of shareholders, while permitting the issue of 
bearer and registered shares (Arts. 35-36) and laying down various rules on 
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transfer of such shares. Concerning the organization of the joint stock company, 
the Code de commerce applied the rules for the contract of agency in accordance 
with the fact that the company was represented by the so-called administrateurs, 
who personally bore no liability to third persons for contracts made on behalf of 
the company as such contracts contained obligations solely for the company. In 
addition, the Code laid down no further rules on the shareholders' status and 
their representation at the meeting, which were left to the articles of association 
to regulate. The foundation of a joint stock company was regarded by Art. 40 of 
the Code de commerce as an act under public law (acte public),' and the French 
Code contained several provisions for the protection of persons in contractual 
relations with the joint stock company, which is ample proof that the société 
anonyme is to be deemed a limited liability company, a capital-pooling company 
rather that an association of persons. 
From the 1820s joint stock companies grew considerably in number in 
France and Belgium and from 1840 in Germany as well. In conformity with 
the French regulation, the concession principle became general in European 
legislation on companies, and the state authorities granting licence accordingly 
devised a set of general rules under which registration of companies was 
accepted and which were called normative regulations in Prussia. The French 
regulation was followed sooner or later by similar codes in all states of Europe. 
- The foundation of companies possessing juristic personality can be traced to the rules 
of Roman law in several aspects. "There is thus here a basis for the 'concession' theory of 
corporations, i.e. that they can only have personality by a creative act of the State, and 
Savigny, one of the chief exponents of this theory, held in fact that there are two separate 
rules. One was that the formation of an association without permission was an offence, 
though this rule only applied when the association was or might become harmful; the other, 
more important and still valid inn the modern law, that no association whatever could 
become a legal person without public authorization." Jolowicz, H. F.: Roman Foundations of 
Modern Law. Oxford, 1957. 131. 
3
 See, e.g., Wetboek van Koophandel (1838), Art. 36 ss.; Gesetz Über die Aktien-
gesellschaften, 9.11.1843; GS für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten 1843, Nr. 31. 341 ss.; 
Act for the registration, Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies, 5.9.1844. 7 
& 8 Vict. C. 110; Act for the Incorporation, Regulation and Winding-up of Trading 
Companies and Other Associations (Companies Act), 7.8.1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89; Loi sur 
les sociétés, 24.7.1867, Bulletin des Lois 1867. 94 ss.; Gesetz betr. Die Kommanditengesell-
schaften auf Aktien und Aktiengesellschaften, 11.6.1870, BGBL Des Norddeutschen Bundes 
1870, Nr. 21.375 ss.; Loi contenant le titre IX, livre I" du code de commerce relatif aux 
sociétés, 18.5.1873, Pasinomie 1873, Nr. 157. 150 ss.; Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht 
(aOR 1881), Art. 612 ss.; Codice di commercio 1882, art. 121 ss.; Código de comercio 1885, 
art. 151 ss.; Loi modifiant la loi du 18 mai 1873 sur les sociétés commerciales, 22.5.1866, 
Pasinomie 1866, Nr. 156. 259 ss.; Código commercial 1888, art. 162 ss.; Verordnung, 
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The regulations on joint stock companies in Germany required a longer 
process, which included a comprehensive codification on joint stock companies 
(the Joint Stock companies Act) in Prussia.4 That Act contained no concrete 
provisions for the internal organization of joint stock companies, only Art. 19 
thereof stating that the board of directors (Vorstand) must act on behalf of the 
company and its following articles specifying the powers of the board of 
directors. The primary importance of the Act was manifest in declaring the 
joint stock company to be a legal entity capable of acquiring immovable 
property on its own behalf (Arts. 8-9) and undertaking obligations concerning 
bills of exchange. This can be attributed chiefly to the influence of Savigny, who 
was Minister of Legislation in the Prussian cabinet at the time. 
This was followed by a tum in the German law of joint stock company when, 
as a result of the revolution of 1848, the Government included Camphauesen 
as Prime Minister and Hansemann as Minister of Finance who abrogated the 
previous regulation and introduced the concession system leading to a significant 
increase in the number of joint stock companies. By that time it had also become 
a general practice for joint stock companies to form three main organs, notably 
the board of directors, the general meeting and the supervisory board (Ver-
waltungsrat or Aufsichtsrat). The rules on joint stock companies accordingly 
became generally applicable, so the ADHGB—when adopted in 1861 — 
witnessed an uniform regulation in the whole territory of Germany. That Code 
followed the concession system, from which however, the different states were 
allowed to make exceptions (Art. 249). The board of directors (Vorstand, Art. 
227), the general meeting (Art. 224) and the supervisory board (Art. 225), which 
was optional, became mandatory organs of the joint stock companies. Art. 224 
(2) states that each share represented one vote, entitling the holder to attend the 
company's general meeting, an organ vested with considerably enlarged powers. 
The ADHGB was clearly indicatory of a democratic tendency in the history of 
the German company law. 
In England as in Germany and France, the process of development from the 
octroi system to the concession system in the field of company law can be 
attributed not only to economic, but also to political factors. Companies in the 
England of the Middle Ages were established by royal charters or Acts of 
Parliament. Along with such companies there operated companies under the 
common law, which were to be regarded as unincorporated companies. The 
20.9.1899, mit welcher ein Regulativ für die Errichtung und Umbildung von Aktiengesell-
schaften auf dem Gebiete der Industrie und des Handels verlautbart wird (Aktienregulativ), 
Reichsgesetzblatt. 1899, Nr. 1755.839-858. 
4
 Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften vom 9. Nov. 1843. 
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latter were first considered invalid, but came to be recognized later, subject, 
however, to members bearing unlimited liability. The so-called Bubble Act of 
1720 prevented the establishment of such companies, and then in the 19th 
century (1856, 1857 and 1862) there were adopted several statutes dealing with 
the English law of joint stock company. The reasons for the time-lag between 
the English codification and the German and French codifications were not only 
political and economic, but are also to be sought in the distinctive feature of 
English law, which is to be seen as a basically uncodified law. This not with 
standing, the 18th century witnessed efforts at regulation of some provinces of 
company law by the so-called Trent Navigation Act (1766), the Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act (1845) and the Railway Clauses Act. The Bubble Act 
was repealed in 1825, thus opening the road to the free development of joint 
stock companies. At the same time, development in that direction bolstered 
speculative designs again, a reason why the obligation of companies to be 
incorporated became inevitable in 1826 and was also written into a statute in 
1844. As regards the organization of companies, the establishment of the general 
meeting as the chief organ of the company's direction became general during 
that period. 
The aforesaid general tendencies described, we shall now review the codifi-
cations and their results in some countries of the west European region. 
2. France 
In connection with joint slock companies it may be emphasized that in French 
law joint stock companies were regulated neither by the Ordonnance du 
commerce of 1673 nor by other general statutes. Establishment of joint stock 
companies was subject to ad hoc royal decrees, as is best exemplified by the 
emergence of companies trading with colonies and developing under the 
influence of Colbert (e.g. Compagnie des Indes occidentals, Compagnie des 
Indes orientales). In the case of those companies a large part of states capital was 
made available by the ruler himself. During that period joint stock companies 
were seen as an exceptional means to attain general goals of public interest, for 
which it was allowed to pool the necessary capital.2 
It was one of the aims of the Great French revolution to abolish the guild 
system, for guilds represented privileges deriving from feudal mentality. That 
Koberg, P.: Die Entstehung des Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Deutschland 
und Frankreich unter Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung des deutschen und französichen 
Gesellschaftsrecht. Köln, 1992. 217. 
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aim was achieved by the "le Chapelier" Act of 1791 granting every French 
citizen the freedom of enterprise subject to payment of business tax. Interest-
ingly, however, although the "class of merchants" had been abolished, the 
commercial law related to it remained in existence, together with commercial 
adjudication redolent of by-gone days and old-time privileges. 
The period of the French revolution was witness to the adoption of several 
statutes in rapid succession, such as the Decrees of 2 January 1791 and 24 
August 1793, the former restricting the foundation of joint stock companies and 
the latter prohibiting the formation of different associations whose capital was 
embodied in bearer shares or similar securities and whose establishment was 
subject to consent of the state. A decree of 1793 prohibited the foundation of joint 
stock companies and ordered the dissolution of existing ones.6 On 20 November 
1795 there were passed a number of statutes which again permitted the foun-
dation of joint stock companies without regulating in any way the organi-
zational structure and the activities thereof.7 These aspects were accordingly 
left to legal practice to govern. 
On 3 April 1801 Bonaparte appointed a committee of seven members to 
frame the Code de commerce. Applicable from 1 January 1808, the uniform 
Code, adopted as five different statutes and consisting of four books (modelled 
on the Code civil: I. Commerce in general; II. Maritime trade; III. Bankruptcy; 
IV. Commercial adjudication), numbered 648 articles. 
The Code de commerce of 1807 was the first European commercial code, 
which—although making allowance for the provisions of the Ordonnance du 
commerce of 23 March 1673, i.e. the work of Colbert—is to be regarded, in 
view of its significance, as a work influenced by early economic liberalism. In 
the first part of the 19th century the Code de commerce served as an example for 
all states in respect of modern commercial legislation. Its elaboration started in 
1801 in the committee set up by the Conseil d'État, in 1806 there were formulated 
separate codes, which were then incorporated in the Code de commerce of 15 
ь
 The reason is to seek in that the companies operating with royal permission belonged 
to the relics of the Ancien Régime and old royal privileges and were thus contrary to the 
republican ideas. Santuari, A.: The Joint Stock Company in Nineteenth Century England and 
France: 'Kinf v Dodd' and the 'Code de Commerce.' Journal of Legal History 14 (1993), 44. 
7
 This was necessary in order to provide appropriate frameworks for the continuing 
operation of trade, with the freedom of entwrprise now guaranteed. Santuari: op. cit., 44. 
8
 Zachariä von Lingenthal, К. E. (Carl Croma): Handbuch des Französichen Zivilrechts. 
1. Freiburg, 1984. 66. For a detailed analysis of the codification by the Code de commerce, 
see Mrs. Nagy Szegváry, К.: Jog és gazdaság (Law and Economy), Budapest, 2001. 46. et 
seq., and for its impact on the codification of the German commercial law see Mrs. Nagy: op. 
cit., 67 et seq. 
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September 1807. Effective from 1808, the Code practically regulated three forms 
of company: general partnership, limited partnership, or partnership limited by 
shares as a special type thereof, and joint stock company. Its particular relevance 
for legal history lies in the fact that the common roots of West European 
regulations on commercial and hence on company law can be traced to this 
Code for the most part.9 Its provisions were applied directly or indirectly in 
Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Poland, and in several non-
European countries such as Egypt and South American states. Special emphasis 
should be laid on the Italian Codice de commercio of 31 October 1882, the 
Spanish Código de comercio of 30 May 1829, and the Portuguese Codigo 
commercial of 18 September 1833. 
The Code de commerce consisted of four books and 648 articles, and its part 
dealing with company law regulated four forms of company, namely general 
partnership, limited partnership, partnership limited by shares, and joint stock 
company. 
The general partnership (société en nom collectif, SNC) was one founded by 
two or more members conducting commercial transactions under the same 
name, with members bearing personal liability jointly and severally for the 
company's debts (Co. Art. 20). Joint and several liability is practically the line 
of demarcation from the French civil-law society (société civile, Cc. Arts. 1832-
1873), where—in the case of simple civil-law societies—members' liability was 
unlimited, but could be determined in proportion to their shares. The foundation 
of a general partnership was subject to a written contract and to compliance with 
the requirements of publicity, which meant the requirement for a copy of the 
signed articles of association, original and certified by a notary public, to be 
deposited with the local court (justice de paix) and with the commercial court 
(tribunal de commerce). However, judicial practice disallowed inspection of 
such document by anyone.'" In connection with the amendment of 1867 it is to 
be stressed that Art. 56 made it mandatory for an excerpt of the articles of 
association to be published in an official journal (Journal d'annonces légals), 
such excerpt to indicate the names of members, the company's name and 
domicile, the provisions on management, the company's capital, commencement 
and duration, the company's registration with the court, and the abbreviation or 
name referring to the type of company. In addition to the Act of 1867 On 
д 
"Bei Beratung des Code de commerce schwechte der Gedanke vor, ein 'droit commun 
de l'Europe' zu schaffen. Dies entsprach der welternhernden Politik Frankreichs, die nicht so 
auf Rechtsausgleichung, als auf Rechtsverdrängung ausging." Lehmann, K.: Lehrbuch des 
Handelsrechts. 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1912. 24. 
Koberg: op. cit. 200. 
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publicity, the acts of 1819 (18 March) and of 1820 (26 June) on trade registry 
required the court of the company's domicile to keep a trade register of those 
companies which had their registered office in their area of operation. 
The general partnership was an association of persons, but it possessed juristic 
personality under the French law and was therefore entitled to be a member of 
another general partnership." Unless otherwise provided by the articles of 
association, all members had the right to act on behalf of the company, while the 
right of representation was transferable to specified members or even to third 
persons. The members of the company bore subsidiary liability for its debts. In 
the 19th century the general partnership was one of the most popular forms of 
company, its percentage practically amounting to 75, with no significant change 
observed in this respect in France until the introduction of the limited liability 
company.12 
Another significant form of partnership in France was the limited partnership 
(.société en commandite SC), which was established by articles of association 
with one or more members bearing personal joint and several liability for the 
company's debts; the members were general partners (associé solidaire, 
commandité), and there were also one or more persons as limited partners 
(commanditaires, associé en commandite) joining the company as providers of 
capital (bailleur de fonds). The company was named after the general partners, 
and the names of limited partners could not figure in the company's name (cc. 
Art. 25). The company's management and representation were reserved for the 
general partners in accordance with the rules on general partnerships. The 
general partners' right of representation could not be limited except by the 
articles of association. The company's representative was liable under the rules 
on agency to the company's members for any damage caused in the exercise of 
his right of representation. The limited partners' liability was limited to making 
available to the company the amounts of cash contribution undertaken in the 
articles of association (Cc. Art.26). It should be mentioned that in the articles of 
association the parties could also stipulate that the company must pay interest to 
limited partners on their contributions in case the company obtained little 
profit. Limited partners were excluded from the company's management and 
representation. 
The first legislation on simple limited partnership (société en commandite 
simple, SCS) was the Ordonnance du commerce of 1673, which demarcated the 
'
1
 Koberg: op. cit., 201. 
12
 Koberg: op. cit., 202. 
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general partnership front the simple partnership, then called société générale, 
in para. 4 of Art. I. The Code cle commerce of 1807 introduced several new 
elements in the regulation on limited partnerships, prescribing that the firm must 
have a name of its own, or subjecting limited partnerships, too, to the rules on 
general partnerships. This was followed by two minor amendments in respect of 
limited partnerships: the Act of 17 July 1856, which amended Arts. 51-63 of the 
Code de commerce and governed settlement of disputes concerning the legal 
relations of the company, and the Act of 6 May 1863 amending Arts. 27-28 of 
the Code de commerce. No statute required the limited partnerships to set up a 
supervisory board, but the possibility was left open of doing so. 
There were no antecedents to the Code de commerce (Art. 38) incorporating 
the partnership limited by shares (société en commandite par actions) as a new 
form of company. In respect of such partnership the division of stated capital 
into shares was governed by the rules on joint stock companies, and other 
aspects by the rules on limited partnerships. This form of company was included 
in the Code at the request of various economic organizations, courts and 
chambers, since the first draft of the Code de commerce was to cover but one 
form of joint stock company, the formation of which was subject to state 
permission, but in the case of partnership limited by shares no further request 
was needed because it was compensated by the personal liability of general 
partners on the ground that shares could be issued without concession, thereby 
securing the necessary capital for the operation of the company. In the first part 
of the 19th century the partnership limited by shares became a significant 
vehicle for economic development, but it also naturally entailed transactions 
seeking profit derived from foundation and speculation. Abuses of such type 
reached quite large proportions during the 1830s and 1840s. The collapse of 
speculative businesses prompted the government to draft a bill in 1836-37 to 
abolish that form of company. However, the committee which had been set up to 
reform the relevant statute framed a bill that was to limit the transferability of 
the shares of partnerships limited by shares by allowing the issue of registered 
shares only, but the bill was not debated in the Parliament. 
Thus it was the Code cle commerce which regulated the joint stock company 
at the legislative level for the first time.14 The joint stock company (société 
anonyme) was covered by Art. II of the Code. According to the relevant rules, 
13
 The general partnership was legislatively governed by the Code Savary for the first 
time, and its designation was changed to société en nom collectif in the Code de commerce. 
14
 The Code de commerce, too, made the foundation of joint stock companies subject to 
the consent of Parliament, thereby seeking to compensate possible abuses resultant from 
companies operating with limited liability. Santuari: op. cit., 45. 
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the joint stock company appeared in commercial transactions under its own 
name, which was not allowed to contain the name of any shareholder, but was 
required to refer to the main object of the company (Cc. Arts. 29-30). The 
joint stock company was represented by mandataries (mandataires) who were 
elected for a specified period and were recallable. The representatives were not 
required to hold shares and were entitled to perform their function either without 
compensation or for a consideration (Cc. Art. 31). They were liable to the 
company under the rules on agency for any damage caused within the scope of 
management and bore no personal or joint and several liability to third parties 
(Cc. Art. 32). The shareholders were liable for the company's debts to the amount 
of their contributions (Cc. Art. 33). The stated capital could also be divided into 
bearer shares and transfer thereof was subject to assignment or, in the case of 
registered shares, to inscription in the book of share (Cc. Arts. 35-36). The 
foundation of joint stock companies was subject to a public document (acte 
public) and state authorization (autorisation) (Ce. Arts. 37 and 40). 
Various decrees on state authorization laid down the rules for procedure. The 
Decree of 23 December 1807 was the first to specify the substantive elements of 
the charter required for the grant of permission. The Decree was later 
supplemented by detailed provisions on 22 October 1817, 11 July 1818 and 9 
April 1819. The relevant rules on authorization may be summed up as follows. 
The founders of a joint stock company were required to present a petition 
(petition) to the local perfect (pré fe t ) and the petition had to be signed by all 
shareholders, with the foundation document drawn up in a notarial document to 
be annexed thereto, and the prefect gave an expert opinion (avis motive) thereon 
and forwarded it and the annex thereto to the Minister of the Interior (Ministre 
de I Interieur), the expert opinion to contain a prognosis of whether the 
economic goal to be achieved by shareholders was appropriate and whether the 
financial strength of the company was acceptable. As a first step, the Ministry's 
Internal Trade Department (Bureau du Commerce Interieur) considered the 
petition before transmitting its decision to the home Affairs and commercial 
Committee of the Council of State (Comité de l 'intérieur et du commerce de 
Conseil d'État). The Committee stated its opinion on the material and returned 
it again to the ministry. This draft was then approved by a resolution of the 
Emperor, the king or the President, which was published after signature in the 
trade journals (Bulletin des Lois and Moniteur).15 That rather detailed and 
complicated procedure was needed because the joint stock company was a 
necessary tool of developing modem undertakings capable of representing 
appropriate strength in both public and private spheres, and practically that was 
13
 For a full treatment of the procedure for authorization, see Koberg: op. cit., 218 et seq. 
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the only course of action in specific areas (e.g. railway construction, canalisation). 
At the same time, however, the joint stock company had the drawback that the 
personal liability of entrepreneurs became limited, whereby the creditors' 
interests could be damaged and room was left for speculation. Nevertheless, the 
complicated procedure for authorization raised an obstacle to the spread of joint 
stock companies as the foundation of a company took a period of 12 to 18 
months.16 
3. Efforts at codification in Italy 
The French code de commerce was received in full into Italy during the rule of 
Napoleon early in the 19th century. The Codice di commercio was enacted on 25 
June 1865 and put into force on 1 January 1866, following the concession 
17 
system. 
The Codice di commercio of 1865 was basically patterned on the Piémont 
regulation of 1842 (Codice Alberttino), which, on the other hand, was based to a 
considerable extent on the Napoleonic Commercial Code.18 That Act disallowed 
stipulation of advantages for founders and prohibited the foundation of a joint 
stock company if four fifths of the capital were not subscribed and one tenth was 
not paid up. 
The Code was not a significant work,14 so MANCINI was entrusted in 1869 
with elaborating a new commercial code. The called Progetto preliminare was 
published in 1872. Thereafter, on 6 October 1876 and on 26 May 1877, a new 
committee on codification was set up by departmental order. Its draft was 
adopted by the Senate on 27 March 1882 and was promulgated as a statute on 2 
April 1882. Then the legislative text revised by the committee, and the new 
Codice di commercio came into being on 31 October 1882 and entered into 
force on 1 January 1883, remaining applicable until the entry into force of the 
Codice civile in 1942.20 
16
 Koberg: op. cit., 220. 
17
 Calisse, C.: A History of Italian Law. New York, 1969. 
Pfenninger, I.: Die Begriffe Imperenditore, Impresa und Azienda im italienischen 
Codice Civile von 1942. Diss. Diessenhofen, 1979, 33. 
1
 ' "Der Codice von 1865 war kein ausgereiftes Gesetzgebungswerk." Mittermaier: Das 
italienische Handelsgesetzbuch vom Jahre 1882. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 
und Wirtschaftsrecht 29 (1884), 132. 
Calisse: op. cit., 504. 
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That Act introduced the normative system, probably under the influence of 
the French Act of 24 July 1867, and the British-type supervision was replaced 
by provision for publicity on the English model.21 The need for a reform arose in 
the wake of World War One; there appeared certain proposals (1922, 1925, 
1934), the law-decree of 24 July 1936 was issued on the supervisory board 
0collegio sindicale), and the Codice civile became effective in 1942. 
4. Spain 
The close of the 19th century ushered in a new era of international commercial 
law, in which the pre-existing commercial law of European merchants had ties 
with a trade or judicial customary law and resulted in the codification of 
divergent urban statute laws. In Spain that process began in 1797, when King 
Carlos IV ordered the elaboration of a uniform Spanish commercial code. It was 
not accidental that the need for it crystallized at the time of the French 
Revolution, the ideas of which brought great influence to bear on regulations on 
commercial law as well, for it was that period which saw the switch from the 
subjective system of commercial law (the law of the status of merchants) to the 
objective system of commercial law. The adoption of the Spanish Civil Code 
and Commercial Code in the period was another determinant factor in Spanish 
codification. It was under the influence thereof that the Constitution of Spanish 
provided for the unification of law in the whole territory of the country. Also 
implying the need for the elaboration of a uniform commercial code, which took 
place in various committees in different periods depending on political struggles 
and different political conditions. It was the irony of history that the uniform 
commercial code was adopted under the rule of King Fernando VII, who was 
expressly Francophobe, in no way supporting the French currents of thought, 
and was also opposed to the European efforts at codification. Still, the 
commercial code was framed, chiefly by Pedro Sainz de Andino (1786-1863), 
who was able to accomplish that goal even in the obtaining unfavourable 
political situation. Sainz de Andino can be considered to have been a prominent 
jurist and even more an excellent merchant, who recognized the dominant trends 
and elaborated the Spanish commercial code in keeping with the needs of 
modern economic life, having regard mainly to the achievements of the French 
21
 Mittermaier: Die italienische Handelsgesetzgebung. Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 11 (1868), 314 et seq., and Mittermaier: das italienische 
Handelsgesetzbuch vom Jahre 1882, 132 et seq. 
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DD law." In that activity he was supported by Luis Lopez Ballesteros the Minister 
of Finance, also a man of a wide intellectual horizon. Their efforts resulted in 
framing a draft commercial code in 1827. Then King Fernando VII set up a 
committee to work out a counterdraft;23 its draft was confined to laying down 
the general principles in brief terms as against Sainz de Andino's draft, which 
was detailed and practical. Fernando VII himself read both drafts and, on 31 
May 1829, decided to accept the work of Sainz de Andino,24 Then, on 5 May 
1929, he issued a royal decree approving the commercial code with effect from 
1 January 1831. At the same time he ordered the particular commercial laws and 
all previous decrees to lose effect on that date. 
The Código de comercio (1829) contained 1219 articles and consisted of five 
books. The first book regulated the rights of merchants and commercial agents; 
the second book covered commercial contracts in general, i.e., their form and 
scope of application; the third book governed maritime trade; the fourth book 
was concerned with bankruptcy law; and the fifth book laid down the procedural 
rules. In its substance Sainz de Andino was guided by the French Code de 
commerce in many respects, particularly in the law of obligations, as the second 
and fourth books of the Code followed the subject areas of the Code de 
commerce. In addition, the Code comprised the traditional Spanish law, such as 
the Consulado del Mar, the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, the Castilian law, and in the 
maritime law it had regard to the Italian theories, while giving special 
consideration to the influence of the Prussian law.25 Compared with the French 
model, the Spanish commercial code was considerably more thorough and gave 
a more detailed regulation. This is true particularly of commercial contracts, in 
respect of which Sainz de Andino formulated detailed rules for sale, exchange, 
loans and credits as well. 
The greatest importance of the Código de comercio to legal history consisted 
in being the first in the world to introduce the trade register and the registration 
of firms. 
In respect of company law the Code followed the French trichotomy, 
distinguishing the general partnership (compania regular coledtiva), the limited 
partnership (compania en comandita) and the joint stock company (compania 
""Coing, H. (Hgg.): Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neuen europäischen 
Privatrechtsgeschichte. III/3, München, 1988. 3475. 
" Löher. B.—Peuser, W.—Reichmann, A.: Spanisches Handelsgesetzbuch. Codigo de 
Comercio. I. Frankfurt, 1984. 5. 
4
 Sainz de Andino's draft contained 1219 articles against 887 articles of the other draft. 
Coing: Handbuch... op. cit., III/3. 3475. 
" Löber—Peuser—Reichmann: op. cit., 6. 
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anónima) and permitting the establishment of partnership limited by shares 
(Art. 275). The Code cushioned the rigour of the French concession system, 
prescribing only the permission of the local commercial authority (tribunal de 
comercio del territorio) and requiring no royal consent to the company's 
foundation (Art. 294).26 
Although the Spanish commercial Code of 1829 received the highest 
professional recognition, it was discovered soon after its entry into force that the 
commercial transactions governed by it did not embrace all areas of economic 
life, and the changing political life of Spain revealed new aspect that were not 
covered in the Code. This led, in the years that followed, to the adoption of 
numerous supplementary statutes and to the preparation of a new programme for 
the elaboration of a completely new commercial code. As early as the 1830s, the 
procedural rules of the fifth book were found to call for additional provisions. 
Therefore, on 24 July 1830, there was adopted a comprehensive Act on 
procedure regulating commercial transactions and, on 10 September 1831, an 
Act establishing the stock exchange in Madrid. Both Acts can be considered to 
have been the constructs of Sainz de Andino. 
The 1840s and 1850s saw a detailed regulation on company law process 
beginning on 28 January 1848 with the adoption of the Joint Stock Companies 
Act, which was followed by the Credit Societies Act of 28 January 1856 and the 
Mining Companies act of 6 July 1859. In the meantime, the Act establishing the 
Spanish National Bank (Banco de Espana) was adopted on 28 January 1856. 
The close of the 1860s witnessed a liberal turn in the territory of Spain, with 
efforts directed towards reforming the commercial law in its foundations. On 12 
January 1869, legislation allowed the establishment of stock exchanges beside 
the Stock Exchange of Madrid, and the Act of 16 October 1869 liberalized the 
foundation of trading companies, allowing free establishment thereof, which had 
previously been subject to state authorization. As has been noted, efforts were 
being made at elaborating a new uniform commercial code during this period, 
and there were set up several committees for that purpose. The first such 
committee had started working in 1834, and another was set up in 1839 to 
prepare a complete draft, which was not adopted, however. In 1869, concurrently 
with the liberalization of commercial law, the state expressed a strong will to 
"
6
 Sainz de Andino justified the mitigation by the fact that, given its losses connected 
with the colonies, the Spanish economy had considerably weakened and was therefore in 
need of urgent influx of foreign capital. Coing: Handbuch... op. cit. П1/3. 3479. However, 
considering that the system left room for abuses in practice, the Act of 28 January 1848 on 
joint stock companies returned to the former concession system in Spain. Coing: 
Handbuch... op. cit. III/3, 3483. 
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have the commercial law recodified. On 20 May 1869 the committee set up in 
1858 for that purpose were accordingly dissolved and the main principles 
governing the preparation of a new code were determined. A new committee 
was set up to do the work. Making slow progress but working with great care 
and precaution for 11 years, it produced by 1880 a draft stamped with the name 
of Minister of Justice Manuel Alonso Martinez. Revised by a new committee, 
the draft was submitted to the Spanish Parliament (Cortes), which, after its 
consideration thereof, adopted it on 22 August 1885 and put it into force on 1 
January 1886. 
The main task during the elaboration of the Cócligo de comercio of 1885 
was to adapt the commercial law to the economic and political trends that had 
emerged and changed since the Code of 1829,27 the result being that, for all 
practical purposes, the structure of the Act of 1829 was also followed by the 
Act of 1885, which, however, divided the material of law into only four books, 
since the Spanish law of procedure had in the meantime been reformed to give a 
uniform regulation, thus eliminating the need for the fifth book. The substantive 
law retained several elements of Sainz de Andino's work, particularly in the 
field of maritime law, while the Code included a great number of new legal 
norms, such as rules of the stock exchange law, the bank law and the company 
law. The introduction of the normative system was seen as a significant step 
in respect of company law. The trichotomy of company forms remained un-
changed. 
5. Portugal 
The Código commercial Portugues, framed by José Ferreira Borges, was 
adopted on 9 September 1833, four years after the Spanish Commercial Code 
constituting its prototype.29 The Code consisted of two parts, the first concerned 
with overland trade in three books and the second dealing with maritime trade. 
Chapter XII of the first part contained provisions on company law, beginning 
with general rules and laying down special rules on different companies. The 
Código was familiar with the joint stock company called companhia de 
commercio, the foundation of which was subject to concession. Also know were 
the sociedade com firma, the equivalent of general partnership, and the silent 
"
7
 Löber—Peuser—Reichmann: op. cit., 8. 
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 Fora full discussion see Coing: Handbuch. III/3. 3487. 
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partnership (sociedade tacita) as well as the parceria mercantil, the rules on 
which applied to limited partnerships, too. 
This Portuguese Commercial Code of 18 September 1833 was elaborated on 
the basis of foreign commercial laws, inclusive of the British. 
The committee set up by a royal decree was working from 1850 to 1859 to 
frame a civil code, its draft (Código Civil Portugués) was then revised by a 
separate committee of 10 members from 1860 to 1865 and submitted to the 
Parliament in November 1865. Following long debates in the committee, the 
revised draft was adopted by both chambers in July 1867. Thus, Act 213 (Diario 
do Govemo Nr.213) adopting the Portuguese Civil code was passed on 1 July 
1867. On 22 March 1868 the Portuguese Civil Code became effective in the 
Kingdom of Portugal and the surrounding islands, the Azores and Madeira. The 
Code consisted of 2538 articles and was divided into four parts. The First part 
(Arts. 1-358) regulated legal capacity iv civil law and the second part (Árts. 
358-2166) governed the law of inheritance and was divided into 3 books, the 
first dealing with basic rights, the second with acquisition of rights with third-
party involvement, and the third with acquisition of rights through action. The 
third part (Arts. 2167-2360) covered the law of property and the fourth part 
(Arts. 2361-2538) contained provision on wrongs and restitution or damages in 
two books, the first concerned with civil-law liability and the second with 
compensation of damage. 
Work preparatory to a new Portuguese commercial code began in 1868 with 
the participation of judges, jurists and different scientific organizations. The 
draft was considered by both Houses of Parliament in 1887 and in Marc 1888, 
respectively, and was finally adopted in June 1888. Thus the Portuguese 
Commercial Code (Código Commercial Portuguese) of 28 June 1888 came into 
being and was put into effect by the royal decree of 23 August 1888 (Diario do 
Governo Nr. 203), becoming operative in Portugal and the surrounding islands 
as from 1 January 1889. On 20 February 1894 the application of the Code was 
extended to the Portuguese colonies and oversea possessions. The Commercial 
Code consisted of 749 articles and was divided into four books, the first (Arts. 
1-95) regulating commerce in general, the second (Arts. 96-484) dealing with 
special commercial transactions, the third (Arts. 486-691) governing maritime 
trade, and the fourth (Arts. 692-749) concerned with bankruptcy. The first 
book contained provisions on merchants, who were persons capable of 
concluding commercial transactions and operating commercial businesses. 
Trading companies were also covered. An association or a legal person having 
no economic goal was not deemed to be a trading company. Interestingly, where 
a husband was to start a business without his wife's consent, the presumption 
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was that both consorts participated in the business. The wife was not entitled to 
start a business without the husband's consent, such permission to be included in 
the official document. Similarly, the wife was not entitled to participate in a 
commercial business except with the husband's consent even if her liability 
would have been limited. Art. 18 required merchants to manage a firm, keep a 
book, make the necessary notifications in the trade register and draw up a 
balance sheet. Foreign companies wishing to engage in business activities in 
Portugal were required to obtain a certificate from the Portuguese consul to the 
effect that their operation was in conformity with their own law and they carried 
on business activities lawfully. In actual fact, the company law was to be found 
in Arts. 104-150 of the Code. 
Know to the Code were the general partnership (sociedcide en поте 
colectivo), the limited partnership (sociedcide em commandita) and the joint 
stock company (sociadade anónyma). The Code maintained the normative 
system introduced in 1867 and covered the board of directors (direccao) and the 
supervisory board (conseille fiscal) as institutions of the joint stock company. As 
under the Act of 1867, the cooperatives (socieclades cooperatives) did not 
constitute an independent trading company, but were held to represent a mixture 
of rules on the three types of company. This Code no longer regarded the silent 
partnership as a trading company, but considered it to be a mere contractual 
formation.0 
Similarly known to the Commercial Code were the general partnership 
(sociedade em поте colectivo, Arts. 151-161), the joint stock company (sociedcide 
anónyma, Arts 162-198), the limited partnership (cociedacle em commandita, 
Arts. 199-206), the cooperatives (sociedades coopératives, Arts. 207-223) , the 
silent partnership (conta em participée, Arts. 224-229), and the enterprise 
(empresa, Art. 230). 
In its main features the joint stock company law showed similarity to the 
German law. Thus, the system of 1833 established for the foundation of 
companies was subjected to government. The Portuguese Act of 22 June 1867 
prescribed registration (Arts. 162-165), just as the new Commercial Code did, 
excepting the banks, where Art. 18 of the Act of 3 April 1896 required separate 
permission of the government. In like manner, the foundation of joint stock 
companies intending to acquire immovable property for a period longer than 10 
years was made subject to government permission. The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry kept a special register of firms along with the trade register. The chief 
organs of the company were the board of directors, the supervisory board and 
the general meeting, either ordinary or extraordinary. In respect of limited 
30
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partnerships it should be noted that they could he either simple limited partner-
ship or joint stock companies. 
6. Greece 
The Code de Commerce was introduced in Greece in 1821 during the war of 
independence and was ratified by the constituent National Assembly. Thereafter 
the Commercial Code was taken over in official translation by the Decree of 19 
April 1835. Originally being the French Code de commerce, it consisted of four 
books. The first three books were available in Greek translation, but the fourth 
was replaced by the Decree of 2 May 1835 introducing the commercial courts." 
•yy 
That Code gave no new regulation, for, as Von Mauer writes, the French 
Commercial Code had been applied in Greek territory before the revolution. The 
Code de commerce contained references to the Code civil as well, since they 
were elaborated at the same time, and they referred, in the places concerned, to 
the Greek-Byzantine law in Greece, i.e. the Greek law was the subsidiary body 
of law.33 According to Rokas, this gave rise to a fundamental problem between 
the substance of the civil and the commercial law,34 for, on the French model, 
the civil law was supplementary to the commercial law in Greece, too. 
Initially the courts applied the Code civil as the underlying regulation. The 
first to do so was a court of Syros Island in 1827, but given that such application 
of law would have led to an indirect introduction of the French Code civil, the 
courts began to apply the Roman Byzantine law. They more or less followed the 
French law in respect of partnerships as well. General and limited partnerships 
were trading companies (as their goal was commercial), both being regarded as 
legal persons. On the French model, the partnership was invalid in relation to 
third persons when the obligation for publicity was disregarded, but once the 
firm was already in operation, this rule was to apply ex nunc. Partnership 
31
 The Code was published in German and Greek in the official gazette, as was the case 
with every Greek statute at the time. 
""Schon vor der Revolution ... dasselbe (d.h. das französische HGB) von denn 
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Griechenland in Gebrauch gekommen (ist)." Maurer, G. L. von: Das griechische Volk. 
Heidelberg, 1835. 164. 
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between husband and wife was null and void,'8 but the Greek interpretation was 
somewhat different. 
7. The Netherlands 
Following the revolution of 1795, there arose a need for codification, with no 
results achieved until after the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
in 1806, and the Code civil was introduced in the Netherlands on 1 May 1809. 
After the attainment of independence in 1813 the various codes remained in 
effect until the national codification of 1838. During that period four codes were 
of decisive importance, namely the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, the Codes 
of Civil and Criminal Procedure, and the code of Judicial Procedure. Modelled 
on the French law, the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetback. BW) was composed of 
four books concerned with persons, things, obligations and evidence, and 
prescription. 
The Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel, WvK), following the 
French model but exhibiting several independent features, was adopted on 1 
October 1838. It consisted of three books, the first covering commerce in 
general, the second legal relations connected with navigation, and the third 
concerned with bankruptcy law in general. The first two books constituted no 
special law but were a part of civil law, especially of the law of contracts. 
The first book regulated the trading company, the general partnership 
(vennootschap onder eene firma), the limited partnership (vetmootschap bij 
wijze van geldschieting v. commanditaire vennootschap), the joint stock company 
(naamloze vennootschhap), the cheque, the bearer security, and the insurance 
contract. The second book governed shipping contracts regardless of whether 
they were made between merchants. The cooperatives were introduced by a 
separate Act of 1876, which was modified in 1925. 
The Dutch WvK was introduced in Indonesia on 1 May 1848. Its rules 
applied first to the European population of Indonesia and were gradually 
extended to the Asian population in 1855 and 1917. The WvK was subsidiary to 
the Data Law in respect of natives in case the latter did not cover some aspects 
(e.g. cheque and bill of exchange) or natives voluntary subjected themselves 
thereto. 
17
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8. Belgium 
Following its separation from the Netherlands, Belgium gained independence on 
4 October 1830. Before that date the two countries were linked by the Treaty of 
London from 20 June 1814 and were under French jurisdiction from 2 June 
1794 (the battle at Fleurus). The French statutes were the central elements of 
Belgian legislation. Art. 138 of the Belgian Constitution of 5 February 1831 
repealed the regulations inconsistent with the Constitution and upheld the 
rest. Belgium adopted and upheld the French Code civil and the Code de 
commerce, albeit with partial modifications by special statutes. The Commercial 
Code consisted of four books, the first governing commercial status, the second 
regulating merchants' contracts of marriage, the third covering commercial 
book-keeping, and the fourth regulating commercial transactions. The founda-
tion of companies was subject to public authorization, depending not only on 
observance of law, but also on whether the foundation was of general benefit. 
It was in the second part of the 19th century that the form of joint stock 
company acquired significance in Belgium, owing chiefly to the freedom of 
trade and enterprise recognized by the Act of 1791, which was passed on 2 
March and put into force on 17 march. The French Code de commerce 1807 was 
also effective in Belgium during the 19th century. It required official consent to 
the foundation of companies. As regards the société anonyme, it is necessary to 
emphasize that members of this type of company bore no liability for the 
company's debts.36 In contrast to the joint stock company, the foundation of a 
partnership limited by shares was not subject to official consent, because in its 
case there was a member, the general partner, who was personally liable with his 
entire property for the company's debts. It was due to the possibility of founda-
tion without official consent that merchants gave preference, as often as not, to 
partnerships limited by shares. It is important to note that in connection with the 
foundation of joint stock companies the state investigated not only the company's 
compliance with statutory provisions, but also whether its foundation served the 
general good, the company was viable and its organization was not designed in a 
way likely to prejudice the interests of its members or of third persons. 
Within the framework of a comprehensive reform, the third chapter in the 
first book of the Napoleonic Code was replaced by a new regulation of 18 May 
1873, which was still applicable in the 20th century (1964) to joint stock 
companies; it scrapped the requirement for preliminary official permission and 
introduced the normative system. There were two limitations on foundation, 
It will be noted here that formerly the société anonyme had been the equivalent of the 
silent partnership. 
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notably the founders' liability and publicity of foundation. As that too large 
freedom of foundation led to abuses, it came to be regulated by partial rules, 
such as the Act of 26 December 1881 on the authenticity of the balance sheet 
and on profit and loss; under it, unauthenticity of the balance sheet incurred 
criminal responsibility. The Act of 22 May 1886 covered flaws and inadequacies 
resulting in the company's nullity. The Act of 25 May 1913 contained rules on 
contributions in kind seeking to avoid overestimate, as well as on issue of shares 
and the general meeting. Royal Decree No. 26 of 26 October 1934 modified 
exercise of shareholders' rights in general meeting, while royal Decree No. 185 
of 9 July 1935 established control over the issue and public sale of shares, while 
introducing the form of limited liability company and allowing establishment of 
silent partnerships. 
Replacing the Napoleonic Code de commerce, a new Act of 18 May 1873 
changed the system of foundation subjected to public authorization and can still 
be seen as the basic legislation on the Belgian joint stock company law. Under 
it, the foundation of a joint stock company was not conditional on official 
consent, with the freedom of foundation becoming general and made subject to 
meeting but two conditions, namely the founder's liability and the publicity of 
the foundation document. Since the freedom of foundation naturally left room 
for very frequent abuses, a new Act of 26 December 1881 regulated the balance 
sheet and laid down rules on the distribution of loss and profit. It was followed 
by Act of 22 May 1886 on joint stock companies (see the amendment act), which 
regulated the founders' liability in cases where the foundation of a company 
proved to be invalid for some reason. These rules governed the founders' 
liability with greater rigour and in greater detail. The second amendment act on 
joint stock companies, passed in 1913, contained rules mainly on creditors' 
protection and considerably stricter provisions on publicity.37 
9. Germany 
With the disintegration and demise of the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning 
of the 19th century, the various German states adopted differing legal regulations. 
Such differences in the domain of civil law can be said to have been of great 
dimension in German territory early in the 19th century.38 During that period the 
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Prussian territory was governed by the ALR of 1794, the code resulting from the 
codification led by High Chancellor Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, 
which contained the first comprehensive rules of commercial law in the territories 
controlled by German law. The ALR was chiefly grounded on municipal laws 
and showed little evidence of the influence of the Ordonnance du commerce 
(1673), since its sections dealing with commercial law rested mostly on the 
former Prussian legislation of Brandenburg.39 The second part of ALR covered 
commercial law, its 7th chapter governing company law (Von Handlungsgesell-
schaften). In Austria the ABGB of 1811 was in force at the time, but it did not 
affect commercial law. In the Rhine territory the Code civil and the Code de 
commerce continued in force even after the war of independence. Baden was 
under the control of the Code civil, its annex being applicable as a commercial 
act (Von den Handelsgesetzen)-, it can be deemed to have been a version of the 
Code de commerce as revised by Baden. Bavaria was controlled by the ins 
commune and, in this respect as well, primarily by the Codex Maximilianeus 
bavaricus Civilis of 1756, while Württemberg was likewise under the control of 
the ius commune and the Württembergisches Landrecht (1610). At the Congress 
of Vienna the German federation expressed the need for a codification of 
regulations by the German states in the domain of civil law, but Metternich 
insisted on strengthening the sovereignty of individual states. As against this, the 
Peace Treaty of Paris of 20 November 1815 laid down that the independent 
German states were not to do anything but enter into a federal union, so, in 
1815, the endeavours to establish united German states failed to produce the 
necessary result, notably unity. At that time, therefore, one can only speak of a 
federation of states in German territory, which lacked powers to legislate 
uniform regulations in the field of civil law. Although under art. 6 of the Treaty 
of Federation it was possible to achieve uniform regulations in pursuance of 
general goals (Gemeinnützige Anordnungen), Art. 64 of the Treaty provided for 
enactment of legislations in the individual member states. 
The first initiative for drafting a uniform commercial law for the whole of 
Germany was taken after the German war of independence, which lasted until 
1813-14. The first draft commercial code was prepared by a committee which 
Imperial Minister of Justice Wohl had set up in November 1848.40 The members 
des französischen, englischen, amerikanischen und schweizerischen Rechts. Europäische 
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of the committee were Widenmann, Deputy Secretary of States of the Minister 
of Justice. Broicher and Grimm, judges of the Appellate Court of Cologne, and 
Professor Tirol of Rostock.41 The draft was framed under strong French influence, 
but the related efforts were discontinued on account of political events. Then, 
in 1856, the federal legislature established a committee which prepared the 
Nuremberg draft in 1861. In its resolution of 31 May 1862 the Bundesrat 
directed the federal government to ensure adoption of the draft by the individual 
states. The draft became effective in Prussia, Saxony and Nassau on 1 March 
1862 and in Hamburg on 1 May 1866, but was never brought into force in 
Limburg and Luxembourg. The constitution of the North-German federal states 
took over legislative powers in the province of commercial law and the bill of 
exchange law and, as a result, the Commercial and Bill of Exchange Code was 
adopted on 25 June 1869 and put into force on 1 January 1870. Its provisions 
that were consistent with the Constitution of the North-German federal states 
were included in the Imperial Constitution, and the ADHGB as an imperial Act 
became effective from 1 January 1871 and entered into force in Württemberg, 
Baden and Bayern with effect from 13 May 1871. The ADHGB relied heavily 
on the rules of the Code de commerce, which was most noticeable in the 
ADHGB also recognizing the status of general partnerships, limited partner-
ships and partnerships limited by shares as subject at law, albeit not as legal 
42 
persons. 
On 21 February 1856 Bavaria entrusted a committee with preparing the draft 
of a uniform German commercial code, an effort at the unification of law closely 
connected with political events. A reform of the German federal system was 
constantly on the agenda from 1855, with King Maximilian von Bayern 
similarly oriented towards a reform. 
The political controversies of German states could be attributed primarily 
to rivalisation between Austria and Prussia. Bismarck was squarely against a 
German federation and opposed any course of development based on a literal 
interpretation of the strict Treaty of Federation. His aim was to establish a non-
federal organization that was to take over any task which the Austrians wanted 
to solve with the medium-sized and small German states through the in-
41
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strumentality of a federation. This also explains why Bismarck as a Prussian 
delegate voted against the proposal presented by the Bavarians on 17 April 
1856. In doing so he stressed that he had no appropriate instructions and 
therefore requested that the records be left open. His request was motivated by 
thinking that the commercial code would otherwise be adopted even without 
Prussia. Bismarck was trying to hinder the work of the committee which had 
been set up to elaborate the code, claiming in part that it was impossible for such 
a code to be drafted by experts alone. At last, the committee was convened in 
Nuremberg on 15 January 1857, and it considered, along with the Prussian 
proposal seeking to elaborate the entire body of commercial law, the Austrian 
proposal aimed at enacting regulations on a narrower field of commercial law. In 
connection with the Prussian proposal mention should be made of an important 
antecedent thereof, that is to say that in 1814, when the Rhine province was 
annexed to Prussia, unsuccessful efforts had been made to introduce the ALR. 
Later, however, there was set up a committee attempting a revision of ALR in 
such a way as to align it with the Rhine law. Since that effort was similarly 
devoid of prospect, the Prussian focused on commercial law, first wishing to 
reshape the commercial-law part of ALR or to have it modified by basing 
themselves on the provisions of the Code de commerce. From the expert 
opinions of the chambers of commerce and of merchants it became apparent at 
that point that the Rhine merchants were more inclined towards maintaining the 
Code de commerce, while the old-time Prussian merchants preferred the ALR. 
That trend changed when a modification of commercial law was proposed in 
1845. Great importance was then attached to the Code de commerce, but 
preparatory work did not begin until 1856. This makes it understandable that 
Prussia, too, made an immediate start on the preparation of a related Act after 
Bavaria had companied the acceptance of its proposal. 
The draft was prepared on the basis of German jurisprudence and judicial 
practice and, first of all, on the examples of foreign states, including the French 
Code de commerce, as well as by drawing upon the Dutch Commercial Code of 
1838, the Spanish Commercial Code of 1829, the Frankfurt draft of 1848 
relating to a general German code, the draft commercial code of 1839 of the 
Kingdom of Württemberg, and the Austrian draft of 1849. 
The Nuremberg committee considered the first three books of the Prussian 
draft at its first meeting from 21 January to 2 July 1857 and at its second 
meeting from 15 September to 30. There were tabled several motions for an 
amendment of the second draft, and, in accordance with the committee's 
decision of 11 March 1861, the draft of a general German commercial code was 
presented to the National Assembly on 16 March. 
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The historical antecedents served as a prelude to the elaboration of a 
commercial code, since the French Code de commerce had proved the existence 
of a possibility for the codification of commercial law in that period. In terms of 
substantive law, the mentioned Code had influence to bear, through the Prussian 
draft, on the elaboration of ADHGB as well. At the same time it may be stated 
that it was not the Code de commerce that provided a basis for the elaboration of 
ADHGB as a special province of commercial law. 
The ADHGB established a distinction between trading companies and 
companies. A company founded by articles of association for the purpose of 
carrying out common economic activities was deemed to be a trading company. 
Economic activity meant engagement in commercial operations or transactions, 
the number of which was determined by ADHGB.43 The general partnership 
(Arts. 85-149), the limited partnership (Arts. 150-172) and the partnership 
limited by shares (Arts. 173-206) as well as the joint stock company (Arts. 207-
249) were known to ADHGB as trading companies. Following the reform of 1 
June 1870, partnerships limited by shares and joint stock companies were 
regarded as trading companies irrespective of the object of business. Also, silent 
partnerships (Arts. 250-265), associations formed for the purpose of keeping 
joint accounts (Vereinigung zu einzelnen Handelsgegellschaften für gemeinsame 
Rechnung, Alts.266-270) and cooperatives (Genossenschaften) belonged to the 
category of trading company. 
Within the meaning of ADHGB, the general partnership (offene Handels-
gesellschaft, OHG) was one consisting of two or more members who carried out 
commercial activities under an identical firm name and whose interests were not 
limited to a pre-established cash contribution. Members bore unlimited liability, 
joint and several, for the company's debts and obligations to the extent of their 
entire property (Art. 112). There was no formal requirement for the conclusion 
of articles of association (Art. 85 II.). The company had to be registered with the 
commercial court, which determined the members, the firm and its domicile and 
prescribed rules for representation. Accordingly it was not necessary to submit 
the full text of the articles of association. Commercial registration was public 
and open to inspection by all. The Act distinguished external and internal legal 
relations of the company. As regards internal legal relations, the rights and 
obligations of members could be determined on the basis of the freedom of 
contract, i.e. the Act contained permissive rules in this respect, whereas its 
provisions governing external legal relations were peremptory. 
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The OHG was not a legal person, its assets were separated from those of its 
members, but the company itself possessed no juristic personality. The company 
could sue and be sued under its firm name. Its character as association of 
persons was shown by the fact that the death of a member led to the termination 
of the company. The OHG could not be a member of another general partner-
ship. It bore the name of one of its members or the names of several members. 
Unless otherwise agreed upon, all members were entitled to manage the 
company and to represent it in relation to third persons. Any limitation on this 
right of representation was invalid (Art. 1 16). Members excluded from manage-
ment were entitled to be informed of the company's affairs (Art. 105). 
The regulations on the limited partnership were based on the Code de 
commerce, but the rules of ADHGB were much more precise.44 The limited 
partnership was one, which carried on commercial activities under a common 
name and whose members, one or more, were liable for the company's debts 
to the amount of their cash contributions, while the members of an OHG, one 
or more, bore full, unlimited liability for the company's debts (Art. 150). 
Accordingly the Kommanditgesellschaft, KG) was a modified version of OHG, a 
distinction of relevance to general partners. One member of a KG was a general 
partner (Komplementäre) and the other a limited partner (Kommanditist). Also in 
the case of limited partnerships, internal legal relations were governed by the 
freedom of contract, the general partner being entitled to manage and to 
represent the company. For that matter, these aspects were subject to the rules on 
OHG. At the same the Act allowed limited partners to act on the company's 
behalf in the capacity of Prokurist of commercial proxy. The limited partnership 
was not a legal person either, but was a form of company that had come to allow 
for one member's limited liability for the company's debts. 
The institution of the partnership limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft 
auf Aktien, KGaA) was also regulated by ADHGB in Arts. 173-206 based on the 
draft of the French and Prussian commercial codes of 1856. In the case of 
partnerships limited by shares the general partner were personally liable for the 
company's debts and were entitled and obliged to represent the company (Art. 
196), while the limited partners were not entitled to participate in the company's 
management, but were tied to the company more closely than would have been 
the case if they were shareholders of a joint stock company. The interests of 
limited partners were expressed in shares, which were bearer shares of a face 
value of 200 thalers each (Art. 173). Shareholders had to be inscribed in the 
company's book of share, and the shares had to be subscribed in order for the 
partnership limited by shares to be entered in the trade register (Art. 177). Where 
44
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the company's capital was composed not only of cash contributions, but also of 
contributions in kind, the first general meeting had to estimate the actual value 
of contributions in kind and the second meeting had to decide on the acceptance 
thereof (Art. 180), whereas general partners were under the control of the rules 
on limited partnerships. Partnerships limited by shares had, in addition to 
management, two more organs: the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of at least 
five members and the general meeting (Generalversammlung) of limited part-
ners. The supervisory board was concerned to control management and was 
entitled to inspect at any time the company's businesses and annual balances as 
well as the distribution of profit (Art. 194). Along with general partners it had 
the right to convene the general meeting and to control implementation of its 
resolutions (Arts. 186-187). This form of company was most popular in the 
territory of Prussia, but it never became as significant in German territory as in 
France. 
The rules of the reform Act of 1870 on partnerships limited by shares under-
went minor modifications, which affected the members of the supervisory board 
and the general partners. It is important to underline, moreover, that the 
requirement for concession was removed in the whole territory of the empire.45 
The reformed Act of 1884 on joint stock companies similarly gave a clearer 
expression, at the statutory level, to the economic differences between partner-
ships by limited by shares and joint stock companies. Seeking to prevent evasion 
of the rules on joint stock companies by choosing the form of partnership 
limited by shares, it provided that limited partners must be subject to the rules 
on joint stock companies and that general partners must have an interest of at 
least 4% if the company's stated capital was not more than DM 3 million and an 
interest of 2% if the stated capital exceeded that amount (Art. 174a). 
The rules relating to joint stock companies (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) were 
laid down in Art. 207-249 of the ADHGB of 1861. A joint stock company was a 
trading company in which all shareholders, all members, made a contribution 
and bore no personal liability for the company's debts (Art. 207). The 
company's capital was divided into shares, but no minimum amount was fixed. 
The articles of association had to be drawn up in a document certified by a 
notary public or a court and had to show the main particulars of the company, 
such as its objects, the amount of stated capital, the value and types of shares 
(bearer or registered), the major rules on the acceptance of the balance sheet, and 
on the convening of the general meeting. Bearer shares could not be issued 
4S
 It will be noted here that the partnership limited by shares had formerly been one of the 
most popular forms of company in Prussia because its liability was limited, while no 
concession was required for its foundation. 
THE PLACE AND ROLE OF COMPANY LAW. 241 
unless the full amount of stated capital per share had been paid; that amount was 
fixed at 40% for registered shares. The company had to be entered in the trade 
register (Handelsregister) as a condition for acquiring juristic personality (Art. 
213 of ADHGB). It had to establish a general meeting and a board of directors. 
Shareholders exercised their rights at the general meeting, and unless otherwise 
provided by the articles of association, each share had one vote (Art. 214 of 
ADHGB). The board of directors represented the company in concluding legal 
transactions. It was composed of one or more members, who were not required 
to hold shares and were entitled to a remuneration, were recallable at any time, 
and their right of representation in relation to third persons was not subject to 
any restriction. The members of the board of directors bore personal liability 
jointly and severally for any wrong or any contravention of the articles of 
association, particularly for payment to shareholders of dividend or interest in 
awareness of the company's insolvency (Alt. 241 of ADHGB). Under the 
ADHGB, establishment of a supervisory board was optional, but once one had 
been established, it was governed by the rules on partnerships limited by shares. 
The foundation of joint stock companies was subject to state permission (Art. 
208 of ADHGB). An exception to this rule was made by the federal states' 
statutes bringing the Code into force, as was done by cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, 
Bremen and Oldenburg, whereas Württemberg and Baden made public 
authorization compulsory for insurance companies and banks only. The 
ADHGB of 1861 relied heavily on the Prussian Joint Stock Companies Act 
of 1843.46 
In Germany the reform of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1870 broke with 
the former concession system and replaced it with the normative system. The 
previous requirement for public authorization was superseded by several new 
rules on the company's organs, publicity and liability. The minimum face value 
of each share was fixed at 50 federal thalers for registered shares and at 100 
thalers for bearer shares (Art. 207a of ADHGB). Every joint stock company was 
required to set up a supervisory board of at least there members. The general 
meeting had to ascertain whether the entire capital of the company had been 
subscribed and whether at least 10% of shares had been paid. It was at that time 
that the Act included special provisions on contributions in kind (Art. 209b of 
ADHGB). Art. 210 of ADHGB provided that the articles of association must be 
entered in the trade register and that excerpts thereof must be made public. The 
members of the supervisory board bore personal liability jointly and severally in 
cases where unlawful repayments or payments of dividends had been made with 
their knowledge and they had failed to take appropriate measures against them 
4i
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(Art. 225b). The board of directors was under obligation to make the balance 
sheet public. In addition, penal-law rules were laid down for members of the 
supervisory board and the board of directors who furnished false information for 
the trade register and the general meeting.47 
From 1873 onwards, German territories began moving towards new reforms, 
and the related endeavours led to the amendment of the Act of 1884,48 which 
sought to bring participants into closer contact with companies, create greater 
guarantees for securing stated capital, separate more sharply the workings of 
company organs and promote the performance of their functions. Another aim 
was to regulate the liability of participants. The minimum face value of shares 
was raised to DM 1,000, with departure from that amount allowed only in the 
case of joint stock companies founded for public purposes. For registered shares, 
the transfer of which was made subject to the company's consent, the face value 
was fixed at not less than DM 200. With respect to the company's registration, 
the requirement was to pay at least one fourth of stated capital against the 
previous one tenth (Art. 210 III. of ADHGB), and the company was prohibited 
from acquiring equity shares or burdening them with lien (Art. 215d of 
ADHGB). As regards foundation, the articles of association had to be signed, 
and the shares taken over, by at least five persons, such acts to be inscribed in a 
notarial or judicial document (Art. 209 of ADHGB). Art. 209h of ADHGB made 
an auditor liable to examining any contribution in kind made at the time of 
foundation. The liability of the members of the board of directors and the 
supervisory board as well as of the founder was expanded. The board of 
directors and the supervisory board were required to supervise and be liable for 
the process of foundation as well (Art. 213c of ADHGB). The liability of the 
members of the board of directors for the company's management was linked to 
the requirements of ordinary business activity and violation of those 
requirements incurred their liability to the company (Art. 241 of ADHGB). The 
same rule applied to the liability of supervisory board members. The powers of 
the general meeting were extended, and it was provided that, as a general rule, 
any matters outside the scope of competence of another organ of the company 
were amenable to decision by the general meeting. Such matters included 
modification of the articles of association, change in the structure of capital, 
election and recall of supervisory board members, acceptance of the balance 
47
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sheet and approval of specified contracts. That Act was the first to provide for 
the protection of minority shareholders' rights. Shareholders representing one 
tenth of stated capital were entitled to request the court to appoint an auditor to 
examine the company's management (Art. 222 of ADHGB). Shareholders 
representing 20% of the company's stated capital were accorded the additional 
minority right to sue members of the compensation of damage caused to the 
company by breach of duty (Art. 223 of ADHGB). Shareholders representing 
5% of stated capital were entitled to obligate the company to place the items 
they proposed on the agenda of the general meeting (Art. 237 of ADHGB). It 
was an added minority right that any shareholder was entitled to contest before 
the court any resolution of the general meeting violative of the law or contrary to 
the articles of association. 
In German law the ADHGB was the first to make a sharp distinction 
between the silent partnership (stille Gesellschaft) and the limited partnership. 
The economic goal pursued by both types of company was to ensure that 
outsiders, participating as partners contributing capital should be liable for the 
company's debts only to the amount of capital made available by them. In the 
case of silent partnership it was difficult to distinguish this form or company 
from simple loan. The ADHGB regulated the silent partnership in Arts. 250-265. 
A silent partnership was one in which a person made available capital to a 
trading company and shared in its profit and loss (Art. 250. I. of ADHGB). Such 
a company was founded by contract not subject to formal requirements (Art. 
250. II. of ADHGB) and governing only the internal legal relations of members. 
It was not required to be entered in the trade register, and silent partners (stille 
Gesellschafter) were not entitled to participate in management. The owner of the 
assets made available to the company by the silent partner became a general 
partner, and in case of the company's bankruptcy the silent partner was entitled 
to notify as creditor one half of the loss exceeding the amount of his cash 
contribution (interest) (Art. 258. I. ADHGB). The silent partner's death did not 
terminate the company, so the death of the general partner, his own bankruptcy 
or his loss of disposing capacity naturally entailed termination of the silent 
partnership (Art. 261 of ADHGB). Of course, this form of company was of 
advantage because the limited partner's liability was limited to the amount of his 
cash contribution, while he was entitled to act with powers of attorney on behalf 
of the company, conducting affairs and even concluding legal transactions. 
Thus, in effect, it was only the general partner who bore liability and personal 
risk. The advantage of the silent partnership vis-à-vis the limited partnership lay 
in that the silent partner was in a position to act as creditor in case of the 
company's bankruptcy. 
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The shipping company (Reederei) was regulated by Arts. 450-476 of 
ADHGB. A shipping company was one in which the vessel was in common 
ownership in order that the parties might undertake business on sea routes by 
keeping a joint account (Art. 456 of ADHGB). The common ownership of the 
vessel was divided into property shares. The Reederei could not be regarded 
either as a trading company or as a legal person, but was a company covered by 
commercial law. Legal relations between members were controlled by the 
articles of association (Art. 457 of ADHGB). Unless otherwise provided by the 
articles of association, each member was entitled to participate jointly in the 
company's management, members acted on the basis of joint decisions governed 
by the majority principle, while the voting rights were determined by property 
shares. Management was transferable to an outsider as well (Korrespon-
denzreeder). Members were required to meet obligations in proportion to their 
property shares (Art. 467 of ADHGB). As a general rule, it was not possible to 
repudiate a shipping company contract, but members' interests were transferable 
at any time without the consent of the other members. Where a shipowner 
(Mitreeder) went bankrupt, died or became incapable of action, such events did 
not result in the company's cessation (Art. 472 of ADHGB). Thus, the Reederei 
was a form of company which bore the typical stamps of associations of persons 
on the one hand and of capital-pooling companies on the other. The high risks 
involved in maritime trade soon came to create a demand for limitations on the 
liability of shipping company members. Accordingly, members' liability for the 
company's debts was limited to the vessel and the cargo, but it was incurred 
only if the shipowner himself was not liable, for if he was liable for his decision, 
he bore personal and unlimited liability for the company's debts. 
The ADHGB was followed by the adoption of the German Joint Stock 
Companies Act on 11 June 1870.44 The subsequent efforts at reforming the 
ADHGB were, in some aspects, treading a common path with the preparations 
for the codification of civil law as a whole, although a commitment was clearly 
expressed to the effect that a dualist regulation should be adopted in Germany.50 
A significant role in revising the ADHGB was played by Secretary of State 
Nieberding of the Imperial Ministry of Justice, who proposed a revision of 
commercial law in 1893. It was on his initiative that Eduard Hoffmann, relying 
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on the expert opinions of Bolze and Behrend, prepared the draft of a new 
commercial code consisting of 414 articles.51 The draft was debated on several 
occasions, and the questions still outstanding were settled by the ministerial 
conference of 24 October 1896, which approved the HGB on 5 November 1896. 
The Bundesrat considered the draft on 1 1 and 22 January 1897, adopting it as 
an Act. 
10. Codification of the Austrian commercial law 
The need to undertake a unification of different legal regulations by the 
codification of commercial law arose early in the 19th century.5" In 1809 the 
Royal Court of Vienna's committee on legal affairs was entrusted with preparing 
a draft commercial code. The Code was to consist of five books containing the 
rules on commerce in general, bill of exchange, maritime trade, bankruptcy, and 
the judicial system. Only two books were prepared, but neither entered into 
force. It was in 1842 that the need for codification was again brought into focus, 
and the related efforts produced in 1849 a new draft consisting of ten books and 
published under the title of Entwurf eines österreichischen Handelsrechts 
(.Zweiter Entwurf). The draft did not become an Act, but it had a significant 
influence on the dogmatics of commercial law. It was followed by the Ministry 
of Trade's draft in 1853, which was revised by the Ministry of Justice in 1855 
and presented to the ruler in 1857,54 but not adopted as an Act either. 
In the 1860s Austria could be divided into three parts in the field of 
regulations on commercial law: Dalmatia and South Tyrol under the influence of 
French law, namely the Code de commerce of 1807; the Hungarian territory 
(Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia) controlled by the commercial acts which the 
Hungarian Parliament adopted in 1839 and 1840; and the remaining Austrian 
51
 Entwurf eines Handelsgesetzbuchs für das Deutsche Reich. For a full treatment see 
Schubert, W.: Die Entstehung des Handelsgesetzbuch von 1897 (Hgg.: Schubet, W.— 
Schmiedel. H.—Krampe, C.). Frankfurt am Main, 1986. 2. 
52
 During that period the influence of French and Bavarian law was felt in South 
Tyrol and Salzburg. Hämmerle, H.—Wünsch, H.: Handelsrecht, l. Allgemeine Lehre und 
Handelsstand. 4th edition, Wien, 1990. 10. 
" For that matter, Tyrol adopted the Act on registration of firms and on trading 
companies as a separate act in that year. Randa, A. R.: Das österreichische Handelsrecht mit 
Einschluss des Genossenschafsrechtes und der Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung. I. 2nd 
edition, Wien, 1911. 7. 
54
 This draft became known as Vierter Entwurf in the pertinent literature. Hämmerle— 
Wünsch: op. cit., 11. 
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territories, where special statutes and decrees governing partial fields of law 
were in effect.55 
In the meantime, the codification of commercial law was similarly under 
way in the German territories and produced the ADHGB, which was put into 
force with some modifications in Austria as in other countries.56 The 
commercial code was composed of four books, the first covering the status of 
merchants, the second regulating trading companies, the third governing silent 
and accidental partnerships, and the fourth concerned with commercial trans-
actions. 
During World War One the need arose for a modification of the commercial 
code, and Professor PISKO drew up a draft in 1920 aimed at the unification of 
commercial law in the German Empire and therefore based mainly on the rules 
of the German HGB of 1897. The draft was not adopted, but the period under 
discussion was marked by the enactment of several special statutes such as those 
regulating shares in 1899 and introducing the limited liability company (GmbH) 
in 1906. For the known political reasons Austria adopted the German HGB of 
1897 in 1928. 
11. Switzerland 
In the middle of the 19th century the intensity of industry and trade cut across 
the cantonal frameworks so strongly as to call for removal of commercial law 
barriers between the cantons. Creation and transformation of the necessary legal 
environment became a social demand also felt at the government level. In 
constituent assemblies the governments of the cantons of Bern and Solothurn 
proposed, as early as 1848, the unification of penal law, the law of penal 
procedure and commercial law as well as the centralization of commercial 
adjudication, but the Constitution of 1848 did not authorized the federal 
legislature to adopt such an act.57 
55
 Randa: op. cit., 6. 
56
 The Austrian commercial code was named Allgemeines Handelsbuch and did not 
comprise maritime law Hämmerle—Wünsch: op. cit., 12. It is to be noted here that this 
Austrian commercial code, resting on the ADHGB, served as a basis for the elaboration of 
Hungary's Commercial Code XXXVII of 1875, although the Hungarian Code showed 
several differences as it did not include, e.g., the partnership limited by shares and the silent 
partnership. For a full discussion see Randa: op. cit., 10. 
57
 For more detail see E. Huber: System und Geschichte des Schweizerischen Privat-
rechts. I-IV. Basel, 1893. 202. et seq. 
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On 17 January 1854 an intercantonal conference chaired by Blösch (a 
member of the Government of the Canton of Bern) met with the participation 
58 
of 13 cantons to make preparations for a uniform regulation on the bill of 
exchange law, although the more distant goal of unifying commercial law was 
already of topical interest at the time. Emanuel Burckhardt-Fiirstenberger, a 
jurist of Basel, drew up the draft, which was considered by a committee5" and 
was modified in several aspects. The draft on bill of exchange law thus prepared 
reflected German influence in the first place, since Burckhardt-Fiirstenberger 
relied on the example of the Allgemeine Deutsche Wechselordnung of 1847, but 
he effected numerous structural and substantive changes (e.g. in respect of 
procedure and enforcement concerning the bill of exchange law). The cantons 
participating in the conference reached no agreement on the acceptance of the 
draft, because each canton demanded major modifications.60 
A renewed effort at codification was motivated by the adoption of the 
Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB) of 1861.61 As was stressed 
by Staehelin,6" the government of the Canton of Bern was specifically 
influenced by this Act in entrusting Professor Walter Munzinger61 and Edouard 
Carlin in July 1861 with framing a commercial code for the Canton of Bern. 
Concurrently with the preparations for the cantonal codification of Bern, the 
federal government sought expert opinion from three professors of law,64 
The conference was attended by representatives of the cantons of Ziirich, Bern Luzern, 
Freibourg, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, Graubünden, Aargau, Thurgau, Waadt, Wallis and 
Neuchâtel as well of the city of Basel. 
54
 Blösch, Adolf Burckhardt, a banker of Basel, and Emanuel Burckhardt-Fiirstenberger 
were members of the committee. 
60
 It will be noted here that several cantons such as Aargau, Solothum, Bern, Luzern and 
Schaffhausen drew upon this draft for framing their own cantonal bills on exchange law. 
M
 The adoption of ADHGB was instrumental in the unification of law in Germany, for 
most of the German Bünde gave it legal effect between 1861 and 1868. 
'"Staehelin, A.: der Entwurf eines schweizerischen Handelsrechts von 1864. In: 
Hundert Jahre Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht (Hgg. Peter, H.—Stark, E. W.—Tercier, P.). 
Freiburg, 1982. 35. 
63
 Walther Munzinger (1830-1873) was the son of a liberal Landamman of Solothum, 
brother of Werner Munzinger Paschka, a known African explorer. After the family had 
moved to Bem, he began to read law in that city and also studied in Paris and Berlin. From 
1857 he was teaching commercial and exchange law, German private law and Swiss 
constitutional law at the University of Bern. He was professor from 1863. 
14
 DUBS, a member of the federal government, had previously requested the expert 
opinion of Heinrich Fick concerning the possibility and desirability of elaborating a uniform 
commercial and exchange law for Switzerland. 
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notably Walther Munzinger, Heinrich Fick65 and Emanuel Burckhardt-Fürsten-
berger. The prominent Swiss jurists in commercial jurisprudence were requested 
to identify the legislative enactments on commercial law in the different cantons, 
the advantages and disadvantages of unifying commercial law at the federal 
level, the possible content of such a commercial code and the changes which the 
adoption of the code would entail in the judicial system. 
Munzinger and Fick thought that unification was possible by widening the 
scope of PGB, while Burckhardt- Fiirstenberger proposed adoption of the 
ADHGB. The federal legislature took it into account that Munzinger was already 
working on a code of commercial law and that his expert opinion was shared 
by its representatives. Therefore, on 22 August 1862, it entrusted him with 
elaborating a body of uniform commercial and exchange law for Switzerland. 
His draft was considered by an expert committee (consisting of DUBS, Emanuel 
Burckhardt-Fürstenberger, Edouard Carlin, Heinrich Fick and Charles Friedrich, 
a member of the Ständerat) at two sittings (between 23 and 30 November 1863 
and between 25 and 31 January 1864). The draft was modified and supple-
mented in several aspects, and its final version was prepared in German in June 
1864 and then translated into French by Friedrich. 
Munzinger's draft bill consisted of five books and 492 articles. In elaborating 
the parts on commercial law and the law of obligations Munzinger kept in view 
the provisions of ADHGB and PGB in the first place, while relying to a lesser 
extent on the Allgemeine Deutsche Wechselordnung and the bill of exchange 
codes of the Swiss cantons for formulating the rules of exchange law. 
The first book (von dem Handelsstand) governed the legal status of merchants 
and such legal institutions as the trade register, the trading company, the 
business book, the powers to register firms (prokura), the commercial power of 
attorney and the commercial broker. The second book (von den Handelsgesell-
schaften) regulated trading companies like the general partnership (Kollektiv-
gesellschaft), the limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft), the partnership 
limited by shares (Kommanditaktiengesellschaft) and the joint stock company 
(Aktiengesellschaft). The third book (von Geschäftern des Mobiliarverkehrs) 
contained contact-law rules, including general provisions on the capacity to 
contract, the making of contract, the place and time of performance, stipulation 
of interest, acquisition of property by legal transactions, retention (retentio) and 
the like as well as special rules on contracts, such as those governing sale, 
65
 Heinrich Fick was the son of a high-ranking state official of Hessen. He took his 
doctoral degree and was qualified as a lecturer at Marburg, where he was later elected mayor, 
but, given his liberal views, his post was not approved by the government of Hessen. 
Thereafter, from 1851, he was professor at the Law School of Zürich. 
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agency, forwarding, insurance, exchange, and issue of orders for payment. 
Furthermore, it included special rules such as conflict rules applicable to 
contracts between subjects at law in different cantons (e.g. Art. 205 governed 
the capacity to contract of citizens of another canton). The fourth book (von dem 
kaufmännischen Konkurse) laid down the rules of substantive law relating to 
bankruptcy proceedings. The fifth book (von der Kassation und Urteilsfällung 
durch das Bundesgericht) determined the jurisdiction of federal courts in matters 
of commercial law. 
The third book of the draft outlined a mixed system of civil and commercial 
law rules, which were incorporated in a single code, for this book contained 
provisions applicable to merchants and non-merchants alike, but gave prominence 
to the special rules of commercial law expressly governing commercial 
transactions only.6'' With this legal-technical solution of codification Munzinger 
followed the PGB of Zürich, in which Bluntschli covered commercial contracts 
as part of contract law on the ground that commercial law was nothing else than 
a part of the law of contracts.67 The draft met a favourable reception among the 
jurists of the day, with its precise and intelligible system and notions praised by, 
e.g., Albert Schneider (1836-1904), professor of Zürich, Wilhelm Endemann 
(1825-1899), professor of Jena and Bonn, Levin Goldschmidt, a jurist in 
German commercial law, and Bluntschli.68 At the same time, Andreas Heusler 
(1834-1921), one of the best known and most acknowledged jurists of 
Switzerland of the day, strongly criticized, in a study of 115 pages, every detail 
of the draft, chiefly because, in his view, the time had not yet come for 
Such provisions expressly applicable only to merchants covered, e.g., the maximum 
rate of interest, merchants' right of retention (retentio), and pledge. 
67
 "Es ist nun Anderes als ein Stück Obligationenrecht und zwar dasjenige Stück, das 
vornehmlich für den handelsmännischen Verkehr von Bedeutung und darum bedürftig und 
fähig ist." Munzinger, W.: Motive zu dem Entwürfe eines schweizerischen Hadelsrechts. 
Bern, 1865. 11, fn. 39. Quoted from Staehelin. Staehelin: op. cit., 43. 
hS
 The Swiss "popular feeling" demanded that in everyday life the law should be 
intellectually accessible even to simple merchants, should not be alienated from the people, 
as it saw the préfiguration of a police state in any overregulation. With that in mind, 
legislation should be simple, brief and understandable. Güggen-Bühl argued against 
overregulation when he wrote: "Dem Richter soll die Regel gegeben werden, aber die 
Ausnahme kann und darf nicht durch den Gesetzgeber normiert werden. Der Richter soll ... 
in einzelnen das Recht erkennen, er soll die rechte Regel anwenden, die rechte Ausnahme 
finden." Guggenbuhl: Die Entstehung des zürcherischen privatrechtlichen Gesetzbuches. 
Zürich, 1924. Quoted by Schlegelberger, F. (Hgg.): Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch 
für das Zivil- und Handelsrecht des In- und Auslandes. I—VI. Berlin, 1929,1. 228. 
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commercial law to be governed by a uniform code in Switzerland.64 The federal 
legislature did not vote for the draft bill, because, as was pointed out previously, 
the Swiss Constitution of 1848 did not authorize the Bundesversammlung to 
adopt such an Act. 
At the intercantonal conference on 4 July 1868 the government's 
representative stressed the need for the Confederation to adopt a uniform code of 
contract law. The task of elaborating such a code was assigned to Munzinger.70  
Concurrently a committee of six members was set up to support the work of 
codification. One year later the committee gave opinion on the parts of the draft 
already prepared (the general part and the contract of sale) and then, early in 
1871, on the first complete draft. The drafters of OR followed the model of the 
important European codes of the time, such as the French Code civil and the 
ABGB. and relied on the traditions of Roman law as preserved in the science of 
the German pandects. In addition, the Dresden draft of 1866 (Dresdner 
Entwurf)11 regulating questions of liability, the Bayerischer Gesetzentwurf über 
die Rechtsgeschäfte und Schuldverhältnisse, the Hessen-Darmstädtischer Entwurf 
and für das Königreich Sachsen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch exerted a great 
influence and served as important source-material.7" 
The thorough revision in 1874 of the Constitution removed the obstacles 
to the federal legislature adopting a code of contract law, which comprised 
commercial and exchange law as well. Art. 64 of the 1874 Constitution 
authorized the federal legislature to frame such a code.73 The German and 
French texts of the draft were first published in 1877. The draft was considered 
69 
For more detail see Staehelin: op. cit.. 40. 
™ After the death of Munzinger, Heinrich Fick continued and completed the elaboration 
of the code, and the draft underwent a profound change under the impact of German law. See 
Stolleis, M. (Hgg.): Juristen. Ein biografisches Lexikon. Von der Antike zum 20. Jahrhundert. 
München, 1995. 446. 
1
 The drafters of OK took over some 400 articles from the Dresdner Entwurf; Schneider 
and Fick made some 240 references to the bill in their commentaries. See H.-P. Benöhr: 
der Dresdner Entwurf von 1866 und das schweizerische Obligationanrecht von 1881. 
Motivationen der Redaktoren und Lösungen in den Kodifikationen. In: Peter. H.—Stark, E. 
W.—Tercier, P. (Hgg.): Hundert Jahre Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht. Freiburg, 1982. 
59 et seq. 
7
" For more detail see Merz, H.: Das schweizerische Obligationenrecht von 1881. Über-
nommenes und Eigenständiges. In: Hundert Jahre Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, op. 
cit. 10. 
73
 "Dem Bund steht die Gesetzgebung zu: ...über alle auf den Handel und Mobiliarver-
kehr bezüglichen Rechtsverhältnisse (Obligationenrecht, mit Integriff des Handels- und 
Wechselrechts)", Bundesverfassung 64. §. 
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in several committees, was finally passed by the Bundesversammlung on 14 
June 1881 and entered into force on 1 January 1883. 
Its system being unique, the code was referred to as code unique in the 
pertinent literature. It gave a uniform regulation on both civil and commercial 
law unlike, e.g., the French model of regulation, where the Code civil as lex 
generalis and the Code de commerce as lex specialis represented a dualist 
model. On the other hand, the code unique showed many points of similarity to 
the PGB, which was basically applicable to both merchants and non-merchants, 
while some of its special provisions revealed differences in respect to merchants, 
the reason being that the special regulation on the situation of certain social 
segments (i.e. merchants) was not in accord with the "democratic feelings" of 
the Swiss people. 
That system of the code of contract law, its structure being contrary to the 
contemporary European trend and resulting in the monism of civil and 
commercial law, was traced by Eugen Bucher 4 to disagreements between the 
Swiss federalists and centralists, since the Swiss cantons wishing to continue 
functioning in a loose confederation were interested in preventing a uniform 
regulation and therefore the most they agreed to was the unification of 
commercial law, which was becoming of vital importance to economic life. The 
centralist cantons supporting a strongly centralized political system set the aim 
of achieving the full unification of Swiss law, and they did attain that aim by 
amending the Constitution in 1898. The said monism of the code, however, 
could in no way be seen as a protest against the French system,75 as was also 
stressed by Bacher E, but it merely pointed up the Swiss political constellation 
of the day,76 as was also reflected in Art. 64 of the 1874 Constitution. 
74
 Bucher, E.: Der Einfluss des französischen Code Civil auf das Obligationenrecht. In: 
Caaroni, P. (Hgg.): Das Obligationenrecht 1883-1893. Berner Ringvorlesung zum Jubiläum 
des schweizerischen Obligationenrechts. Stuttgart, 1984. 144. 
75
 This is borne out in particular by Bucher's study clearly indicating those rules in the 
Swiss code of contract law that were identical, often literally, with those of the French Code 
civil, influencing the OR or its drafters directly by borrowing from the Code civil or 
indirectly through the rules of the Dresdner Entwurf or the codes of some French Swiss 
cantons. 
76
 "Der Code Civil war ja die Grundlage für die kantonalen Zivilgesetzgebung der west-
und südschweizerischen Gruppe. Es versteht sich von selbst, dass Munzinger, der sich ja 
auch für französisches Recht habilitiert hatte, bei Ausarbeitung des aOR schon deswegen 
stark auf französisches Zivilrecht (Code civil, Code de commerce) zurückgreifen musste, um 
das Gesetz auch für die französischrechtlichen beeinflussten Kantone konsensfähig zu 
machen." Kramer, E. A.: Die Lebenskraft des schweizerischen Obligationenrechts. Zeitschrift 
für Schweizerisches Recht 124. I. (1983), 251. Although, as was also emphasized by Kramer, 
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Another reason for a monist codification can be found in that the PGB as the 
prototype of OR likewise outlined such a system in Switzerland and that a 
similar demand was formulated by the Swiss people's sense of justice, as was 
voiced in the government' s committee on codification, as well.77 That legislative 
technique served to avoid a double regulation of the same daily relations, for 
which there was in fact no material basis.78 Given that Switzerland had adopted 
no separate commercial code, views were also expressed that Switzerland had 
no commercial law either.79 Oftinger held that although the Swiss law had 
indeed no set of norms embodied in a separate Act in respect of merchants, 
Switzerland did have a commercial law, for there existed special rules based on 
80 
civil law material and applicable solely to merchants. 
The 1881 code of contract law consisted of five books and 33 chapters. The 
first book comprised the general part (Allgemeiner Teil) embodying general 
rules of contract law, such as those relating to the conclusion and expiration of 
contracts, the sanctions for and the consequences of non-performance, and the 
passing of contractual rights. The second book contained special rules on 
contracts (Die einzelnen Vertragsverhältnisse), such as those governing sale, 
donation, and lease. The third book laid down the rules of company law. The 
last two books regulated the trade register, accounting and securities. The third 
chapter on trading companies followed the German commercial code and the 
amendment acts of 1871 on joint stock companies. The association ( Verein) was 
likewise regulated in those books. That legislation was followed by amendment 
acts supplementing the OR and laying down partial rules, such as the Decree of 
81 6 May 1890 introducing the trade register and the official journal of commerce. 
Munzinger was qualified as a lecturer on French law,, it was an unquestionable fact that the 
drafters of the Swiss codes of commercial law (Munzinger, Fick and Huber) belonged in their 
cast of thought to the ambit of German law. (For more detail see Kramer: op. cit., 247 et seq.) 
"Die Ablehnung eines Sondergesetzes für Kaufleute stehe »mit den demokratischen 
Gesinnung des Schweizervolkes im Zusammenhand, vermöge deren es jeder Sonderstellung 
eines Berufsstandes entschieden abgeneigt« sei." See Kramer: op. cit., 255. 
7
 It will be noted here that the current international trend is similarly moving towards 
unification (See, e.g., the Italian Codice civile of 1942 and the Hague Convention on 
International Sale). 
4
 K. Oftinger: Handelsrecht und Zivelrecht. Monismus oder Dualismus des Privatrechts 
und seiner Gesetzbücher? Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 50. (1954), 153. Oftinger refers here 
to Oser-Schönenberger's commentary on contract law, in which the authors questioned the 
existence of a Swiss commercial law. 
s
" Oftinger: op. cit., 160. 
81
 The numerous other amendment acts, or the Nebengesetze can be divided into three 
groups in terms of content, notably acts on warranty (Haftplichtgesetze), acts on industrial 
property, and acts on private insurance. 
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Eugen Huber, in evaluating the qualities of OR, emphasized that its parts 
dealing with the law of contracts rested on Roman law (e.g. the doctrine of 
error), and he confirmed that the OR was a mixture of the sciences of the 
German pandects and of the French doctrine based on the French Code civil. " 
In point of fact, Italian jurisprudence as the third "nation" of Switzerland added 
no more than the translation to the radiance of altOR, the work of Professor 
Filippo Sefarini of Pisa. Eugen Huber wrote in praise of the drafters of OR, 
because the old OR was conductive to the unification of law in the area where it 
was most needed.83 
12. England 
In 1825 in England three forms of company existed: company founded by 
royal charter, company founded by statute, and deed of settlement company.84 
During the decade after 1825 the legislators came under strong economic and 
social pressure to license the joint stock company on a general scale, or else 
unincorporated companies could have gained more ground, with their 
contradictory legal status and with the drawbacks of limitations on contractual 
liability merely under civil law.81 During that period the legislators were hesitant 
Huber cited as examples compensation for damage, the theory of bilateral contract, 
performance of contract, and the regulation on transfer of property on the French model. For 
more detail see Kaufmann, H. A.: Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht und Eugen Huber. 
In: Caroni, P. (Hgg.): Das Obligationenrecht 1883-1998. Berner Ringvorlesung zum 
Jubiläum des schweizerischen Obligationenrechts, Stuttgart, 1984. 79. 
83
 "Es sei zugleich eine »politische Tat« deren Ergebnis »Vorarbeit für ein allgemeines 
europäisches Recht« sei. " Huber quoted by Kaufmann: op. cit., 80. 
84
 For a summary of this topic, see Boyle, A. J.: The Minority Shareholder in the 
Nineteenth Century: A Study in Anglo-American Legal History. MLR 28 (1965); Buxeaunt, 
R. H.—Hopt, K. J.: Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and 
Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. Berlin, New York, 
1988; Teubner, G.: Enterprise Corporatism. New Industrial Policy and the 'Essence' of the 
Legal Person. In: EUI Working Papers, No. 87/294. Badia-Fiesolana, 11987; Tunc, A.: A 
Comparison of European and British Company Law. In: Schmitthoff, С. M. (ed.): The 
Harmonization of European Company Law. London, 1973; Sándor, I.: A; angol társasági jog 
történetének Jobb korszakai és azok jellemzői (The Main Periods of the History of British 
Company Law and Their Distinctive Features). Acta Facultatis Politico Juridicae Universitatis 
Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eörtvös Nominatae 36 ( 1997/98), 57 et seq. 
85
 "If the State had not given way, we should have had in England joint stock companies, 
unincorporated, but contracting with limited liability." Maitland quoted by Palmer's 
Company Law. London, 1996. 1011. 
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in the question of authorizing on a general scale the establishment of joint stock 
companies possessing juristic personality. In the wake of the great French 
Revolution the existence and operation of capital-pooling companies, subject to 
limitations 011 members' liability, became a necessity but,, in the light of 
previous experience, achievement of the related goal was not possible except by 
strict provisions for the protection of creditors and owners.86 Propensity to invest 
was widespread in England at the time, and it was heightened by the possibility 
of reaping enormous profit from loans to be granted to the newly emergent 
states of South America and on the insurance market.87 The firms that had not 
won royal or legislative favour could not but carry on such activities in a form of 
company possessing no juristic personality, and therefore, at the beginning of 
the 19th century, there operated in England a large number of firms that were 
88 
not legal persons but were named joint stock companies. The first step was 
taken in 1834 by the adoption of the Trading Companies Act, which ordered 
registration of the company's members, but gave no general regulation 
concerning the limitation of their liability.8" By way of experiment, there were 
introduced, on the proposal of barrister H. Bellenden Kerr and on the continental 
model, companies that could be established by royal charter (Chartered 
Companies Act, 1837), but they did not gain much ground because of the heavy 
costs they involved. 
In 1844, on the motion of Gladstone, Chairman of the Board of Trade, the 
Parliament passed the Joint Companies Act,40 which prohibited the operation of 
8h
 Radia aptly terms them "blue sky laws". "Many Securities Acts ("Blue Sky Laws"), 
designed to protect investors, have been passed. The most striking characteristic of the 
modern corporation is the severance of ownership and control." Radta, M.: Handbook of 
Anglo-American Legal History. 1936. Reprint, Florida, 1993. 482. 
87
 Hunt, С.: The development of the Business Corporation in England 1800-1867. New 
York, 1926. 30 et seq. 
88
 Hunt: op. cit., 54. 
84
 In 1818 England made an initiative to introduce the French société anonyme, but the 
Parliament rejected it. Hunt: op. cit., 52. Again, the Act of 1834 failed to introduce the 
normative system, and the process of foundation was long-drawn-out and expensive and 
remained impossible to complete in the overwhelming majority of cases. 
40
 (7 § 8 Vict. C. 110) The Act rested on three basic principles. First, it sharply 
distinguished the partnership and the joint stock company, allowing foundation of firms of 
more than 25 members or where shares were freely transferable without the consent of the 
company's other members. Second, it required nothing but the mere fact of registration for 
the foundation of a joint stock company, but the company was to engage strictly in the same 
activity for which it had been established. Third, the registrar of Companies ensured full 
publicity of the company's particulars. However, the failure of the Act to have accepted the 
members limited liability remained a drawback, and members were not exonerated from 
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unincorporated companies and was the first to permit foundation of joint stock 
companies subject to registration, thereby introducing the normative system in 
England. " Another positive novelty of the Act lay in establishing the Company 
Registrar, i.e. the register of firms. While the Act allowed the companies to 
acquire immovable property, for instance, it did not invest them with juristic 
personality representing the greatest advantage, that is, members of the company 
t 9-) . . 
remained directly liable for the company's debts. " Members were trying in vain 
to eliminate this drawback by including in the foundation document stipulations 
limitative of liability, but such stipulations were deemed invalid in relation to 
third persons. A further problem was presented by the cumbersome and 
unwieldy procedure of registration, for companies were not entered with full 
effect in the Registrar of Companies until after a preliminary, provisory 
procedure. It was only upon completion of such procedure that companies 
acquired separate juristic personality.43 The introduction of the normative system 
placed foundation of joint stock companies within reach of all, although the two-
tier system made the procedure bureaucratic.44 
In 1852 the Mercantile Law Commission was entrusted with determining the 
type of modifications necessary for the introduction of the limited liability 
company. The Commission relied on French examples and examples of the 
States of New York and Massachusetts for preparing its report of 1854 showing 
that the proposed alterations would not be of benefit to the country's general 
unlimited liability for the company's debts until after three years following alienation of 
shares. Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law. 4th edition, London, 1979. 41. 
41
 The registration of a joint stock company required at least 25 founding shareholders, 
and publicity was a requirement for the process of subscribing shares. This caused the 
registration procedure to be separated into two phases: the company was first registered 
conditionally, such registration was followed by public subscription of shares, the documents 
of subscription and the foundation document to be submitted concurrently and conjointly to 
the registry of firms, which registered the simultaneous certificate showing that at least three 
fourths of the company's stated capital had been subscribed. For that matter, the Act referred 
to this form of company as partnership in several places (e.g. sect. 25). For a detailed analysis 
of the Joint Companies Act of 1844, see Horrwitz, W.: Historical Development of Company 
Law. Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946), 376 et seq. 
92
 The introduction of limited liability had been proposed by the Hause of Commons as 
early as 1825 (Hansard XII (1825) 1284.) and then Bellenden Kerr proposed introduction of 
the société en commandite on the French model, namely the limited partnership, thus 
ensuring limited liability. 
43
 For a full treatment see Hunt: op. cit., 96 et seq. 
44
 From 1844 to 1856 there were registered 910 English and 46 Irish companies. Hunt: 
op. cit., 114. 
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economic life. '5 That notwithstanding, the House of Commons restated its case 
for progress in a resolution of that same year,'"' which eventuated in the passing 
• • 97 
of the Limited Liability Act. 
The Limited Liability Act of 1855 allowed limitation of joint stock company 
members' liability to the face value of their shares, subject to certain conditions, 
however. Thus, the company was required to have at least 25 members who had 
to own not less than three fourths of the face value of the company's capital and 
had to subscribe at least 20% of the face value of their shares; the last part of the 
company's name had to include the word Limited; and the company's auditor 
had to be approved by the Trade Commission. Further significant progress was 
made by the provision that the company's directors were not personally liable 
for their activities on behalf of the company except when, in awareness of the 
company's insolvency, they paid dividend or gave loan to members. The first 
two of the aforesaid requirements were removed by the Joint Stock Companies 
Act of February 1856,48 but the second, invented by Lord BRAMWELL, is still 
mandatory in modified form. The Limited Liability Act (1856) consolidated all 
earlier legislation on joint stock companies and, guided by the spirit of laissez-
99 
faire, ushered in a completely new era in the development of company law. Its 
essential principle was that of allowing everyone to form and operate a joint 
stock company with limited liability100 and ensuring that third persons had 
knowledge of such facts. The procedure for registration of companies became 
simplified and less expensive, the foundation document required but seven 
signatures and the charter of company could be based on the model as devised in 
43
 Horrwitz: op. cit., 379 et seq. 
46
 "That the Law of Partnership which renders every Person, who though not an 
ostensible Partner, shares the Profits of a Trading Concern, liable to the whole of the Debts, 
is unsatisfactory, and should not be so far modified as to permit Persons to contribute to the 
Capital of such Concerns on Terms of sharing their Profits, without incurring liability beyond 
a limited amount." Hansard CXXXIV (1854), 764, 800. 
47
 Furthermore, the Limited Liability Act of 1855 allowed companies founded under the 
Companies Act of 1844 and issuing shares at a face value of at least 10 English pounds each 
to bear legally limited liability. Holdsworth, W. S.: A History of English Law I-XVI. London, 
1966. XV. (2). 54. 
48
 "This Act, of 116 sections and a Schedule of tables and forms, was the first of the 
modem Companies Acts." Cower: op. cit., 48. 
44
 Horrrwitz: op. cit., 383. 
100
 Conferring limited liability on the shareholders of joint stock companies markedly 
increased propensity to invest: the companies formed between 1856 and 1862 numbered 
2.500, a figure which rose to 3.500 between 1863 and 1866. Hunt: op. cit., 143 et seq. 
THE PLACE AND ROLE OF COMPANY LAW. 257 
Table В annexed to the Act. The company was not required to pay up its capital 
before commencing business. 
In 1862 the Parliament passed the Companies Act, denominated magna carta 
of co-operative enterprise by Sir FRANCIS PALMER, which made significant 
amendments to the Act of 1856,101 containing—inter alia—the model charter in 
Table A for the first time. While the Companies Act of 1862 represented 
considerable progress, the first modem Act was the Companies (Consolidation) 
Act of 1908, which "consolidated" the 18 Acts passed since 1862. 
It was practically the Companies Act of 1862 which introduced the ultra 
IQ7 
vires doctrine in English law, " serving as a restriction chiefly to provide 
protection against abuses of limited liability."'3 That Act was the groundwork for 
company law up to 1908. Under it, the company was allowed to make contracts 
only within its scope of activities as shown in the foundation document, while 
members were not entitled to alter the foundation document in this respect even 
by unanimous decision. Subsequent legal practice widened this rule to the effect 
that payments to members were similarly allowed within the company's scope 
of activities only.1"4 English law made continuous efforts to abrogate the ultra 
vires rule, which was changed by the Companies Act of 1947 empowering 
shareholders to alter the company's scope of activities by unanimous decision 
without the consent of the court."15 The Companies Act of 1862 had the added 
merit of introducing the company limited by guarantee (provided by members), 
101
 For a full treatment see Horrwitz, W.: Company Law Reform and the 'Ultra Vires' 
Doctrine. Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946), 66 et seq.; Horrwitz: Historical Development, 
3844 et seq. 
I,L
 The ultra vires doctrine was formulated in Art. 12 of the Companies Act of 1862, 
providing that "...save as hereinafter provided in the Cas of Change of Name, no 
Alteration shall be made by any Company in the Conditions contained in its Memorandum 
of Association". This specially Anglo-Saxon rule did not apply to companies formed by 
charter. 
103
 The legislator's intent is expressed with the greatest clarity in Judge Lord Hatherley's 
judgement: "When you consider that this Act of Parliament (i.e. the Companies Act 1862) 
was passed with the view of enabling persons to carry on business on principles which 
were, up to that time, wholly unknown in the general conduct of mercantile affairs in this 
country ... it was necessary that the public, that is the persons dealing with a limited 
company, should be protected, as well as that the shareholders themselves should be 
protected." Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. (Ltd.) v Riche, 7 H. L. 684. 
104
 Horrwitz: Company Law Reform, 70. Also see Pickering, M. A.: The Company As a 
Separate Legal Entity. MLR 31 (1968), 485 et seq. 
105
 Kahn-Freund, О.: Companies Act 1947. Modern Law Reriew 11 (1948), 82. 
2 5 8 ISTVÁN SÁNDOR 
and extended its scope of applicability to insurance companies, which had 
formerly been covered by a separate Act.""' 
In addition to the introduction of limited liability, the election of an auditor 
was made mandatory to protect shareholders and creditors. Auditors came to 
play a decisive role in controlling the operation of companies.107 
Another significant change was brought about by the amendment of 1867, which 
spelled out the unlimited liability of directors and managers to the company for 
any damage caused to it by their activity. 
At the end of the 19th century the greatest weakness of company law was 
represented by misleading statements made in reports, a problem which became 
most conspicuous in the judgement rendered in the case known as Derry v. Peek 
(1889) 13 App. Cas. 337, the court holding that the directors who had furnished 
false information in the carefully prepared balance sheet were not liable for the 
damage caused thereby, provided they had acted truthfully and not fraudulently. 
That unfortunate decision was corrected by the Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 
and another Act of 1900 prescribed public registration of the company's debts in 
the balance sheet.I(IS 
13. Closing conclusions 
It may be stated in general that company law played an important role in the 
codification of commercial law during the 19th century. The leading role in 
regulations on company law was assigned to the French Code de commerce, with 
significant contributions also made by the German ADHGB, the Swiss OR, and 
the British Acts on company law, which broke new ground in some respects. 
Possibilities for formulating partial rules to govern different forms of 
company at the statutory level, thereby laying the basis for establishing the basic 
principles of a new branch of law drawing its nourishment from commercial 
law, were opened by the codifications of commercial law. No doubt that a great 
role in related efforts during that period was reserved for statutory regulations on 
companies possessing juristic personality and that the development of a 
normative system which became widely accepted on the English model can be 
said to have been of epochal significance. 
106
 Holds worth: op. cit., XV. (2), 58. 
107
 Hunt: op. cit., 140. 
102
 For a full discussion of the Company Act of 1900 see Topham, A. F.: Company Law. 
Law Quarterly Review 51 ( 1935 ), 21 1. 
THE PLACE AND ROLE OF COMPANY LAW. 259 
Of course, the company law achieving a status of its own within commercial 
law brought with it the formulation by this branch of law of its set of internal 
rules as well. Particular emphasis should be laid in this respect on the fact that 
the introduction of the normative system was primarily instrumental in the 
detailed elaboration of rules for the protection of minorities and creditors, which 
were conductive to the attainment of the foremost aims of company law in 
modern times. 
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The legal regulation of protection of environmental rights 
Environmental rights are recognized and regulated under human rights law and 
concern observance of various needs of the person in any interaction with the 
environment (nature). 
Recognition and regulation of environmental rights are the most essential 
innovations of the development of Russian legislation. It is especially important 
that environmental rights are recognized by the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation (1993). According to Art. 42. everyone shall have the right to 
favourable environment, reliable information about the state of the environment 
and compensation for damages inflicted to health or property by violation of 
environmental regulations. This scope of rights is directly related to the right to 
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work in conditions which meet safety and hygiene requirements (Art. 37), and 
to the right to health protection and medical care (Art. 41). 
Furthermore, the Constitution establishes other constitutional rights which 
stipulate proper observance and protection of environmental rights. According to 
Art. 29. everyone shall have the right to seek, receive, transmit, produce and 
disseminate information by any legal means. Everyone shall have the right of 
association, including the right to establish trade unions for the protection of 
their interests (Art. 30). Citizens of the Russian Federation shall also have the 
right to assemble peacefully without weapons, hold rallies, mass meetings and 
demonstrations, marches and pickets (Art. 31). Citizens of the Russian Federation 
shall also have the right of appeal in person and make individual and collective 
appeals to state bodies and bodies of local government (Art. 33). So as to 
guarantee protection of human rights and freedoms in Russia, the Constitution 
accordingly provides that everyone has the right to protect rights and freedoms 
by all means not prohibited by law (Art. 45). 
The former Soviet Constitution of the RSFSR (1978) also guaranteed the 
human right to health protection. The Constitution stipulated that this right was 
ensured in particular by measures concerning improvement of the state of the 
environment. But the state of the environment since the adoption of that 
provision has exacerbated and now it is characterized as catastrophic. The state 
of health of the citizens has accordingly worsened. The mechanism of protection 
of individual rights remained extremely weak at that time. 
The provision of the RSFSR on Protection of the Natural Environment1  
(1991) not only specifies the right of citizens to health protection from adverse 
effects incurred by the natural environment, but also stipulates a number of 
important rights of the citizens that promote its protection. In particular, it 
guarantees the citizens the right: 
a) to establish public associations, funds and other public groups for the 
purpose of environmental protection, to join such associations and funds, and 
contribute their earned income; 
b) to take part in meetings, rallies, picket lines, marches and demonstrations, 
petition drives or référendums on environmental protection, to express their 
opinion and write letters, complaints and statements concerning environmental 
protection and demand that these receive consideration; 
c) to demand that the respective organs provide prompt, full and reliable 
information about the state of the natural environment and take measures to 
protect it; 
1
 Vedomosti S'iezda narodnih deputatov Rossiiskoi Federacii i Verkhovnogo Sovieta 
Rosiiskoi Federacii, 1992. No. 10. § 457. 
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d) to demand that decisions that permit the sitting, planning, construction, 
rebuilding or operation of environmentally harmful facilities be rescinded either 
by administrative means or by court proceedings, and to demand restriction, 
suspension or termination of the operations of enterprises and other facilities 
which have negative effect on the environment and on human health; 
e) to demand prosecution of officials concerned and private citizens and 
file suit to seek compensation for damages caused to citizens' health or property 
by environmental offences (Art. 12). 
With respect to the high social and ecological danger of pollution of the 
environment by radiological sources the Federal Act on Radiation Safety of the 
Population of 9 January, 1996" also establishes a scope of rights for the 
citizens. According to Art. 22. the citizens of Russia, foreign citizens and 
persons without citizenship living in the territory of the Russian Federation 
have the right to radiation safety. The citizens and public associations also 
have the right to access to objective information from organizations which 
carry out activities with the use of sources of radiation within the limits 
concerning radiation and according to accepted measures on maintenance of 
radiation safety (Art. 23). The representatives of public associations are given 
the right to appeal to any organization which carries out activities with the use 
of radiological sources under conditions established by the law of the Russian 
Federation. According to Art. 26. the citizens have the right to compensation 
for loss of life, damages caused to their health, and (or) to compensation for 
losses caused to them. 
The Federal Act on Protection of the Rights of Consumers of 2 January, 
19963 specifies the right of consumers to education so as to protect the rights 
of consumers (Art. 3). This right is guaranteed by specification of appropriate 
requirements concerning state educational standards of both general educational 
and professional programs, and also by means of organization of a system of 
information of consumers about their rights and the necessary actions for 
protection of these rights. The act establishes another important right of the 
consumer—to safety of the goods (work, service). The consumer has the right 
that the goods (work, service) under usual conditions of their use, storage, 
transportation and utilization were safe for life and health of consumers and the 
environment, and that they did not cause damages to property. 
In the system of protection of environmental rights of the citizens, it is 
possible to distinguish rights to the use of nature, i.e. to use natural resources 
for fulfilment of various needs of the person—economic, recreational, aesthetic, 
Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rosiiskoi Federacii, 1996. No. 3. §. 141. 
3
 Ibid., 1996. No. 3. §. 140. 
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scientific or cultural. The rights of citizens to the use of nature are regulated 
broadly by the law concerning natural resources—land, water, forest, under-
ground (mineral resources) and wildlife. 
Political and legal importance of the recognition 
of environmental rights 
In the event of a critical environmental situation in the country, low efficiency 
rights has large political and legal implications. The importance of the re-
cognition and legal regulation of environmental rights is determined by 
nature protection regulations, especially, the constitutional regulation on the 
rights of the individual have in the development of modern society and state. 
According to the general theory of the rights of the person, the prerequisites of 
vital activities of people are formulated under human rights regulations, 
which objectively facilitate the functioning of the individual, the society and the 
state. 
The recognition of the person, his rights and freedoms as a supreme value 
(Ait. 2 of the Constitution) entails from political and legal aspects a change of 
approach to the relationship between the state and citizens and of guidelines for 
the activity of state bodies. Taking into account the lact that the powers ol the 
bodies of legislative, executive and judicial authority in a law-based state originate 
in the rights of the person and citizen, recognizing a priority of the rights of the 
person means that when adopting new law, making administrative and judicial 
decisions, it is not the interest of the state, its bodies and officials, but the natural 
and inalienable rights of the person that shall be the basic guidelines. 
By recognizing environmental rights, the Russian legislation made a step in 
the direction of formation of a law-based state and asserted the intention to 
form it. The rather broad regulation of subjective environmental rights in the 
developing law is a certificate of the democratization of the state. The re-
cognition of these rights promotes the consciousness of citizens, environmental 
awareness and culture. The right to favourable environment and other environ-
mental rights justify the demand for appropriate conduct of other subjects, first 
of all, of state bodies. They will promote the involvement of citizens in protection 
of the environment and of the state in the given sphere. At the same time, the 
regulation of environmental rights supports the powers of the state, exposure of 
the state to international scrutiny and entry into European and global legal 
networks. 
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The legal importance of the recognition of these rights is predetermined by 
their content and the circumstances of the citizen endowed with the rights. So, 
the subjective right as a legal category means the rights expressed in a norm 
and framed by it: a) freedom of conduct by the individual within limitations 
established by the legal norm; b) an opportunity for the individual to draw 
on a social boon; c) right to take steps and demand that other persons take 
appropriate measures; d) an opportunity to appeal to court for redress of the 
violated right. 
The recognition and legal regulation of environmental rights is important 
not only for the individual, but also for the society and the state. So, the socially 
responsible state, establishing this or that right, may expect that the citizens 
asserting these rights promote an increase in the efficiency of nature protection 
by the state. For example, securing citizens the right to participate in preparation 
and making environmentally significant economic and other decisions within 
the procedure of environmental impact assessment that relies on expertise in 
environmental protection, it is reasonable to expect an increase in the efficiency 
of the concerning activity of bodies of the executive authority. 
Accordingly, the society and the state do not remain indifferent to how the 
citizen asserts his rights. They must be interested in the involvement of citizens. 
Thus, environmental rights have essential legal importance as instruments 
of gradual restoration of a favourable state of the environment in the country, 
which, when consecutively enforced, shall ensure normal conduct of the person. 
The right to favourable environment 
The right to favourable environment is one of the basic natural rights of the 
person. This right as well as the right to life established under Art. 20 of the 
Russian Constitution, are rights guaranteed by nature. The human right to 
favourable environment as well as the right to life were for the first time 
established in the Russian Constitution of 1993. 
The right to life is associated with the right to favourable environment. The 
first, undoubtedly, is related to the quality of environment, in which the person 
lives. The lifetime of people should not be shortened because of ignorance of 
environmental legal regulations. According to the available data, the state of 
health of the person is determined to 20-30 p.c. by the state of the environment. 
According to the Russian State Statistical Committee, in 1997, the average life 
span of men in Russia was 57 years. There are grounds to assume that the life 
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span is shortened, alongside with other reasons, because of degradation of the 
environment. 
So long as the right to life is related to the protection of natural environ-
ment, it can be protected by means and instruments stipulated under Russian 
law on protection of environmental rights. The right to life will be guaranteed 
and protected objectively by means of observance and protection of the right to 
favourable environment. 
The subjects of the right to favourable environment are the citizens of 
Russia and foreign citizens who live in the territory of the Russian Federation. 
To ensure the most effective observance and protection of the right to 
favourable environment, it is theoretically and practically important to determine 
the content of the concept of favourable environment. Russian law does not 
define this concept, though legally significant criterions prevail in the given 
context. First of all, they are expressed in the system of norms concerning 
environmental quality. The system of such norms, as well as the general require-
ment of their development is determined under the Act on Protection of the 
Natural Environment. It includes norms pertaining to maximum permissible 
concentration of harmful substances in atmospheric air, waters and soil, and 
norms of maximum permissible levels of noise, vibration, magnetic fields and 
other harmful physical impacts on the environment. 
The mentioned norms prescribe qualitative characteristics of the state of the 
natural environment and are primarily designated to promote maintenance of its 
cleanliness that is only one, but a very important characteristic of the favourable 
state of the environment. 
Its other main required characteristic is the non-exhaustion (non-depletion) 
of natural resources. Environmental criteria concerning the use of natural 
resources to serve economic purposes and needs of the person are specified to 
limit the use of the natural resources under the above mentioned act. The 
respective limitations on use of natural resources are determined under regulations 
pertaining to land, underground (mineral resources), water, forests and wildlife. 
The requirements to satisfy aesthetic and other needs of the person and to 
sustain the biological variety of nature are also specified under the right to 
favourable environment. The maintenance of a favourable state of the environ-
ment with the purpose of satisfaction of these needs and of the preservation of 
natural resources is provided for under the regulation pertaining to specially 
protected natural territories and objects, recreational zones and other territories. 
Thus, the environment is favourable if its state meets the established 
environmental criteria, norms and requirements concerning its cleanliness, non-
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exhaustion (depletion) of natural resources, ecological stability, biological 
variety and aesthetic riches. 
The right to favourable environment is one of the fundamental and universal 
subjective rights of the person and citizen that affect vitality and it promotes 
the maintenance of normal ecological, economic, aesthetic and other conditions of 
life. Other environmental rights—to demand duly, complete and authentic 
information about the state of the environment and measures on its protection, 
or compensation for damage caused to health or property of the person by 
environmental offences, to demand the cancellation of decisions on location, 
design, construction, reconstruction or operation of environmentally harmful 
objects in an administrative or judicial procedure as stipulated by the Consti-
tution of the Russian Federation and other law—in essence serve as means of 
enforcement of the right to favourable environment. 
The observance of the right to favourable environment in the Russian 
Federation should be guaranteed within the framework of nature protection by 
authorized state bodies and users of natural resources on the basis of a system 
of legal, institutional, technical, economic, scientific, educational and other 
measures on protection of the nature and rational use of natural resources. 
Powers of public environmental associations 
The citizens may draw on environmental rights by establishing public environ-
mental associations endowed with broader powers than those of individual 
citizens. 
The powers of public environmental associations for protection of the natural 
environment are specified under a number of statutes. In the most concentrated 
form they are stipulated under Art. 13 of the Act on Protection of the Natural 
Environment. According to the act, environmental associations and other public 
associations engaged in protection of the environment have the right to: 
— develop, adopt and promote their own environmental programs, protect 
the public's environmental rights and interests, develop the public's environ-
mental awareness, and engage citizens in active environmental protection 
efforts on a voluntary basis; 
— use their own funds and volunteer labour to work in connection with the 
protection and renewal of natural resources and improvement of the environ-
ment, to render all possible assistance to state organs in their struggle against 
those who violate regulations on environmental protection and establish public 
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environmental protection funds and spend those funds on the implementation 
of environmental measures; 
— recommend their own representatives so that they contribute to state 
environmental expertise with regard to sitting and designing facilities, draw on 
public environmental expertise, and demand the repeal of decisions to site, build 
or operate environmentally harmful facilities or the restriction, suspension, 
termination or reorientation of their activities in an administrative or legal 
procedure; 
— demand that prompt, reliable and complete information be provided 
regarding environmental pollution and environmental protection measures; 
— organize meetings, rallies, picket lines, marches, demonstrations and 
petition drives and gather signatures and make proposals regarding projects 
and référendums; 
— demand that state environmental expertise be secured and outline an 
environmental platform via the mass media; 
— demand the prosecution of officials concerned and file claims in court 
or an arbitration tribunal in search of compensation for damages to citizens' 
health and property stemming from violation of environmental regulations. 
The act requires that the environmental activities of public associations 
should be conducted in full accordance with their charters and the law of the 
Russian Federation and its subjects. 
At present there are more than 1000 public environmental associations in 
Russia, which implement diverse useful activities. 
One of the instances of the enforcement of the powers of public associations 
in the field of protection of the environment is the appeal of the Russian social-
ecological union in Vologda to the regional arbitration court by reason of the 
decision of the Vologda authorities to commence the construction of a site 
for solid waste disposal on the territory of "Russian North" national natural-
historical park designated by the Government of the Russian Federation in 
March, 1992. In March, 1996 the court approved of the claim of the public 
organization. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation approved of the 
claim of the Russian branch of Greenpeace and the representatives of the 
population of Krasnoyarsky krai, when it considered the Decree of the President 
of Russia on the Slate Support of Structural Reorganization and Conversion of 
Nuclear Industry in Zsheleznogorsk of Krasnoyarsky Region of 25 January, 
1995 as illegal and contradicting Russian nature protection regulations. The 
President in his decree permitted that the mining-chemical industrial complex 
operated with temporary storage for the purpose of further treatment of 
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nuclear fuel waste from foreign nuclear power stations in the territories of 
other states. The decree contradicted Art. 50 of the Act on the Protection of the 
Natural Environment, which stipulates that import of radioactive wastes and 
materials from other states for the purposes of storage, depletion or disposal of 
radioactive materials underwater or the transfer of such materials into outer 
space for disposal is forbidden. 
Therefore, the presidential decree aimed to promote environmentally harm-
ful activities, which violate the right of citizens of Russia to favourable 
environment. 
Protection of Environmental Rights 
The mechanisms and procedures of protection of environmental rights is a 
necessary prerequisite that the proclaimed rights shall be enforced. The 
specification of such mechanisms creates legal guarantees that ensure obser-
vance and protection of environmental rights. 
The analysis of the legislation in the field of protection of the environment 
and human rights reveals two basic ways of protection of environmental 
rights: a) self-defence and b) protection by means of a state institution. Each 
of these ways in real protection mechanisms of protection of environmental 
rights draw on many factors, including democratization in the field of environ-
mental protection, i.e., real involvement of the citizens in the preparation of 
and making environmentally significant decisions and control of their 
enforcement. 
a) Ways of protection of environmental rights in the scope of competence of 
executive authority bodies 
While the option for assertion of environmental rights by the citizens frequently 
depends on the discretion of administrative bodies and the respective officials, 
the problem of protection of environmental rights in the scope of competence 
of executive authority bodies becomes rather significant. The ways of protection 
include: 
— judicial control of administration (i.e., the powers of courts over con-
sideration over administrative disputes and potential organization of the administ-
ration of justice); 
— administrative (interdepartmental) control and supervision of implemen-
tation within the framework of the executive authority; 
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— organisation of admission and consideration of appeals (claims and 
complaints) by bodies of the executive authority; 
— supervision of the competence of specific structures of the executive 
authority (ministries and departments) and also of bodies of local government; 
— control by the representative bodies of state authority over administrative 
bodies in frameworks determined by law and in the context of the principle of 
division of powers.4 
Violated environmental rights can be directly redressed in an administrative 
way. The administrative way of the appeal for review of decisions and actions 
violating environmental rights is regulated by the Federal Act on the Appeal 
for Review of Actions and Decisions Violating the Rights and Freedoms of 
Citizens to a Court of 14 December, 1995.5 The act provides an opportunity for 
administrative appeal of joint and individual actions, decisions or failure to act 
by state bodies, bodies of local government, institutions, enterprises and their 
associations, public associations and officials, state employees, as a result of 
which the rights and freedoms of the citizen are violated or the assertion of 
rights and freedoms by the citizens are impeded. 
The act provides the claimants an opportunity for the choice of bodies, to 
which they can file complaints for the violated environmental right. The claimant 
can appeal directly to court or to a higher state body, a body of local govern-
ment, an establishment, an enterprise, association or to an official. According to 
the act, a higher body, association or an official shall be obliged to consider the 
complaint in a month's time. If the complaint is repudiated or the claimant has 
received no answer within one month from the date of its submission, he/she has 
the right to appeal for consideration of the complaint to court. 
The procedures of consideration of complaints by executive authorities 
have practically not obtained as of today, since according to experts, procedures 
in the former USSR were extremely imperfect and protected primarily the 
administrative authority to the detriment of the citizen's rights and interests. 
The adoption of the regulation of appeals by the citizens to executive 
authorities, which stipulates procedures of consideration so that they promote 
effective protection of human rights, is extremely pressing. The perfection of 
mechanisms of protection of environmental rights within the competence of the 
executive authority bodies can be connected to the development of the system of 
4
 Salischeva, N. G.: On some aspects of the protection of rights, freedoms and lawfull 
interests of citizens in the domain of activities of executive organs of the Russian Federation. 
In: The Constitution of the Russian Federation and the improvement of the mechanism of 
protecting human rights, Moscow, 1994. 74. 
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the administration of justice as stipulated under Art. 1 18 of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation. 
b) Protection of environmental rights in court 
The constitutional provision on the principle of division of powers and the 
separation of state authority from judicial authority implies a qualitative change 
of roles, i.e., on the one hand, authority and influence of courts on the 
competence of state bodies in the field of environmental protection, on the other 
hand, it opens new legal ways of protection of environmental rights and interests. 
The Russian Constitution sets forth that everyone shall be guaranteed judicial 
protection of his rights and freedoms (Art. 46). The right of the citizens to 
claim judicial enquiry is one of the latest significant instruments of Russian 
law in the scope of environmental protection. 
The right of the citizens to submit a claim in court is stipulated under 
Articles 12 and 91 of the Act on Protection of the Natural Environment, which 
provides for the termination of environmentally harmful activities that cause 
damage to health and property of the citizens, national economy and the natural 
environment. As a general norm, the act specifies that disputes on protection of 
the natural environment, which concern citizens, are subject to consideration in 
a judicial process (Art. 78). 
The right of the citizen to claim judicial enquiry as a universal legal means of 
protection allows to represent not only the interests of the claimant, but 
finally of the whole community and promotes the maintenance of legal order. 
Simultaneously, this right is established as an effective form of control over 
powers of the state apparatus, bureaucracy and over abuse of authority. 
The process of judicial appeal is regulated under the Federal Act on the 
Appeal to Court for Review of Actions and Decisions Violating Rights and 
Freedoms of Citizens. The act also determines the scope of actions (decisions), 
which can be appealed to court. As such, it distinguishes joint and individual 
actions (decisions) of state bodies, bodies of local government, institutions, 
enterprises and their associations, public associations, officials, state employees 
and requires submission of official information as grounds for taking action 
and as a result of which: a) the rights and freedoms of the citizen are violated 
or curtailed; b) any duty is illegally assigned to the citizen or he/she is illegally 
held responsible. 
The citizens also have the right of appeal for failure of state bodies, enter-
prises, associations, officials, state employees to act, if that entailed consequences 
as listed above. In the scope of environmental protection the opportunity of the 
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appeal by reason of failure of state bodies and other subjects to act according to 
regulations concerning protection of the environment, is potentially a powerful 
legal means of increasing efficiency of nature protection by the state. 
The citizen has the right to challenge both actions (decisions) above and 
information as the basis for implementation of actions (adoption of decisions) 
or both simultaneously. 
According to the act, the appeal is admitted, if the rights, freedoms and 
interests of the claimant are infringed. Thus, the citizen has the right to 
appeal to a court for any action or failure to act that has adverse environmental 
consequences for a community on a whole. Meanwhile, sometimes it is 
difficult to prove that the illegal decision or action (failure to act) obviously 
violates the environmental rights of the claimant. But in case the decision is 
recognised as illegal, not only the right to favourable environment of the citizen 
that challenged this action is protected, but also that of a broader circle of 
persons affected by the action. 
The complaint can be lodged by the citizen, whose rights are violated, 
and at the request of the citizen, by the authorized representative of a public 
association or labour collective. 
So that an appeal to court with a complaint concerning wrongful environ-
mentally significant actions or decisions can be made, it is necessary to have a 
minimum of legal and environmental knowledge. However, the overwhelming 
majority of Russian citizens at present does not have such knowledge. 
According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, everyone shall be 
guaranteed the right to qualified legal assistance (Art. 48). The case can be 
transferred to legal consulting firms. However, these organizations are hardly 
capable to render qualified legal assistance on environmental issues, as 
protection of the environment is a poorly advanced area in Russia. As minor 
importance is assigned to this sphere in practice, it has had a corresponding 
effect on the competence in environmental law of the employees of consulting 
firms. Under these conditions, specialized law firms could have a major role in 
representation of environmental interests of the citizens in courts. Lately, they 
have been established in Russia. 
The Federal Act on the Appeal to a Court of Actions and Decisions Violating 
the Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens specifies a choice of courts for the 
citizens, to which they can appeal for protection of their rights. According to the 
decision of the citizen, the complaint can be submitted to a court of his 
residence or to a court where the body, association, official that violated his 
environmental rights is based. 
ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT IN RUSSIA 273 
The law also determines the terms of appeal to court with the complaint. If 
the citizen files a complaint for review of the decision or actions violating his 
environmental rights in an administrative procedure, the term of submission 
of the complaint in court is one month from the date of reception in writing the 
refusal of a higher body, association or from the expiration of a month's term 
after submission of the complaint, if the citizen had not received written 
answer to it. If the citizen directly resorts to judicial proceedings to protect his 
rights, the act specifies a three months' term to file a complaint since the day 
the citizen recognised the infringement of his right. The court has the right to 
amend the term of submission of the complaint missed for valid reason. 
It is a distinctive feature of consideration of the complaint of the citizen by 
the court that state bodies, bodies of local government, institutions, enter-
prises and their associations, public associations, officials, state employees, whose 
actions (decisions) are challenged, have the remedial duty to prove documentary 
legality of the challenged actions (decisions). Thus, the citizen is released from 
the duty to prove their illegality, but is obliged to prove the fact of infringe-
ment of his rights and freedoms. 
Consequently to consideration of the complaint, the court makes a decision. 
If the complaint is well-grounded, it will recognize the challenged action or 
decision which has resulted in the infringement of the rights of the citizen as 
illegal, and it will oblige to comply with the claims of the citizen, cancel the 
measures taken or in other ways redress the citizen's violated rights and 
freedoms. Moreover, at a stage of submission of the complaint to consideration, 
at the request of the citizen or under the initiative of the court, it has the right 
to suspend the implementation of the challenged action or decision. 
Concerning state employees, whose actions (or decisions) are recognized as 
illegal, the court shall apply the Federal Act on Fundamentals of State Service 
of the Russian Federation'' or other federal law concerning the responsibility of 
the state employee or shall dismiss the case. The responsibility can be assigned 
to persons, whose actions (decisions) are recognized as illegal and to persons 
who presented information as grounds for illegal actions (decisions). 
The court can make a decision on compensation for losses or damage caused 
to the citizen by illegal actions (decisions) and also by presentation of invalid 
information. 
It is an important question whether courts can not only reject, but also 
change the challenged decision. From the point of view of the principle of 
division of powers, the decision of the court should contain only a conclusion 
6
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about the legality of the challenged actions and decisions and about their 
cancellation in case of validity of the complaint. 
Protection of environmental rights by the constitutional court of the 
Russian federation 
An important role in the mechanism of protection of the environmental rights in 
Russia belongs to the Constitutional Court. In connection with recognition of 
the right to favourable environment under the Constitution, it is an urgent 
problem to provide conformity of Russian law, normative legal acts and treaties 
with the Constitution. According to the Constitution, human rights and freedoms 
shall determine the meaning, content and implementation of the law, the 
functioning of legislative and executive authority and of local government (Art. 
18). Therefore, not only new law and other normative acts should be brought 
into line with the Constitution, but all obtaining law, as well. 
Art. 125 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation specifies a number of 
normative legal acts, which shall be considered by the Constitutional Court with 
respect to their conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
It includes federal law, normative acts of the President of Russian Federation, 
the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian 
Federation; constitutions of republics, charters, and law and other normative 
acts of subjects of the Russian Federation; treaties between state government 
bodies of the Russian Federation and state government bodies of subjects of the 
Russian Federation; international treaties of the Russian Federation which are 
not in force. 
The Constitutional Court scrutinizes the conformity of these specific 
regulations, however, not on its own initiative, but at the request of specific state 
bodies. The right of appeal to the Constitutional Court belongs to the President 
of Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government 
of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the 
Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation and to legislative and 
executive government bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation. 
According to the Federal Constitutional Act on the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation of 21 July, 1994,7 the conformity of new normative acts 
and agreements between state authority bodies to the Constitution shall be 
reviewed from the point of view of the content of norms, the form of the act; 
the order of signing, conclusion, adoption, publication, putting into force and 
7
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from the point of view of the division of legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities. The establishment of conformity of the acts, which had been adopted 
before the Constitution of the Russian Federation came into force, is made 
only with respect to the content of norms. 
The recognition of the result of consideration of the respective normative act 
or treaty or of its separate provisions as not corresponding to the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation entails the cancellation not only of the given act (treaty, 
provision), but it also creates basis for cancellation of other normative acts if 
they are based on the act (treaty, provision) considered as unconstitutional. 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation also stipulates the instrument of 
the review of conformity of the regulations to the Constitution at the request of 
courts. When considering a case, the court comes to the conclusion that the law 
applied in this particular case is not in conformity with the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, so the court appeals to the Constitutional Court with a 
request for review of the conformity of the regulation. From the moment of 
making the decision by the court on appealing to the Constitutional Court and 
until this Court makes its decision, the consideration of the case in court shall be 
suspended. 
Alongside with the review of conformity of the specific provision and other 
acts to the Constitution, the protection of environmental rights within the 
competence of the Constitutional Court is connected to the enforcement of the 
right of the citizens to constitutional complaint. According to the Act on the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the right of appeal to the Consti-
tutional Court with an individual or collective complaint against violation of the 
constitutional rights and freedoms belongs to the citizens and an association of 
citizens, whose rights and freedoms have been violated by the law applied or 
subject to application in a particular case. Such right also pertains to other 
persons and bodies specified under federal law (Art. 96). 
The complaint for violation of the constitutional rights and freedoms by the 
law is admitted, if the law mentions the constitutional rights and freedoms of 
the citizens, and also if the law is applied or is subject to application in a parti-
cular case, the consideration of which is completed or had been commenced in 
court or other body applying the law. 
By admitting the consideration of the complaint against violation of consti-
tutional rights and freedoms by the law, the Constitutional Court consequently 
notifies the court or other body that considers the case, in which the challenged 
law is applied or is subject to application. However, the notice does not entail 
suspension of consideration of the case, though it can be suspended at the 
discretion of the court or body. 
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As a result of consideration of the complaint against violation of consti-
tutional environmental rights by the law, one of alternative decisions can be 
accepted: either on recognition of the law or its separate provisions as cor-
responding to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or on recognition of 
the law or its separate provisions as not corresponding to the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation or as creating an opportunity for interpretation by court 
or other body, which would not correspond to the Constitution. In case of 
recognition of the law applied in a particular case as not corresponding to the 
Constitution, the case shall be subject to reconsideration by the appropriate 
body in the usual process. 
Protection of environmental rights by the commissioner for human rights 
Violated environmental rights can be redressed by the Commissioner for Human 
Rights, as well. This position is established according to Art. 103 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation with the puipose of maintenance of 
guarantees of state protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens, their 
observance and respect by state bodies, bodies of local government and officials. 
The institution of the Commissioner for Human Rights (ombudsman), which 
functions in more than 100 states, supports, supplements and expands the tradi-
tional control functions of parliament concerning other state bodies and thereby 
g 
ensure the observance and protection of human rights. The commissioner is 
appointed to the position and is released from the position by the State Duma in 
a procedure stipulated under the Federal Constitutional Act on the Com-
missioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation of 26 February, 1997. 
The establishment of the position of the commissioner for human rights promotes 
both the restitution of violated rights, improvement of the legislation in the field 
of human rights in Russia bringing that in conformity with the conventional 
principles and norms of international law and with the development of inter-
national cooperation in the field of human rights, legal education on the rights 
and freedoms of the person, on forms and methods of their protection. 
The competence of the Commissioner includes consideration of complaints 
against decisions or actions (failure to act) of state bodies, government bodies, 
officials, state employees if earlier the claimants had challenged these decisions 
or actions (failures to act) in a judicial or administrative procedure, but disagree 
s
 Khamaneva, N. J.: The Ombudsman role in contolling the observation of human rights 
and freedoms of citizens. In: The Constitution of the Russian Federation... op. cit. 141. 
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with the decisions adopted on their claims. The act sets forth that the Com-
missioner shall not consider complaints against the decisions of the Chambers 
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and of legislative bodies of 
subjects of the Russian Federation (Art. 16). The act stipulates the conditions 
of submission of complaints concerning terms. They should be filed to the 
Commissioner within a year from the date of violation of the rights and free-
doms of the applicant or from the day the applicant recognised their violation. 
According to Art. 20, the Commissioner, by receiving the complaint, has the 
right: 
— to submit the complaint to consideration; 
— to inform the applicant about the instruments it can resort to for pro-
tection of his rights and freedoms; 
— to transfer the complaint to a state body, a body of local government or 
official, to which the competence of the sanction of the complaint in substance 
pertains; 
— to reject submission of the complaint to consideration. 
The Commissioner shall notify the applicant about his decision in a ten 
days' term. In case of commencement of consideration of the complaint, the 
Commissioner also informs the state body, the body of local government or 
official about the decisions or actions (failure to act) which will be reviewed. 
Under certain circumstances, the Commissioner on his own initiative has 
the right to arrange for protection of interests of the people within his scope of 
competence. Such circumstances involve: availability of information about 
mass or rough violation of the rights and freedoms of the citizens, and also cases 
that entail special public importance or circumstances related to the protection 
of interests of the persons who are individually not capable of resorting to 
legal means of protection (Art. 21). 
For effective performance of functions, the Commissioner is guaranteed a 
scope of substantial rights. When considering the complaint he has the right: 
— to visit all bodies of state authority, bodies of local government, enter-
prises, institutions, organizations, military objects; 
— to request and receive information, documents and materials necessary 
for consideration of the complaint from state bodies, bodies of local government, 
from officials and state employees; 
— to receive explanation on questions subject to consideration of the 
complaint from officials and state employees, except the judges; 
— to carry out independently or together with competent state bodies, 
officials and state employees an enquiry into the activity of state bodies, bodies 
of local government and officials; 
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— to commission competent official bodies to implement expert re-
search and reach conclusions on questions subject to consideration of the 
complaint; 
— to be informed about criminal, civil cases and cases of administrative 
offences, decisions on which have entered into force; and also about cases 
terminated in proceedings, and about materials, initiation of criminal cases on 
which was rejected. 
As a result of consideration of the complaint, the Commissioner has the 
right: 
— to appeal to court with a petition for protection of rights and freedoms 
violated by the decision or action (failure to act) of a state body, body of local 
government or official, and also to participate in the trial as specified by the 
respective law personally or through a representative; 
— to appeal to competent state bodies with a petition for initiation of a 
disciplinary or administrative procedure or a criminal case against the official in 
whose decisions or actions (failure to act) violation of human rights and 
freedoms are seen; 
— to appeal to court or procurator with a petition for review of the decision 
of a court or judge, which has entered into force; 
— to state the reasons to the official, who has the right both to protest and 
be present at the trial as a supervisor; 
— to appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a 
complaint against violation of constitutional rights and freedoms of the 
citizens by the law applied or subject to application in a particular case. 
Conclusion 
The Russian state in the 1990s paid considerable attention to the regulation of 
protection of environmental rights. In this respect, its policy corresponds to 
international approaches to the solution of environmental problems. 
Significant steps have been taken to develop the environmental legislation 
and to create the mechanism of protection of the environment in the country. 
This mechanism includes the specification of environmental quality and 
discharge norms, environmental impact assessment, ecological expertise, 
ecological licences, ecological certification, ecological audit, economic 
measures for protection of the environment and liability under environmental 
law. Objectively, these instruments are to ensure observance of environmental 
rights. 
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In practice, these are not implemented in the most effective way. As a 
result, environmental rights are usually violated. The existing mechanism for 
restitution of violated environmental rights is not applied frequently, for which 
the main reasons are non-readiness of state bodies to protect these rights and 
the mentality of the Russian people. 
Further tasks in this context are to develop the regulation of environmental 
rights, especially with respect to the rights of future generations and to provide 
education on environmental protection to people, officials and state employees. 
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Poland—a state without much national diversity'—should be treated as a 
relatively non-conflictual one. 
After many years during which there were no legal regulations concerning 
national minorities and the state implemented an assimilation policy, the 
establishment of the Sejm Committee for National Minorities was crucial for 
recognizing the existence and expectations of minorities (in August 1989), 
just like the declaration of the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki in September 1989, when he stated that Poland is also the 
homeland of national minorities. 
Soon, the respect for such differences and application of international 
standards concerning such societies was manifested in bilateral international 
agreements (treaties)," regulating the issues of national minorities and containing 
clauses aimed at protecting them. 
Despite various degrees of specificity of the matters regulated by treaties, their 
common feature is the reference to international standards and the so-called 
1
 The number of members of national minorities, according to results of the National 
Census announced in June 2003 is: out of the total number of 38,2 million citizens of 
Poland—173.000 Silesians, 153.000 Germans, 48.700 Belorussians, 31.000 Ukrainians, 
12.000 Roma people, 1.100 Jews, 1.100 Armenians, 8000 Czechs, 500 Tartars and 50 
Karaims. In other words, 96,74% of respondents declared Polish nationality, 1,23%—a 
nationality other than Polish, while 2,03% did not make the relevant declaration. 
These data differ considerably from the estimates made in 1992, when this number 
according to minority organizations approx. was 1,5 million; according to governmental 
estimates between 900.000 and 120.000; according to estimates of the Helsinki Committee in 
Poland—between 860.000 and 980.000. The percentage of national minorities in the total 
number of inhabitants of Poland (38,45 million) was between 1,9 and 3,8%. Figures quoted 
after: Report for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on implementation by the 
Republic of Poland of provisions of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the 
Protection of Minorities, Warsaw 2002; Rzeplinski, A.: Polozenie mniejszosci narodowych 
w Polsce [Situation of national minorities in Poland]. In: Kloczowski, J. (ed.): Ochrona 
praw mniejszosci narodowych i religijnych [Protection of Rights of National and Religious 
Minorities], Lublin, 1993. 44. 
Such commitments are contained in agreements with: Germany of 17 June 1991; the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republics of 6 October 1991; Hungary of 6 October 1991; 
Ukraine of 18 May 1992; Russia of 22 May 1992; Belarus Republic of 23 June 1992; 
Republic of Latvia of 1 July 1992; Republic of Estonia of 2 July 1992; Kingdom of Spain 
of 26 October 1992; Romania of 25 January 1993; Bulgaria of 25 February 1993; Republic 
of Lithuania of 26 April 1994; Moldavia/Moldova of 15 November 1994; Uzbekistan of 11 
January 1995; Greece of 12 June 1996. Quoted after: Janusz, G.—Bajda, P.: Prawa mniejszosci 
narodowych. Standardy Europejskie [National Minority Rights. European Standards], 
Warsaw, 2000. 68-69. 
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minority clauses, covering a wider or greater catalogue of rights in the field of 
protection of persons belonging to minorities concerning: the right to learn the 
mother tongue and to education in the mother tongue and to use this language 
freely in private and public life, the right to form their own associations and 
organizations, the freedom of contacts between the members of a given minority 
in the country and abroad, the right to spell forenames and surnames in the 
mother tongue, the right to confess and practise their own religion.3 The persons 
protected by treaties may exercise these rights individually or collectively 
(together with other members of their group). 
Until 1997 the constitutional provisions did not contain any regulations on 
national minorities. There were certain nationality-related criteria in Article 67 
para. 2 and Article 81 of the provisions of the 1952 Constitution maintained in 
force by the so-called Little Constitution (constitutional act of 1992), which 
adopted the general principle of equality and non-discrimination.4 
Only the Polish Constitution adopted on 2 April 1997, for the first time after 
the war, did contain a provision dedicated exclusively to protecting national 
minorities. This regulation is contained in Article 35, in the chapter concerning 
the freedoms, rights and obligations of a person and a citizen. 
II. Constitutional regulation of national minority rights 
The model of protection of national minority rights adopted in the 1997 
Constitution is characterized by: 
1. the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, 
2. ensuring, apart from the general equality and non-discrimination, also 
separate protection of the rights of minority members, 
3
 Janusz, G.: Regulacje prawne dotyczqcc ochrony mniejszosci narodowych w Polsce 
[Legal regulations concerning national minority protection in Poland]. In: Status prawny 
mniejszosci narodowych vv Polsce w swietle Konwencji Ramowej о ochronie mniejszosci 
narodowych [Legal Status of National Minorities in Poland in the Light of the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities]. Warsaw, 2001. 119. 
4
 The postulate of a separate regulation, one conforming to international standards, of the 
problems of national minorities in the Constitution was accepted almost from the very 
beginning of the constitutional debate. Cf. Rybczyhska, A.: Uwagi na temat statusu prawnego 
mniejszosci narodowych w Polsce w swietle projektów konstytucyjnych lata 1989-1991 
[Remarks about the legal status of national minorities in Poland in the light of constitutional 
drafts in the years 1989-1991]. In: Ochrona... op. cit. 83-89; Kallas, M.: Prace parlamentarne 
nad uregulowaniem statusu mniejszosci w Polsce (1989-1995) [Parliamentary work on 
regulation of the status of minorities in Poland (1989-1995)], Przeglqd Sejmowy, 1995, No. 3. 
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3. the adoption, to a certain extent, of protection of rights of communities 
of national and ethnic minorities. 
Ad. 1. The constitutional prohibition of discrimination is formulated very 
widely. According to the provisions of the Constitution (Article 32 subpara. 2) 
no one may be discriminated against in the political, economic and social life 
"for any reason whatsoever", while the state authorities are under a duty to 
treat all persons equally. In addition, the Constitution introduces a prohibition 
against political parties whose programmes or activities are based upon or 
sanction racial or national hatred (Article 13). 
Ad. 2. The contents of Article 35 of the Constitution, which concerns 
"national and ethnic minorities", must be analyzed in terms of: a) the notions 
contained in it and b) the persons enjoying protection and its scope. 
The Constitution does not define the notion of minorities (national or 
ethnic ones). 
Ad. 3. Since it is impossible to rely on a definition of "minorities" (national 
and ethnic ones) agreed in international law, the constitutional law doctrine5 
identifies each minority using a combination of two criteria: the subjective 
one—signifying the willingness of each person to identify with such a minority— 
and the objective one—indicating the actual existence of a minority group, 
distinguished by some objective features. When determining the notion of a 
"national or ethnic minority" such features include a distinct culture, especially 
language, and a well-rooted awareness of such distinctness. 
In other words, you may only belong to an actually existing minority if you 
have the features which characterize it, but always on condition of voluntary 
identification with that minority. As a consequence, the notion of minority is 
formulated in the doctrine as "a group of citizens of the state which are 
distinguished from the dominant part of the society by the awareness of their 
national (or ethnic) membership, which may be accompanied by differences in 
the language, religion, customs and culture in general.'1 
Garlicki, L.: Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Kamentarz [Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland. Commentary]. Vol. Ill, Chapter II: Freedoms, rights and obligations of 
a person and citizen, Article 35, 4. 
6
 See Tozinski, S.: Przekroczyc wlasny cien [Cross Your Own Shadow]. In.: 
Berdychowska, B. (ed.): Mniejszosci narodowe w Polsce. Praktyka po 1989 roku [National 
Minorities in Poland. Practice After 1989]. Warsaw, 1998. 15; Kwasniewski, К.: Socjologia 
mniejszosci a definicja mniejszosci narodowej [Sociology of minorities and the definition 
of a national minority], Sprawy Narodowosciowe, vol. I, 1992, No. 1. 14. A similar 
definition of a minority as the entity that enjoys protection was adopted in Article 20, para. 
1 of the 1991 Treaty with Germany. 
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The wording of this article, which mentions "national and ethnic minorities", 
proves that these are two different notions, thus each of them may be defined 
separately. 
Here, we should mention that: 
1. this distinction is not universally adopted in international law, where 
often only one of these terms is used, both these terms being treated as inter-
changeable.7 
2. The fact that these terms are treated as interchangeable in international 
law does not mean that they are synonymous in Polish law. The fact that the 
constitution uses both of them implies that they have different meanings. Their 
non-synonymous nature is expressed in the Polish legislative solutions where 
e.g. only national (and not ethnic) minorities enjoy the privilege of relief from 
the consequences of electoral threshold. 
3. The fact that the legislator uses both these terms requires establishing a 
criterion to distinguish them. Such a criterion proposed by the legal doctrine 
to distinguish "national" from "ethnic" minorities is the criterion of "state-
hood", according to which a national minority is a group which forms part of a 
nation whose main seat is in another state, while an ethnic minority is a group 
distinguished from the given nation by the possession of certain specific 
cultural features (e.g. distinct language, dialects, customs). 
Despite certain deficiencies of the above differentiation (history knows 
many nations deprived of their statehood), it seems that this criterion was 
adopted also by the Supreme Court when it ruled on the inadmissibility of 
registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality, which will be 
discussed in detail later on. 
The persons who enjoy individual protection include only "Polish citizens" 
who belong to minorities, excluding foreign and stateless persons even if they 
stay in Poland." 
7
 Cf. Article 27 ICCPR and Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of a Child, which 
concern ethnic minorities, and Article 5, para. 1 of the Convention against Discrimination 
in the Field of Education and Article 14 ECHR, which concern "national minorities". 
8
 Winczorek, P.: Komentarz do Konstytucji RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 roku [Commentary 
to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997]. Warsaw, 2000. 54-55; 
Lobozinski: op. cit.. 35. The same criterion is used in the justification for the draft Act on 
National and Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Poland, Druk Sejmowy, No. 223. 
4
 The range of persons who enjoy protection as national minorities is differently regulated 
in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, to which Poland is a party. 
According to the interpretation of its provisions made by the Commission on Human 
Rights, members of minorities do not have to be citizens and do not even have to be 
permanent residents. Migrant workers or even visitors in a State-Party, including those that 
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The constitutionally guaranteed freedom is the possibility to maintain and 
develop the particular national or ethnic identity, which is expressed as the 
freedom to maintain and develop the particular language, maintain customs 
and traditions, as well as to develop the particular culture. 
Apart from Article 35, also Article 27 of the Constitution concerns the 
language-related rights of minorities. Pursuant to this provision, "Polish shall 
be the official language of the Republic of Poland. This provision shall not 
infringe upon the national minority rights resulting from ratified international 
agreements".10 
Therefore, it follows from the contents of Article 27 of the Constitution that 
the scope of respect for language-related rights of minorities is determined, in 
the event of national minorities, by international agreements. This applies 
especially to such an important right as the right to use one's mother tongue as 
an auxiliary language" in contacts with public authorities. 
The constitutional freedom of maintaining customs and traditions and 
developing culture is connected with the constitutional safeguards of freedom of 
confession, ensuring religious education and upbringing to children. 
In conclusion, we may state that Article 35 in combination with the 
remaining principles and provisions that form the system of freedoms and 
rights of a person allows us to formulate three general rules: the prohibition of 
assimilation (understood as measures taken by public authorities in order to 
eliminate national and ethnic diversities); the principle of equal treatment; the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
constitute a minority, are entitled not to be refused the enjoyment of the rights granted to 
minority members. Cf. Komentarz Komitetu Praw Czlowieka dotyczqcy praw osób 
nalezqcych do mniejszosci chronionych [Commentary of the Human Rights Committee on 
rights of members of protected minorities]. In: Torunski Rocznik Praw Czlowieka i Pokoju, 
1994-1995. vol. 3, Torun, 1996. 119. 
'" Regardless of this provision. Article 87 of the Constitution contains a general 
provision recognizing ratified international agreements as a source of law in Poland, which 
gives Article 22 the character of lex specialis. 
" Such a possibility is envisaged in the contacts between persons that belong to 
minorities and administrative authorities by Article 10, para. 2 of the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ratified by Poland. There are direct 
references to the issues of using a minority language as an auxiliary language in the 
agreements with the Czech and Slovak Republics (Article 8, para. 2) and Belarus. Bilateral 
agreements with Germany and Lithuania use the expression "free use of the mother tongue 
in the private life and publicly". For more information see Janusz: op. cit., 118-122. In the 
current legal status, Poland has not ratified the European Charter for Regional Languages, 
signed on 12 May 2003. 
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Respect for these freedoms is guaranteed by various administrative and 
judicial procedures—including the right to trial, the constitutional complaint, 
the right to apply to the Ombudsman. 
The Constitution formulates also the right of groups of national and ethnic 
minorities to the protection of their identity, indicating their institutional rights 
(establishing their own educational and cultural institutions and institutions 
designed to protect religious identity) and procedural rights (the right to 
participate in the resolution of "matters concerning their cultural identity"). 
III. Statutory regulations of minority rights 
Provisions of the Constitution do not pose any obstacles for the ordinary 
legislator to extend the rights of national and ethnic minorities beyond those 
identified in Article 35, unless this infringes upon other constitutional principles 
and norms. The extension of such rights may also partly result from international 
agreements. 
In the current legal status, as there is no statute regulating in a comprehensive 
manner the situation of national and ethnic minorities (the Constitution does 
not make its adoption mandatory), the legal regulations concerning these issues 
are dispersed. 
Despite the lack of a statute which would provide for the possibility of 
using in public life, apart from the official (Polish) language, minority languages 
as auxiliary ones, the binding Codes of Administrative, Civil and Criminal 
Procedure permit the use of other languages than Polish in official relation-
ships to a limited extent (by conducting proceedings with the participation of a 
translator/interpreter). The Law on the System of Common Courts12 gives a 
person who does not have sufficient command of Polish the right to appear 
before a court and speak a language known to him/her, receiving gratuitously 
the assistance of an interpreter. 
The Polish Language Act,13 while stating that Polish is the official language, 
emphasises at the same time that it "shall not infringe the rights of national 
and ethnic minorities" (Article 2 subpara. 2). Executing the statutory delegation, 
the Minister of Interior and Administration14 established the possibility of 
12
 Act of 22 July 2001, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw), No. 98, item 1070. 
13
 Of 7 October 1999, Journal of Laws, No. 90, item 999. 
14
 Regulation of 18 March 2002, Journal of Laws, No. 37, item 349 on the events 
when names and texts in Polish may be accompanied by versions in translation into a 
foreign language. 
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providing the names and texts in localities that have large communities of 
national minorities or ethnic groups with translations into a foreign language, 
in particular the language of the national or ethnic minorities living in the 
given area. Providing translations concerns the names and texts designated to 
be read by the public, placed on: plaques of a public utility authority or 
institution, in other noticeable place designated for information, in means of 
public transport.'5 
Currently, there are also no problems concerning the right to spell and 
pronounce the forenames and surnames of members of minorities in the mother 
tongue, even though the provision of Article 2 para. 2 subpara. 2 of the Act of 
1956 on Changing Forenames and Surnames still considers non-Polish pro-
nunciation of a surname as a valid reason for changing it. 
The possibility of returning to the surnames and forenames compulsorily 
polonized in Poland after 195216 is fully recognized in judgments of the 
Supreme Administrative Court issued on the basis of regulations of bilateral 
treaties. 
Similarly, there are no issues connected with the legal regulation of 
educational rights of national minorities. 
The Act on the Educational System of 1991 obliges public schools to 
enable their pupils and students to maintain the sense of their national, ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural identity, and in particular to learn their own language, 
history and culture. Such education may be conducted upon the parents' 
application in various forms: in separate groups, branches or schools - with 
additional lessons of language, history and culture; in inter-school teaching 
teams of schools or their branches where the language of tuition is the 
language of the national or ethnic minority. 
Detailed principles of education are now contained in the Regulation of 
the Minister of National Education and Sport of 3 December 2002 on the 
conditions and manner of performance by public schools and establishments of 
tasks allowing the maintenance of the sense of national, ethnic, linguistic and 
religious identity. Pursuant to another Regulation of the Minister of National 
Education, pupils or students who belong to national minorities and ethnic 
groups may take final secondary school examinations in Polish or in the 
' 'The first event of application of the provision of the Regulation was placing the 
plaques of the Office and Council of Lasowice Wielkie Grnina [Municipality] (Opolskie 
voivodeship) in German, with the official name of the locality. 
16
 Pursuant to an unpublished order of the Prime Minister of 7 September 1952. 
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language of the given national minority (except for examinations in the Polish 
language, geography and history).17 
Even though neither the Constitution nor ratified international agreements 
concern the political rights of national minorities, linking them with civil 
rights, the Law on Elections to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland contains a provision (introduced in 1993) that relieves national minorities 
18 
from the duty to exceed the 5% electoral threshold. In 2002, a provision was 
introduced into the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils stating that, when 
dividing voivodeships [provinces] into constituencies, grouping together 
poviates [counties] may not be grouping together in a way which violates the 
social links between electors belonging to national or ethnic minorities who 
live in the territories of these poviates.1 ' 
Minorities were granted access to mass media by a provision (Article 21 
para. 1 subpara. 9) of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Act of 1992, which 
obliges the public radio and television stations to take into account the needs 
of national and ethnic minorities."1' 
Protection of minority rights in the structures of the executive power21 
was entrusted to the relevant organizational units of the Ministry of Culture 
(Department of Culture of National Minorities), Ministry of National Education 
(Department of Education and Upbringing) and Ministry of Interior and 
Administration (Department of Citizenship). 
The Minister of Interior and Administration is responsible for the govern-
ment's policy concerning national minorities. This policy is co-ordinated by 
the Interministerial Team for National Minorities,"" headed by a Secretary of 
State delegated by the Minister. Representatives of each ministry dealing 
with various aspects of national minority policy participate in the Team's 
work. 
17
 Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 21 March 2001 on the conditions 
and manner of evaluating, classifying and promoting pupils, students and listeners and 
conducting examinations and tests in public schools. Journal of Laws, No. 29, item 323. 
18
 Act of 12 April 2001 Law on Elections to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland, Journal of Laws of 16 May 2001, No. 46 item 499. 
19
 Journal of Laws, No. 127, item 1089. 
20
 Of 15 October 1992. 
21
 Sora, M.: Ochrona mniejszosci narodowych z perspektywy administracji rzqdowej 
[Protection of national minorities from the perspective of government administration]. In: 
Status prawny... op. cit., 135 and foil. 
"" The Team, appointed on 6 February 2002, continues the activities of the Inter-
Ministry Team for National Minorities, which existed in the years 1997-2001. 
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The Team is one of the opinion-giving and advisory bodies of the Prime 
Minister as regards developing and co-ordinating the Government's policy on 
minorities. The Team is serviced by the National Minorities Division, which 
has functioned since 2000 within the structure of the Department of Citizenship 
of the Ministry of Interior and Administration. The head of the Division is also 
the secretary of the Team for National Minorities. 
Since 2000, at voivodeship level there are plenipotentiaries (or advisors) of 
voivodes [province governors] for national minorities. 
Regardless of the legal regulations discussed above, the Parliament is 
working on a draft of Act on National and Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of 
Poland. The current23 version of the draft, apart from a definition of national 
minorities, attempts to regulate in a comprehensive manner their social, educa-
tional and cultural rights. 
The definition of minority proposed in the draft is similar to the definition 
adopted in the Central European Initiative Instrument for the Protection of 
Minority Rights of 1994, which means that the draft does not take into account 
the constitutional distinction between national and ethnic minorities. 
The draft makes references to almost all principles of the Council of Europe's 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, including a 
catalogue of rights enjoyed by national minorities, the prohibition of discrimi-
nation on national or ethnic grounds and the prohibition of assimilation. While 
recognizing the principle of equality of citizens, it does not exclude the 
possibility of conducting a policy of preference for national minorities in order 
to even out the chances. 
In the areas inhabited traditionally or in considerable numbers by members 
of national minorities, the draft envisages the possibility of minority languages 
being treated as auxiliary languages, taking into account the possibility of 
spelling names of localities, authorities and streets in minority languages. A 
special chapter devoted to education and culture of national minorities contains 
regulations connected with teaching the mother tongue and education in that 
language, the principles concerning financing cultural events, national minorities 
and the tasks of radio and television broadcasts. The draft envisages also the 
The work on the previous draft was delayed, among other things, because of delayed 
ratification by Poland of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe for the 
Protection of National Minorities. After ratification of the Convention in April 2000 and 
the Committee taking into account its provisions, the draft was again submitted by the 
Sejm Committee for National and Ethnic Minorities on 11 January 2002. 
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establishment of the Office for National Minorities headed by the Chairman, 
who would be responsible for implementation of the state policy on minorities. 
Critics of the draft (including the government), while accepting the need to 
adopt the statute and the majority of solutions proposed in it, point out some 
deficiencies of the draft and proposals of controversial solutions. 
In the government's opinion, the draft submitted for the first reading 
displays major content-related and legislative defects. The most important 
objections concern: 
— lack of differentiation in the text of the draft between the notions of 
"national minority" and "ethnic minority" and lack of indication of the 
categories for membership of such minorities, 
— lack of precise regulation of the principles of using minority languages 
as auxiliary languages in the public life. According to the government, a 
statutory regulation of this issue, due to both its importance for the status of 
minorities and novelty of the regulation, should be a comprehensive one. The 
statute should indicate the conditions (prerequisites) which have to be met in 
order for the minority language to be introduced as an auxiliary language in the 
given gmina, 
— the government objected also decisively to the proposal of establishing a 
new central authority of government administration for minority issues—the 
Chairman of the Minorities Office. According to the government there are no 
actual grounds for such a major change of the system of protecting minority 
rights in the structure of the executive power and it would be sufficient to 
strengthen the position of the Team for National Minorities and increase the 
powers of the Minister of Interior and Administration. 
IV. Protection of minority rights in international law 
The policy of the Republic of Poland on national minorities is implemented on 
the basis of the internal legal order and instruments of international law, signed 
and ratified by Poland, which instruments set standards of protection of rights 
of members of national minorities. It is international law regulations that 
determined those standards of protection of rights of national and ethnic 
minorities that were the point of reference for Poland on its way back to the 
family of democratic states. 
The Constitution of 2 April 1997 defined for the first time in an unequivocal 
and undisputed manner the place of international law instruments in the 
domestic legal order, which makes real the protection of minority rights on the 
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basis of international agreements. Article 87 para. 1 mentions ratified inter-
national agreements among the legal instruments binding in the Republic of 
Poland. This means that provisions of ratified international agreements may 
bind all entities in the state—they may affect the legal status of individuals, 
similar entities (e.g. private-law legal persons), political parties, NGOs and 
each segment of public authorities at central and local level. At the same time, 
by the introduction of the category of sources of universally binding law, the 
Constitution defined in an exhaustive and enumerative manner the categories 
of instruments on whose basis the rights, freedoms and obligations of all these 
entities may be regulated.24 
According to the Constitution, a ratified international agreement, after 
promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, becomes part 
of the domestic legal order and is applied directly, unless its application 
depends on the enactment of a statute (Article 91 para. 1 ). Here, we are concerned 
with international agreements relating to freedoms, rights and obligations of 
members of national minorities, which agreements belong to the constitutional 
category of international agreements whose ratification requires prior consent 
granted in a statute (Article 89 para. 1). The Constitution defines the special 
place of such agreements in the domestic legal order: they take precedence 
over statutes if the statute cannot be reconciled with the agreement (Article 91 
para. 2). The constitutional watchdog of coherence of the system of source of law 
is the Constitutional Tribunal, which decides inter alia on the conformity with 
the Constitution of statutes—including the statutes authorizing the President to 
ratify a specific category of international agreements—and international agree-
ments, and on the conformity of statutes to ratified international agreements 
whose ratification required prior consent granted in a statute (Article 188). 
Due to the fact that previously the issue of validity of international agree-
ments in the domestic legal order was not regulated in the fundamental law 
and Poland acceded, in the pre-constitutional period, to many important inter-
national agreements, relevant provisions were included in the transitional 
provisions of the Constitution. A principle was introduced that international 
agreements ratified by the Republic of Poland before the entry into force of the 
Constitution pursuant to the constitutional provisions in force at the time of 
their ratification and promulgated in the Journal of Laws are considered as 
ratified with prior consent granted in a statute and the provisions of Article 91 
of the Constitution, quoted above, apply to them if it follows from the contents 
Garlicki, L.: Polskié prawo konstytucyjne. Zarys wykladu [Polish Constitutional 
Law. Reading Outline], ed. VII, Warsaw, 2003. 126. 
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of the international agreement that they concern the category of matters listed 
in Article 89 para. 1. 
After the end of WW II and the establishment of UN system of human rights 
protection, Poland became a party to numerous UN documents which regulate 
the status of minority members, including: Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, International 
Convention on Liquidation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
ILO Convention on Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. 
Poland opted also for the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights 
concerning the rights of members of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities, adopted at 57lh session of the Commission in Geneva. 
Within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, Poland signed the following instruments concerning, inter alia, the 
protection of national minorities: Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference 
on the Human Dimension of CSCE and "Challenges of Change"—the Helsinki 
Document. It participates—as the host of the Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights of OSCE—in annual meetings of member States, aimed at 
reviewing the commitments in the field of human rights and developing new 
strategies, including the preparation of effective aid for Roma people. 
National minorities issues are one of the topics discussed at all meetings of 
the Wyszehrad Group (including in Bratislava in 1999, in Budapest in 2000, in 
Prague in 2000 and in Warsaw in 2001). Discussions concern legal solutions 
devised to protect minorities and, in particular, experiences of implementation 
of minority programmes in each state. Within the framework of another regional 
group, the Central European Initiative, in 1995 Poland became a signatory of a 
now, within the framework of the CEI Working Group on Minorities, it document 
entitled "CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights", and participates 
in cooperation and exchange of experiences with partners from the region. 
Since 1989, the strategic objective of Poland's foreign policy has been 
membership of the European Union. These efforts have been crowned with the 
signature of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003. Before this took place, 
Poland, like other candidate states, was obliged to meet specified requirements, 
including political ones, determined in the conclusions of the European 
Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. One of the important conditions was 
observance of national minority rights. In the course of harmonization activities, 
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Poland was evaluated by the European Commission from the point of view of 
its preparedness for accession. It should be stressed that only two states, Poland 
and Cyprus, were considered as states conducting proper policies on national 
and ethnic minorities (mainly Roma people). The European Commission 
considered that Polish legislative and executive powers function properly from 
the point of view of national minority protection. 
The Republic of Poland has been a party to the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities since 1 April 2001. Ratification 
documents were submitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
together with the interpretation declaration adopted by the Council of 
Ministers of Poland. The declaration states, inter alia, that in view of lack of a 
definition of national minority in the Framework Convention, the Republic of 
Poland interprets this term to denote national minorities inhabiting the territory 
of Poland, whose members are Polish citizens. This understanding of national 
minorities corresponds to the wording of Article 35 of the Constitution. 
The principle of reciprocity is the basis for international law commitments 
concerning the rights and freedoms of national minorities resulting from 
bilateral agreements between Poland and other states, particularly neighbouring 
states (cf. footnote 2). The fact that legal regulations concerning the status of 
each minority are dispersed in bilateral agreements results in their differentiation, 
despite their basic conformity to European standards. Naturally, minorities 
without a "mother state"—Roma people or Karaims—are deprived of protection 
in such agreements. 
V. Problem of the Silesian minority in case law of domestic courts and 
ECHR 
The initiative of recognition of a distinct Silesian nationality emerged in 1995, 
at the meeting of an association called the Movement for the Autonomy of 
Silesia. The pioneer of separation of the Silesian nationality was also priest 
Arkadiusz Wuwer from Tychy, who in 1996 sent an inquiry to the Ministry of 
Interior whether Silesian nationality existed. The answer was that, due to lack 
of a precise definition of a nation in Polish law, everyone had the right to feel 
who they wished. Priest Wuwer sent the letter from the ministry together with 
a declaration on membership of the Silesian nationality to his mother gmina 
requesting that it be included in his personal files. 
In 1996 the Voivodeship Court in Katowice received an application for 
registration of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality pursuant to the Act— 
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Law on Associations." According to the submitted memorandum of association 
of the Union, its objectives included the protection of ethnic rights of persons 
of Silesian nationality (Para. 7), and there was a provision that each person of 
Silesian nationality was eligible to become an ordinary member of the Union 
(Para. 10). Paragraph 30 stated that the Union was an organization of the 
Silesian national minority. 
In June 1997, the District Court of Katowice registered it in spite of the 
negative opinion of the voivode. The voivode questioned the provision of the 
memorandum of association that the Union is an organization of the Silesian 
national minority, while such a nationality does not exist (only an ethnic 
group, if anything), therefore the court registered something that did not exist. 
In addition, the voivode pointed out that the memorandum of association did 
not contain a definition of a "person of Silesian nationality", as a result of 
which the membership of this nationality was left to an arbitrary decision of 
the Union's authorities, which was inconsistent with the Law on Associations. 
The Appeal Court of Katowice supported the voivode"s opinion, holding 
that Silesians could not be treated as a national minority, but only an ethnic 
group. It ruled that a national minority to which one wishes to belong and with 
which the given person identifies himself/herself must objectively exist. One 
cannot determine one's national identity without reference to the basic 
precondition which is the existence of the nation. And the nation exists when 
the general public has no doubts as to its existence."6 
The Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal filed by the would-be 
Union of People of Silesian Nationality and upheld the decision of the Appeal 
Court. It found that registration of the Silesian nationality would infringe the 
law, because "non-existent minority" would enjoy the privileges of national 
minorities, adding that Silesians were not a national minority, but an ethnic 
one. As we have already mentioned, both these definitions are still missing in 
Polish law. Even though, on the day of issue of the judgment, Poland was not 
yet bound by the Framework Convention on National Minorities, the Supreme 
Court referred to an explanatory report to this Convention of 1995, which 
provides that the individual's subjective choice of the nation is inseparably 
linked to objective criteria relevant to the person's national identity. This 
means that a subjective declaration of membership of a specific nationality 
groups implies prior social acceptance of the existence of such a nationality 
group. Therefore even though an individual has the right of subjective choice 
25
 Act of 7 April 1989—Law on Associations, Journal of Laws, 1989, No. 20, item 
1 0 4 . 
26
 Judgment of the Appeal Court of Katowice of 24 September 1997,1 ACa 493/97. 
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of nationality, this does not directly lead to the emergence of a new, distinct 
nationality or national minority. 
The Supreme Court confirmed also that, contrary to appellants' statements, 
refusal to register the Union did not infringe Poland's international commitments, 
because neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides for unlimited freedom of association."7 
Having exhausted the domestic instance procedure, in 1999 the would-be 
members of the Union of People of Silesian Nationality filed a complaint to the 
European Commission on Human Rights in Strasbourg that the Republic of 
Poland violated Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights— 
freedom of association. They considered that Polish courts abused the right 
to assess whether a given—Silesian in this case—nationality exists. After entry 
into force of Protocol 11 to the Convention, the application was referred to the 
Court for examination. 
In the judgment of 20 December 2001, ECHR supported the arguments of 
the Polish government. It pointed out that the applicants' real motive for 
registration was to benefit from electoral preferences. It declared that "rights and 
freedoms of individuals or groups may be limited so as to ensure greater stability 
of the country as a whole, including its democratic electoral system." However, 
it stressed, referring to the existing case law, that the restrictions on freedom of 
association admissible under Article 11 should be interpreted narrowly. 
ECHR did not express its opinion whether Polish courts had the right to 
examine the existence of Silesian nationality. It found, however, that as Polish 
law did not provide for any procedure whereby a national minority could seek 
recognition, for groups not recognized as minorities by bilateral treaties the only 
way was the procedure of registration of the relevant association. Consequently, 
it criticized the Polish state for the lacuna in the law as regards registration of 
membership of a minority, which left a sense of uncertainty for individuals and 
forced them to make use of a procedure designed for a different purpose." 
The Silesian unionists appealed against the judgment. The case was referred 
to the Grand Chamber of ECHR on 2 July 2003 and examined as the first case 
against Poland according to the appeal procedure. The Silesians pointed out that 
refusal to register their union was justified by mere suspicions and suppositions 
as to the future, that is uncertain, activities of the union including the use thereof 
to abuse electoral privileges. The appellants put forward an opinion that 
registration of an union or association is not the same as the registration of an 
27
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 1 8 April 1998, I PKN 4/98. 
8
 Case of Gorzelik and Others v. Poland. Application No. 44158/98. 
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electoral committee. The committees are registered by the State Electoral 
College. If it refuses registration, the case may—upon application of the persons 
concerned—be decided upon by the Supreme Court according to the procedure 
determined in the electoral law. Should it turn out that the Silesians' Union 
abuses the law, its activities may be suspended by the voivode and even the 
association may be dissolved by the court. So if the Court in the previous 
judgment found that the institution of elections should be protected against 
abuse, the procedures that exist in Polish law are sufficient for that purpose. 
The Polish government put forward a counter-argument that registration of 
the union would signify legal recognition of the existence of this nationality. In 
turn, recognition of the existence of this nationality would have important 
political consequences in the light of the Law on Elections to the Sejm and 
Senate of the Republic of Poland, as its Article 134 provides for exemption 
from the 5% electoral threshold for committees of "registered organizations of 
national minorities". In its opinion, the government suggested that main 
objective behind the establishment of the union was to circumvent the above 
provisions of the Law on Elections. 
Decisions on referring an appeal to the Grand Chamber of ECHR are rare. 
When commenting on this fact. Chairman of the Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights, Marek Nowicki, said that this meant that the previous judgment raised 
serious objections of the Court.29 Marek Nowicki supported the opinion of the 
Union of Silesians that the sole criterion relevant for assessing whether a 
national minority exists should be the subjective conviction of the persons 
concerned that they belong to it. Therefore the state has no right to assess such 
membership based on objective preconditions. If fifteen persons wishes to 
establish the association of the minority of dwarves, the state has no right to 
investigate if they really are dwarves. They have the right to associate under 
any banner, provided they do not violate the law. And if the state wants to 
protect its electoral law, it should formulate it differently. 
The National Census, whose results were published in June 2003, showed 
that the Silesian nationality is not only an artificial construction, adopted by its 
advocates in order to take advantage of electoral privileges.30 
The census confirmed that Poland is a nationally homogeneous state, 
since 96,7% respondents declared Polish nationality. As many as 173.000 of 
29 
Cf. the words quoted in the article entitled Narodowosc dozwolona [Permissible 
nationality]. Gazeta Wyborcza of 30 June 2003. 9. 30
 It is symptomatic that the Chief Statistical Office, the body responsible for 
conducting the National Census, when publishing its results on its website uses the term 
"Silesian community" and not "Silesian minority". 
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respondents declared—for the first time in the history of censuses in Poland— 
they belonged to Silesian nationality. So, out of approx. 5 million inhabitants 
of the region, about 3% submitted declarations of membership of Silesian 
nationality. We know, however, that this number would be greater if there 
were broader awareness of the possibility of choosing this option. What came 
as a surprise was the number of persons declaring German nationality— 
153.000 in the whole country—that is, considerably smaller than estimated 
(including estimates of the government and the Helsinki Committee in Poland 
that defined their number at around 300.000).31 
The census was preceded by a wide-ranging awareness-raising action 
organized by the Movement for the Autonomy of Silesia, that there was a 
possibility of declaring Silesian nationality in the census. In a kind of reaction 
to it, the German minority organization conducted a leaflet campaign in which 
it denied the existence of the Silesian minority. 
In the National Census, respondents were asked: "What nationality do you 
belong to?" and the census takers were obliged to use the following definition 
of nationality: "Nationality is a declarative individual feature (based on a 
subjective feeling) of each person, expressing his/her emotional, cultural or 
genealogical (due to parents' origin) links with a certain nation". The nationality 
question was an open one, no possible categories of answers were suggested, 
unlike in the census conducted in Czechoslovakia standing on the verge of 
disintegration in 1991, when the category "Silesian nationality" was used for 
the first time. The definition used in the census question gives right to theore-
tical doubts and allows almost all ethnonyms to be accepted as answers (quite 
frequently the answer "European nationality" was given—sic!). These state-
ments indicating "Silesian nationality" should be understood as a declaration 
of a sense of link with this ethnic group, closer than that the link with the 
Polish or German nations. 
The declaration of national identity in the census is, by definition, unfairly 
simplifying: those having complex or multiple identities have to choose only 
one. The picture becomes simplified and deceptive, but clearer. In sociological 
research of a more nuanced nature than the census, over 50% of respondents in 
31
 The census revealed also that in Poland there are approx. 280.000 of persons with 
double—Polish and German—citizenship, which constitutes slightly more than half of the 
number of persons declaring German nationality. The falling number of members of 
German nationality is connected with the gradually shrinking in each subsequent election 
to the Sejm support for the Social and Cultural Society of Germans in Slqsk Opolski, which 
enjoys the statutory exemption from electoral thresholds (from about 74.000 in 1993 to 
42.000 in 2001). 
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the area of Slqsk Opolski [part of Silesia] declared mixed identity: Silesian and 
German or Silesian and Polish.3" 
If the census confirmed the new phenomenon of the Silesian minority, it 
should be linked with both positive and negative factors. The first category 
should include the fact that now, just before accession to the European Union, 
regional identity is becoming increasingly attractive (and it may be possible to 
acquire certain status and obtain economic support from the Communities), 
and the real attitudes of inhabitants of the region, especially the identification 
with their specific work ethos and the strong sense of family links. The second 
group includes political contestation of pauperization and economic degradation 
of the region (shutting down unprofitable hard coal mines, which were the 
main employers in Silesia), which—in Silesians' opinion—the Polish govern-
ment does not try to prevent.33 
Using sociological criteria one could hardly agree that a Silesian nation or 
even nationality exists. We are rather dealing with a strong ethnic group and 
not a fully-developed nation or even nationality, as nations usually strive for 
an independent state or political independence, use their own languages, have 
their own national territories. In the case of Silesia nobody requests separation, 
regional autonomy at most, there is no Silesian language but rather a groups of 
34 
various dialects of the Polish language, and the ethnic territory is currently 
divided between two states—Poland and the Czech Republic.35 
According to European standards, a national state has full sovereignty to 
grant the status of a national or ethnic minority to ethnic groups that inhabit its 
territory. From this point of view the census results would have little signi-
ficance—Polish authorities would not have to consider Silesians as a nationality. 
But we have to remember that another standard is the so-called self-categori-
zation of citizens, i.e. recognition that—in accordance with Article 3 para. 1 of 
3
" Cf. research by dr Danuta Berlihska quoted by Marek Swiercz in the article Slqzak 
brzmi dumniej [Silesian sounds more proudly]. Slqsk, 2003, No. 8 (94), 6-7. 
33
 Dziadul, J.: Narodziny narodu [The birth of a nation], Polityka, 2003, No. 28 (2409) 
20-22. 
34
 Silesian dialects, unlike the language of Kashubians, a Pomeranian ethnic group that 
forms part of the Polish nation, were not considered as the so-called regional language 
within the meaning of the Council of Europe Charter of Regional or Minority Languages. 
However, some linguists recognize the existence of regional varieties of Polish: the above-
mentioned Kashubian and Silesian. Cf. Dunn, J. A.: The Slavonic Languages in the Post-
Modern Era. www.arts.gla.ac.uk, quoted in the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 17 February 2004 in the case of Gorzelik and Others. 
35
 Szczepanski, M. S.: Narody, narodowosci i spisowe deklaracje [Nations, nationalities 
and census declarations], Slqsk. 2003, No. 8 (94) 8. 
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the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities—"every 
person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to 
be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this 
choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice". 
In the second-instance proceedings, ECHR regarded the census results from 
Silesia as one of the facts of the case worth consideration and quoted them in its 
judgment of 17 February 2004. The judgment of the Grand Chamber was 
consistent with that issued in the first instance. ECHR declared that the 
Republic of Poland did not restrict the applicants' freedom of association as 
such. State authorities did not prevent the concerned parties from associating 
or promoting the particular minority issues, but from creating a legal person 
which—thanks to its memorandum of association and pursuant to the electoral 
law—would obtain special status and electoral preferences. The Court also 
pointed out that Polish courts questioned only those provisions of the articles 
which would grant the Union the right to electoral privileges, approving all the 
remaining ones. The applicants' refusal to make the necessary amendments to 
the memorandum of association shows, according to the Court, a clear 
intention to use the association for political putposes. Summarizing, the Court 
considered that the steps taken by the Polish State in this case were legitimized 
by a "pressing social need" and did not infringe the principle of proportionality, 
therefore refusal to register the association was within the permitted scope of 
restrictions on the right "necessary in a democratic society", as provided for in 
Article 11 para. 2 of the Convention. 
Despite the clear standpoint taken by the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg 
court, the case of union of people of Silesian nationality is not over. Members of 
the Movement for Autonomy of Silesia (whose current number is around 5.000) 
filed a new application to the court for registration of the Union of People of 
Silesian Nationality. These has been one major amendment to the memorandum 
of association presented to the court. Before it was to be an organization of "the 
Silesian national minority", while now—an association of "persons declaring 
they belong to the Silesian nationality", the official name remaining unchanged 
yet. Initiators of registration stress that they do not attempt to acquire the rights 
enjoyed by national minorities and that the union will not enter the political 
scene, but is to cultivate the culture, language and history.36 
36
 Cf. the words of Andrzej Roczniok, who initiated the efforts to register the 
association, in Mniej niz mniejszosc [Less than a minority], Polityka, No. 24 [2456] of 12 
June 2004. 
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I. This idea occurs for the first time in Terence's comedy, Heautontimoroumenos; 
„Neqite tu scilicet / illuc confugies: 'Quid meet? Num mihi datumst? Num. itissi? 
Num ilia oppignerare filiam meant me invito potuit?' Verum illuc, Cherme, / 
dicunt: lus summum saepe summast malitia. "' The situation is the as follows: 
Syrus asks Chermes for money, so that he could help his young master, but in 
order to get the sum he claims that he needs it for Chermes's daughter. The law 
is indoubtedly on Chermes's side, but the unconditioned clinging to the law 
cannot be reconciliated with the pietas and dementia expected from a Roman 
paterfamilias. In order to analyse the summa malitia turning point it is useful to 
peruse some meanings and the most typical occurences of the summus-summa-
summum adjective and the different connotations of the word malitia. In its 
original meaning summits is the Latin equivalent of the Greek hypathos: 
Varro3 and Isidorus Hispalensis4 use it as a grammatical technical term for 
the explanation of the superlativus, while Quintilian applies it for the description 
of rhetorical amplification.5 Used figuratively, it can be encountered in many 
places, both with temporal meaning6 and in relation with social status,7 e.g. 
applied to the optimates and the nobiles8 as the contradiction of the humiles, 
the infima plebs' and the infimus or do.1(1 Isidorus describes the word malitia, 
deriving from the word malus, as the evil thought of mind," it occurs in the 
works of many auctors as the synonym of astutia and calliditas.12 In the prologue 
of Heautontimorumenos Terence mentions e.xpressis verbis the Greek type of 
1
 Terentius: Heautontimoroumenos 792. sqq. 
' Walde, A.—Hofmann, J. В.: Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch /-//. Heidelberg, 
1954. II 630. 
1
 Varro: De lingua Latina 8, 75. 
4
 Isidorus: Origines sive etymologiae 1, 7, 27. 
5
 Qiiintilianus: Institutio oratorio 1, 10. 
' Plautus: Asinaria 534; Persa 33; Pseudolus 374; Cicero: С at о maior de senectute 
78; Suetonius: Tiberius 64, 4. 
7
 Plautus: Cistellaria 516; Amphitruo 77; Captivi 279; Mercator 694; Stichus 409; Persa 
418; Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes 2, 144. 
8
 Plautus: Stichus 492. sq.; Cistellaria 23. sq.; Pseudolus 70; Mercator 604; Terentius: 
Heautontimoroumenos 221. 609; Adelphoe 502. 
9
 Plautus: Cistellaria 24. sq.; Terentius: Eunuchus 489; Hecyra 380; Cicero: Epistulae 
ad Atticum 4, 1,5; Philippica in M. Antonium 2, 3. 
10
 Carcaterra, A.: 'lus summum saepe summast malitia'. In: Studi in onore di E. 
Vol terra, Milano 1971. IV. 631. sqq. 
" Isidorus: Differentiae 1, 358. Cogitatio prova mentis malitia appellatur. 
1 2 . , 
Isidorus: Origines sive etymologiae 10, 6. Astutus ab astu vocatus, quid est callidi et 
cauti nominis, qui possit sine periculo fortiter aliquid facere;. Cf. Carcaretta: op. cit. 638. 
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his comedy, " which, with regard to the above cited proverbium, can most 
probably be identified with two lines by Menander,14 though the two ideas do 
not correspond word for word.'5 Terence speaks about ius, whereas Menander 
mentions nomoi, i. e. the laws and not dikaion\ the synchophantés has a slightly 
wider semantic meaning than malitia, which could be translated into Latin as 
damnum, calumnia or malum, in any way designating a content in contradiction 
with the spirit and destination of ius.16 The lian akribós can be equally translated 
by the phrase summo iure or ni mi s e.xacto quodam studio}1 Hence it becomes 
obvious that Terence heavily altered the Menandrian thought and adapted it to 
the circumstances of Roman legal life but preserved its basic message.18 
Hieronymus takes his version from this Terentian locus: „О ve re ius summum 
summa malitia. "I9 A statement with similar content (summum ius summa crux) 
is formulated by Columella, when he deals with the responsibilities of the pater 
familias and the dominus: „сот iter agat cum colonis facilemque se prebeat, ... 
sed пес dominus in unaquaque re, cui colomon obligaverit, tenax esse sui iuris 
debet, sicut in diebus pecuniarum vel lignis et ceteris paucibus accessionibus 
exigendis, quorum cura maiorem molestiam quam impensam rusticis adfert. Nee 
sane vindicandum nobis quidquid licet, nom summum ius antiqui summam 
putabant crucem. "20 So it is forbidden to deal too harshly with the colonii, the 
master should exercise the virtues of meekness and consideration.21 
The proverbium passed into legal common knowledge in Cicero's formu-
lation in De Officiis: „Existant saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis 
callida, sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud 'summum ius summa 
iniuria' factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium."" Consequently, it is not 
13
 Terentius: Heautontimoroumenos 4-5. 
14
 Menandr. Nr. 545. 
13
 About the question of contaminatio in Terence's comedies see Rieth: Die Kunst des 
Menanders in den Adelplten des Terenz. Hildesheim, 1964. 
16
 Donatus: Commentarius a. h. I. Summum ius saepe summa est malitia id enim, 
quod datum est, utique reddendum est, sed iure cautum est, ut filia quidquid acceperit 
vel filiae nomine datum fuerit, quae in familia est, non recte datum videatur. Itaque 
aequitatis est ut debitum solvi debeat, ius est lit sic datum reddatur: ita summum ius 
summa malitia. 
17
 Carcaterra: op. cit. 641. 
18 Carcaterra: op. cit. 644. 
Hieronymus: Epistulae 1, 44. 
"Columella: De re rustica 1,7, 1. sq. 
21
 Fuhrmann, M.: Philologische Bemerkungen zur Sentenz 'Summum ius, summa 
injuria', In: Studi in onore di E. Voltéira, Milano, 1971. II. 74. 
22 
Cicero: De officiis 1, 33. 
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the ius itself that results in iniuria, but the malevolent enforcement of a 
seemingly lawful claim is the case, when injustice is committed unter the 
mask of law enforcement." Taking into consideration the bequeathing of the 
proverbium, one can safely assert that the Terentian and Columellian versions 
are more closely connected to each other than to the Ciceronian! antithesis, and 
that they represent an earlier stage in the formulation of this thought.24 In these 
two authors' work the clash of the legal and moral norms becomes fore-
grounded, i. e. the action permitted and approved by the ius becomes a subject 
of contest from the side of the mos.25 The Ciceronian formulation goes even 
further: it is not only the legal and ethical norm that conflict here, the collision 
takes place within the legal system.26 The claim is made not only for a morally 
correct decision but also for the right and justified application of the law. The 
proverb objects to the abuse of the law, to its literal and not sensible inter-
pretation."7 (The phrase factum etiam tritum sermone proverbium could refer to 
the fact that Cicero himself took over the idea of summum ius summa iniuria 
from an earlier auctor or the practice of the forum. It can be also assumed that 
he is referring to his own rhetorical practice when he emphasises the great 
familiarity of the proverb, as he frequently used the summo iure agere and the 
summo iure contendere phrases, too." ) 
However, he greatly exceeds the requirement of equitable legal interpretation 
in De legibus, where, among other things, he analyses the connection between 
natural law and positive law."4 In this work Cicero appears as legislator—as his 
model Plato30 does in Nomoi2[—, a thing which must have seemed extremely 
"
3
 Bürge, A: Die Juristenkomik in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena, Zurich, 1974. 53; Földi 
A.—Hamza G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History an Institutes of Roman 
Law). Budapest, 2004. (9lh edition) 73. 
Stroux, J.: 'Summum ius, summa iniuria' Ein Kapitel der Geschichte der inter-
pretatio iuris, Berlin—Leipzig 1926. 21; Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1971. 74. 
Stroux: op. cit. 49. 
26
 Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1971. 75. 
Büchner, K.: Summum ius summa iniuria. In: Humanitas Romana. Heidelberg, 1957. 
102; Tomulescu, C. S.: Der juristische Wert des Werkes Ciceros. In: Gesellschaft und 
Recht im griechisch-römischen Altertum. Berlin, 1968. I. 230. 
8
 Cicero: In Verrem 6, 4. Non agam summo iure tecum, non dicam id quod deheam 
forsitan obtinere, cum indicium certa lege sit.; Epistulae ad Atticum 16, 15, 1. Ego ... 
dubitassem fartasse utrum remissior essem an summo iure contenderem. 
4
 Tomulescu: op. cit. 230. 
30
 Cicero: De legibus 1, 15. 
11
 Cf. Görgemanns, H.: Beiträge zur Interpretation von Piatons Nomoi, München, 
I960; Morrow, G. R.: Plato's Cretan City, Princeton, 1960. 
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new, almost provoking indignation, because doing this he intended to reform 
and replace the venerated leges XII fabularum," thus occupying the place of 
the nation who made these laws." The first book contains considerations of 
legal theory, which was practically unknown in Rome in the 1st century ВС. It 
aims at harmonizing statutory law with natural law because this was the only 
way Roman law could lay claim to universality.34 From the demand of ius 
naturale neither the comitia, nor the senatus can give exemption, this being 
eternal and unchanging. The fundamental task of the legislator and the judge is 
to porceed according to this,35 and the task of the law is to separate the lawful 
from the unlawful.36 The law and the ratio are inseparably connected, 
moreover, they are each other's synonyms in a certain respect; so the law must 
originate directly from philosophy and not from the pretoriai edict or the leges 
37 
XII fabularum, thus it can never lose its validity. He formulates in a strictly 
imperative mood the demand never before written down in Rome: „Lex iusta 
38 
estol" Law must be based on Justice, which might seem trivial in itself, but 
Cicero had felt the lack of this condition himself; thus the law solely depends 
on Justice, and social cohabitation depends only on the law, this conclusion 
must have seemed considerably bold in ancient Rome.34 Cicero, appearing in 
philosophy as a great system originator, wanted to encompass law in a system 
as well as in his work—unfortunately lost since then—entiteled De iure civili in 
artem redigendo, which does not seem to have exerted much influence on legal 
scholars in Rome.40 
Returning to summum ius summa iniuria: it was quite common that certain 
maxims formulated in everyday life and transmitted through literary sources 
were appropriated by Law as rules of universal validity. Just as example, I 
enumerate hereby a couple of proverbia becoming regulae iuris.41 Aquila 
32
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 23. 59. 
33
 Knoche, U.: Ciceros Verbindung der Lehre vom Naturrecht mit dem römischen 
Recht und Gesetz, In: Cicero ein Mensch seinerzeit, hg. Radke, G. Berlin, 1968. 41. 
34
 Hamza, G.: A ius naturale a Corpus Ciceronianumban (The ius naturale in the 
Corpus Ciceronianum). In: Hereditas Ciceroniana. Debrecen, 1995. 75. sqq. 
35
 Cicero: De re publica 3, 22. 
36
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 13. 
37
 Cicero: De legibus 1, 18; 2, 14. 
38
 Cicero: De legibus 1,18. 
34
 Knoche: op. cit. 46. sqq. 
4(1
 Lübtow, U. v.: Cicero und die Methode der römischen Jurisprudenz. In: Festschrift 
für L. Wenger. München, 1944. I. 232. 
41
 Carcaterra: op. cit. 663. 
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Romanus quotes the sentence „cui quod libet, hoc licet",4' which can be found 
in Ulpianus as „поп опте quod licet honestum est".44 Publius Syrus's thought, 
„lucrum absque damno alieno fieri non potest"44 resonates with Pomponius's 
rule: „iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri 
locupletiorem".45 Seneca maior's sentence „tacite loquitur; silentium videtur 
confessio"4b corresponds with Paulus's „qui tacet, non utique fatetur: sed 
tarnen verum est eum non negare".41 
II. In order to highlight the origin and the meaning of the word interpretatio, 
let us examine the loci to see in what context the concept interpres and 
interpretari in Plautus, and other, mainly fragmentary bequethed authors of 
archaic Roman literature. In Poennulus the slave says that the speech of his 
master could only be made intellegible by Oedipus, who solved the enigma of 
48 
the Sphinx too. In Pseudolus the content of an undecipherable letter could be 
solved only by the Sybilla.4" Both cases are concerned with the deciphering the 
meaning of extremely intricate texts, which can be done exclusively by 
oracula, the solvers of great predictions, of mythical secrets, so the author 
draws the activity of interpretari into the scope of religious mysteries and 
endows it with the meaning of decoding, of solving an enigma.50 In Bacchides, 
the importunate messenger is made to leave in a comic fashion but with quite 
resolutely, by the use of very palpable means,51 to which the messenger, who 
interpreted the highly paraphrased threat for himself thought it better to 
proceed more cautiously." In Cistellaria a father makes out from the words of 
4
 Aquila Romanus: Defiguris sententiarum 27. 
43
 Ulp. D. 50, 17, 144. 
44
 Publilius Syrus: Sentential' L, 6. 
45
 Pomp. D. 50, 17, 206. 
40
 Seneca: Controversial' 10, 2, 6. 
47
 Paul. D. 50, 17, 142 
48
 Plautus: Poennulus 443. sc/. Isti ... orationi Oedipo opust coniectore, qui Sphingi 
interpres fuit. 
4
 Plautus: Pseudolus 25. sq. Has ... credo, nisi Sibulia legerit, interpretari alium 
posse neminem. 
50
 Fuhrmann, M.: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, in: Sympotica F. Wieacker. 
Göttingen, 1970. 82. 
31
 Plautus: Bacchides 595. sq. Ne tibi hercle baud longe est os ab infortunio, ita 
dentifragibuia haec meis manibus gestiunt. 
«a 
Plautus: Bacchides 597. Cum ego indus verba interpreter, mihi cautiost. 
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the hetaira speaking with him that she seduced her son; in this case it is not 
the enigmatic words and composition of the interlocutor where one should 
draw conclusions from, but it is rather the conclusion drawn from the situation, 
the subjective opinion that is denominated by the word interpreter.44 Refreshing 
the interlocutor's memory, recalling a certain event can also be signified by the 
verb interpretari,55 elsewhere the revealer, the solver of a doubtful situation, or 
the implementor of a plan is called the interpres. In the last case it is the 
synonym of Internuntius46 Thus Plautus uses the expressions interpres and 
interpretari with two connotations, on the one hand in their original sense, 
meaning mediation, on the other hand in the sense of understanding, making to 
understand, a more abstact and indirect meaning; this latter meaning including 
a kind of irrational activity, pertaining to the realm of the religio.41 This seems 
to be corroborated by the fragments after Plautus and before Cicero. A 
Pacuvian fragment connects the task of the interpres with the interretive 
58 
activity of the augures and haruspices and it mentions a sinister prodigium, 
placing the interpretive activity within the context of Roman religious 
institutions. 4 A fragment from a Latin translation of the Ilias contains a line 
from Agamemnon's reply to Calchas's premonition; comparing it to the 
Homeric text it becomes evident that interpres here stands for the Greek 
mantis.60 It is also a fragment by Pacuvius, according to which the activity of 
the interpretari in the course of interpreting obscure texts is at certain times 
doomed to highly uncertain guesses.61 Based on this, we can assume that in the 
beginning the interpres mediated not only between humans but also between 
the human and the divine sphere, so in the course of fulfilling his task, besides 
53
 Plautus: Cistellaria 316. sqq. Seil cum dicta huius interpreter, haec herclest, ut 
ego opinor, meum quae corrumpit filium. Suspiciost earn esse, utpote quam numquam 
videro; de opinione credo. 
54
 Fuhrmann: lnterpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 84. 
55
 Plautus: Epidicus 552. 
7(1
 Plautus: Miles gloriosus 798. 951. sq. 962. 
77
 Fuhrmann: lnterpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 84. 
8
 Pacuvius v. 80. sqq. (Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmente, ed. Ribbeck, O., 
Leipzig, 1871.) Cives, antiqui amici maiorum meum, consilium socii, augurium atque 
e.xtum interprétés, postquam prodigium horriferum, portentum pavos. 
59 
About the aurures and haruspices cf. Latte, К.: Römische Religionsgeschichte, 
München, 1967. 141. 158. 60
 Matius frg. 2. (Fragmente Poetarum Latinorum, ed. W. Morel, Leipzig 1927.) 
Obsceni interpres funestique ominis auctor.; Cf. 11. 1, 106. sq. 
w
 Pacuv. v. 151. sq. (Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta, ed. Ribbeck, O. Leipzig, 
1871.) Nil coniectura quivi interpretarier, quorsum flexiloqua dictio contenderet. 
3 0 8 TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
everyday logic he had to employ certain means belonging to the realm of the 
irrational as well.'1" 
For the religious usage of these expressions one can find ample evidence in 
the Corpus Ciceronianum and other authors from the contemporary Roman 
literature; augures, haruspices, decemviri and Persian magi are mentioned as 
interprétés,63 premonitions, miraculous and sinister signs, thunderstrucks, 
dreams, religious phenomena, and generally the will of the gods, all pertaining 
to the sphere of religio, constitute the object of interpretari.M In many cases 
the expressions interpres and conieetor serve as each other's explanation, 
highlighting each other.67 According to Cicero, this interpretive activity is 
necessary because of the obscure and doubtful nature of certain religious 
phenomena. It is not surprising however that the concept of interpretatio was 
eagerly connected to obscure and polisemic contents outside the circle of 
religio too, e. g. in philosophical polemic.66 
In accordance with sacral connotations the most practical, everyday use of 
interpres can also be founded, it occurs in diplomatic, administrative, military 
and commercial fields too. In these cases the interpres is noone other than 
interpreter or translator. In the sources the interpreter translates word for word, 
verbum pro verbo, and in this respect he can be regarded as the contrary of the 
rhetor, who possibly takes over a thought from somebody else, but enriches 
and embellishes it with elements of style when delivering it to the audience.67 
Cicero himself used these possibilities of individualisation when he translated 
the speeches of Greek rhetors into Latin, an in his philosophical works with 
respect to the employment of Greek models.68 Horace, giving advice to poets, 
in his Ars Poecita is against word for word translation performed in the 
h
" Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 85. 
63
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 20; Philippica in M. Antonium 13, 12; De natura deorum 2, 
12; 3, 5; De divinatione 1, 3. 4. 46; 2, HO; Livius: Ab itrbe condita 10, 8, 2; Gellius: 
Noctes Atticae 4, 1, 1. 
64
 Cicero: De legibus 2, 20. 30; De divinatione 1, 3. 45. 92. 93. 116; Pro M. Aemilio 
Scauro 30; De domo sua 107; Quintilianus: Institutio oratorio 3, 6, 30; Plinius: 
Naturalis história 2, 141; 7, 203; Gellius: Noctes Atticae 4, 1, 1; Valerius Maximus: 
Facta et dicta memorabilia I, 5. 6. 
65
 Cicero: De natura deorum 2, 12; De divinatione I, 118; 2, 62. 66. 144; 
Quintilianus: Institutio oratorio 3, 6, 30. 
99
 Cicero: De divinatione I. 1166; De natura deorum 1, 39; Quintilianus: Institutio 
oratorio 3, 4, 3. 
97
 Cicero: De finibus bonorum et malorum 3, 15; Hieronymus: Epistulae 57, 5. 
98
 Cicero: De optima g eue re oratorum 14; De legibus 2, 17; De officiis 1, 6; 2, 60; 
De oratore 1, 23; Academica priora 2. 1,6; De finibus bonorum et malorum 1, 6. 
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manner of the interpres?4 Quintilian challenges a poet's originality precisely 
because of his being an interpres?0 Interpretatio as a technical term first 
occurs in rhetorics namely in Auctor ad Herennium' s discourse concerning 
rhetoric figures, according to which a kind of geminatio\ the conduplicatio 
only differs from interpretatio in that the verbum pro verbo translation is a 
form-and-content.true transfer of a train of thought from a different language 
whereas conduplicatio is the same activity within a single language.71 
Quintilian does not consider the interpretatio to be a rhetoric figure as it was 
previously by Cornificius, but sees in it only an exercise to be used in the 
course of rhetoric training.7" In certain cases interpretatio means the 
etymological analysis of words and the most precise rendering in Latin of the 
Greek technical terms, in course of which, as Cicero warns, one should avoid 
excessive hair splitting.73 
It can be concluded that in the Ciceromian age the expression interpres 
was used in two clearly separable meanings. On the one hand it was used as 
interpres deorum, for the definition of the person enlightening phenomena 
from the sphere of religio, transmitting the divine will towards the human 
realm, on the other hand (as the religious semantic content did not entirely 
occupy this concept) it was used for denoting the interpreter and translator 
mediating in human communication by bridging linguistic impediments.74 
As a scientific technical term, the word interpres first became widely used in 
the fields of philology and legal science. Cicero does not call the philologists 
interprétés,75 according to Suetonius's relations however Cornelius Nepos 
already mentions them as poetarum interprétés?' In the field of legal science 
» 77 
Livius remembers Tullus Hostilius as „clemens legis interpres", though this 
wording is slightly anachronistic as the king did not interpret or translate the 
69
 Horatius: Ars poetica 133. sq. Nec verbum pro verbo curabis reddere fidus 
interpres. 
"Quintiiianus: Restitutio oratorio 10, 1, 87. 
71
 Auctor ad Herennium 4, 38; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1970. 88. 
7
~ Quintiiianus: Institutio oratorio 9, 3, 98; 10, 5, 5. 
73
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 1; Topica 35; De officiis 2, 5; De finibus bonorum et 
malorum 3. 15; Livius: Ab urbe condita 1, 44, 4; Seneca: De benefieiis 1, 3, 6; Gellius: 
Noctes Atticae 4, 9, 9; Quintiiianus: Institutio oratorio 5, 10, 8; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 
1970. 89; Flashar, H.; Formen der Aneingnung griechischer Literatur durch die 
Übersetzung, Arcadia 3. 1968. 
74
 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 91. 
71
 Cicero: De divinatione 1, 34. 
76
 Suetonius: De grammaticis 4. 
77
 Livius: Ab urbe condita 1, 26, 8. 
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78 
law concerning provocatio, he only faciliated its implementation. In Pliny's 
Naturalis História the Ephesian Hermodoros QppCcirs as the intcrprcs of the 
leges XII fabularum but it means only translator,74 just as in Pomponius's text 
80 
the mentioning of Hermodoros as auctor means the same. However in 
connection with the lex Valeria, dating from 449 ВС., conferring the status of 
sacrosanctus on the trinuni plebis, aediles and the indices decemviri, Livius 
already speaks about the interprétés as a genuine legal technical term, as they 
81 
tried to establish the correct interpretation of this law in long legal debates. 
Both the explanators of the leges XII fabularum, driven by an archeological 
interest, usually searching for the meaning of a forgotten word, and the iuris 
prudentes of the near past are mentioned as interprétés in the 1. century ВС. 
sources.8" Cicero does not simply call the lawyers of his time interprétés 
83 
iuris—as it was later used by Quintilian as the equivalent of iuris consultus — 
but rather he defines the task of interpretari as a basic component of the iuris 
84 
consultus's activity, at times narrowing its scope using synonyms.' In De 
oratore, in the parts concerned with establishing the place and importance of 
the auxiliary sciences of rhetorics from the point of view of the theory of 
science and dialectics Cicero does not mention interpretation Cicero, in his 
work entiteled Brutus — dealing with the history of Roman rhetorics — in the 
loci dedicated to his friend, one of the most outstanding lawyers of the age, 
Servius Suplicius,86 makes some remarks concerning certain cases of 
interpretatio (primary highlighting its task to clarify and order obscure and 
doubtful states of affairs), but neglects to make its methodology and inner 
construction an object of scrunity; in the course of this he fails to mention the 
78
 Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 92. 
74
 Plinius: Naturalis história 43, 21. 
80
 Pomp. D. 1,2, 2, 4. 
81
 Livius: Ah urbe conclita 3, 55, 8. 
82
 Cicero: De oratore I, 193; De legibus 2, 59; Brutus 144: Philippica in M. 
Antonium 9, 10; Cf. Fuhrmann: op. cit. 1970. 92. sq. 
83
 Quintilianus: Institutio oratorio 3, 6, 59; Cf. C. 1, 14, 12, 5; 7, 4, 17. pr.; 6, 29, 4. 
pr.; 6, 23, 30. 
84
 Cicero: Pro Balbo 20; Pro Caecina 70; De oratore 1, 199; De legibus 1, 14; De 
officiis 2, 65. 
83
 Cicero: De oratore 1, 185-192; Cf. К. Barwick: Das rednerische Bildungsideal 
Ciceros, Berlin 1963. 7. sqq. 
88
 About Servius Sulpicius Rufus see Schulz, F.: Geschichte der römischen 
Rechtswissenschaft, Weimar 1961. 65; Stein. P.: The place of Servius Sulpicius Rufus in 
the development of Roman legal science. In: Festschrift für Wieacker F., Göttingen, 
1978. 176. sqq. 
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instances of interpretatio iuris when the iuris consultas is dealing with the 
applicability and modes of application of perfectly clearly formulated legal 
87 
texts containing decrees of general validity. 
In legal texts, the expression interpres can seldom be encountered, and not 
88 
as a technical term, it usually means translator or interpreter here and only in 
specific cases does it signify the person doing the interpretation, the one searching 
89 . . . 
for the meaning of texts. The derivations interpretari and interpretatio 
beyond any doubts mean the interpretive activity performed by lawyers and 
forums administrating justice. Following Fuhrmann's thematization, this inter-
pretive activity could refer to different legal transactions (e. g. testamenta, 
stipulationes, contractus), to the laws in general, to criminal laws, to verdicts 
in criminal cases, imperial privileges, and certain concrete decrees resulting 
from the leges XII fabularum, other laws, the pretoriai edict, senatus consulta 
and constitutiones,90 In certain cases the meaning of interpretari ranges from 
interpretation to assumption and establishing. " Based on this, the formational 
and developmental process of the meaning of interpretari become visible. In 
the preclassical age, interpretatio often occurs in the spheres of religion and 
mantics, i. e. indicating the mediation between the divine and human spheres. 
However, from Cicero's time the latest, it became to mean the translator's 
and interpreter's activity, i. e. a secularised activity, mediating only between 
87
 Cicero: Brutus 152. Cf. Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 
96. sq. 
88
 Ulp. D. 45, 1, 1, 6; Pomp. D. 49, 15, 5, 3; Gai. inst. 3, 93. 
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 Paul. D. 1,3, 37. Optima est legum interpres consuetude. 
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D. 7, 8, 12, 2; Mod. 31, 34, 1. Stipulationes: Proc. D. 50, 16, 125; Cels. 45. 1, 99. pr.; 
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24; Pap. D. 17, 2, 81; Paul. D. 50, 17, 172. pr.; Ulp. D. 23, 4, 11. Laws in general: Cels. 
D. 1, 3, 18; lui. D. 1, 3, 11; Paul. D. 1, 3, 23. 37; Ulp. 1, 3, 13; Mod. D. 1, 3, 25. 
Criminal laws and criminal cases: Paul. 50, 17, 155, 2; Herrn. D. 48, 19, 42. Privilegs: 
lav. D. 1, 4, 3; Paul. D. 28, 6, 43. pr. Leges XII fabularum: Pomp. D. 40, 7, 21. pr.; 50, 
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49, 14, 40. Edicta: Paul. D. 13, 5, 17; Ulp. D. 12, 1, 1. pr.; 13, 5, 18, 1; 13, 6, 1, 1; 25, 4, 
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 Cels. D. 48, 19, 21; Nerva D. 25, 1, 15; lui. D. 50, 16, 201; Afr. D. 47, 2, 62. 6; 
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humans. From this time both grammar and rhetorics, and on their analogy 
jurisprudence, began to use it as their own technical term." 
III. Celsus's famous statement „ius est ars boni et aequi"—transmitted by 
Ulpianus—occurs as the opening idea of Iustinian Digesta, according to this, 
whoever intends to deal with law should first know where its name comes 
from. Ius got its name from iustitia—as Celsus astutely defines—law is the art 
of the good and the equitable." Following this train of thought, Ulpianus states 
that lawyers should exercise their profession as a priestly vocation, because 
they must respect justice, propagate the knowledge of the good and the 
equitable, separating the legal from the illegal, the permissible from the 
forbidden. '4 Later Ulpianus defines justice as an unceasing and eternal effort to 
give everybody their due right. Therefore the commandments of the law are 
the following: to live decently, not to hurt anyone, to give everybody their 
due." This definition being considerably well known, there is not need of 
further explanation. In concordance with this Ulpianus expressis verbis calls 
the magistrates' attention to the fact that unlawful procedures are forbidden. 
As far as judges are concerned—for whom it is also forbidden to proceed with 
partiality, prejudice, or generally incorrectly—they must keep in mind the 
principle of aequitas, especially in the cases in which their personal conside-
ration is of greater importance.46 The mere memorization of the legal material 
is not equivalent with the genuine knowledge of law, as Celsus emphasises, 
and he strongly blames the lawyers who do not want to consider the entire law 
when solving a case, and who only present an arbitrarily selected portion even 
while justifying their responsa.91 The „suum cuique tribuere" principle is in 
remarkable resonance with that locus of Cicero's Topiea which defines the ius 
civile as the aequitas established for the people living in the same state with 
92 
Fuhrmann: Interpretatio—Notizen zur Wortgeschichte, op. cit. 99. sq. 93
 Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1. luri operám daturum prias nosse oportet, linde потен iuris 
descendat. Est autem a iustitia appellation: nam, ut eleganter Celsus définit, ius est ars 
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% Ulp. D. 47, 10, 32; 5, 1. 15, 1; Gai. D. 50, 13,6; C. 3, I, 13,6; Tryph. D. 16,3,31. pr. 
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 Cels. D. 1,3, 17. 24. Cf. Polaeek, A.: lus est ars aequi et boni. In: Studi in onore di 
A. Biscardi. Milano, 1982. II. 27. sq. 
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the scope of preserving their goods.9'3 Regarding the Corpus Ciceronianum, in 
the speech delivered in defence of L. Licinius Murena, this contradiction is 
throughly highlighted: in connection with certain legal institutions of marital 
law (coemptio tutelae evitandae causa, coemptio sacrorum interimendorum 
causa)," which became empty and troublesome by the time of Cicero, the 
rhetor formulates:100 „In omni denique iure civili aequitatem relinquerunt, verba 
ipsa tenuerunt. "1<и So, criticism is not directed against the keystone of the state, 
the laws,102 only against legal practitioners and their methods of interpretation. 
The loci from the Corpus Ciceronianum referring to aequitas—with special 
regard to Cicero's theoretical works—can be classified in the following 
categories.103 In certain cases aequitas appears as the opposite of ius,104 in 
other cases one can find the trinity of aequitas-ius-lex, which divides the 
concept of law in a very special way.105 On the one hand it divides justice into 
a ius based on lex, on the other hand into a ius based on aequitas. 106 Elsew-
here—e. g. in Pro Caecina—aequitas is none other than the means of inter-
pretatio iuris.107 A third different group is constituted by the loci where 
aequitas is mentioned as a synonym of ius.m In his philosophical works 
aequitas appears in many thoughts as a projection, a form of iustitia, being the 
foundation of human relationships.104 It brings us closer to our present topic of 
discussion if we try to trace the occurences of aequitas in Cicero's speeches 
and his correspondence. In certain characterisations it appears as a personal 
48
 Cicero: Topica 2, 9. Ius civile est aequitas constitute eis, qui eiusdem civitatis sunt 
ad res suas obtinendas. 
44
 Cf. Benedek, F: Die conventio in tnanum und die Förmlichkeiten der 
Eheschließung im römischen Recht, PTE Dolg. Pécs, 1978. 19. sqq. 
100
 Cic. Mur. 27. Mulieres omnes propter infirmitatem consilii maiores in tutorum 
potestate esse voluerunt, Iii invenerunt genera tutorum, quae potestate nndierum 
continetur. Sacra interire noluerunt, horum ingenio senes ad coempionales faciendas 
interimendorum sacrorum causa reperd sunt. 
101
 Cicero: Pro Murena 27. 
1
 "" Cicero: De legibus 1,14. 
103
 Ciulei, G.: Les rapports de l'équité avec le droit et la justice dans l'oeuvre de 
Cicéron, RHD 1968. 640. sqq.. 
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 Cicero: De inventione 32; Partitiones oratoriae 28; Pro Caecina 36; De oratore 
I, 56. 
105
 Cicero: Topica 5. 7. 
I0<
' Ciulei: op cit. 642. 
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 Cicero: Partitiones oratoriae 39: De re publica 5, 2. 
108
 Cicero: Topica 2. 24; Partitiones oratoriae 37. 
"" Cicero: De re publica 1, 2; Laelius de amicitia 22; De officiis 1, 19; Topica 23. 
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characteristic feature,110 this is the way he characterises Scipio1" and Servius 
Sulpicius,"2 and he expects every Roman in office to possess this quality, he 
finds it particulary desirable in the case of judges."3 At the same time iustitia 
appears only as an exception as somebody's personal feature in Ciceronian 
characterisations."4 Aequitas, often mentioned together with ius, not only as its 
complementary, is considered an ethical norm playing an important role in the 
administration of law."5 So it does not appear as the kind of equity that would 
give the judge the possibility to reach a decision in contradiction with written 
law because this way the verdict could easily become unjust, coming to a 
result contradictory with its aim."6 
Let us take a quick view—following Pringsheim's statements—to the changes 
that the concept of aequitas underwent after Cicero, as the complementary and 
opposite of ius, and see how the concepts of ius aequum and ius strictum are 
formed.117 The ius aequum adjectival construction does not mean the legal 
interpretation, used in an abstract sense, based on equity, but the adjective 
aequus means, both in literary and legal sources, according to its original 
sense, the equal right, identically available for everybody.118 Basically, it is not 
the ius that is divided into ius aequum and ius strictum, but aequitas appears as 
a principle regulating, at times correcting ius, at times harmonising with it, at 
times constituting a contradictory principle, which however, has never been 
defined at the level of an abstract definition, probably due to a lack of effort."4 
In the time of the dominate aequitas kept gaining terrain from ius, a turning 
point in this being was Constantinus's legislation who on the one hand 
declared that the emperor alone is entiteled to interpret the difference between 
ius and aequitas, on the other hand, he made aequitas the synonym of iustitia 
110
 Cicero: Ad Quintum fratrem I, 1, 45. 
' " Cicero: In Verrem 5, 81. 
11 
Cicero: Adfamiliares 4, 4, 3; Philippica in M. Antonium 9, 10. 113
 Cicero: De lege agraria 2, 102; Pro M. Tuilio 8; Pro L. Valerio Flacco 49; Pro 
Cluentio 5. 159. 
114
 Cicero: Ad familiares 13, 28 A, 2; 13, 66, 2; Cf. Bürge: op. cit. 49. sqq. 
" Cicero: De oratore I, 86. 173; Cf. Schulz op. cit. 90; F. Pringsheim: lus aequum 
und ius strictum, ZSS 42. 1921. 643. sqq. 
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 Cicero: Philippica in M. Antonium 5, 20; De imperio Cn. Pompei 58; Cf. Bürge: 
op. cit. 52. 
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 Cicero: In Verrem 3, I 18; Livius: Ah urhe condita 38, 50, 9; Tacitus: Annales 3, 
27; Seneca: Epistulae ad Lucidum 86, 2; Tryph. D. 29, 1, 18, 1; Paul. D. 46, 1, 55; C. 3, 
36, 11; 6, 58, 15, I. 
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Paul. D. 50, 17, 90; 44, 4, 1, 1; Ulp. D. 2, 14, 52, 3. Cf. Pringsheim: op. cit. 644. 
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and ius iustitiaque, ranking these above ius (strictum). ' This idea was later 
taken over by Iustinian legal science, so the sources reflect the clear dominance 
of aequitas, to which the concepts of humanitas, iustitia, benignitas, utilitas and 
bona fides121 are associated, 122 leaving to ius the meaning of strict, limited 
and—sit venia verbo—narrow-minded law, clinging to a rigid, word for word 
interpretation.1-1 The expression ius strictum cannot be found in the literary 
sources of the classical period, indicium strictum is used as a technical term 
of rhetorical works.124 In Statius's Silvae strictae leges are opposed with 
aequum;12s ius strictum only becomes an unquestionable technical term in 
Iustinian's legal work.1"'' 
Returning to Cicero, the expressions „summo iure agere" and „summo iure 
contendere" indicate the use of the whole range of posibilities offered by the 
law,127 which in itself does not mean legal practice contradictory with aequitas, 
its being proper or improper becomes clear only in the concrete situation. At 
times Cicero has the possibility to be lenient, but the hostile behaviour of the 
opponent can make him legitimately act against this with the strictest means of 
the law, keeping in mind not only his personal interests but the interests of the 
state as well.'"s (In connection with the summum ius being dependent on the 
specific situation, both Stroux1"9 and Bürge130 quote as a literary example, the 
scene from Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice in which, Portia as judge uses 
the literal, instead of the sensible interpretation of the law against Shylock, 
reluctant to accept the doge's more equitable proposal, finally making him 
withdraw.131) Although aequitas as the principle of interpretatio is not 
120
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121
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formulated expressis verbis in connection with causa Curiana, treated by 
Cicero, the contradiction between lnterpretatio restrictiva and lnterpretatio 
extensiva being discussed here, regarding its content, it seems to belong to its 
essence. The basic question concerning the facts of the case is whether the 
substitutio papillaris112 can also be regarded as substitutio vulgaris,133 and 
connected to this, the question whether the so-designed heir is also the heir of 
the bequeather, should also be answered.134 Q. Mucius Scaevola argued for 
the restrictive, L. Licinius Crassus argued for the extending interpretation. 
Consequently, both of them referred to auctores substantiating their opinion. 
Moreover, Crassus, employing the weapon of humor, made fun of the obsolete 
formulation of the legal text, thus ridiculing its restrictive interpretation.'35 
(The decision made in causa Curiana did not prove to be of long-lasting value 
from the point of view of legal science, as we know about several later 
sententiae contradictory with this.136) As we have seen neither Cicero, nor other 
137 
Roman legal scientists, basically reluctant to abstract definitions, determined 
the uncontradictory concept of aequitas. Therefore the decisiveness of the 
attempt to solve the scriptum-voluntas contradiction, emphasised by Stroux in 
138 
connection with the causa Curiana, loses its validity because the aequitas 
did not act as a basic principle of judgement, but rather as a rhetorical orna-
ment.13' Crassus, who in the causa Curiana acted as patrocinium aequitatis, in 
another case proved to be the advocate of ius strictum. M. Marius Gratidianus 
sold a plot to C. Sergius Orta, from whom he had bought the same plot a few 
years earlier. The plot was loaded with servitudes,140 about which Sergius Orta, 
as the former owner must have had knowledge, however, at the signing of the 
contract, Gratidianus did not mention the Servitutes, though this would have 
been his duty.141 In the case of actio empti the seller is responsible for the dolus, 
the judge had to decide whether Gratidianus proceeded dolose or not; the 
advocati of the parts had a great opportunity to influence the index, using 
rhetoric devices based on legal science.'42 As Cicero remarks too, in this case 
l3
~ Gai. inst. 2, 179. Cf. Finazzi, G.: La sostituzionepupillare, Napoli, 1997. 
133
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Antonius based his reasoning on aequitas, opposed to him, Crassus clung to the 
more restrictive interpretation. The appearance of these poles in the same case 
strongly resonates with the training practice of rhetoricians, according to which 
the magister divided the case to be discussed among the students in a way that 
half of them had to defend their point of view based on the aequitas, the other 
half based on ius strictum, then they changed the roles.143 
In as much as we do not consider aequitas to be an abstract idea in these 
cases, but as a freely applicable rhetoric device, Cicero's rather liberal handling 
of the concept of aequitas harmonises with the other statements dealing with the 
essence of eloquence.'44 Within the boundaries desingated by legal science— 
which in a given case can mean the facts of the case, determined by the iuris 
consultus—the orator can freely move concentrating his attention on the task 
of the defence, all the more so, as he is not striving for proving the truth, but 
for convincing the audience of the veri simile.l43 (To illustrate this, Cicero tells 
the following example. A simple man from the country wanted to ask P. Crassus 
iuris consultus for advice, but the jurist sent him away, as he thought that he 
could do nothing for him. However, Servius Galba, the rhetor, presented him 
so many examples, parallels, arguments interlarded with humor, based on 
aequitas, and not on ius, in support of the rusticus, that the jurist—still not 
sharing the rhetor's point of view—had to admit that his arguments were so 
probable that they almost sounded like truth.14' ) The freedom of movement of 
the rhetor is considerably greater than that of the jurist, as Gellius puts it, he is 
not closely tied to the truth content of the facts.147 The rhetor had to be able to 
argue for or against the same case, as this technique constituted a substantial 
part of rhetoric studies.148 The difference between legal and rhetorical methods 
was long preserved in Rome, as Quintilian admits in his Institutio oratorio, in 
the chapter in which he emphasises the importance of the rhetor's acquiring 
legal knowledge.144 In the course of time, this difference even became wider, 
143
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when, at the beginning of the Principate, political eloquence faltered, whereas 
eloquence lost its connections with jurisprudence by dealing with fictitious 
examples and solving more and more artificial rhetorical situations.150 
IV. Investigating the use and explanation of the proverbium „summum ius 
summa iniuria" in Erasmus of Rotterdam seems substantiated not so much due 
to the historical and depth of the Erasmian interpretation—as this idea was 
made the object of much more through-going legal theoretical scrutiny by 
numerous humanists e. g. Claudius Cantiuncula, Bonifacius Amerbach or 
Symon Grynaeus (if only due to Erasmus's slighter interest for historical 
study)—, but for the immense influence over the centuries feeding on the 
enormous authority of this excellent humanist.'51 Without entering a more 
meticulous genetic and influence study of Erasmus's Adagia, it can be stated 
that from its first edition in the XVI century until the end of the XVIII century, 
it was used as a widely appeciateed scholary text book, thus it can be safely 
assumed that the „summum ius summa iniuria" paroemia gained considerable 
popularity among humanists, theologians, philosophers, as it is proved by its 
being frequently quoted in the most various context.152 
As Erasmus was taking effort to perfect the Adagia until the end of his life, 
several versions and explanations of this idea are to be encountered in the 
Erasmian corpus. The first edition dating from 1500 mentions the proverb in 
two places,153 first in connection with the Terentian quotation „summum ius 
summa malitia"}*4 later referring to Plato and Cicero under the title of „ad 
vivum summo iure"}** The text appearing in Basel in 1540,156 but dating from 
150
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157 
1536 synthetizes every known occurence of this idea in Latin authors. 
Before enumerating and analysing the loci, trying to avoid the charge that he 
includes sententiae instead of adagia i. e. proverbs Erasmus gives a long 
158 
explanation, finally finding his aquittal in quoting the Terentian nominatim. ' 
Erasmus himself—not being a jurist—dedicated less attention to the legal 
paroemia, except a few explanations referring to Iustitia. Only four years 
before his death, in 1532 Erasmus became interested in juridic regulations and 
asked his friend, Bonifacius Amerbach in a letter to send him some material, 
suitable for the completion of tha Adagia. Then, after having received the two-
page-long collection, he urged his friend to send him some more. It is highly 
probable that this was how the quotations provening from the Roman sources 
found their way into the 1540 edition of the Adagia.159 In Erasmus's inter-
pretation the aequitas often mentioned to highlight the „summum ius summa 
sensum trahens. Additque. Quare sequundum exactam rationem, quando et tu ad vivwn 
resecas, nul I us artifex peccat. Nec huic dissimile il lud apud Ciceronem pro Cecinna (§ 65). 
Nam caeteri, inquit tum ad istam orationem decurrunt, quum se in causa putant habere 
equum et bonum quod defendant, si contra, verbis et Uteris et (ut dici solet) summo iure 
contenditur, soient eiusmodi iniquitanti et boni et aequi nomen dignitatemque opponere. Est 
igitur summo iure contendere, leges ad vivum et nimis severam rationem exigere, und et 
illud: Summum ius summa malicia. 
15(1
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iniuria" paroemia probably did not so much mean equity as legal interpretive 
principle, but rather justice, that should be enforced even against the letter of 
the law."'0 For the explanations Erasmus usually makes appeal to antique 
authors generally with the exact documentation of the sources but at times 
without summarizing their content; the concept of aequitas is most often 
simply used in the sense of aequum et bonum, as the opposite of iniquitas, 
placing the spirit of the law above its letter. One can find the type of the 
Ciceronian pair of concepts in the Aristotelian Etliica Nicomacheci, according 
to which a man can be regarded equitable, if he is satisfied with less, even if 
the law is on his side, and does not stick to his own justice in the detriment of 
others, so equity is none other than a kind of justice.161 It is interesting though, 
that Erasmus does not make reference to Aristotle in the early editions of the 
Adagia. It is only the edition of 1536 and 1540, which permit us to assume that 
probably he had in mind the specific locus from Ethica Nicomacheci. In these 
latter editions reference is made to Cicero's Pro Murena, instead of Pro 
Caecina, naturally, together with the classic formulation of the proverbium, 
which can be read in De officiis. We can suspect Aristotelian influence—rather 
on an ideological level not so much in the concrete wording—in the reference 
to the intention of the legislator opposed to the letter of the law.16" The „ voces ... 
quasi legum cutis est" picture, i. e. the words constitute the skin, the outward 
layer, is presumably Erasmus's own; Erasmus's attention to the two legal 
fragments by—Celsus and Paulus respectively—from the Digesta by Iustinian 
was probably called by Bonifacius Amerbach, but he used these rather as a 
kind of illustration without examining either their historical or dogmatic 
background.163 
Reaching the end of our introspection, we can draw the following conclusions. 
From the maxims of legal logic as means of legal interpretation, in the present 
work we made the proverbium „summum ins summa iniuria" the object of our 
scrutiny, enumerating its occurences in the antique literary sources, namely in 
Terence, Columella then in Cicero. In this last formulation the meaning of the 
proverb became the most clearly crystallized, it signifies the excessive, 
malevolent legal practice in the course of interpretatio iuris, playing the letter 
of the law against its spirit. Following this we tried to trace the different 
meanings, the formation, and developmental stages of the expression inter-
1611
 Büchner: op. cit. 13. sq. 
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pretatio itself, in the course of which interpretatio, combining mutatis 
mutandis the nuances of the religious sphere on the one hand, and those of the 
grammatical field on the other hand, until it reached the semantic content of 
interpretive activity, becoming a determinal factor by the classical age. The 
Celsian „ius est ars boni et aequi" sententia formulates one of the most general, 
all-encompassing basic principles of interpretatio meant to offer protection 
against the too strictly interpreted and applied summum ius. Although jurists 
never clearly defined the concept of aequitas, it became a very important 
means of legal development as a thought emerging from the interaction of 
Jurisprudence and eloquence. By presenting the relevant loci from Erasmus of 
Rotterdam's Adagia as a typical example of the persistence of the paroemia 
„summum ius summa iniuria", we wanted to show the way a proverb becoming 
regula iuris—apart from its direct legal application—became an integral part 
of today's legal common knowledge. 
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The Fragmented Legal Vocabulary of Globalisation1 
Reflections on the book entitled Global Law Without a State 
I. Preliminary observations 
The impact of globalisation has fundamentally changed the regular scientific 
framework of social sciences that developed throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Each of its branches has started an adaptation process related to the 
profoundly transformed circumstances of the global environment. In the 21st 
century any social fact could attain a different meaning from the regular one as 
a consequence of the new global conditions. It was anticipated that legal 
sciences, especially legal theory must integrate into his framework the impact 
of globalisation. Nevertheless this process of integration has started slowly and 
nowadays the science of legal theory has no comprehensive framework to 
interpret the phenomenon of globalisation. 
One of the early attempts to make use of the experiences of globalisation 
in order to enrich the science of legal theory and legal sciences in general, is 
the book entitled "Global Law Without a State." It seems to be a very promising 
volume, and it could prove to be useful to analytically revise its conceptual 
background. This conceptual background probably has suggestions about the 
possible interpretations of the phenomenon of globalisation within the 
framework of legal sciences. Prior to analysing the book in further detail, it 
may be useful to dedicate a few sentences to the phenomenon of globali-
sation. 
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II. Major words of the vocabulary 
A possible way to discover the volume's main theoretical statements could 
be via the presentation of its conceptual background, through the peculiar 
system of a quasi-vocabulary. The 'message' of the whole book takes shape by 
collecting and analysing the most important concepts of its authors. Neverthe-
less, being familiar with this conceptual background does not supplant a 
detailed knowledge of the whole book, it can only give a sketch of the most 
important contours. 
i. Legal pluralism 
The theory of legal pluralism provides for the general theoretical background 
of the authors' works. Therefore it is worth knowing precisely how the authors 
interpret this major stream of legal thinking. In his introductory study Gunther 
Teubner discusses in detail his own concept of legal pluralism." According to 
Teubner the new phenomenon of global law can only be adequately explained 
by the above-mentioned theory, but it is necessary to transform it parallel with 
the new conditions of the profoundly changed global environment.3 Since the 
early years of the 1940s, when the concept of legal pluralism has firstly 
emerged in the work of Llewellyn and Hoebel—in their volume entitled The 
Cheyenne Way—, and has crystallised in the 1950s through the famous 
researches of Pospisil, this theory has focused on the interrelationship between 
the different dimensions of law: the law of the state and the diverse laws of the 
different communities. Teubner argues that in order to make the theory of legal 
pluralism eligible to the explanation of the new global legal phenomena, it is 
necessary to reformulate its core concepts by shifting the focus from diverse 
groups and communities to different discourses and communicative networks.4 
By shifting the scope of legal pluralism from the communities to the 
communicative processes the theory is ready to adequately explain the 
phenomenon of global law, because it is more able to incorporate into its 
general background the most of the new and thus revolutionary legal 
phenomena. Teubner also reminds the readers that the main distinctive feature 
2
 Teubner, G.: Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In: Global 
Law Without a State (ed.: Teubner, G.). Aldershot—Brookfield USA—Singapore— 
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(distinction directrice) of the legal phenomena is the use of the binary code: 
legal/illegal.7 
With the elaboration of this new form of legal pluralism Teubner has 
created a comprehensible framework, which seems to be eligible—even from a 
narrow theoretical point of view—to the detailed research of the new global 
legal phenomena. Therefore it is easy to understand Jean-Philippe Robé's 
statement that the theory of legal pluralism is the key concept of a post-modern 
understanding of law.'1 
ii. Global law 
As a starting point of his discussion of the nature of global law, Teubner uses 
the concept of 'living law' coined by Ehrilch. Quoting a statement of Ehrlich,7  
the author declares global law a sui generis legal order, which has its own 
characteristic and therefore "should not be measured against the standards of 
national legal systems." He claims that global law does not have any 
structural deficiencies compared with national laws, its special characteristics 
distinguish it from the 'normal' law of nation states. The most characteristic 
feature of the global legal regime is its lack of any form of political and 
institutional support and its strong connection with socio-economic processes." 
So it is a depoliticised body of rules, however, this depoliticisation does not 
inevitably mean that the emerging global law is value-neutral, as, for instance, 
some activities of MNEs proved it."' 
How can the origin of this new legal phenomenon be determined? In his 
chapter Teubner rejects the 'traditional' political and institutional theories of 
law-making, those processes, within which the nation state plays a prominent 
role." After rejecting the 'traditional' concepts of legal thinking, the author 
5
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6
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follows the above-mentioned theory of Ehrilch concerning the autonomous 
law-making of society. Since globalisation is reality, it has a uniquely 
distinctive feature: parallel with the globalisation of economic processes the 
emergence of a countervailing world society under the leadership of interstate 
politics is missing, therefore, it is a highly contradictory and fragmented 
process.12 As a result of this lack of 'world politics' "global law will grow 
mainly from the social peripheries not from the political centres of nation 
states and international institutions."13 Thus, global law does not have any 
contact with the traditional political institutions of law-making, it is growing 
out from diverse and fragmented social institutions that are actually closely 
coupled with the specialised—mainly economic—dimensions of globalisation. 
Teubner indicates that the lack of a global political system and some global 
legal institutions may cause problems in the establishment of a global legal 
discourse. The lack of global politics shall be a serious problem because it is 
very difficult to imagine a global symbol of validity that is neither rooted in 
national laws, nor has any political support on global level.14 At this point 
Teubner establishes a unique concept to solve this theoretic problem that can 
be termed a paradox as well. He claims that through the "deparadoxification" 
of the phenomenon of the so called 'self validating contract' (contrat sans loi) 
it is possible to explain how global law, that is primarily contract based, 
creates its own non-contractual foundations for itself. Via impressive 
argumentations, using the example of a special sort of commercial contracts, 
the so-called "closed circuit arbitration" contracts, Teubner solves this paradox 
through transforming the vicious circle of contractual self-validation into a 
virtuous cycle of two legal processes: contracting and arbitration.'5 With this 
"deparadoxification" Teubner proves that it is largely possible to make law 
without the intervention of the state into the law-making process. From this 
point on, a private legal order, that has global validity, is not longer un-
thinkable, for instance, the law of multinationals or lex mercatoria, both of 
which shall be discussed later. 
Finally, the author collects four important features of the emerging legal 
phenomenon: (i.) the boundaries of this sort of a legal phenomenon are deter-
mined by 'invisible social networks' or 'invisible professional communities,' 
therefore they transcend territorial boundaries, (ii.) "global law is produced in 
'" Teubner: op. cit. 5. 
13
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14
 Teubner: op. cit. 15. 
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self-organized processes of 'structural coupling' of law with ongoing globalised 
processes of a highly specialized and technical nature,""1 (iii.) global law is not 
as insulated from the on-going socio-economic processes than 'normal' national 
law, it is closely dependent on them, (iv.) it is necessary to preserve the variety 
of legal sources of the globally unified law, because a total unity of global law 
would become a real threat to legal culture.17 
iii. Lex mercatoria 
We can define lex mercatoria as a body of transnational law serving for the 
special purposes of world-wide economic transactions. Teubner argues that lex 
mercatoria is the most successful example of global law,ls he indicates that 
this legal phenomenon incorporates all the characteristics that would be able to 
surpass—and to refute partly—the nation state based 'traditional' theories of 
law-making. Lex mercatoria is a paradigmatic case, and the experiences 
arising from it shall be important for all other emerging field of global law, 
therefore it is worth going into the details of this unique legal phenomenon.19 
The author expounds briefly the history of the "thirty years" war over the 
independence of global lex mercatoria and emphasises that the traditional 
schools of legal thought dominated by the overestimated role of the nation 
state—represented mainly by French and American scholars—were incapable 
of properly explaining the fundamental questions of global lex mercatoria. In 
order to give a proper explanation, it is necessary to break the taboo of the 
necessary connection of law and state. The phenomenon of lex mercatoria 
breaks down this taboo from two different directions. Firstly, it claims that 
'private orders' can make law valid law, without the control and authorisation 
of the state. Secondly, this means that this body of legal rules—produced 
merely by 'private orders'—is valid outside the nation state and international 
relations also.2" 
At this point Teubner poses a crucial question: does a global "rule of 
recognition" exist for lex mercatorial He claims that it is a law with an under-
developed 'centre' and highly developed 'peripheres', therefore one shall look 
"Teubner: op. cit. 8. 
17
 Teubner: op. cit. 7-8. 
18
 Teubner: op. cit. 3. 
"'Teubner: op. cit. 8. 
20
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328 BALÁZS FEKETE 
for the "rule of recognition" on these 'peripheres'.21 So this legal regime of 
international business can be typified by the asymmetries of a weak institutional 
centre, which depends on strong socio-economic 'peripheries' stamming from 
the special circumstances of its global environment. As in the case of global 
law, Teubner here also tries to outline the main features of the examined legal 
phenomenon. The overriding feature is that Lex mercatoira is structurally 
coupled with economic processes, therefore it is very vulnerable to the interests 
and power pressure of economy. This openness might corrupt the originally 
value-neutral lex mercatoria." Lex mercatoira seems to be an "uncoordinated 
ensemble of many small domains, a patchwork of legal regimes"" as the legal 
system of the Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation. This means that 
commercial arbitration institutions—for instance the Chambre de Commerce 
International—are strong in the production of precedents (episodes), but they 
are inefficient communicatively linking them up with each other in order to 
produce a unified legal doctrine. Thus, the institutional background of lex 
mercatoria seems to be not as efficient and solid as the actors would need it, 
moreover, it is weak from the point of view of the—above mentioned— 
communicative links.24 Lastly, lex mercatoria is a soft law mainly consisting 
of broad principles, not precise rules. Teubner argues that this is not a deficiency 
because it compensates the lack of global enforceability by making it more 
flexible and adaptive to the rapidly changing global circumstances and 
unprecedented cases.25 
iv. Multinational enterprises 
MNEs are the most important players of today's economic world order. Until 
the publication of this volume the communis opinio doctorum regarded them as 
major economic actors from an exclusively economic point of view. It made 
no attempt to develop a comprehensible framework to interpret their legal 
aspects. Therefore the two studies of the book dedicated to the issue can be 
regarded as serious efforts towards the establishment of such a framework, 
which can deal with the legal dimensions of the existence of MNEs. Jean-
"' Teubner: op. cit. 12. 
"" Teubner: op. cit. 19. 
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Philippe Robe"' sets out to analyse the fundamental questions of MNEs, while 
Peter T. Muchlinski27 observes MNEs as transnational law-making bodies. 
The main issue of Robé's work is the nature of multinationals. According 
to his opinion the enterprise is only a socio-economic paradigm, not a legal 
concept, because it does not exist in the positive law of states. The positive 
national legal systems work with different concepts of legal persons (or 
personnes morales) but they never define the enterprise as an explicit legal 
person. Therefore Robé claims that the enterprise is an autonomous legal 
order, which does not need state recognition as a prerequisite to its existence. 
The author describes it as a unitary, closed and unique order that can define 
'norms* for the persons under its jurisdiction and can create coercive means to 
guarantee respect for these 'norms'. Thus with the use of these mandatory 
internal behavioural rules the enterprise constitutes a legal order in the classical 
Werberian meaning.''8 
According to Robé's hypothesis, each MNE constitutes an autonomous legal 
order. The next question is thus given: what is the origin of this constitutive 
power? He argues that this situation is an unambiguous consequence of 
classical liberal principles, that were incorporated into all liberal constitutions. 
The protection of property and the acknowledgement of the freedom of 
contract has produced such a legal framework where enterprises and after them 
MNEs could be born. So the nationalisation of law never resulted in the 
disappearance of legal pluralism in modern nation states.29 Hence, the power of 
MNEs is derived from the classical principles of liberal constitutions, and this 
fact opened the possibility to create autonomous legal orders that are equiva-
lent to that of the states from a legal point of view. The internationalisation of 
these liberal principles facilitated the evolution of a transnational civil society, 
where the major players are the MNEs and—maybe—the states.30 For instance, 
in the US a newly emerging constitutional order is imaginable based on the 
separation of powers between MNEs, states and the federal government.31 This 
26
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 Muchlinski. P. T. 'Global Bukowina' Examined: Viewing the Multinational 
Enterprise as a Transnational Law-making Community. In: Global Law Without a... op. 
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new 'style' of the division of power illustrates how the existence of MNEs can 
transform the realm of traditional legal concepts and theories. 
In the other above-mentioned chapter Muchlinski sets out from a statement 
of Teubner; the new living law of the world can be defined as "the proto law of 
specialized organizational and functional networks which are forming a global, 
but sharply limited, identity."32 Muchlinski claims that some of the operational 
activities of MNEs show such a 'proto law' or 'law like' qualities, therefore it 
is worth examining them in detail. On the one hand the internal system of 
business organisations can be regarded as aspects of an emerging global law 
according to the meaning given by Teubner. If we think about law as 
communicative process based on the distinction of legal/illegal, three major 
groups of MNEs' internal activities can partially fall under this standard. 
According to Muchlinski certain cases within the managerial control, some of 
the contractual relations between the affiliated entities in the whole trans-
national network, and lastly, the adoption of intraenterprise codes of conducts 
as general guidance of behaviour.33 Muchlinksi also indicates that these are not 
solid concepts with precise boundaries, there are many uncertainties in the 
interpretation of them, but some of them can be defined as cases of such a 
'proto law'. If these operational activities demonstrate a considerable degree of 
consistency and generality of practice, these two characteristics can facilitate 
the acknowledgement of their 'proto law' nature. The existence of a binding 
duty shared by not only the directly involved persons can also strengthen the 
'law like' quality of those internal activities.34 On the other hand, MNEs can 
influence the external legal environment, and this activity can be an important 
way to convert their own 'proto law' into 'hard law' status. Henceforth, they 
can affect the generation of whole national and international regimes via 
lobbying activities.33 A result of these influencing activities could be the 
emergence of a global business law that may constitute a new world order with 
newly born legal principles and institutions.36 
3
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v. State 
Although neither chapter of the book specialises on the questions of state 
explicitly, the studies reflect a solid attitude concerning it. Starting from the 
theory of legal pluralism it is unambiguous that the authors want to liberate the 
legal thinking from the dominance of the nation state. Before the emergence of 
global law the centre of gravity of law and politics obviously was in the 
nations state, the authors argue, but by the appearance of the first fragments of 
global law this situation has been seriously challenged. In consequence of the 
prominent role of the internal dynamics and plurality of 'global society,' 
moreover, its highly specialised sub-systems in the evolution of global law the 
traditional political theories of law are not capable any longer of understanding 
the global law, argues Teubner.37 Thus, the emergence of global law could be a 
serious chance to rethink the role of the state in the legal thinking or in legal 
processes. 
Talking of lex mercatoria, Teubner proves in detail that it is possible to 
create law exclusively by 'private orders' and this type of law will be valid 
without the recognition of the state. Mertens supports this approach when he 
claims that the national monopoly of law-making is a simple illusion, because 
the arbitrators can base their decision on the rules of lex mercatoria independent 
38 
of state, without any material obstacles. It can clearly be observed that the 
authors try to establish the foundations of such a legal science where the state 
does not have a prominent role in legal issues, it is no more than an actor in the 
field of law amongst many equally significant actors. In the global or world 
society of the future the cases of autonomous law-making—lex mercatoria, 
internal law of MNEs, and other meanwhile appearing special areas for 
instance the lex sportiva internationalis—could be much more important than 
the 'normal' field of law-making where the dethronised state might be 
involved. Following this line of thought it is easy to imagine that in the affairs 
of the world society of the future the state will not have any serious relevance. 
The growing significance of MNEs as independent legal orders strengthens 
the earlier conclusion. If every MNEs constitutes an independent and unique 
legal order, and these legal entities are diffusing beyond and between national 
borders the exclusivity of state sovereignty will not be maintainable in the long 
run. The proliferation of international organizations as representatives of 
37
 See: Teubner: op. cit. 5-6. 
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partial economic interests—for example: WTO, certain free-trade zones and 
specialised representative bodies—has also altered the traditional 'playground' 
of interstate diplomacy.34 
The main question raised by these well-founded conclusions concerning the 
state is the following: does the fundamental transformation of the modern 
context of statehood, indicated by the emergence of global society and law, 
follow the disappearance of the state as a general social phenomenon? It shall 
not be forgotten that the main characteristic of this developing global regime is 
the lack of any 'traditional' political background at global level, or the lack of 
politicisation, in accordance with Teubner. Is it possible that the dream of 
Engels shall be realised via the gradual emergence of global law and society? 
Nobody can be brave enough to answer this question with full certainty. It is 
only possible to indicate a contribution to the interpretation of this serious 
question. Statehood was never a monolithical concept, its precise outlines have 
changed continuously parallel to the transformation of the social context. The 
Greek idea of polis differs from the medieval concept of regnum and both 
notions differ from the modern concept of the nation state. Therefore, it is 
thinkable that parallel to the emergence of global law and society a new idea of 
the state will appear via the continuous adaptation to the radically changed 
global context, instead of the definitive disintegration of statehood. 
III. Concluding remarks 
The reviewer does not feel to be competent enough—due to his young age and 
relatively "inexperienced" status—to draft an overall evaluation of the above-
observed book. Therefore the reader must be contented only with some special 
remarks. 
The volume reflects the general uncertainty concerning the essence of 
globalisation within social sciences. With respect to the majority of the 
observed problems the authors did not intend to formulate as exact or definite 
statements as the greatest classicals of legal and political science—for example 
Kelsen or Duverger—have done it. But this lack of certainty—if we think 
about it more thoroughly—is not necessarily a serious deficiency. Moreover, it 
could be even considered a merit of the book. Through the indication of the 
terminological, interpretative or other-like difficulties the authors suggest the 
necessity of self-restriction in scientific attitude. In the age of globalisation the 
Robe: op. cit. 4 6 - 4 7 . 
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belief in omniscience is not more than a mere—and a little bit ridiculous— 
illusion. In our age, when the availability of information is much more rich 
than ever before, the possibility of erring or at least the fact of uncertainty has 
to be accepted. 
The editor and the authors have a consistent conceptual and philosophical 
background. They primarily applied the concepts and philosophical ideas of 
Luhman, Habermas, Foucault and Teubner. To sum up, the editorial concept of 
this volume is based partly on the post-modern results of social sciences and 
incorporates the political presuppositions of modern liberalism. This alloy of 
post-modernity and modern liberalism formulates a solid and sure conceptual 
background and ensures the unity of the authors' attitudes. Furthermore, it 
proves to be truly practical because the book can represent a unified attitude 
with solid common points contrary to many other articles or books. Solely one 
question remains in this respect: stamming from differing streams of thinking, 
take conservative ideas or the doctrine of Marxism for instance, would it is 
possible to arrive—at least in the major points—at similar conclusions? 
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It was the spring of 2004 when the book entitled A másért való felelősség a 
római jogban by Professor András Földi was published in Budapest. The 
author is full professor at the Department of Roman law of the Eötvös Loránd 
University (Budapest). The present book is András Földi's dissertation for the 
so-called academic doctorate. The dissertation had been submitted to the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2000, and it was the year 2002 when the 
title of academic doctorate was obtained by András Földi. Nevertheless the 
present book has been revised in many aspects since then, as the author took 
into consideration the legal literature, which has been published since 2000. 
The beginnings of this research however were initiated as many as twenty 
years ago. András Földi has been researching this question since then, never-
theless he has been dealing with other important problems of Roman law in the 
past twenty years, as well. He wrote his dissertation for obtaining the degree 
"candidate of sciences" on questions of commercial institutions in Roman law, 
his monograph on this topic came out in 1997.' He published a book on the 
principle of good faith (bona fides) in 2001." He is the co-author with Professor 
Gábor Hamza of the textbook of Roman law, which was published in the ninth, 
revised and enlarged edition in 2004.3 Professor Földi published several 
articles of other questions of Roman law and contemporary civil law, too. 
Regarding the present book first of all we have to underline the extremely 
wide range of legal literature, which is worked up in the monograph. The 
author has taken into consideration many important works on general—also 
1
 A. Földi: Kereskedelmi jogintézmények a római jogban. (Commercial Institutions in 
Roman Law.) Budapest, 1997. that András Földi obtained the candidate's degree in 1990. 
- A. Földi: A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve. Intézménytörténeti vázlat a római jogtól 
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Principle from Roman Law up until the Present.) Budapest, 2001. 
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philosophical—problems of liability for the other person's deed in Roman law 
and in modern civil law in several languages (German, Italian, English, French, 
Spanish and Hungarian). As a matter of course, the author also presents the 
sources of Roman Law in Latin also providing analysis based on the text of the 
sources. We have to state that Földi has accomplished a really thorough 
research on this topic. This circumstance gives the possibility for the inquiring 
reader to find important works on liability for other person's deed and on 
liability in general in the bibliography of the book. The properly edited index 
and bibliography is very helpful for further inquiries. 
Surprising as it may seem the title of the book—without reading the 
subtitle—can be a little bit misleading. The book does not study merely the 
Roman law but contains important analysis on comparative civil law and 
theory of law, as well. 
The monograph is divided into four chapters, and each of them has several 
subdivisions. The first chapter is devoted to the theoretical problems of the 
notions of liability, legal liability and liability for other person. The second 
chapter deals with the delictual liability for other person's deed in Roman law. 
The third chapter analyzes the question of contractual liability for other person's 
conduct in Roman law. The fourth chapter gives a comparative presentation on 
vicarious liability in some modern civil codes with special emphasis on the 
survival of Roman law. 
I reckon that the structure of the book is very logical and makes the whole 
work an easy-to-read one. The first part creates a good theoretical estab-
lishment for the entire problem showing many dogmatic difficulties. The 
second and the third chapters can be regarded as the core of the work being a 
dissertation on Roman law. The last chapter can be considered as a proper 
proof for the inevitable relationship between modern law and Roman law. 
Thus, reading the last chapter the reader can be impressed by the significance 
of Roman law for the comprehensive study of the present-day civil law. 
At the beginning of the first chapter Professor Földi presents a definition of 
vicarious liability. According to him one can speak about vicarious liability 
when somebody has to compensate the damage, which was caused by a third 
person illegally and—at least presumably—culpably because of the sole cir-
cumstance that this person does have a contractual or other legal relationship with 
the person causing the damage. 
The author makes it clear that the vicarious liability is a relatively 
independent part of the civil law liability. Földi refers to several terms of this 
liability: Dritthaftung, Haftung für Dritte, Haftung für andere, Haftung für 
fremde Schuld, Verantwortlichkeit für fremdes Verschulden in German, 
BOOK REVIEW 337 
responsabilité du (or pour) fait d'autrui in French, responsabilità per fatto 
altrui in Italian and vicarious liability in English.4 The author presents also the 
differences of the meanings of the various terms. 
Földi takes the standpoint that the dogmatic essence of the liability for 
other person is the legal relationship between the person compensating and the 
one causing the damage. Nevertheless this relationship—which nolente-volente 
creates the liability—may have various forms. 
After drafting the history of researches of Roman law on the field of 
vicarious liability the author provides an analysis of the question of legal 
liability. Földi reveals that—according to the researches of Zucker—the first 
appearance of the idea of liability can be found in Persians, which is a tragedy 
of Aischylos, in which the term wte'uG'uvoç is used in the sense 'responsible'. 
This term is also used by several Greek writers (e.g. Demosthenes) for the 
liability of the leaders of the polis. 
After introducing the most important terms for liability in Roman law, the 
author analyzes the evolution of the modern notion of liability (responsibility) 
from the Middle Ages to the emergence of the corresponding terms (respon-
sibility, responsabilité, responsabilità) in the English, French and Italian 
languages in the second half of the 18lh century. French responsabilité and 
German Verantwortlichkeit. Földi states that it was the French term that had an 
important role in the formation of the modern notion of responsibility. 
The author describes several modern Hungarian and foreign liability-
conceptions. The author presents a good summary of the newest Hungarian 
literature of this field: he is also familiar with the recent foreign ideas, as well. 
One should especially underline the theory of HART concerning the meaning of 
responsibility, which is also discussed by the author.5 
Földi pays special attention to the modern Hungarian term of culpability 
(felróhatóság), which was newly interpreted by Gyula Eörsi in the Hungarian 
literature.6 Accepting more or less Eörsi's conception Földi thinks that the 
4
 Concerning vicarious liability András Földi refers to the deep roots of this term in 
the English Common Law referring to the fact that the vicarious liability is recognized by 
the law of contracts on the basis of the principal and agent and by the law of torts in the 
relationship of master and servant. 
5
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Hungarian technical term introduced by Eörsi is problematical as it can 
terminologically seem a subjective standard. 
I think that the first chapter of Professor Földi's book can be also 
considered as an independent part from the rest of the book. As a precise and 
well-founded study this chapter can be used as a proper guide for those who 
would like to conduct further researches on the field of the notion of liability. 
Hence, this chapter can be very useful not only for researchers of Roman law 
or civil law but also for jurists, dealing with legal theory and legal philosophy, 
as well. 
The second chapter of the book discusses vicarious liability on the field of 
delictal liability in Roman law. In this section of the book describes two levels 
of vicarious liability are distinguished, namely the noxal liability as a general 
form of delictal liability for others and with some special forms of the delictal 
vicarious liability. 
It is absolutely beyond any doubts that the noxal liability is a typical 
example for the delictual liability for other person. In the literature of Roman 
law there are even opinions, which state that the clearest forms of the vicarious 
liability is the noxal liability. For example, Thomas writes the following in his 
English textbook of Roman law: " In Roman law, however, the truest instances 
of vicarious liability were these of noxal liability for the acts of members of the 
family and of liability for animals."1 
The author analyzes the so-called principle '/гола caput sequitur' and 
mentions that the possible translation of this rule is quite problematical. 
András Földi refers among others to a text of Festus, in which the Latin noxa 
did even have the meaning of damage. The author also takes into consideration 
the dogmatic problem whether noxae deditio could be interpreted as facultas 
alternativa. In another context the author underlines that according to the 
sources of Roman law in case of concurrence between the noxal liability and 
the quasi-delictal liability, one has to apply the rules of the noxal liability. As a 
consequence of it this institution seems to be stronger concerning the vicarious 
liability. The author also emphasizes the theoretical problem of the culpability 
of the dominus who should be considered finally liable for the deed of the 
alieni iuris. 
It is very interesting and original that Földi points out the economic arguments 
for noxae deditio, too. He explains arguments why it had been simply more 
economical to compensate the damages by noxae deditio than to pay for 
compensation. The author also emphasizes the theoretical problem of the 
7
 See: Thomas, J. A. C.: Textbook of Roman Law. Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, 
1976. 384. 
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culpability of the dominus who should be considered finally liable for the deed 
of the alieni iuris. 
Földi presents a detailed discussion on the special forms of vicarious 
liability. From this I would like to underline the so called edictum de deiectis 
et effusis. According to this edictum—which is thoroughly analyzed by the 
author—the owner of a house (or apartment) was held liable for the damages 
caused by things, which had been thrown out or had been poured out from the 
window. The author describes the cultural and historical background of this 
institution, quoting Roman poets and other non legal sources, as well. The 
reader may learn that in Rome from the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. 
higher and higher buildings had been built, and at the same time the public 
services, public utilities (e.g. channels) did not follow this development. This 
could result that there were many cases, when the garbage, etc. had been 
thrown out from the window. 
The author introduces the edictum de posito et suspenso, which regulated 
the liability for things suspended and placed to certain parts of the building. He 
mentions that only some certain parts of the building—the so-called suggrunda 
or protection—fell into the scope of this edictum. The aim of this regulation 
can be reasoned with the architectural characteristics of Rome, i.e. that there 
were certain buildings with projections almost connecting the two buildings 
and almost hiding the sky. András Földi mentions that one can find even today 
examples for these particularities in Italian towns. The author analyses 
thoroughly the complicated and discussed problems of passive legitimation 
regarding both edicts. 
I guess that these explanations of the book give a special atmosphere to the 
whole work by proving the close relationship between the everyday of the 
Roman citizen and Roman law. It helps the reader to understand the value and 
the role of Roman law in the Roman society, as well. 
The author also pays attention to the liability of the slaves of the publicani, 
who were in charge of collecting the public taxes after leasing them from the 
state. As we can see the publicani can be regarded as predecessors of the 
modern factoring-companies, which deal with buying claims from creditors 
with the intention of enforcing them against the debtors. According to Wicke 
the liability of the publicanus for his apprentice is a functionally limited 
liability (funktionelle begrenzte Gehilfenhaftung). 
8
 It is worthy mentioning that Antonio Guarino even detects the antecedents of the 
modern leasing-transactions in Roman law. See esp.: Guarino, A.: II «leasing» del 
gladiatori. Index 13 (1985). 
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Földi discusses the liability of the sailors and landlords for their employees. 
In this respect we have to refer to Professor Földi's monograph, in which he— 
inter alia—deeply analyzes also the structure of the so-called reception 
nautarum cauponum stabulariorum? 
It is a crucial question of Roman law how one can find the common 
characteristics of the quasi-delicta. According to Földi it is just the vicarious 
liability, which should be considered as a common denominator of the quasi-
delicta. According to his original but hardly provable hypothesis the liability 
of iudex qui litem suam fecit w a s substituted in the postclassical age for the 
liability of publicani in the list of the four quasi-delicts. 
In chapter three the author deals with the question of vicarious liability in 
the field of the bonae fidei contractus. In this chapter the author touches upon 
the real and consensual contracts except the mutuum, providing and analyzing 
the relevant sources. Among the real contracts he pays special attention to 
commodatum. In the case of commodatum it was very often the slave of the 
contracting party who committed a theft, which resulted in the vicarious 
liability. Analyzing the sources Földi draws the conclusion that the classical 
Roman law recognized the principle that the debtor should be considered liable 
for his assistant as for his own conduct. It means that if the assistant's culpa 
can be detected there is no need for the culpa in eligendo of the debtor. 
As for the consensual contracts. Földi deals first with the famous case on a 
sale of a house.10 According to the law-case the sold house was burned down 
because of the misconduct of the slaves of the seller. The final consequence of 
the legal scholar Alfenus is that the seller cannot be held liable for this 
damage, if he had conducted such diligence, which can be expected from 
honest and careful people (homines frugi et diligentes). 
Concerning the contractus consensuales it is undoubtedly the locatio 
conductio where the most cases on vicarious liability appeared. One of the 
reasons for that is that locatio conductio—as it is known—included in fact 
many contracts. It is also relevant in this respect that in the locatio conduction 
opens there can be many assistants and other persons working for the 
efficiency of the whole contract. Földi shows out—based on a text of 
Venuleius11—that in case of a building contract the prime contractor is obliged 
to select the workers on a diligent and careful way even if it results in some 
loss of time for him. This is an appearance of the diligentia in eligendo, which 
idea may seem very useful for the modern building contracts, as well. As it is 
4
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known a modern building contract means a wide network of sub-contractors 
where the diligentia in eligendo should serve as an important guideline for the 
main contractor. 
Földi devotes a detailed discussion to the very famous case on transporting 
columns.12 According to this case there was a contract on transporting columns. 
During the transportation one of the columns was broken. The crucial point of 
the case is the legal relationship between the contractor and his assistants. 
Földi refers to several theories of the modern literature, which try to 
reconstruct the original view of Gaius.13 
One should underline that concerning the societas it is rather the inner 
relationship of the parties where the liability for the other person's deed may 
appear. It is a consequence of the particular structure of the societas, as 
societas—in spite of e.g. collegium or corpus—was not recognized as a legal 
entity by Roman law. 
Chapter 4 of Professor Földi's monograph discusses the liability for other 
person's deed in some modern civil codes with special regard to the survival of 
the Roman law traditions. The author deals with the French Code civil, the 
Austrian ABGB, the Swiss ZGB and OR, the German BGB, the Italian Codice 
civile of 1942. Professor Földi also analyzes the vicarious liability in the 
Hungarian private law concerning the regulations of the Draft Hungarian Code 
of 1928 and the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959. 
The author refers to the fact that in France at the time of the ancien régime 
the term of quasi-délits became a synonym for the negligent damage. The 
influence of this can be detected in the French Code civil and in the French 
jurisprudence, as well. The author highlights that French law contains no 
general provision for vicarious liability (responsabilité du fait d'autrui) 
concerning contractual relationships. In French law however there are several 
acts which contain provisions concerning the responsabilité du fait d'autrui in 
contractual relationships. I refer as an example to the Code de l'aviation civile 
of 1967. 
Földi points out that in the Austrian ABGB, in par. 1316 ff. we can see 
perhaps the clearest example of the survival of the quasi-delictal liability in 
Roman law. 
Concerning German law the author describes the origin of par. 831 of 
BGB. This paragraph—which can be found under title Unerlaubte Handlungen 
in BGB—contains the general rule for the vicarious liability in delictal 
12
 Cf. Gai. X. ed. prov. D. 19, 2, 25, 7. 
13
 András Földi also refers to the interpolatioinistic researches and theories of 
Textstufenforschung in connection with this case. 
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relationships. It is par. 278, which provides provisions for vicarious liability on 
the field of contract law. One should take into consideration that this rule did 
have influence on the Swiss Obligationenrecht and on the development of 
Hungarian private law, as well. 
Regarding the Hungarian law Professor Földi sums up the most important 
scientific tendencies concerning vicarious liability. Thus he presents—inter 
alia—the theories of Béni Grosschmid and Géza Marton.14 The author also 
analyzes the provisions of the draft Hungarian Civil Code of 1928, which 
shows the influence the German BGB and the Saxon Civil Code of 1863. He 
also outlines the provisions of the effective Hungarian Civil Code concerning 
vicarious liability.13 
András Földi takes also into consideration that the composition of a new 
Hungarian Civil Code is under process based on the Government-Resolution 
1050/1998. (IV. 24.). Therefore he enumerates those problems with which the 
codificators of the Code have to face regarding vicarious liability. 
I think that Professor András Földi has written an excellent monograph on 
the questions of vicarious liability. The book contains very important 
information not only to Romanists and legal historians but also to jurists in 
general and even to historians dealing with ancient Roman history. As I have 
mentioned the first chapter of the book is very interesting for researchers of 
theory of law. At the same time this work is also very significant for lawyers, 
dealing with comparative law, civil law, law of the torts. 
I have high hopes that I could give a brief summary of this book, 
which can under no circumstances substitute the reading of the whole 
monograph. Nevertheless it would be the most desirable if an English, a 
German or a French translation of the book could appear in the close 
future to make the entire work available for the non-Hungarian readers, 
as well. 
Adám Boóc 
14
 In this aspect see especially: Marton, G.: A polgári jogi felelősség (The Civil Law 
Liability), (red. Zlinszky, J.). Budapest, 1992. 
15
 A very important Hungarian monograph ont he contractual vicarious liability is due 
to Harmathy, A. Cf.: Harmathy, A.: Felelősség a közreműködőért (Liability for the 
Assistant). Budapest, 1974. 
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